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Interstate Banking Developments in Florida: Pushing
Through Legal Barriers and Toward a Level Playing
Field
Scott W. Dunlap*
I. Introduction
The Florida banking market is one of the most coveted in the
country.1 The Sunshine State is one of the fastest growing states in the
nation,2 and this growth provides increased deposits in the State's'
banks. As long as this growth continues, new businesses which need
funds to begin operations will be attracted to Florida. In short, the in-
flux of people and businesses into the state insure that Florida will re-
main a deposit-rich state, requiring large amounts of capital to fund its
continued growth. Because banks depend on both obtaining deposits
and making loans for their existence, the Florida banking market is
quite attractive.
Until recently, Florida excluded out-of-state banks and bank hold-
ing companies3 from its retail banking market.4 This did not mean that
* B.S., University of North Carolina; J.D., University of Florida. Associate; Abel,
Band, Brown, Russell and Collier, Sarasota, Florida.
1. Brown, Interstate Banking and a Report from the Test Side, 98 BANKING
L.J. 615, 640 (1981).
2. From the previous census count, April 1, 1980, to July 1, 1982, Florida's pop-
ulation is estimated to have climbed from approximately 9,746,000 to 10,416,000, for a
percentage change of 6.9. These increases, when compared to the other states, rank
Florida third in population increase and fourth in percentage increase. UNITED STATES
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS 1983 FLORIDA STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 4 (F. Terhune ed.).
3. A bank holding company is presently defined as "any company which has con-
trol over any bank or over any company that is or becomes a bank holding company by
virtue of this Act." 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (1983). Control is characterized by direct or
indirect control or twenty-five percent or more of any class of voting securities of the
bank or company, or controlling the election of a majority of directors or trustees.
4. Section 3(d) of the Bank Holding Company Act, commonly referred to as the
Douglas Amendment, prohibits interstate banking unless the state chooses otherwise.
12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1983). Section 658.29 of the Florida statutes buttresses this fed-
eral prohibition. FLA. STAT. § 658.29 (1983).
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such companies were prohibited from providing other financial ser-
vices.5 Out-of-state companies have employed trust companies, invest-
ment advisory offices, loan production offices, EPT facilities, and other
methods to establish their physical presence in Florida and other
states.6 Financial giants such as Citicorp and Chemical Bank, two New
York based banks, continue to expand their Florida financial opera-
tions. 7 By expanding their Florida wholesale operations, these two
banks, and many other out-of-state banks alike, hope to have estab-
lished a foothold in Florida when national interstate banking is
allowed.8
Two recent developments, however, have opened the Florida retail
banking market for a select group of banks. North Carolina National
Bank Corporation (NCNB), the largest bank holding company in the
Southeast, 9 aggressively entered the Florida banking market in 1981.10
5. Financial Services Industry-Oversight: Hearings Before the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, Part II, 98th Cong., Ist
Sess. 411 (1983) (statement of William F. Baxter, Assistant Attorney General, Anti-
trust Division, Department of Justice) [hereinafter cited as Industry Hearings 11]. Mc-
Fadden and Douglas prevent banks from providing full service retail banks outside of
their home states. They have not prevented banks from providing a wide variety of
banking or related financial services on an interstate basis. Id.
6. Id. The Florida financial market has also been penetrated in recent times by
out-of-state bank holding companies. In Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447
U.S. 27 (1980), the Supreme Court struck down a Florida statute that prohibited out-
of-state companies from establishing trust companies or investment advisory services in
Florida. Id. at 53.
7. Tampa Tribune, Sept. 21, 1983, at 6B, col. 1. Citicorp, Inc., the large New
York based banking organization, has established Person-to-Person in Florida, its
Southeast regional headquarters for its consumer lending service. Citicorp also bases
Citicorp Acceptance Corp. and Citicorp Real Estate Investments in Florida, and plans
to relocate its international travelers check processing operation to Tampa. Chemical
Bank of New York owns about 25 percent of Florida National Banks of Florida, Inc.,
in Jacksonville, of which only 4.9 percent is common stock. Id. See also Craddock,
Here Comes Citicorp's Lean, Meran Team, FLA. TREND, May 1984, at 55 (Citicorp's
aggressive strategy in the Florida financial markets).
8. See Financial Services Industry-Oversight: Hearings Before the Committee
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, Part 11, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. 105 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Industry Hearings 1].
9. At year's end 1983, NCNB had total assets of approximately $12.81 billion
dollars and total deposits in excess of $8.81 million dollars. NCNB 1983 Annual Re-
port 1 (1984).
10. AM. BANKER, June 19, 1981, at 23. Chairman Thomas Storrs warned that
banks must take advantage of every opportunity to broaden their market and fit their
products to their customers' needs, or they will find themselves in a bad way in the next
[Vol. 9
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NCNB capitalized upon a "grandfather" clause contained in a Florida
statute" that was interpreted as an authorization for NCNB to acquire
commercial banks in Florida. 2 Since NCNB's initial acquisition, the
company has acquired many other banks, the most recent being one of
Florida's largest holding companies. 3
The second development is the Florida legislature's passage of the
"Regional Reciprocal Banking Act of 1984."' 4 This new law authorizes
bank holding companies in other southeastern states'> that pass similar
reciprocal legislation to acquire or merge with Florida banks or bank
holding companies. When the law takes effect,' 6 regional bank holding
companies will eagerly enter the Florida market.17
Both of these changes illustrate problems that arise when Board or
State action is taken that allows conditional, or limited, interstate
banking. After outlining the regulatory background of geographic bank
restrictions, this article will first examine the interpretive issues created
by Florida's grandfather statute and then analyze the equal protection
issues emanating from the State's new regional banking law. The
problems underlying these legal issues will also be noted. Finally, this
article will explain that while limited interstate banking will be allowed
for the present, and the underlying problems will be ignored, nation-
wide interstate banking is the inevitable level playing field.
ten years. Id.
11. FLA. STAT. § 658.29(3)(d) (1983). Generally, a grandfather clause is a pro-
vision in a new law or regulation exempting those already in, or part of, the existing
system which is being regulated, or an exception to a restriction that allows all those
already doing something to continue doing it even if they would be stopped by the new
regulation. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 629 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
12. NCNB, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 54 (1982).
13. The Board approved NCNB's application to acquire Ellis Banking Corpora-
tion of Bradenton in NCNB, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 225 (1984).
14. 1984 Fla. Laws 42 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 658.295).
15. The states in the "region" are Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisi-
ana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia,
West Virginia, and the District of Columbia. Id. § 1.
16. The Act takes effect on July 1, 1985, or the date on which regional states
having twenty percent or more of the total regional banks deposits, excluding Florida,
have enacted and have in effect reciprocal statutes, whichever occurs sooner. Id.
17. Sun Banks and Trust Company of Georgia have announced a merger effec-
tive July 1, 1985. The banks will be run independently at first, but plans call for the
merged holding company to be based in Atlanta. Other likely combinations are First
Atlanta and Southeast, and Citizens and Southern Georgia. Talks and Predictions,
FLA. TREND, Aug. 1984, at 24.
1984]
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II. Regulatory Background
A fear of too few banks having too much power permeates Ameri-
can banking regulation.' Geographic limitations on bank operations
and expansions reflect this concern. Such limitations on bank holding
companies 9 were specifically addressed in the Bank Holding Company
Act of 1956.0 Section 3(d) of the Act, commonly referred to as the
Douglas Amendment, prohibits Federal Reserve Board approval of an
application for an interstate bank acquisition unless the acquisition of
such shares of a state bank by an out-of-state bank holding company is
specifically authorized by the state in which such a bank is located. The
authorization cannot be implicit."' This exemption recognizes the his-
torically weighty state interest in whether or not to allow local banks to
be controlled by out-of-state bank holding companies.22 Expansion
across state lines is permitted only if the host state expressly agrees by
statute.
The Florida legislature, in 1972, supplemented the Douglas
Amendment prohibitions by enacting section 649.141 of the Florida
Statutes. This legislation provided that no out-of-state bank holding
company, bank, or trust company shall acquire, retain, or own the con-
trol over any Florida bank or trust company.2" The legislature made
several exceptions to this prohibition. In particular, subsection (3) ex-
cepts from the statute's restrictions any bank, trust company, or bank
holding company, the operations of which are principally conducted
outside this state, which, on December 20, 1972, owned all the assets of
or control over a bank or trust company located within and doing busi-
ness within this state. 4 NCNB based its effort to enter the Florida
banking market on the effect and scope of this subsection.
18. See Haywood, Trade Groups Choose Sides, ECON. REV., May 1983, at 66,
66 (the three specific goals of banking regulation are: to insure market stability, to
prevent undue concentration of market power, and to guard against unfair dealing).
19. See supra note 3.
20. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50 (1983).
21. See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1983).
22. Lewis, 447 U.S. at 38. The Court accepted the submission that as a matter
of history and as a matter of present commercial reality, banking is a profound local
concern.
23. FLA. STAT. § 659.141 (1972) (renumbered § 658.29 during the 1980 revision
of the Florida Banking Code).
24. FLA. STAT. § 658.29 (3)(d) (1983).
[Vol. 9
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III. Board Action and Interpretive Issues
NCNB applied to purchase the First National Bank of Lake City,
Florida, on June 24, 1981.25 The Federal Reserve Board first consid-
ered the legality of the proposed acquisition under state and federal law
before the proposal was evaluated based on the statutory factors con-
tained in section 3(c) of the Bank Holding Company Act.26 Because
the Board received comments questioning NCNB's authority under
section 658.29 and under the Douglas Amendment to acquire First Na-
tional Bank of Lake City, the proper interpretation of section 658.29
was put at issue.17 In approving NCNB's application, the Board inter-
preted section 658.29 to specifically authorize NCNB's acquisition of
Florida banks.2" The history and purpose of section 658.29 provides a
starting point for evaluating this administrative decision.
A. Legislative History of Section 658.29
The Florida financial market remained relatively free from out-of-
state holding companies until 1971. As the desirability of the Florida
market increased, ways to avoid the Douglas Amendment's prohibition
surfaced. Northern Trust Company, an Illinois-based bank holding
company, acquired Security Trust Company of Miami.29 Because inter-
state acquisitions of trust companies are not prohibited by the Douglas
Amendment, this acquisition was lawful.30
The legislature responded in 1972 by enacting section 659.141 of
25. AM. BANKER, June 26, 1981, at 3. The application was delivered to the Fifth
District Federal Reserve Bank in Richmond, where the validity was to be checked. The
application would then be sent to Washington for a judgment on the merits by the
Board.
26. NCNB, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. at 54. Under Whitney National Bank in Jefferson
Parish v. Bank of New Orleans and Trust Company, 379 U.S. 411 (1965), the Board
cannot approve an application if approval would be prohibited by a valid state law. Id.
at 54 n.l.
27. In fact, the original idea for, and basic outline of, the following argument
comes from the comments received from the Florida Bankers Association, State Ex-
change Bank and Columbia County Bank. See Comments of Florida Bankers Associa-
tion, The State Exchange Bank, NCNB, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 54 (1982).
28. NCNB, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. at 59.
29. See Nortrust Corp., 58 Fed. Res. Bull. 67 (1972).
30. See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1983). The Douglas Amendment only prohibited
the acquisitions of banks, and Florida has no further prohibitions at this time.
1984]
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the Florida Statutes.3' This statute prohibited out-of-state banking or-
ganizations from owning or acquiring Florida trust companies or in-
vestment advisory businesses providing such services to banks or trust
companies. 32 This legislation attempted to close a loophole in federal
banking law33 and keep large, out-of-state banks from entering the lu-
crative trust business.34 For equitable35 and legal reasons,3 6 "grandfa-
ther" exemptions were added to the new law. In this manner Nortrust
was grandfathered in by virtue of its ownership of Security Trust, and
NCNB was grandfathered in because of its pending application to buy
the Northern Trust Company of Florida.
An increase in pressure on the Florida financial market opened up
loopholes in the newly enacted section 659.141. The Royal Trust Com-
pany, a Canadian bank holding company, sought and received the
Board's approval to acquire Inter National Bank of Miami.37 The
Douglas Amendment was inapplicable because Royal Trust was neither
a bank nor a bank holding company under the Bank Holding Company
31. FLA. STAT. § 659.141 (Supp. 1971).
32. Id.
33. Hearings on H.B. 3784 Held Before the House Business Regulation Com-
mittee 1 (Mar. 2, 1972) (reference to transcriptions of the tapes of the hearings on
Florida House of Representatives Bill 3874, which became Fla. Laws ch. 72-96 (1970)
(codified at FLA. STAT. § 659.141 (1971), and of which original tapes can be found in
the State of Florida Archives) [hereinafter cited as State House Hearings]. Represen-
tative Culbreath, the primary sponsor of the House bill related that the House wanted
to keep the trust business in the State, without having the money siphoned off by out-
of-state trust companies. This prohibition was designed to accomplish that purpose by
closing the gap in federal law. Id.
34. Hearings on S.B. 916 Held Before the Senate Commerce Committee, 2-3
(Mar. 2, 1972) (reference to transcripts of tapes of hearings on Florida Senate Bill
916). [hereinafter cited as State Senate Hearings]. Bruce Culpepper of the Florida
Association of Bank Holding Companies explained that the loopholes in the law were
allowing out-of-state banks to do indirectly what they were prohibited from doing di-
rectly. Id.
35. See Whitehead, Interstate Banking: Taking Inventory, ECON. REV., May
1983, at 4, 5. Because legislatures are usually faced with restricting activities after
innovative organizations have engaged in the activity, in some cases it would be detri-
mental or impossible to require the organization to cease the activity, even though a
general prohibition is desirable. In these cases, the equitable approach is to allow the
innovative organization to continue, but not expand the questioned activity. Id.
36. See State Senate Hearings, supra note 34, at 5. Requiring divesture might
have made the statute illegal.
37. See The Royal Trust Company, 58 Fed. Res. Bull. 665 (1972).
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Act.38 The Board also ruled that the Royal Trust acquisition did not
violate Florida law because "the State's laws did not forbid a foreign
trust company from acquiring control of a national bank operating a
trust department."39
Bankers Trust New York Corporation also sought access to the
Florida financial market. Bankers Trust applied to the Board for ap-
proval to establish an investment advisory business in Florida.40 There
was no violation of federal law because an advisory business is not a
bank, but rather, a permitted related activity under the Bank Holding
Company Act.4 Florida prohibitions were avoided because section
659.141 only forbade out-of-state holding companies from acquiring
such businesses that provide service to Florida banks or trust compa-
nies,42 and Bankers Trust planned to provide investment advice to
individuals.43
Before the approval of the Bankers Trust application, however, the
Florida Legislature amended section 649.141 to further prohibit out-of-
state organizations from acquiring Florida holding companies, banks,
or any type of investment advisory business.44 The definition of "hold-
ing company" was also broadened so that foreign banks could be
stopped from entering the Florida market.4 5 Again, as with the original
enactment of section 659.141, the purpose of the law was to close loop-
holes in the state's ban on out-of-state entry into the Florida banking
industry.46 In addition to noting that the new bill would close the Bank-
ers Trust loophole,47 Representative Hartnett explained during the
38. The term "bank," as defined in section 2 of the Bank Holding Company Act,
does not include banks in foreign countries. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1983).
39. P. HELLER, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL BANK HOLDING COMPANY LAW 15 n.
274 (1976).
40. See Banker's Trust New York Corporation, 59 Fed. Res. Bull. 364 (1973).
41. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1983).
42. See FLA. STAT. § 658.29 (1983).
43. Banker's Trust, 59 Fed. Res. Bull. at 364.
44. See FLA. STAT. § 659.141 (1973) (a version of § 659.141 as amended by Fla.
Laws ch. 72-726 (1972)).
45. Id.
46. Am. BANKER, Dec. 8, 1972, at 2.
47. Proceedings of the House of Representatives Concerning H.B. 25-A, 4 (Nov.
30, 1972) (transcripts of Florida House floor debate concerning eventual amendment to
FLA. STAT. § 659.141, available in State of Florida Archives) [hereinafter cited as
Florida House Debate]. Hartnett observed that the legislators did not foresee the possi-
bility of out-of-state organizations establishing investment advisory services. This
amendment would prevent future entities from entering Florida in the same manner as
1984]
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House debate that the new bill would still prohibit out-of-state financial
institutions from purchasing Florida banking institutions.48
The critical change in section 659.1412 came with the amendment
of the section's exceptions. The legislature added subsection (3)(g) to
provide that the prohibitions and restrictions of the section shall not
apply to any bank, trust, company, or holding company, the operations
of which are principally conducted outside this state, who, upon the
effective date of this act owned all the assets of, or control over, a bank
or trust company located within and doing business within the state.49
The purpose of this subsection, the current subsection (3)(d) of section
658.29, is to prevent the bill from being unconstitutional because of its
retroactive effect on existing contracts."
B. Authorization Under Florida and Federal Law
Substantively, the Board's ruling that Florida law allowed NCNB
to buy a Florida bank may be lacking in several respects. The Board
ruled that since section 658.29 was clear and unambiguous on its face,
legislative intent must be derived from the words. 1 However, there is
case law holding that legislative intent must guide the court and be
given effect, even though that intent may contradict the strict letter of
the statute.52 Whenever possible, the court's construction of a statute
should include the statute's legislative history, the evil to be corrected,
an indication of the intent of the legislature, the nature of the subject
regulated, and the object sought to be obtained.53
The history of section 658.29 reveals that Florida desired to fill in
the gaps of the Douglas Amendment's prohibitions and not to enlarge
did Bankers Trust. Id.
48. Id. at 5-6. Representative Hartnett explained that out-of-state organizations
"cannot now, purchase a banking institution, in the stock exchange or any other form
like that [sic]." Id.
49. See FLA. STAT. § 659.141(3)(g) (1973) (renumbered § 658.29 during the
1980 session).
50. See Florida House Debate, supra note 47, at 8-9.
51. NCNB, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. at 56-57. See also Thayer v. State, 335 So. 2d 815
(Fla. 1976); State v. Egan, 287 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
52. See State v. Webb, 398 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 1981) (legislative intent is the
polestar by which court must be guided, and this intent must be given effect even
though it may contradict strict letter of statute).
53. Utica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Jones, 408 So. 2d 769, 771 (Fla. 2nd Dist.
Ct. App. 1982). See also 2A SOUTHERLAND'S STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 4803 (4th
ed. 1982).
[Vol. 9
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out-of-state banking companies' rights.54 Legislators were forced to let
in Royal Trust because it was already operating in Florida,55 but
wanted to put a stop to such future acquisitions. To accomplish this,
the grandfather clause, or current section 658.29(3)(d), had to parallel
the expanded prohibitions in the main statute. The clear intent was to
allow these organizations to continue to conduct business that was now
unlawful under Florida law. 56 Florida had approved ten previous acqui-
sitions by the two other grandfathered organizations.5"However, each
of these acquisitions involved the same type of Florida organization as
the acquiring institution had owned prior to the grandfather date.58
Nothing in the legislative history evinces an intent to allow the
grandfathered organizations to expand into businesses in which they
were not then engaged.
The other half of the interpretive issue is whether section 658.29
suffices under federal law as a specific authorization for out-of-state
bank holding companies to acquire Florida banks.59 In answering this
question affirmatively, the Board relied on a Court of Appeals interpre-
tation of a similar Iowa statute.60 In that case, the reviewing court
agreed with a Board's ruling which implicitly accepted the sufficiency
of the authorization under the Douglas Amendment of an Iowa stat-
ute." The Iowa statute provided that nothing in the statutes should be
construed to authorize an out-of-state bank holding company to acquire
any interest in any Iowa bank, unless such bank holding company was,
54. See supra notes 31-50 and accompanying text. See also BT Investment Man-
agers, Inc. v. Lewis, 559 F.2d 950, 954 n.13 (5th Cir. 1977) (characterized FLA. STAT.
§ 659.141 as a brazen attempt to stop out-of-state competition).
55. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text. See also AM. BANKER, Dec.
8, 1972, at 2. The bill was an outgrowth of unsuccessful efforts to keep the $1.9 billion-
asset Royal Trust Company of Montreal from acquiring Inter National Bank of
Miami.
56. State Senate Hearings, supra note 34, at 5. Culpepper voiced his concern
that requiring divesture of something already approved is legally questionable. He felt
an amendment grandfathering in the organizations would be an acceptable solution. Id.
57. NCNB, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. at 59.
58. Id. at 56-57 n.10. The Board also noted that nothing in the statute restricts a
grandfathered company's acquisitions to the grandfathered activity. Because the stat-
ute refers to "bank and trust company" in the alternative, the Board concluded that
the grandfathered company can acquire banks and trust companies. Id.
59. See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1983).
60. NCNB, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. at 59.
61. See Iowa Independent Bankers v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, 511 F.2d 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
1984]
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on January 1, 1971, registered with the Federal Reserve Board as a
bank holding company, and on that date owned at least two banks in
the state.62
The Board relied on the fact that the Florida statute was couched
in the same language as the Iowa statute, which is an exception to a
prohibition on interstate banking acquisitions.6 3 But this does not nec-
essarily mean that the Florida statute is a specific authorization. The
Iowa statute states that if certain grandfathering criteria were met,
then the statute specifically authorized that qualifying out-of-state
holding companies could acquire Iowa banks. The legislative history of
the Iowa statute makes this intent to authorize an acquisition clear.61 It
is questionable, indeed unlikely, that section 658.29 can be read the
same way. A logical reading of section 648.29(3)(2) would mean re-
moving NCNB from the section's prohibitions, but leaving no authori-
zation.65 The federal prohibitions would, therefore, still bar NCNB
from acquiring Florida banks.
C. Continuing Problems from Such Board Actions
Although NCNB probably should not have been initially allowed
to expand into the Florida commercial banking market, that expansion
is a fact. 16 However, the NCNB decision, as well as subsequent deci-
sions, illustrates that problems arise from these Board actions. Board
decisions on interstate bank expansion may not always be consistent
with the relevant state policy on interstate banking. In some cases, the
Board may even believe they are constrained by the Act to approve a
proposal that potentially may undermine the Act's policies. 67 In addi-
62. IOWA CODE § 524.1805 (Supp. 1974-1975).
63. NCNB, Fed. Res. Bull. at 59.
64. See Iowa Independent Bankers, 511 F.2d at 1294-95.
65. The Board also relied on the fact that Florida had treated the language in
FLA. STAT. § 658.29 as a specific authorization. NCNB, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. at 59. But
the Board is confusing issues, because this question was not raised by the expansion
within Florida of Nortrust or of Royal Trust. Royal Trust was a foreign bank company
and not subject to the Douglas Amendment. Northern Trust's acquisitions were not
subject to Douglas because Northern acquired trust companies.
66. Laches would bar a suit if there is unreasonable delay in bringing suit, and
prejudice is caused by the delay. Independent Bankers Association of America v. Hei-
mann, 627 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1980). More important, however, is the nature of this
ruling and others like it.
67. See U.S. Trust Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 371, 372 (1984).
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tion to NCNB, U.S. Trust6" illustrates these problems.
U.S. Trust Corporation, a New York bank holding company, ap-
plied for Board approval to add the acceptance of time and demand
deposits and the making of consumer loans to the activities of its Palm
Beach subsidiary, U.S. Trust Company.6 9 This proposal was not pro-
hibited by the Douglas Amendment because the Florida subsidiary
would not be a bank as defined in section 2(c) of the Bank Holding
Company Act. No commercial loans would be made by U.S. Trust
Company." The Board recognized the possibility of abuse of the Act's
policies, 71 but nevertheless approved the application.72 The dissent
stated that approval would have the practical effect of allowing inter-
state banking without the express authorization of the state law. 3
Therefore, the dissent viewed the Board as not being limited by the
technical "bank" definition, but rather as possessing authority to deny
the application by using its broad discretionary powers to prevent eva-
sions of the Act.74
Agreement or disagreement with the NCNB and U.S. Trust rul-
ings is not the end of the problem. Inherent in these Board rulings is
the decision to allow interstate banking for certain bank holding com-
panies. These rulings are not always in accord with state policy and
may threaten the efficacy of the Douglas Amendment.7 5 Additionally,
banks that remain excluded from a state market, as they are from Flor-
ida's will begin to question the legitimacy of this piecemeal approach. 6
68. Id.
69. Id. at 371.
70. Id. at 372.
71. Id. The Board reaffirmed its views that an institution that is chartered as a
bank and accepts transaction accounts from the public should be subject to the Act's
policies.
72. Id. at 373. Approval was subject to three conditions that the Board felt
would ensure U.S. Trust's compliance with § 3(d).
73. Id. at 374 (dissenting statement of Governor Rice).
74. Id.
75. In addition to U.S. Trust, four more bank holding companies have received
permission to operate Florida "no-bank banks," and several hundred such applications
are pending nationwide. Regulators deplore the trend of this de facto interstate bank-
ing, but believe present law provides no hurdles to the developments. State legislators
are beginning to fear that, in this manner, money center banks will have dominance
before a substantial number of regional banks can be established. Magnusson,
Lawmakers Gingerly Circle the Hot Non-Bank Bank Issue, FLA. TREND, July 1984, at
23.
76. Bank of New York (BNY) applied to acquire a Connecticut bank, using
19841
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IV. State Action and the Regional Reciprocal Banking Act
Florida recently chose to expressly allow certain bank holding
companies in the Southeast 77 to enter the Florida banking market. En-
try for the privileged states was provided by the passage of the Re-
gional Reciprocal Banking Act of 1984.78 The Regional Act authorizes
the acquisition or merger of a Florida bank or bank holding company
by or with a bank holding company whose principal place of business is
within the region, but only if the laws of the other state permit the
reciprocal acquisition of banks or bank holding companies in that state
by Florida bank holding companies.7 9 The Regional Act is similar to
the regional legislation previously passed by several New England
states.80 The relevant New England statutes have already been used to
support a few New England interstate transactions,8' and at least one
southeastern merger that will become effective on the Regional Act's
effective date82 has been announced.83
The rationale for the Regional Act is that it will enable banks in
the Southeast to merge and strengthen themselves against takeover at-
tempts by money-center banks when nationwide interstate banking is
Connecticut's enactment of a regional statute as authority. BNY argued that by this
enactment, the Douglas Amendment's prohibitions were lifted, and therefore that all
bank holding companies could now enter Connecticut. The Board rejected this argu-
ment, saying that BNY's position was based almost entirely on a textual analysis of the
Douglas Amendment that, if accepted, would undermine state policies. See Bank of
New York Co., Inc., 70 Fed. Reg. Bull. 527 (1984). But query, why other applications
based on a textual analysis, such as NCNB and U.S. Trust, have succeeded.
77. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
78. 1984 Fla. Laws 42 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 658.295).
79. This Act expressly overrides Florida's prohibition on interstate banking for
the regional status. An "anti-leapfrogging" provision is included that requires divesture
of any Florida bank or bank holding company by any other bank holding company that
ceases to be a regional bank.
80. See 1983 Conn. Acts 411 (Reg. Sess.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 167A, §
2 (West Supp. 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 19-30-1, 19-30-2 (1984).
81. Bank of Boston Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 524 (1984); Bank of New England
Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 374 (1984); Hartford Nat'l Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 353
(1984). A United States Court of Appeals stayed the effectiveness of the Board's Or-
ders in Bank of New England and Hartford, pending the court's decision on constitu-
tional issues raised by Citicorp and other protestants. In view of that decision, the
Board stayed the effectiveness of its Bank of Boston order. Bank of Boston Corp., 70
Fed. Res. Bull. 584 (1984).
82. See supra note 16.
83. See supra note 17.
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inevitably permitted. 84 The effect of the Act, however, is that south-
eastern banks may now compete in Florida to the exclusion of banks in
all of the other states. Constitutional guarantees arise, given the dis-
criminatory nature of such a law.8 The issue is whether these state
laws limiting entry into the states to "regional" bank holding compa-
nies are permissible under the United States Constitution. Although
the issue raises questions under the Commerce Clause 6 and the Com-
pact Clause, 7 this article will test the Regional Act against the Equal
Protection Clause.88
A. The Traditional Test for Economic Regulation
The fourteenth amendment commands that no state shall deny a
person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the law.89 This doc-
trine prohibits a state's unequal treatment of persons, absent adequate
justification.90 Courts have articulated three justification standards: the
two traditional tiers of the rational relation test, the compelling interest
84. See Graham Leads the Interstate Charge, FLA. TREND, Oct. 1983, at 26.
Florida does not view the markets in those states as presenting big banking opportur.i-
ties, but rather, as a chance to promote regional mergers that will strengthen ther
Southeast's banks.
85. The constitutionality of the New England regional reciprocal laws is pres-
ently being litigated. See infra notes 130-36 and accompanying text.
86. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The legal evaluation under the commerce
clause turns on whether the Douglas Amendment allows a state to discriminate against
out-of-state bank holding companies on the basis of their location. One view is that the
Douglas Amendment eliminates any commerce clause problems. See, e.g., Hawke, Are
State Laws Permitting Interstate Banking Constitutional? AM. BANKER, Dec. 15,
1982, at 4, col. I. Another view suggests that the Douglas Amendment cannot support
the right of a state to burden interstate commerce by deciding which states may enter
its territory. See Golembe, Massachusetts and Interstate Banking, 2 BANKING EXPAN-
SION REP., 1, 1 (No. 2 1983).
87. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. A compact clause violation would be found if
the scheme would have a tendency to increase the political power of the states in a way
that would encroach upon federal supremacy. United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate
Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 471 (1978) (quoting Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503,
519 (1983); New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363, 369 (1976). However, Congress
could consent to the legislation.
88. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
89. Id.
90. McCoy, Recent Equal Protection Decisons-Fundamental Right to Travel
or "Newcomers" as a Suspect Class?, 28 VAND. L. REV. 987, 988 (1975). See also
Tussman and tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341
(1949).
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test, and the sliding scale of strictness test.9' The rational relation test
is applied in the area of economic regulation when no fundamental
right or suspect classification is involved.92 The test has been stated to
mean that the statute must reasonably relate to a valid state purpose
and will only be held unconstitutional in violation of the equal protec-
tion clause when the classification results in arbitrarily disparate treat-
ment.93 The Supreme Court took such a deferential approach in City of
New Orleans v. Duke.94 The Court upheld the grandfather clause to a
New Orleans ordinance which excepted from the ordinance's prohibi-
tion against street vendors in the French Quarter those vendors who
had continuously worked in the Quarter for eight years.95 The Court
characterized the ordinance and its grandfather clause as solely an eco-
nomic regulation, and then stated that in this area, the judiciary may
not sit as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legis-
lative policy determinations.96 The Court then applied the rationality
test to the grandfather clause and found that the city's objective was
legitimate,97 and that the city's classification rationally furthered that
objective. 98 Therefore, the ordinance was not a constitutionally imper-
missible denial of equal protection.99
City of New Orleans illustrates the doctrine that courts will give
only cursory scrutiny to purely economic regulations attacked under
91. See San Antonio Indep. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 97-110 (1973) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting). See also The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REv. 41,
115-19 (1974).
92. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
93. In re Estate of Greenberg, 390 So. 2d 40, 42 (Fla. 1980).
94. 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
95. Id. at 304. The two vendors who qualified under the grandfather clause had
operated in the area for over 20 years, rather than eight. Id. at 305. The appellee had
operated in the French Quarter for two years before the ordinance was amended. Id. at
298.
96. Id. at 303. Wide latitude is given states in the regulation of their local econo-
mies under their police powers, and rational distinctions may be made with less than
mathematical exactitude. Id.
97. Id. at 304. The objective of the provision was to "preserve the appearance
and custom valued by the Quarter's residents and attractive to tourists." Id.
98. Id. at 304-05. The Court held that the ends fo the City's means were ra-
tional: banning all vendors who had not become part of the distinctive charm of the
Quarter and who had not built up substantial reliance interests in continued operation.
A step by step approach, such as this, to solving problems will be upheld. Id.
99. Id. at 305. Note, also, that the Court overruled Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457
(1957) because of that case's testing a statute's potential irrationality. Id. at 306.
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the equal protection clause.1"' But a rational relation to a legitimate
governmental object must still exist. Although testing the constitution-
ality of state laws which discriminate in favor of a region is a novel
issue, 1 1 reasoning in other cases is useful to hypothesize how courts
would apply the rational relation test to Florida's Regional Act.
B. Florida's Regional Act
In Iowa Independent Bankers v. Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System,102 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
evaluated an equal protection claim somewhat similar to the instant
issue. Iowa Independent Bankers involved a petition by an association
of over four hundred Iowa banks to set aside a Federal Reserve Board
order approving the acquisition of two Iowa banks by Northwest Ban-
corporation."0 3 The basis of Northwest's acquisition, as well as the law-
suit, was the previously mentioned Iowa statute. 04 This statute prohib-
ited out-of-state holding companies from acquiring Iowa banks unless
such companies had owned, since 1971, at least two Iowa banks.' 05
When the statute was raised and passed in 1972, only Northwest quali-
fied for this exception.' 0 6 No other out-of-state holding company owned
any Iowa banks.'0 7 The Iowa association first objected to the proposed
Northwest acquisition, and upon Board approval appealed, arguing
that the statute violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 10 8 The court rejected the association's argument and found
100. See id. The Court acknowledged, however, that different principles govern
even economic regulations when constitutional provisions such as the commerce clause
are implicated. As to what principles apply, the Court does not say, but it seems an
intermediate standard would be applied because the regulation still falls short of affect-
ing a fundamental right or a suspect class. Id. at 304 n.5.
101. See Bank of New England Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 374, 379 app. (1984).
102. 511 F.2d 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
103. Id. at 1291. Some of the Association's members were new competitors of
Northwest after the Board's ruling.
104. IowA CODE § 524.1805 (Supp. 1974-1975).
105. Id.
106. Iowa Independent Bankers, 511 F.2d at 1292.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1292-94. The legality of the statute, then, was the basic issue. The
Board refused to rule on the constitutionality of the statute under the authority of
Whitney National Bank in Jefferson Parish v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co., 379
U.S. 411 (1965). Whitney allows the Board to consider the applicability and effect of
State legislation, but the constitutional validity of that legislation is presumed. Objec-
19841
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no equal protection violation." 9
The appeals court agreed with Iowa that the state had a legitimate
interest in protecting its banking structure from outside bank holding
companies.11 The question was whether Northwest could be excepted
from the general prohibition of out-of-state bank holding companies
without violating the equal protection clause. The crux of the court's
decision was the finding that the Iowa legislature intended Northwest
be allowed to compete in the Iowa market on the same basis as other
Iowa banks."' This allowance was due to Northwest's pre-existing
stake in the Iowa banking system." 2 As the court noted, the precise
intent of the Iowa legislature was to treat Northwest as a domestic
bank holding company." 3 Thus, the court adopted two classifications:
(1) those bank holding companies with an existing stake in Iowa bank-
ing and (2) those companies with no stake in Iowa banking. Such a
classification was supported by a rational basis, and is the type of
grandfathering that has been repeatedly approved by the Supreme
Court." 4 City of New Orleans also recognized the validity of such rea-
soning when it stated that the city could validly grandfather in vendors
who had become part of the distinctive character and charm that dis-
tinguishes the Vieux Carr6."9
tions to the constitutionality are properly cognizable only by the judiciary. Id. at 1292-
93.
109. Id. The petitioner's initial error, the court said, was the incorrect definition
of the classes created by the statute. That the line drawn by the statute on its face,
between out-of-state banks owning less than two banks and those owning two or more
banks, is without consequence, because of the realities of the Iowa market. Id. at 1295.
110. Id. at 1294; See also American Trust Co., Inc. v. South Carolina State Bd.
of Bank Control, 381 F. Supp. 313, 320 (D.S.C. 1975). See generally 8 MICHIE,
BANKS AND BANKING, ch. 17 (1971).
111. Iowa Bankers, 511 F.2d at 1294.
112. The court recognized that the pre-existing state in the Iowa banking system
was obtained "by virtue of past ownership of in-state banks." Id. (emphasis in
original).
113. Id. The court quotes from a report by the joint legislative committee that
drafted the Iowa banking legislation to pinpoint the legislature's intent. The committee
stated that it was undesirable to leave the state's banking structure open to outside
entry, but that Northwest had demonstrated its good standing in the Iowa community
and should be treated as a domestic bank holding company.
114. Id. at 1295. The court observed that the legislature intended to allow all
pre-existing bank holding companies, whether in or out-of-state, to compete on an
equal basis, while preventing any new out-of-state entries into the Iowa banking mar-
ket. Id. Cf., supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
115. City of New Orleans, 427 U.S. at 305. It is interesting to note that the
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The foregoing rulings sustain the power of the states to be reason-
ably selective in permitting out-of-state bank holding company entry." 6
But using this rationale to support the Regional Act is difficult, if not
impossible. Regional reciprocal legislation, unlike the common custom
of grandfathering, discriminates on a novel basis.Y17 The concept of rec-
iprocify connotes some feeling of fairness, but the relationship between
a state's interest in controlling its banking structure and a state's secur-
ing of reciprocal entry rights is not entirely clear." 8 Reciprocity, as a
basis for excluding some out-of-state banks, becomes even less credible
when a state imposes further conditions, such as location within a par-
ticular region, which effectively preclude many states from
eligibility." 9
Similar problems exist with the regional concept. In Lewis v. BT
Investment Managers, Inc., 20 the Supreme Court struck down a Flor-
ida law which contained language that prohibited out-of-state acquisi-
tions of trust companies and investment advisory businesses. The Court
reasoned that, although states are permitted to regulate matters of le-
gitimate local concern, states may not promote economic protectional-
ism.121 Furthermore, the Court observed that the power given to the
states under the Bank Holding Company Act'22 applied only to legisla-
NCNB ruling could have been susceptible to an equal protection attack. NCNB only
owned one trust company in Florida; NCNB had no pre-existing stake in Florida's
banking market and was neither a positive nor a negative force in that market. Hence,
allowing NCNB to compete in the Florida banking market to the exclusion of other
out-of-state bank holding companies was not supported by a rational basis.
116. See Hawke, supra note 86, at 18, col. 3.
117. V. APILADO, G. BENSTON, J. DAVID, R. EISENBEIS, L. FRIEDER, T. GEls, P.
HORVITZ, H. ROSENBLUM, & D. WHITEHEAD, INTERSTATE BANK EXPANSION: MARKET
FORCES AND COMPETITIVE REALITIES, THE REPORT OF THE FLORIDA INTERSTATE
BANKING STUDY GROUP 197 (1984) [hereinafter cited as FLORIDA BANKING STUDY].
118. Hawke, supra note 86, at 18 col. 3. Reciprocity has been accepted as a
legitimate state interest, however, in cases involving professional licensing require-
ments. See, e.g. Hawkins v. Moss, 503 F.2d 1171 (4th Cir. 1974) (lawyers); Fales v.
Commissioner on Licensure to Prac. Heal. Art, 275 A.2d 238 (D.C. 1971) (doctors);
Mercer v. Hemmings, 194 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 1967) (accountants).
119. Hawke, supra note 86.
120. 447 U.S. 27 (1980).
121. Id. (quoting Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)).
Whatever the test for commerce clause limitations upon the states, the Court has con-
sistently distinguished between outright protectionism, and more indirect burdens of
trade. Id.
122. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50 (1983).
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tion operating within the commerce clause. 2 ' Therefore, it is question-
able whether a decision by a state as to which among the fifty states it
shall allow to enter its territory is a legitimate state interest at all."2 4
Short of this stance, one could argue that a regional approach is legiti-
mate because such an approach will maintain a responsive, local bank-
ing system. But the legitimacy of the regional approach does not seem
to depend on the rational choosing of the region. 12 5 The New England
regional grouping illustrates that the probable result will be the careful
exclusion of states, such as New York, with money-center banks.2 6
That the regions being created are based on protectionist fears and not
on natural market areas is illustrated by the fact that Utah has
adopted a bill creating a Western region excluding California - but
including Alaska and Hawaii. 27
C. Continuing Problems from Regional Reciprocal Acts
The legal resolution of the constitutional questions raised by Flor-
ida's Regional Reciprocal Act will not end the issue. 12 s The underlying
isue is discrimination against certain out-of-state bank holding compa-
nies. This problem will continue even if courts decide that Congress, by
passing the Douglas Amendment in 1956, has cloaked state efforts to
discriminate against non-regional banks with constitutional
123. Id. at 49. The Court found that although the BHC Act does reserve to the
states a general power to enact banking regulations, nothing suggests the states were
extended powers beyond federal law. Id. at 48-49.
124. Cf. Golembe, supra note 86, at 13 (nothing in the Douglas Amendment or
the "states rights" provision of the Bank Holding Company Act supports the right of a
state to burden interstate commerce by such a decision).
125. But cf. FLORIDA BANKING STUDY, supra note 117, at 197-98, 209 n.38.
Professor Davis feels that the identity of the region must be chosen rationally, but that
it would be difficult to show that the states were selected so irrationally as to violate the
equal protection clause.
126. See Golembe, supra note 86, at 13. New York was excluded from the New
England region, and the guess is that other states with money-center banks, such as
Illinois and California, will be carefully excluded. Id.
127. THE FINANCIAL SERVICES COMPETITIVE EQUITY ACT-REPORT OF THE
SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS S. Rep. No. 560,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 104, 110 (1984) (additional views of Senator D'Amato) [hereinaf-
ter cited as COMPETITIVE EQUITY ACT REPORT].
128. See Golembe, supra note 86, at 11. Argumentation and litigation of the
issue under any of the constitutional theories ultimately will be of little import, al-
though resolution may have some impact on the timing of change.
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immunity. 29
A recent United States Court of Appeals decision has, in fact, up-
held the New England regional scheme against constitutional attack. 3 '
In Northwest Bancorp. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, 13' the petitioners'3 2 appealed from three Federal Reserve
Board orders that approved mergers pursuant to sections 3 and 4(c)(8)
of the Bank Holding Company Act. 33 The petitioners charged that the
Massachusetts and Connecticut regional statutes3 4 impermissibly dis-
criminated against non-New England bank holding companies, thereby
violating the equal protection clause. 35 The court held that the two
states may be concerned that local banks could become dominated by
New York or Chicago banks, cited Iowa Independent Bankers, and
found no equal protection clause violation. 36
This decision will not be the end of the legal issue.' 37 It will be
interesting to note whether future court decisions will give more than
cursory attention to the underlying problem of such blatant state dis-
crimination against certain out-of-state bank holding companies. If
courts choose to address this problem, the equal protection clause is
probably the best constitutional argument available to strike regional
reciprocal legislation. 38
129. Id.
130. Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem, 740 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1984).
131. Id.
132. The petitioners in this consolidated action are Citicorp, Northeast Bancorp,
and Northeast's subsidiary bank, Union Trust Company. Id. at 3.
133. See supra note 81.
134. 1983 Conn. Acts 411 (Reg. Sess.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 167A, § 2
(West Supp. 1982).
135. Northeast Bancorp, 740 F.2d at 210. Petitioners also alleged violations of
the commerce and compact clauses. Id.
136. Id. at 13.
137. A petition for certiorari has been filed in the Northeast Bancorp. case. See
supra note 130. Also, other regional schemes may be challenged after they are passed.
138. The standard for permissible, discriminatory state action under the equal
protection clause is less stringent than that under the commerce clause. Bank of New
England Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. app. 385 (1984). However, finding a commerce
clause violation would probably mean that no conditions at all would be tolerated. Also,
any compact clause violations could be remedied by Congressional approval. The equal
protection clause would be more flexible in that some entry conditions could be found
rationally related to a legitimate state interest, while other conditions could be struck.
1984]
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V.* Toward a Level Playing Field
Apart from the legal issues raised by recent interstate banking de-
velopments in Florida, there exists the idea of a level playing field. A
level playing field, as used in banking regulation, means having the
same rules for all financial regulations so that competition on an equal
footing exists.139 The level playing field concept explains why the legal
and underlying problems involved with Florida's interstate banking de-
velopments have been given little thought and; therefore, why present
developments will be tolerated for a time. However, the concept also
commands that, ultimately, action must be taken to recognize full-scale
interstate banking and to remove the discrimination against excluded
out-of-state bank holding companies.
A. The Short-Term Field
Market pressures have made interstate banking substantively a re-
ality.14 0 This de facto interstate banking has been forced by regulatory
loopholes, unregulated competition, and technical innovations. 4' Im-
portant regulatory loopholes include a bank holding company's permis-
sion to acquire no-bank subsidiaries,'42 and the existence of loan pro-
duction offices 143 and Edge Act Corporations. 44 Imaginative thinking,
spurred largely by market pressures, will continue to uncover new ways
to sidestep outdated legal barriers. Non-bank financial institutions are
offering a growing array of services to their customers and are compet-
ing directly with banks in many areas. 45 But these organizations are
"unregulated" and can compete nationwide. 46 Finally, new technologi-
139. See Garn, Legislation and Financial Service Deregulation: The Level Play-
ing Field, J. CASH MGMT., Apr.-May 1983, at 20, 25.
140. This has led some to argue that the issue now is "interstate deposit taking."
FLORIDA BANKING STUDY, supra note 117, at 220.
141. Id. at 155.
142. Id. Because non-bank subsidiaries are free to open offices on an interstate
basis, bank holding companies can use them to evade interstate prohibitions.
143. Id. at 156. These offices cannot make loans or accept deposits; but they can
solicit loans.
144. Id. These Corporations provide banking services related to international
trade and can be used outside of a bank holding company's home state.
145. The money market mutual fund is the principal innovation used to collect
retail deposits on a national level. The real significance of these funds is that they have
broken down the local bank dependency of some customers. Id. at 35.
146. See Whitehead, supra note 35, at 8. Commercial banks are the only
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cal forces are changing the public's banking habits and rendering geo-
graphic expansion restrictions archaic.
147
These outside forces indicate that existing geographic restrictions
on banks are ineffective and, more importantly, that banks are suffer-
ing from these restrictions.148 In addition, studies show that the re-
laxing of interstate barries is independently desirable in terms of public
policy. 149 Considerations such as convenience and needs, quantity and
quality of service, small bank viability, safety and soundness, and com-
petition and concentration will be positively influenced by interstate
banking. 50
Internal and external pressures, therefore, indicate that interstate
banking is both inevitable and preferable. The two interstate banking
developments in Florida are recognitions of this fact. The Board ex-
pressly acknowledged the pressures and realities involved by stating in
U.S. Trust that "it would be ineffective and inequitable to impose a
competitive limitation only on bank holding companies by denying this
proposal."' 5 ' Such actions relax interstate prohibitions, thereby pushing
banks in the right direction. 52
Board and State actions encouraging limited interstate banking
seem to be the accepted short-run path to a geographically level field.
Eventually, congressional consent to state laws that permit limited in-
financial service suppliers effectively constrained geographically today.
147. An interstate retail electronic banking system is still being put together,
despite the legal interpretation that an automated teller machine is a branch. Other
technological developments continue to erode geographical barriers. FLORIDA BANKING
STUDY, supra note 117, at 159.
148. The geographic restrictions today adversely affect banks in that the rules no
longer protect banks from outside competition, but instead prevent them from following
their customers or attracting new customers over the geographic range of their compet-
itors. Eisenbeis, Regional Forces for Interstate Banking, ECON. REv., May 1983, at
24, 28.
149. See, e.g., FLORIDA BANKING STUDY, supra note 117 at 211-36.
150. See id. at 160, 222; See also Rhoades and Savage, Can Small Banks Com-
pete?, BANKERS MAG., Jan.-Feb. 1981, at 59 (the study analyzed the ability of small
banks to compete with large banks by reviewing four crucial areas: growth, profitabil-
ity, economies of scale, and EFT; the evidence and actual performance of small banks
indicate small banks are viable competitors).
151. U.S. Trust, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. at 372.
152. Since non-bank financial institutions have no geographic limitations, the
"right" direction required is facing market realities and easing geographic restrictions
on banks. Reversing the trend of deregulation by placing restrictions on institutions
such as Merrill Lynch and Sears is not feasible. Edwards, Commercial Banking Re-
view: Geographic Expansion, U.S. BANKER, March 1981, at 18, 26.
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terstate expansion may be forthcoming.' 5 But the very nature of these
two regulators suggests that the discrimination from such action will
continue. Congressional action is needed.
B. The Eventual Level Field
Congressional inaction to date has been evident. The Depository
Institutions Act of 1982,154 heralded as the most far-reaching federal
banking law in fifty years, did almost nothing for interstate banking.1 55
Such inaction cannot continue much longer. Recent Board orders show
the inadequacies of interstate banking decisions that must turn on the
technical language and intent of the Douglas Amendment.' 56 Regional
Acts are particularly troublesome because of their increasing accept-
ance and pure discriminatory effort. Congressional action would pro-
vide guidance to the Board and states that wish to allow interstate
banking.
The Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System has called for a fresh congressional review of interstate banking
policy.1 7 The Chairman cited problems with the developing de facto
interstate banking system and the movement towards regional arrange-
ments as the major reasons a new look is needed.'5 8 Other authority
believes that the emerging regional systems will deliver the final shock
to the nation's banking system that will rouse Congress from its ad-
vanced state of paralysis. 59 Congress will not stand by and see the
states carve up the banking system into dukedoms, all in the name of
states rights and the Douglas Amendment. 60
153. See COMPETITIVE EQUITY ACT REPORT, supra note 127, at 48. The Com-
mittee recognized that while legal arguments are not frivolous, they believe regional
statutes are consistent with the constitution. Id.
154. Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320,
96 Stat. 1469 (1982) (codified in various parts of 12 U.S.C.).
155. See Hawke, supra note 86, at 4, col. 2. The only interstate provision was
the one for the extraordinary acquisitions of failing banks in very limited circum-
stances. Id.
156. See supra notes 51-76 and accompanying text.
157. Statements to Congress, Before the House Comm. on Banking, Finance,
and Urban Affairs, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 561, 567 (1984) (statement of Chairman Volck-
er, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
158. Id.
159. Golembe, supra note 86, at 11. In this sense, the author applauds the Mas-
sachusetts action.
160. Id. at 14.
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Congressional action will make possible the eventual level playing
field. Congress may choose to recognize regional banking as a transi-
tional step in the right direction, but it must ultimately recognize inter-
state banking as the level playing field. The realities of interstate bank-
ing cannot be avoided, delayed, or arrested by action or inaction. 161
Regional configurations are inadequate for the same economic reasons
that state barriers are now undesirable.162 Today's financial world dic-
tates that the answer must be nationwide banking. 1 3 Additionally, only
when nationwide banking is permitted will the underlying discrimina-
tion against the excluded bank holding companies be removed.
VI. Conclusion
Interstate banking developments in Florida illustrate both the
trends of gebgraphic deregulation and the problems associated with
these trends. Board decisions will continue to open up state banking
markets to those imaginative out-of-state bank holding companies that
discover loopholes in existing state and federal law. Also, states dissat-
isfied with the pace or direction of these Board decisions will continue
to enact laws that permit their own desired form of limited interstate
banking. Both actions raise legitimate legal objections. However, devel-
opments will be permitted for a time because of increasing market
pressures for interstate banking and congressional inaction.
Nevertheless, the underlying problems of a lack of a current na-
tional banking policy and the increasing discrimination against states
with money-center banks must eventually be addressed. Ideally, the de-
veloping economic balkanization will shock Congress into a fresh re-
view of its interstate banking policy, causing Congress to act quickly to
remove the underlying discrimination by mandating nationwide bank-
ing. It is only a matter of time before the ultimate level playing field of
nationwide commercial reached.
161. FLORIDA BANKING STUDY, supra note 117, at 215.
162. See supra notes 140-152 and accompanying text.
163. Golembe, supra note 86, at 14. The inadequacies of the regional approach
should be revealed after a thorough look by Congress and the banking industry.
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Cogeneration and Small Power Production: Florida's
Approach to Decentralized Generation
Jeffrey Fuller*
I. Introduction
The changing economics of electricity generation in the 1970's,
coupled with the 1973-74 oil crisis, prompted both a legislative and
societal examination of the United States' approach to decentralized
electricity production.1 During the early 1970's, costs associated with
the expansion, maintenance and replacement of generating capacity in-
creased sharply due to inflationary pressures while the growth rate of
electricity demand fell.2 The oil embargo sent fuel costs skyrocketing
and further devastated the electric power industry,3 as cheap fossil fuel
had molded the development and operating structure of the industry.4
Accordingly, every administration and Congress since 1973 has sup-
ported energy conservation to reduce capacity expansion needs and has
encouraged energy supply expansion to reduce foreign oil dependence.
President Carter responded to this energy crisis by proposing a na-
tional energy plan. On November 8, 1979 President Carter signed the
National Energy Act (the Act). Three parts of the Act, the Public
Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), the National Gas Policy
Act, and the Energy Tax Act of 1978, contain provisions relating to
cogeneration and small power production.5
* B.A., University of South Florida; M.B.A., J.D., University of Florida. Law
Clerk to Justice James E. Alderman of the Florida Supreme Court. Certified Public
Accountant.
1. Lock, Encouraging Decentralized Generation of Electricity: Implementation
of the New Statutory Scheme, 2 SOLAR L. REP. 705-752, 707 (1980).
2. Id. Cost increases resulted from increased capital costs necessary to finance
plant construction. Additionally, consumption per dollar GNP fell substantially from
1970 to 1971. See 1983 UNITED STATES STATISTICAL ABSTRACT exhibit No. 973.
3. For example, the percent price change increase measured in 1972 constant
dollars of crude oil and bituminous coal for the period 1973-75 was 65.8 percent and
96.4 percent respectively. Id. exhibit No. 974.
4. Lock, supra note 1, at 707.
5. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. ch. 60 (Supp. 1983); 16 U.S.C. ch. 46 (Supp. 1983).
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This legislative encouragement of decentralized electricity produc-
tion is planned to yield several major societal benefits in the long run:
an increased efficient utilization of energy resources with a commensu-
rate saving of scarce oil and gas reserves,8 an enhanced use and devel-
opment of renewable energy resources, 7 a greater flexibility and preci-
sion in planning utility capacity because of the smaller generating units
utilized in the decentralized structure" and a decrease in business and
financial risks associated with satisfying fluctuating or uncertain future
demands on utility systems due to the faster construction times for
smaller units. 9 The realization of these benefits, however, depends on
the strength of the federal incentives provided in the Act and their ef-
fective implementation by the appropriate federal and state agencies.'"
Congress substantially delegated the practical implementation of
PURPA's provisions to the individual states' public commissions
(PUCS), l" as PURPA establishes only broad guidelines necessary to
convey legislative intent.'2 PURPA requires these commissions to pro-
mulgate rules pursuant to the Federal Energy Commission's (FERC)
regulations.'3 Under FERC's regulations, the states must establish
rates for utilities' purchases and alternatively establish rates for utili-
6. California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) Order No. 91109,011 No. 26
(December 19, 1979) at 13-14. Cogeneration offers efficiencies by permitting the utili-
zation of fuels in a more efficient manner when combined by cogeneration that is possi-
ble under conventional technologies. Id.
7. Certain energy resources are renewable such as wind and solar power.
8. California PUC Decision No. 91109, supra note 6. The lead time required for
the construction of a cogeneration facility is estimated to be several years less than the
time required for the construction of a large central station power plant. Thus, cus-
tomer demand need not be projected so far into the future making demand forecasts
more accurate. Id.
9. Id. Benefits to ratepayors could result because non utility owned cogenerators
have to raise the required capital for construction of the cogeneration facility and these
financing costs would not to be borne by the ratepayors. Further, the cogenerator's
facility is not included in the utility's rate base and the cogenerator is only reimbursed
for actual production, thus, the ratepayor does not have to bear the costs of any un-
scheduled outages of that facility.
10. See generally, 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (Supp. 1983) (discussion of federal incen-
tives for decentralized power generation).
11. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (f)(1) (Supp. 1983). The provision, in part provides: "af-
ter any rule is prescribed by the Commission . . . each state regulatory authority shall,
after notice and opportunity for public hearing, implement such rule (or revised rule)
for any electric utility for which it has ratemaking authority." Id.
12. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (a) (Supp. 1983).
13. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (f) (Supp. 1983).
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ties' sales to these co-producers in a manner to effectuate and provide
incentive for the development of decentralized electricity generation.14
However, the establishment and implementation of these rates to en-
courage this development of decentralized electricity generation has re-
mained the most controversial provision of PURPA.
This article will examine Florida's recent unique implementation
of decentralized power production within the scheme of PURPA. As
background, the institutional barriers that long prevented the develop-
ment of decentralized power production will be discussed. The scheme
and purpose of PURPA will then be identified with a corresponding
focus on appropriate FERC regulations. With this background, the
final section will examine state implementation of the regulations and
their potential implications with particular emphasis on Florida.
II. Institutional Barriers to Decentralized Electricity
Production
Electricity, as an energy form, cannot be stored and, therefore,
must be consumed or lost. This physical property is significant for two
reasons. First, the proper distribution of electricity to potential users
requires an efficient transmission system. Second, the inability to store
electricity demands a sufficient generating capacity to satisfy user
needs during those times of the day and year when electrical consump-
tion peaks. Accordingly, the contruction of transmission systems and
productive capacity should necessarily extend beyond current demand.
The necessity of this construction results in extensive plant, property
and equipment investments carrying large fixed costs. Because electric-
ity production is so capital intensive, economies of scale dominate a
electric utility because costs decrease as sales increase. As production
and corresponding sales increase, large fixed costs are distributed over
a greater number of units (i.e., kilowatts) thus decreasing the fixed
costs per unit. 5 This economic behavior is shown in Exhibit 1:
14. 18 C.F.R. § 292.401 (a) (1983). This section provides in part: "each State
regulatory authority shall, after notice and an opportunity for public hearing, com-
mence implementation of Subpart C." Id.
15. L. WEISS & A. STRICKLAND, REGULATION: A CASE APPROACH 3-5 (1976).
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per
Unit
Output
0
EXHIBIT I
These economies of scale and improving technologies allow the
utility industry to reduce per unit costs by increasing capacity and en-
couraging customer sales.
Because of these scale economies, electricity during the early
1900's quickly proved to be a relatively safe, cheap and attractive
power source, and its use spread to numerous industrial, commercial
and residential application. As utilities continued growing, the utilities'
ability to provide electricity at steadily declining rates made decentral-
ized generation uneconomical. State and local governments began regu-
lating production facilities as public utilities, and years of large-scale
concentrated generation engendered regulatory structures which cre-
ated economic and insitutional barriers to decentralized electricity pro-
duction. The states granted monopolies over electricity generation and
distribution to these existing public utitlities based on the theory that
electric power production was a natural monopoly. A natural monopoly
exists when the lowest cost per unit results when only one company
exists in a decreasing cost industry as demonstrated in Exhibit 1. The
one enterprise's fixed costs can be spread across more sales than if two
firms must split the market demand. Thus, the idea of a government
imposed monopoly on power production and distribution was well
founded and in the ratepayors' best interest.
[Vol. 9
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The distribution of power remains a natural monopoly because
competition between electric utilities would require duplicate transmis-
sion and distribution systems which have sharply decreasing costs. 16
Because of changing economies and technologies, however, the genera-
tion of power is no longer a decreasing cost proposition.17 Indeed, in
electric generation some competition would be feasible if all generating
companies could bid for the distribution systems.'" Notwithstanding
this economic fact, the utilities' control over the distribution systems
has perpetuated their monopoly over production even though smaller
facilities could generate at lower costs. Generation cost efficiencies are
irrelevant if the electric power can not be delivered.
The public utilities' transmission and distribution control substan-
tially rendered small producers' sales to parties other than the utility
itself virtually impossible. Because of their monopoly position, public
utilities lacked incentives to purchase electric power or, further, to
purchase the electricity at an appropriate market rate. In addition to
the suppressed purchase price, uncertainty existed as to the treatment
of these small producers as public utilities and as subject to the same
regulation, public scrutiny, controlled profits and administrative burden
as a public utility. Finally, public utilities could also charge discrimina-
tory rates to smaller producers for such services as back-up and main-
tenance power to discourage their operation.' 9 Thus, the lack of an
open market for electricity sales, coupled with the administrative un-
certainty of being regulated as a public utility, discouraged potential
decentralized generation. This inflexible situation existed when the oil
embargo occurred. These barriers, however, prevented a receptive re-
sponse which highlighted the need for a reorganization of electricity
generation.
III. Federal Legislative Response-PURPA
Sections 201 and 210 of PURPA contain the primary legislative.
response to these institutional and economic barriers to decentralized
generation.20 PURPA establishes broad guidelines2' and requires the
16. See L. WEISS, supra note 15, at 4-5. The logistics of having multiple power
lines throughout the service area by competing power products would be cost prohibi-
tive and aesthetically distasteful.
17. Lock, supra note 1, at 713-14.
18. See L. WEISS, supra note 15, at 5.
19. 45 Fed. Reg. 17,959 (1980).
20. See 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (Supp. 1983).
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FERC to issue explicit rules for the encouragement of cogeneration
and small power production which state public utility commissions
must implement. 22 Although the FERC regulations permit state discre-
tion, three requirements are clearly set forth by the provisions'
language.
First, a public utility is required to purchase all power offered by
the facility at the utility's full "avoided cost". Thus, qualifying decen-
tralized facilities are conceptually guaranteed a market at an economi-
cally fair price.23 Avoided cost represents the cost the utility would
have incurred from either generating or purchasing from another sup-
plier, to have that additional increment of power. 24 Second, intercon-
nection with a utility system's electric grid, which guarantees qualify-
ing facilities a limited distribution and transmission system,25 is
required. This interconnection provision is implicit and critical to the
effective right to sell the electricity because public utilities' monopolies
on distribution systems are overridden. Thus, qualifying facilities can
effectively shop for a competitive price. Finally, if the qualified facility
chooses,26 it must be permitted to purchase electricity from the utility
at non-discriminatory rates. This purchase option enables small
cogenerating facilities to have sufficient backup power for their own
operation if their own systems fail. The successful implementation of
these requirements determine the effectriveness of the Congressional in-
centive to encourage cogeneration and small power production.
To obtain these federal and corresponding state guarantees, a fa-
cility must qualify under the FERC provisions and under the respective
state regulations.2  The federal regulations distinguish between
21. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (a) & (b) (Supp. 1983).
22. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (a) (Supp. 1983).
23. Lock, supra note 1, at 713. Each public utility is required to purchase energy
and capacity power from each qualifying facility at the public utility's avoided cost. 18
C.F.R. § 292.303 and 292.304 (1983).
24. 18 C.F.R. § 292.101 (b)(6) (1983). This provision defines avoided cost as the
"increased costs to an electric utility of electric energy or capacity or both which, but
for the purposes from the qualifying facilities, such utility would generate itself or
purchase from another source." Id.
25. 18 C.F.R. § 292.303 (c) (1983). This section requires electric utilities to
make interconnections with qualifying facilities as is necessary to accomplish purchases
or sales as required by the subpart. Id.
26. 18 C.F.R. § 292.305 (b)(1) (1983). This provision requires public utilities to
furnish qualifying utilities with (i) supplementary power, (ii) back-up power, (iii)
maintenance power and (iv) interruptible power upon request. Id.
27. See 18 C.F.R. § 203 (1983); FLA. ADMIN. CODE 25-17.80 (1983). There are
[Vol. 9
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cogenerators and small power producers, although both facilities are
regulated virtually identically. The FERC regulations define a cogener-
ator as a facility which produces electric energy in addition to some
form of useful energy utilized for industrial, commercial, heating or
cooling purposes.2 8 Aside from certain efficiency standards specified in
the regulations29, the productive capacity of the facilities is not limited.
However, a facility does not qualify as a cogenerator if an electric util-
ity owns more than fifty percent of the equity interest in the plant.30
Alternatively, the regulations define a small power producer as an elec-
tric generating facility utilitizing as its primary energy source biomass,
waste, renewable resources, geothermal resources or any combination
thereof. The fifty percent ownership restriction is also imposed on small
power producers.31
Beyond these qualification criteria, the regulations delegate broad
authority to the states to implement rules in accordance with the intent
of PURPA. The Florida Public Service Commission (FPSC) has
adopted the FERC's qualifying criteria for cogenerators and small
power producers, thus simplifying the qualifying process.
32
several benefits for qualifying as a cogenerator or small power producer in addition to
those cited in the text. The most important is that such a qualifying facility will be
exempt from federal and state public utility regulation. 18 C.F.R. § 292.601 and
292.602 (1983).
28. 18 C.F.R. § 292.202 (c) (1983).
29. 18 C.F.R. § 292.205 (a) and (b) (1983).
30. 18 C.F.R. § 292.206 (a) and (b). This section reads, in part:
[A] cogeneration or small power production facility shall be considered to
be owned by a person primarily engaged in the generation or sale of elec-
tric power, if more than 50 percent of the equity interest in the facility is
held by an electric utility or utilities, or by an electric utility holding com-
pany, or companies, or any combination thereof. If a wholly or partially
owned subsidiary of an electric utility or electric utility holding company
has an ownership interest of a facility, the subsidiary's ownership interest
shall be considered as ownership by an electric utility or electric utility
holding company.
Id.
31. 18 C.F.R. § 292.204 (1983).
32. FLA. ADMIN. CODE 25-17.80 (9-2-83). The Florida Public Service Commis-
sion adopted FERC's qualifying criteria as their own. The Florida Commission pro-
vided, however, that those facilities failing to satisfy the adopted FERC criteria may
still petition the FPSC for qualifying states for the purpose of receiving payments
under the rules. Id.
1984]
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IV. State Implementation
State public utility commissions (PUCs) are required by section
210 of PURPA to implement the FERC regulations governing the
purchase and sale of electric power by qualifying facilities. The rates
established by the PUCs must act as a price signal to encourage the
development of decentralized generation in accordance with the intent
of the PURPA. The major areas of state discretion are set forth below:
A. Sales By Qualifying Facilities
Section 210 of the PURPA requires PUCs to establish rates for
electricity sales by qualifying facilities (QFs) to public utilities.3"
PURPA provides that established sales rates "shall not exceed the in-
cremental cost to the electric utility of providing that energy."34 Clari-
fying PURPA's language, the FERC regulations further state that
electric utilities will not be required to purchase power at rates exceed-
ing the utility's avoided cost. 5 The regulations define avoided cost as
the "incremental costs to an electric utility of electric energy or capac-
ity or both which, but for the purchase from the qualifying facility or
qualifying facilities, such utility would generate itself or purchase from
another source if the purchase from the qualifying facility has not oc-
curred."3 6 Although the regulations provide a number of criteria to
consider in determining avoided costs,"1 the rules leave considerable
33. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(f) (Supp. 1983). This section requires that one year fol-
lowing the issuance of FERC's rules, each state commission shall after notice and op-
portunity for public hearing implement rules pursuant to the mandate of PURPA. Id.
34. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b) (Supp. 1983). This section also provides that the
purchase rates shall be just and reasonable to customers of the electric utility, in the
public interest, and not discriminate against qualifying facilities. Id.
35. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304 (a)(2) (1983).
36. 18 C.F.R. § 292.101 (b)(6) (1983).
37. 18 C.F.R. § 792.304 (3). These criteria include:
1. Availability of capacity or energy from a qualifying facility during the system daily
and seasonal peak periods, including:
a) Ability of the utility to dispatch the qualifying facility;
b) Expected or demonstrated reliability of the qualifying facility;
c) Contract terms or other legally enforceable coliation, including the du-
ration of the obligation, termination notice requirement and sanctions
for non-compliance;
d) Extent to which scheduled outages of the qualifying facility can be
usefully coordinated with scheduled outages of the utility's facilities;
e) Usefulness of energy and capacity supplied from a qualifying facility
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discretion to the PUCs concerning avoided costs calculations and QF
purchase rate structure. Essentially, basing payments to QFs on
avoided costs merely provides that payments will be calculated on a
utility's marginal costs. Marginal costs represent the additional costs a
utility incurs if a customer increases power usage at any given time.
Thus, if the electricity a QF supplies to a utility permits that utility to
avoid the costs of purchasing or producing that electricity, the QF re-
ceives as payment the utility's avoided cost. As shown in Exhibit 2,
basing utility purchases on marginal costs rates is theoretically sound
because utility purchases reflect the cost consequences to that utility of
supplying that incremental electricity. The shaded area represents the
marginal cost that a utility would incur in producing the additional x
+ 1 unit of electricity. Thus, the utility pays the actual cost that would
have been incurred if the utility had produced or purchased the energy
from another public utility.
Cost
per
Unit
Marginal
Cost
Output
0 X X+I
EXHIBIT 2
during system emergencies, including its ability to separate its load
from its generation;
f) Individual and aggregate value of energy and capacity from qualifying
facilities on the electric utility's system; and
g) Smaller capacity increments and the shorter lead times available with
additions of capacity from qualifying facilities; and
2. Relationship of the availability of energy or capacity from the qualifying facility to
the ability of the electric utility to avoid costs, including the deferral of capacity
additions and the reduction of fossil fuel use.
19841
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FERC regulations subdivide avoided costs into energy cost and ca-
pacity costs.38 Capacity costs represent the costs associated with the
capability to deliver electricity and consist primarily of the facilities
capital costs. 39 Generally, capacity costs can be thought of as the physi-
cal facilities necessary to generate electricity. Energy costs, alterna-
tively, are the variable costs associated with the production of electric
energy and represent fuel costs in addition to certain operating and
maintenance expenses.40 The Florida Public Service Commissions's
(FPSC) rules utilize the same distinction between capacity and energy
costs in calculating avoided costs for firm as opposed to non-firm power.
B. Non-Firm Power
Non-firm power or "as available" power, as termed by the FPSC,
is energy produced and sold by a QF with no contractual commitment
as to the quantity, time or reliability of delivery to the purchasing pub-
lic utility.4 The FPSC requires utilities to purchase as available energy
from all QFs within their service area at the utilities' avoided energy
cost.42 Because as available energy lacks these crucial assurances, Flor-
ida's rules require only energy payments and do not provide for capac-
ity payments.4 3 The FPSC explicitly rejected the argument that FERC
regulations require that all QFs delivering "as available energy" be
compensated by a capacity payment.44 The FPSC noted that FERC
does not require that all QFs delivering "as available energy" receive
capacity payments but, rather, only that such delivery may confer ca-
pacity related benefits which should then be compensated.45 Further,
the Commission interpreted FERC's regulations as establishing an if-
then test: "if the evidence demonstrates that a QFs delivery of as-avail-
able energy confers capacity related benefits, then compensation for ca-
pacity credits should be made."'48 In the rule making proceeding, how-
38. See supra note 36. This section draws the distinction between electric energy
payments and electric capacity payments. Id.
39. 45 Fed. Reg. 12,216 (1980).
40. Id.
41. FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 25-17.825 (1) (1983).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Florida Public Utilities Commission (FPUC), Order No. 12634, Docket No.
820406-EU (Oct. 27, 1983), at 9.
45. id.
46. Id.
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ever, the FPSC found that persuasive evidence did not exist in the
record to justify such capacity payments.47
This approach reflects a realistic approach to capacity payments.
The rationale underlying capacity payments can be simply stated. As
the utility's service demands expand, guaranteed power is crucial to the
satisfaction of customer needs. If QF production can defer the con-
struction of a generating station by a public utility, then the QF has
replaced the necessity of building additional capacity. Consequently,
the QF should receive payments for this deferred capacity. If, however,
power deliveries fluctuate between periods, then utilities can not depend
on these deliveries during peak periods and need to construct the neces-
sary capacity. Public utilities must expand capacity to meet these de-
mands which the QFs fluctuating delivery could not satisfy with suffi-
cient certainty. In this situation, no capacity needs have been avoided,
thus rendering capacity payments improper.
Many PUCs, including Florida's, apply the concept of time-of-use
rates to the purchase of "as available power." Under this methodology,
rates reflect the value of QF generation to the utility system at differ-
ent times.48 The demand for power varies both with the time of day
and the season of the year as shown in Exhibit 3:
D
E
M
A
N
D
Summer Fall Winter Autumn
D
E
M
A
N
D
Morning Midday Evening
EXHIBIT 3
47. Id. The FPSC found that record indicated that Florida utilities included QF
capacity in their expansion plans but this was an inadequate showing of what amount
of this power would be sold on a firm basis. Thus, capacity payments were not sup-
ported by the record. Id.
48. Lock & Kuiken, Cogeneration and Small Power Production: State Imple-
mentation Of Section 210 Of PURPA, 3 SOLAR L. REP. at 673 (1981).
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Utility generating equipment can be divided into three categories:
baseload, intermediate, and peaking. Baseload equipment supplies that
portion of the load which remains constant, regardless of the time or
season. Baseload generating units are large and substantial warm up
periods. Naturally, peaking units are small and have the ability to be
placed on line quickly to satisfy sharp demand peaks. Intermediate
generating units can be placed on line more quickly than baseload units
and may be utilizied a significant portion of the time as a spinning
reserve. Generally, baseload generating capacity requires the highest
capital costs followed respectively by intermediate and peaking units.
Because peaking and intermediate units are utilized only a portion of
the time, the actual capacity recovered from the ratepayors is often in
the reverse order. Thus, when the capital cost is weighted by the time
that the capacity is utilized, peaking units are the most expensive.49
In addition to capacity costs, fuel costs are generally higher when
intermediate and peaking equipment are usually less efficient than
baseload equipment. Also, baseload units usually consume less expen-
sive fuels than intermediate and peaking units. Thus, QFs will receive
the highest purchase rates for delivering power during peak demand
periods when their power can reduce the utility's need to run the more
costly units.5 0 The relationship between these costs is demonstrated in
Exhibit 4:
""-Intermediate
Capital Cost
Cost Peaking
per Capital Cost
Unit
Baseload Capital
Cost
Peaking Fuel
Cost
Intermediate
Fuel Cost
Baseload Fuel
Cost
0 Time Utilized
EXHIBIT 4
49. Eisenstadt, PURPA and PV Systems, 2 SOLAR L. REP. 1061-82 (1981).
50. Id.
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In Florida, if the utilities do not negotiate a contractual rate with
a QF in their service area, they must purchase "as available energy" at
rates established in their standard contract tariff.51 The standard tariff
rates will be predetermined by the FPSC. Additionally, these tariff
rates will be based on either the utility's actual hourly incremental
costs for hours during which no economy energy transactions occur, the
actual incremental costs after economy energy purchases, or the actual
incremental costs before economy energy sales. Thus, Florida's tariff
rates reflect time of day usage.52 Alternatively, a utility may negotiate
a separate contract rate with any QF either inside or outside its service
area. In any case, as stated above, a utility is not required to pay for
capacity costs. 53
C. Firm Power
The FPSC defines firm power as energy and capacity produced
and sold by a QF pursuant to a contract and subject to quantity, time,
and reliability of delivery contractual provisions.54 The FPSC has taken
a unique approach in calculating firm power payments and has asserted
that in evaluating firm energy and capacity payments, whether pursu-
ant to promulgated tariffs or negotiated contracts, rates must be based
on deferrable capacity related costs viewed on a statewide perspective.
To implement this statewide approach, the FPSC chose a "uni-
form statewide price for QF capacity based on the next planned uncer-
tified unit wherever the need existed in the state."5 5 This planned un-
certified power plant is termed the "statewide avoided unit." Under the
standard offer, the price for capacity payments is based on the value of
deferring construction of the statewide avoided unit for a period of
time. Thus, if a QF provides firm power to a public utility, the utility
can incorporate and utilize the contracted for electricity sales in its ex-
pansion plans. Given a sufficient level of firm power available, utilities
can defer the construction of additional plants. The FPSC has adopted
an approach of treating Florida as one service area. Statewide tariff
rates are based on deferring the construction of this unit. Essentially,
51. See supra note 41.
52. FLA. ADMIN. CODE 25-17.825 (2) (1983).
53. Id. 25-17.825 (1)(b) (1983).
54. Id. 25-17.83 (1) (1983).
55. Id. 25-17.83 (1983); Docket No. 820406-EU, Order No. 12634, (Oct. 27,
1983) at 14.
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the value of deferral is a calculation of the value of deferring the reve-
nue requirements associated with the new generating plant by a time
period, then comparing the difference in annual revenue requirements
should the revenue requirements stream began in year x as compared
to beginning in the year x + I. 6 In order to calculate the deferral
value, one must identify the deferred plant and must ascertain the an-
ticipated in-service date along with the plant's projected costs.57 The
FPSC has designated a jointly owned peninsular Florida base load coal
plant consisting of two 700 mega-watt units with an in-service date of
April 1, 1992 as the statewide avoided unit. 58 A utility needs to know
that QF capacity will not supplement an avoided unit until that unit's
otherwise anticipated in-service date. Projected capacity savings, there-
fore, must be discounted back to present value. The FPSC believes
these rules link the purchase price of QF capacity to the value of other
supply side alternatives available to a utility necessary to its service
obligation. This linkage ensures that cogeneration and small power pro-
duction will remain a cost effective conservation measure. Thus, the
value of QF capacity is linked to the statewide unit from both a timing
and a cost perspective.
Although the actual capacity payment calculation is complicated,
the Florida approach is very unique. First, the FPSC has included no
provision for the payment of existing capacity credits but rather pay-
ments are based on deferring future capacity construction. Some states
do include such a capacity payment. Under the FPSC's rules, however,
capacity payments reflect the avoidance of future potential costs to the
ratepayors. Second, the rules attempt to funnel cogeneration capacity
to the utilities with the greatest need. The FPSC considered setting
capacity prices on an individual utility basis. Under this approach, each
utility would set a capacity price based on the value of deferring its
next planned uncertified generating units in its service area. Because
the price would vary with each utility under this methodology utilities
with the earliest in-service date would probably offer the best price and
QFs would pursue negotiations with this utility out of economic self
interest. This approach would generate differing price and require
wheeling if the utility with the greatest need was to receive the needed
additional capacity. The approach adopted by the FPSC establishes a
56. Id. at 14-16.
57. Id. at 16.
58. Florida Public Service Commission (FPSC), Order No. 13247, Docket No.
830377-EU (May 1, 1984) at 4.
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uniform statewide price. Utilities are required to purchase all QF ca-
pacity in their service area. The FPSC explicitly stated, however, that
it expects a utility to promptly sell unneeded QF capacity in its service
area to the utility with the statewide avoided unit in its service area.
Further, the Commission expects these transactions to occur at cost
thus the utility without the need for QF capacity will incur no costs
related to the initial purchase and these costs will not be passed on to
their ratepayors. This statewide approach promotes uniformity and
fairness in the development of decentralized generation. The Commis-
sion believed this approach protects the interests of all Florida
ratepayors on an equal basis. This approach also recognizes that decen-
tralized generation confers capacity related benefits on ratepayors only
if QFs supply the needed capacity at a cost effective price. That is,
capacity payments must be based on a forward looking approach, and
decentralized generation should not be an end into itself, but should
lead instead to an efficient allocation of resources. Finally, these rules
are specifically geared at paying avoided costs and not the additional
costs of providing cogeneration and small power production. 59
The energy payments for firm power are also linked to the state-
wide avoided unit. Section 25-17.83(6) of the Florida Administrative
Code provides that commencing with the avoided unit's anticipated in-
service date, QFs receive "the lesser of the as available energy costs of
the utility planning the avoided unit or the energy cost associated with
the unit itself." 0 This rule requires the payment of "the lesser" be-
cause where the planning utility's incremental fuel costs are less than
the avoided unit's fuel costs, it is cost effective to base fuel costs on
existing plants' marginal costs.
Florida's growth blurs the FPSC's line between payments for en-
ergy and payments for capacity. For example, if a utility is adding
large amounts of baseload capacity to satisfy growing demands then
defining energy costs as the marginal operating costs may underesti-
mate actual energy costs. Under this scenerio, capacity is added to
avoid the need to use peaking units. Capacity is added because the
lower operating costs of base load units more than compensates for
high capital costs. Thus, capital costs are incurred to provide energy,
not capacity. This conclusion is based on the fact that capital can be
substituted for fuel costs in the long run. Accordingly, in this situation
some capacity costs are really energy costs, and some avoided capacity
59. Id. at 14.
60. FLA. ADMIN. CODE 25-17.825 (6) (1983).
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costs are in reality avoided energy costs.
The statewide approach for both capacity and energy payments is
beneficial to the State of Florida and its ratepayors for several pur-
poses. First, the capacity related benefit of decentralized generation re-
flects the avoidance or deferral of additional generating capacity con-
struction. Thus, capacity payments reflect the avoidance of future
potential costs to ratepayors. This approach is also consistent with the
FPSC's approach of determining additional capacity need on a state-
wide basis. This consistency in policy decisions reflects and promotes a
uniform reaction to Commission decisions; therefore, policy disputes
are focused. Further, this approach permits Florida and its ratepayors
to maximize the benefit from QF capacity by channeling geographi-
cally dispersed QF capacity to the utility with the most urgent capacity
need.6 Thus, one utility's generation expansion plans may be signifi-
cantly altered by the aggregate impact of all firm QF capacity as op-
posed to a potentially slight impact on the generation expansion plans
of many utilities by varying amounts of firm QF capacity scattered
throughout their separate service areas.62
D. Purchases by QFs
Section 210(1) of PURPA requires that retail rates charges to
QFs for power purchases be just, reasonable and nondiscriminatory
against QFs.63 The FERC interprets the nondiscrimination provision as
requiring that QFs be charged the same retail rate as another customer
of power and not as a co-producer of electricity.64 Only if a utility can
demonstrate on the basis of adequate data that a QF's service costs are
different from other customers, would a different rate be justified and
allowed.6 5 This provision is particularly critical to many potential in-
dustrial cogenerators which feared that their purchase rates would in-
crease if they competed with the utility in electricity generation.
This provision is an essential part of the PURPA scheme if the
legislative encouragement of decentralized generation is to be effective.
Further, this article asserts that these rates should be adjusted to re-
flect the load these cogenerators actually place on the system. For ex-
61. See supra note 55, at 18.
62. Id.
63. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (c) (Supp. 1983).
64. 18 C.F.R. § 292.305 (a) (1983).
65. 18 C.F.R. § 292.305 (b) (1983).
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ample, suppose that existing customer rates are based on marginal
costs. The issue becomes whether a QF should purchase electricity on a
marginal cost as any other customer. The proposed answer is not that it
is necessarily in the ratepayor's interest for the QF to purchase electric-
ity based on marginal cost. Traditionally, a class of customer's load
factors permit PUCs to estimate what demands this group will place on
the utility system. On the basis of this predicted behavior, costs are
allocated and charged in a manner to reflect this behavior. This is why
different customer classes exist for rate making purposes. Accordingly,
a more equitable rate would utilize a rate structure that explicitly
tracks utility costs for sales made to QFs rather than a broad structure
that applies to all customers. This approach is consistent with the
PURPA scheme because unjustifiable discrimination is not allowed and
should be guarded against.
Moreover, the rates at which QFs can purchase power are crucial
to the development of decentralized generation. For example, if average
costs are higher than marginal costs at a given generation point, then it
may be reasonable to base all purchase rates on average costs, or at
least charge the QF a rate higher than marginal costs as shown in Ex-
hibit 5. This approach would provide additional payments from QFs'
power purchases so that QFs would contribute revenues to meet the
utility's fixed costs as other ratepayors. This approach, however, may
simply encourage QFs to install extra capacity and forego purchasing
any electricity from the utility.
Cost
per
Unit
Marginal
EXHIBIT 5
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The proposed Florida cogeneration guidelines in section 25-17.84
of the Florida Administrative Code do not appear to capture the above
underlying economic consequences. However, the rate setting procedure
may compensate for any lack of foresight in these rules or lack of spe-
cific guidelines.
V. Effective Implementation of Florida's Approach - A
Realistic Analysis
A. Wheeling
Section 210 of PURPA does not provide QFs with an automatic
right to wheel its electricity to other utilities outside the adjacent util-
ity's service area. Further, QFs are not granted the statutory right to
request a FERC wheeling order under sections 211 and 212 of the Fed-
eral Power Act because such wheeling requests are limited to facilities
defined as public utilities, and the thrust of PURPA is not to define
cogenerators as utilities.66 The FERC unofficially has stated that the
agency will not move on the issue of forced wheeling for cogenerators.
The reason stated for this policy is that no party has demonstrated that
forced wheeling will boost the efficiency of electricity generation or dis-
tribution.6" The FERC regulations, constrained by the FERC's author-
ity to order wheeling, do enable a QF to wheel with the consent of the
adjacent utility and any other intervening utility.68 If every utility co-
operated in wheeling, QFs could shop around for the most favorable
rate throughout the utility grid.
A strong economic incentive to wheel may exist between a QF and
an adjacent utility where the adjacent utility does not generate its own
power, but rather purchases its power in bulk from another utility. The
66. 16 U.S.C. § 824 j and k (Supp. 1983).
67. FERC Will Not Move on Issue of Forced Wheeling, not Even for Cogener-
ators, ELEC. UTIL. WK., Aug. 2, 1982, at 1.
68. 18 C.F.R. § 292.303(d) (1983). This section, in relevant part, provides:
If a qualifying facility agrees, an electric utility which would otherwise be
obligated to purchase energy or capacity from such qualifying facility may
transmit the energy or capacity to any other electric utility. Any electric
utility to which such energy or capacity is transmitted shall purchase such
energy or capacity under this subpart as if the qualifying facility were
supplying energy or capacity directly to such electric utility.
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best example of this situation is an electricity cooperative. Assume the
adjacent utility buys electricity at rates based on the nonadjacent util-
ity's average embedded cost, but that this rate is lower than the
nonadjacent utility's avoided cost. Further assume that the nonadjacent
utility's embedded cost rate and avoided cost rate are five and ten cents
per kilowatt hour respectively. Assume also that the QF sold its elec-
tricity to the adjacent utility for purchases from the nonadjacent facil-
ity (i.e., five cents per kilowatt hour). That is, the adjacent utility's
purchase price from the nonadjacent utility represents the full avoided
costs. Under this scenario, an obvious incentive exists for the QF to
wheel to the nonadjacent utility rather than sell to the adjacent utility.
Selling QF power to the nonadjacent utility would provide ten cents per
kilowatt hour payment to the cogenerator as opposed to a five cents per
kilowatt hour if sold to the adjacent utility. The adjacent utility bene-
fits because the facility can continue to purchase power from a stable
source. Practically, however, the QFs' incentive may be reduced by the
requirement that the transmitting utility be reimbursed for the line
losses or by the burden of negotiation costs.
Some PUCs have-noted the importance of wheeling to QF develop-
ment, but few have made specific substantive rulings. The lack of PUC
involvement in this area may be based on its position that states lack
direct authority to order wheeling because of federal pre-emption. Fur-
ther, a reasonable position might be that efforts by PUCs to assert di-
rect jurisdiction over wheeling may violate the pre-emption doctrine
even if the transaction takes place within the state concerned. This po-
sition is based on cases where courts have viewed utility transmission
lines, which are interconnected with the grids of other states, as being
essentially in interstate commerce and subject to the Federal Power
Act. Extending this reasoning then, even if a QF made direct sales to
non-utility end users, the utilization of a utility's transmission lines
would be subject to federal jurisdiction. This conclusion would be the
same regardless of whether the sale itself were a wholesale sale, subject
to FERC jurisdiction, or a retail sale, usually subject to PUC jurisdic-
tion. This position is not universal, however, and the matter has not
been directly tested in the courts.69
The FPSC's rules do not follow this line of analysis, but do follow
the minority view. Section 25-17.835(1) of the Florida Administrative
Code requires the utility in whose service area the QF is located, and
69. Lock & Kuiker, supra note 48, at 679.
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any other intervening utility, to wheel the QFs' electricity to any
purchasing utility.70 The QF, however, must pay for all costs associated
with such wheeling including wheeling charges, line losses and inadver-
tent energy flows. 71 The wheeling utility may petition the FPSC to
waive this wheeling requirement if the utility's ability to provide ade-
quate service to its other customers will be impaired or will unduly
burden the utility. 72 As aforementioned, the commission believed that
the maximum benefit of decentralized generation would be achieved by
establishing a statewide wholesale market for QF power. This wheeling
requirement again remains consistent with the statewide approach in
establishing purchase rates for firm energy and capacity. With respect
to firm energy and capacity, the FPSC has attempted to establish a
regulatory scheme where QFs would not be concerned with the wheel-
ing because of the established statewide price and where the QF would
merely contract with the utility in whose service area it is located. This
statewide price would eliminate the need for a QF to shop for the high-
est price because the highest price would be predetermined. The utility
planning the statewide unit would then purchase QF capacity from all
other utilities73 and thus satisfy its capacity needs. Under this regula-
tory plan, the contractual process is streamlined and the utility whose
capacity needs have been aleviated receives the necessary electricity.
Alternatively, the FPSC provided for QFs to deal directly with the
utility planning the statewide unit or to market its electrical power to
other utilities.7 4 Thus, under the FPSC's integrated plan, QFs can ne-
gotiate contracts throughout the state for the purchases of their power
and are guaranteed a means of delivery. This wheeling requirement
should encourage decentralized generation because QFs can effectively
shop around for the "best deal" in the state, if one exists.
The financial incentives of shopping around depend significantly on
the wheeling charges imposed by the transmitting facility. The FPSC
70. FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 25-17.835 (1983). This section provides in part:
"Where such sakes are made the utility in whose service territory the qualifying facility
is located and any other intervening utility shall make arrangements to wheel electric-
ity produced by the qualifying facility to the purchasing utility." Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 25-17.835, Docket No. 820406-EU, Order No. 12634,
(Oct. 27, 1983), at 20.
74. Id. at 21. The FPSC believed that "since the ratepayors will experience no
direct benefit as a result of wheeling of power . . . the wheeling utility absorb no costs
of the transaction." Id.
46
Nova Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [1984], Art. 10
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol9/iss1/10
Florida PURPA
has ruled that QFs be responsible for all wheeling expenses. The FPSC
adopted this rule based on the equitable considerations of the transmit-
ting utilities' ratepayors in that the wheeling utility's ratepayors will
receive no direct benefit as a result of wheeling QF power; accordingly,
the wheeling utility should absorb no costs of the transaction. 75 The
actual detrimental effect of this rule to cogeneration development var-
ies if the electricity is wheeled from a QF to a utility in which the
statewide avoided unit is located. If the purchasing utility is directly
interconnected with the utility planning the statewide avoided unit and
has transmission line capability, one could reasonably assert that no
wheeling charges should be imposed. If, however, the purchasing utility
is not directly interconnected, but must wheel the QF's electricity
through a third utility whose transmission capability is not available,
then affected utilities should impose wheeling charges on the QF or
refuse such wheeling. Further, if the purchasing utility is not directly
interconnected, and must wheel the electricity through a third utility
with sufficient line capacity, the wheeling utility should impose wheel-
ing charges to recover any resulting costs. The FPSC has adopted the
above approach, but expressed doubt as to whether the commission or
the FERC has the authority to establish such wheeling rates. The im-
pact of this intrastate approach of decentralized generation depends on
the ability of the FPSC to receive a favorable legal opinion from the
FERC and possibly ultimately from the courts.
B. Environmental Impact
In addition to the uncertainty surrounding the FPSC's authority to
order wheeling, environmental issues dampen the proposed advantages
of a legislative encouragement of decentralized generation. The use of
excess waste heat or certain fuels may result in severe environmental
damage which would not be permitted by a public utility. Electric utili-
ties are subject to the Florida Electrical Energy Power Plant Siting Act
(the "Siting Act") in addition to various Federal environmental re-
quirements. Although inadequate in their operation,76 these statutory
requirements provide a framework for evaluating the environmental
75. FLA. STAT. § 403.501-519 (1983).
76. See Note, Florida Electrical Energy Power Plant Siting Act: Perpetuating
Power Industry Supremacy in the Certification Process, - U. FLA. L. REV. -
(1984); Note, Nuclear Power Plant Siting: Additional Reductions in State Authority,
28 U. FLA. L. REV. 439 (1979).
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impact of planned power plants. Moreover, the Siting Act does not
even apply to facilities which produce under 50 megawatts which
would include many QFs.11 The same framework for analyzing large
power plant production would not apply to cogeneration facilities al-
though the environmental concerns would be identical.
The development of environmental standards for QFs would be eq-
uitable to all parties included. First, the economic feasibility of QF pro-
duction should be evaluated in light of all relevant costs including envi-
ronmental concerns. Second, a balance must be struck between the
encouragement of decentralized generation and the protection of the
natural resources. Currently, the balance weighs heavily in favor of de-
centralized generation. Third, rate payors should not be required to pay
avoided costs which include costs of complying with environmental reg-
ulations to QFs which do have to comply with the identical regulations.
If ratepayors must pay full avoided costs, they should receive the same
environmental protection. Finally, such protections extend the intent of
the Siting Act. Therefore, current cogeneration and small power pro-
duction provisions at both the state and federal levels should be modi-
fied to effectively deal with the environmental implications of decen-
tralized generation.
C. Implications of Simultaneous Sales and Purchases
The FERC rules permit a QF simultaneously to sell its entire out-
put to a utility at avoided cost and to buy energy from the utility at
retail rates.78 The consequences of this approach are demonstrated in
Exhibit 6. Average costs are less than marginal costs. Existing cus-
tomer and QF purchase rates are based on average costs such as shown
at point x. QFs can sell their output at the higher marginal cost to the
utilities which are required to purchase at this avoided cost. Under this
scenerio, a QF will receive higher payments for electricity sold to the
utility (marginal costs) than a QF must pay for electricity purchases
(average cost). Thus, the QF may in fact receive a net payment from
the utility even though all its output may be used on site.
77. FLA. STAT. § 403.503(7) (1983). This section provides in part: "Electric
power plant means . . . except that this term does not include any steam or solar elec-
trical generating facility of less than 50 megawatts in capacity. Id.
78. 18 C.F.R. § 292.305 (1983).
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Cost
per
Unit Marginal Cost
(Avoided Cost)
Average VariableS Cost
(Price QF's can
purchase power)
Output0 X
EXHIBIT 6
This approach represents a substantial policy decision and can be
justified on several grounds. First, one could assert that cogenerators
should not be discriminated against in the purchase of electricity sim-
ply because they are co-producers of electricity. In return for being
granted a state potential monopoly and guaranteed a specific rate of
return on investments, utilities owe an obligation to all customers, in-
cluding QFs. Additionally, it is arguable that ratepayors are not paying
more for the electricity than if the utility produced the power itself
because payments to QFs are based on the utility's avoided costs. Fi-
nally, this approach provides an additional incentive to the development
of decentralized generation which could benefit all parties in the long
run.
Notwithstanding the above rationale, there is an inherent injustice
in permitting QFs to benefit from simultaneous purchases and sales.
under certain instances. For example, consider an industrial plant
which produces excessive waste heat. The plant had previously obtained
the requisite power from the local public utility. Because of the
cogeneration rules, the industrial plant installs a power production
mechanism which produces electricity far in excess of. the plant's needs.
Moreover, the plant chooses this oversize capacity to take advantage of
the simultaneous purchase and sale requirements and even purchases
an inefficient boiler to reduce production costs. Under this scenerio, the
plant can purchase the public utility's power at the lower average cost,
yet force the utility to purchase the plant's power at the higher avoided
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cost. The plant benefits from receiving payments far in excess of their
power production costs. It is doubtful whether the ratepayors benefit
because the utility must purchase the electricity at a higher price, not
for just the net amount, i.e., what the plant produced over what the
plant purchased from the utility, but for the entire amount produced.
That is, if the plant produced eighty megawatts, but only used two
megawatts, the utility would have to purchase the full eighty mega-
watts and not the more logical seventy-eight megawatts. Moreover, all
parties suffer if the plant's production facilities cause more pollution
than if the utility produced the incremental amount.
The FPSC has adopted both a simultaneous buy/sell approach
and a net billing approach under the current rules; however, simultane-
ous buy/sell arrangements must be available to QFs if they choose."
Given the above scenario, more flexibility should be built into the fed-
eral and state rules to permit only a net billing approach in the appro-
priate situation.
VI. Conclusion
Decentralized generation has many potential benefits. The realiza-
tion of these benefits, however, depends on an effective implementation
of the federal provision by the state PUCs. Additionally, the effective-
ness of the rates imposed depend on the specific economic conditions
for both the utility and the QF. Notwithstanding this limitation, Flor-
ida has adopted a unique and well-reasoned approach to implement
these rules by balancing the competing interests of QF development
and existing ratepayors. Ratepayors theoretically bear no additional
costs under the FPSC's rules yet are still able to reap the benefits of a
decentralized generation approach. Environmental issues have yet to be
adequately addressed. However, this balancing should result in a well-
planned and cost effective development of decentralized generation in
this state.
79. FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 25-17.82 (3), Docket No. 820406-EU, Order No. 12443,
(Sept. 2, 1983).
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Comparative Analysis: Agents' Personal Liability on
Negotiable Instruments
J. Clifton Cox*
I. Introduction
Negotiable instruments receive similar treatment in many devel-
oped nations. Justice Story noted one hundred and forty years ago that
"[t]he law respecting negotiable instruments may be truly declared, in
the language of Cicero, adopted by Lord Mansfield ... to be in great
measure, not the law of a single country only, but of the commercial
world."1 Nevertheless, three major commercial law systems remain in
the western world: the United States Uniform Commercial Code,2 the
English Bills of Exchange Act,3 and the Geneva Conventions on negoti-
able instruments.4 This article compares these systems of negotiable in-
struments law by discussing the formal requirements for negotiable in-
* B.A., Stetson University; J.D., Vanderbilt University. Associate; McCune,
Hiaasen, Crum, Ferris and Gardner, Fort Lauderdale, Florida.
1. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 19 (1842).
2. This article only discusses such negotiable instruments as checks, drafts which
are governed by article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code, promissory notes, and
certificates of deposit. See U.C.C. § 3-104(2). All states have now adopted article 3 of
the U.C.C. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 5 (2d ed. 1980).
All citations to the U.C.C are to the 1972 official text unless otherwise indicated.
Scholars have written excellent treatises and commentaries analysing United States law
on negotiable instruments. See, e.g., J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra; Holland, Corpo-
rate Officers Beware-Your Signature on a Negotiable Instrument May Be Hazardous
to Your Health, 13 IND. L. REV. 893 (1980). A thorough discussion of United States
law is beyond the scope of this article. The writer will identify significant legal provi-
sions, issues, and policies only to the extent necessary for comparison with law of for-
eign jurisdictions.
3. Bills of Exchange Act of 1882, 45 & 46 Vic., ch. 61, reprinted in 3 HALS-
BURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 186 (3d ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as Bills of Ex-
change Act]. See also Cheques Act of 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, ch. 36, reprinted in 3
HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 238 [hereinafter cited as Cheques Act].
4. June 7, 1980, 143 L.N.T.S. 259. The Geneva Conventions are the basis for
commercial practices in several civil law jurisdictions in continental Europe. See infra
note 181. French legal practices will be utilized to illustrate the effects of the Geneva
Conventions on the law of a ratifying country.
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struments, the effects of negotiability, the rudiments of agency law,
questions of conflict of laws, and proposals for reform, addressing the
question: How may an agent avoid personal liability on a negotiable
instrument he signs in his principal's behalf?
II. United States
A. Negotiable Instruments
A negotiable instrument 5 is a written6 and signed promise or order
to pay a sum certain in money to order or to bearer on demand or at a
specific time.7 These instruments include drafts, checks, certificates of
deposit, and promissory notes. 8 A negotiable instrument confers legal
rights on a holder9 separate from a party's rights on any underlying
obligation. 10 An obligor may be subject to suit either on or off the in-
strument." No one is liable on a negotiable instrument, however, unless
5. Whether an instrument is negotiable may determine whether a person obli-
gated on the instrument may present personal defenses against a holder. See U.C.C. §
3-305. This note will, therefore, devote substantial attention to definition of negotiable
instruments.
6. U.C.C. § 1-201(46) defines "writing" to include "printing, typewriting, or any
other intentional reduction to tangible form."
7. U.C.C. § 3-104(1).
8. U.C.C. § 3-104(2).
9. U.C.C. § 1-201(20) defines "holder" as "a person who is in possession of a
document of title or an instrument or a certificated investment security drawn, issued,
or indorsed to him or his order or to bearer or in blank." A holder in due course is a
holder who has purchased the negotiable instrument for value (defined in U.C.C. § 3-
303 as a significant economic interest), in good faith, and without notice of any claim
or defense to the instrument or of any violation of its provisions. U.C.C. § 3-302.
There can only be a holder in due course if the instrument is negotiable. See
U.C.C. § 3-805. A holder in due course takes the instrument free from most defenses,
including failure of consideration. U.C.C. § 3-305.
The Code distinguishes between real defenses, which an obligor may assert against
a holder in due course (U.C.C. § 3-305), and personal defenses such as failure of con-
sideration (U.C.C. § 3.408), which an obligor may not assert against a holder in due
course. An agent may also escape liability on the instrument if his principal ratifies the
signature; the agent then may be liable to the principal. U.C.C. § 3-404 official com-
ment 3.
10. U.C.C. § 3-301.
11. U.C.C. § 3-802 qualifies this concept of obligations both on and off the
instrument:
(l)unless otherwise agreed where an instrument is taken for an underlying obligation
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his signature12 appears on the instrument 13 or is firmly attached on an
allonge.14
The Code defines "signature" broadly. A signature may be "any
symbol executed or adopted by a party with present intention to au-
thenticate a writing."15 The word "adopted" implies that after a mark
is executed, a party may cause that mark to become his valid signature.
The Official Comment advises courts to use "common sense and com-
mercial experience" to determine whether a given mark constitutes a
signature.1 " Although a letterhead may be a signature for purposes of
the Code, the finder of the fact should be loath to find a "signature"
in such an improbable place.
B. Signature by Agent
Commercial practice requires, and article 3 affirms, that agents
may obligate their principals without binding themselves on negotiable
instruments if the agents are authorized to sign instruments and they
sign according to the rigid forms prescribed by the Code. An agent
may present the same defenses that his principal could assert in an
action to enforce payment on a negotiable instrument. If the agent
deviates from the Code's requirements, he may find himself personally
obligated and unable to assert a defense against a holder in due course.
(a)the obligation is pro tanto discharged if a bank is drawer, maker or acceptor of
the instrument and there is no recourse on the instrument against the underlying
obligor; and
(b)in any other case the obligation is suspended pro tanto until the instrument is
due or if it is payable on demand until its presentment. If the instrument is dishon-
ored action may be maintained on either the instrument or the obligation; discharge
of the underlying obligor on the instrument also discharges him on the obligation.
(2)The taking in good faith of a check which is not post dated does not of itself so
extend the time on the original obligation as to discharge of surety.
Id.
12. See U.C.C. § 3-401(2), defining "signature" broadly as "any name, includ-
ing any trade or assume name . . . or by any word or mark used in lieu of a written
signature."
13. U.C.C. § 3-401.
14. U.C.C. § 3-401(1) and official comment 1, referring to U.C.C. § 3-202(2),
which provides that an allonge is deemed to be part of the instrument to which it is
attached.
15. U.C.C. § 1-201(39).
16. U.C.C. § 1-201 official comment 39.
17. Id.
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1. Form of Signature
An agent must satisfy stringent requirements for the form of his
signature in order to obligate his principal and to escape personal lia-
bility on the instrument."' Professor Arthur E. Sutherland summarized
the effect of these provisions on signatures executed in both proper and
improper form:
3-403(2) contemplates at least three diferrent types of signatures:
(1) X. Inc. A. E. Brown
(2) X. Inc. by A. E. Brown, V.P.
(3) A. E. Brown, Vice President
Under 3-403(2), in case (1), as Mr. Brown did not indicate his
representative capacity, both he and X Inc. are bound. In case (2),
only X Inc. is bound because the instrument names the representa-
tive capacity. In the third case, although the unfortunate signer
added words indicating a representative capacity, he failed to dis-
close his principal. Under these circumstances, X Inc. not being
named, is not bound; and Brown is individually bound. 9
The signer of a negotiable instrument generally will be personally
18. U.C.C. § 3-403 provides:
(I)A signature may be made by an agent or other representative, and his authority to
make it may be established as in any other cases of representation. No particular
form of appointment is necessary to establish such authority.
(2)An authorized representative who signs his own name to an instrument
(a)is personally obligated if the instrument neither names the person represented
nor shows that the representative signed in a representative capacity;
(b)except as otherwise established between the immediate parties, is personally
obligated if the instrument names the person represented but does not show that the
representative signed in a representative capacity, or if the instrument does not name
the person represented but does show that the representative signed in a representa-
tive capacity.
Id.
The language "or other representative" in U.C.C. § 3-403 was added to show that
trustees and executors or administrators of estates, in addition to technical agents, may
affect legal relations between legal entities. See U.C.C. § 1-201(35).
19. Letter of Professor Arthur E. Sutherland to New York Law Revision Com-
mission, August 9, 1954, reprinted in 1 LAW REVISION COMMISSION REPORTS OF
HEARINGS ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 240, 251 (1954) [hereinafter cited
as LAW REVISION COMMISSION REPORTS].
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liable unless the instrument indicates that he signed in a representative
capacity and the instrument also identifies the principal.20 The intro-
ductory phrase "except as otherwise established between the immediate
parties" indicates that this rule is not conclusive. An agent who appears
obligated on a negotiable instrument may in some cases escape liability
by presenting parol evidence showing the parties did not intend to bind
him. Courts will only admit parol evidence, however, if the instrument
contains an ambiguity placing the holder on notice that the intended
obligor may be someone other than the person who signed. A substan-
tial body of precedent has established that the requisite ambiguity may
exist anywhere on the face of the instrument; the form of the signature
need not place the holder on notice that the signer did not intend to be
bound.
In St. Croix Engineering Corp. v. McLay,21 the Minnesota Su-
preme Court admitted parol evidence as it held that the agent was not
personally obligated on the instrument.2 2 The court considered facts in-
dicating that the plaintiff knew initially that the defendant signed in a
representative capacity: the name, address, and logo of Mitronics, Inc.,
were printed in the upper left corner of each check; a check cutting
machine imprinted the written sum on each check; St. Croix knew Mc-
Lay did business as a corporation; St. Croix initially sued Mitronics,
Inc., rather than McLay; the plaintiff complained to Mitronics after
the checks were dishonored.23 The court found that section 3-403 re-
quired acknowledgement of agency on the instrument, but not necessa-
rily in the signature.2 4 The opinion recognized that the fact finder may
consider business practice and custom. 25 The court also indicated in
dicta that it would be more likely to find an agent personally liable on a
corporate note than on a corporate check. 6
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia admitted parol
20. See U.C.C. § 3-403, supra note 18.
21. 304 N.W.2d 912 (Minn. 1981).
22. Id. at 915. Gerald McLay, president of Mitronics, Inc., issued checks to St.
Croix Engineering Corp. St. Croix sued Mitronics when the checks were dishonored,
and Mitronics entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy. St. Croix then sued the estate of Mc-
Lay, who had died after Mitronics entered bankruptcy. St. Croix claimed that Mc-
Lay's failure to indicate he signed on behalf of Mitronics caused McLay to be person-
ally liable on the instrument under U.C.C. § 3-403. Id. at 913-14.
23. Id. at 914-15.
24. Id. at 914.
25. Id. at 915, citing J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 2, at 405.
26. McLay, 304 N.W.2d at 915.
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evidence to exonerate the defendant in Chidakel v. Blonder.17 Plaintiff
sued Harvey and Florence Blonder on a note that provided:
For Value Received Discount Car Wash Number Five, A Va.
Corp. promise [sic] to pay to the order of Pauline P. Chidakel the
sum of One Hundred Thousand ($100,000.00) Dollars.
Attest: Discount Car Wash Number 5
(Initials "H.B.") by (signature
of Florence Blonder). 28
The court found that Harvey was not bound because the face of
the instrument revealed that he signed only as a witness.2 9 The opinion
next recognized that this promissory note did not fall within any cate-
gory in U.C.C. section 3-403; the note was a hybrid of sections 3-
403(2)(b) and 3-403(3). 0 Florence's title did not follow her name, but
her name followed the word "by" and was immediately below the name
of the business. The opinion recognized that the face of the note indi-
cated the person represented (Discount) and provided some evidence
that Florence signed in a representative capacity.31 The court noted a
split of authority over whether the word "by" may be evidence of rep-
resentative rather than personal capacity,3 2 and held that parol evi-
dence was admissible in this case to show the agent signed only in a
representative capacity.
The St. Croix Engineering Corp. and Chidakel courts based their
holdings on findings that the face of the instrument did not show
clearly whether the agent signed in a representative capacity. The
courts admitted parol evidence to resolve the dispute. The Alabama Su-
preme Court elaborated on this view in Wurzburg Bros. Inc. v. Cole-
man.3 The opinion noted that the Code3 4 allows parol evidence to re-
27. 431 A.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
28. Id. at 595.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 596.
31. Id.
32. Compare Southeastern Financial Corp. v. Smith, 397 F. Supp. 649 (D. Ala.
1975), rev'd on other grounds, 542 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1976); and Dynamic Homes,
Inc. v. Rogers, 331 So. 2d 326 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that "by" and other
factors indicate representative rather than personal capacity) with Giacalone v. Bern-
stein, 348 So. 2d 679 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977), cert. denied, 354 So. 2d 980 (Fla.
1977).
33. 404 So. 2d 334 (Ala. 1981). Defendant was president of Coleman American
Moving Services, Inc. Plaintiff sold supplies to Coleman American on an open account.
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solve a dispute between initial parties to the instrument if there is a
partially disclosed principal,3 5 or if the instrument names the person
represented, but does not indicate the agent signed in a representative
capacity.36 The Wurzburg Bros. Inc. court next found it could look be-
yond the signature on the instrument to determine representative ca-
pacity,37 but noted that defendant had the burden of proof to establish
he was not liable. 8 The opinion emphasized the policy of promoting
certainty and predictability in the law of negotiable instruments.3 9
Holders of instruments "should be able 'to tell at a glance whose obli-
gation they hold' ".40
In their debates about the Uniform Commercial Code, the New
York Law Revision Commission devoted surprisingly little attention to
the policies behind U.C.C. section 3-403.41 The dearth of discussion
may have resulted from the similarity between the New York Negotia-
ble Instruments Law then in effect and U.C.C. section 3-403.42 The
Coleman American paid with checks that the bank dishonored. Plaintiff's credit man-
ager feared Coleman American would become insolvent. He therefore had defendant
sign a note to secure the debt. The note provided: "Coleman American Moving Ser-
vices, Inc. promises to pay ... $44,419.68." The note was signed "James H. Cole-
man" and did not indicate that Coleman signed in a representative capacity. The Ala-
bama Supreme Court admitted parole evidence and found defendant personally liable
on the instrument. Id. at 335-37.
34. U.C.C. § 3-403(2) provides "except as otherwise established ... " implying
that parol evidence is admissible in the situations described.
35. Wurzburg Bros, Inc., 404 So. 2d at 336. A person acts for a partially dis-
closed principal if he acknowledges the representative capacity of his signature but he
does not identify the persons he represents. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 4
(1958), [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
36. Wurzburg Bros, Inc., 404 So. 2d at 336.
37. Id. The court recognized opposing authority. See, e.g. St. Regis Paper Co. v.
Wicklund, 24 Wash. App. 552, 597 P.2d 926 (1979).
38. Wurzburg Bros., Inc., 404 So. 2d at 336 (citing Byrd Co. v. Tolbert, 286
Ala. 465, 241 So. 2d 840 (1971)); Fanning v. Hembree Oil Co., 245 Ark. 825, 434
S.W.2d 822 (1968). Defendant failed to meet this burden; the court placed little
weight on his self serving statements because another court had recently convicted him
of securities fraud. Wurzburg Bros, Inc., 404 So. 2d at 337.
39. Wurzburg Bros, Inc., 404 So. 2d at 336, citing Rotuba Extruders, Inc. v.
Ceppos, 46 N.Y.2d 23, 385 N.E.2d 1068, 413 N.Y.S. 2d 141 (1978).
40. Wurzburg Bros, Inc., 404 So. 2d at 336, quoting J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS,
supra note 2, at 489.
41. See generally LAw REVISION COMMISSION REPORTS, supra note 19.
42. Section 38 of the New York Negotiable Instrument Law (1877) was adopted
from section 19 of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (1896). 1 LAW REVISION
COMMISSION REPORTS, supra note 19 at 223 (1955). This section provided: "Signature
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Law Revision Commission noted that both the U.C.C. and the Negoti-
able Instruments Law imposed a potentially severe burden on an agent
who intended to act on behalf of another.43 The Commission concluded,
however, that "[t]he requirements of certainty and definiteness of com-
mercial paper are thought to call for this unfortunate's [the agent's]
sacrifice if he has not signed in the correct form. That is the rationale
of the harsh rule, as described in Comment 3 to Section 3-403."" 4 The
Commissioners observed that New York followed the minority rule
which admitted parol evidence in a suit between initial parties but re-
fused to admit it as a defense to suit by a holder in due course.45 The
Commission concluded that adoption of the U.C.C. would change this
practice. 46 The Code, however, may achieve a similar result in a less
direct manner because an obligor may assert personal defenses, includ-
ing failure of consideration,47 against anyone other than a holder in due
course.
48
In Havatampa Corp. v. Walton Drug Co., Inc.,49 a Florida District
Court of Appeals noted that the presumption in favor of agent's per-
sonal liability promotes certainty and predictability in negotiable in-
by agent; authority; how shown.-The signature of any party may be made by a duly
authorized agent. No particular form of appointment is necessary for this purpose; and
the authority of the agent may be established as in other cases of agency." Id.
43. Id. at 225.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 226-27.
46. Id. at 227.
47. U.C.C. § 3-408.
48. U.C.C. § 3-305. The Commission recognized policies supporting the minority
rule and the U.C.C.:
A holder in due course should not be required to inquire what was meant
by that form of signature [words of agency alone]. Such inquiry would
slow up the ready transfer of negotiable instruments as a substitute for
money. Hence the agent should not be allowed as against a holder in due
course to show by parol evidence that he did not intend to bind himself
personally. But as against a plaintiff who is the payee and who has dealt
directly with the agent, it does not seem to make sense to say that the
agent will not be permitted to show that such payee plaintiff knew that the
agent did not intend to be bound personally, for the payee could not have
been misled by such form of signature.
2 LAw REVISION COMMISSION REPORTS, supra note 19, at 227 (quoting F. WHITNEY,
BILLS AND NOTES 19 (1943).
49. 354 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). Defendants executed a note
stating "We promise to pay .... ," and signed
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struments. 50 Imposing a burden on the agent to reveal his representa-
tive capacity and to identify his principal makes negotiable instruments
easier to understand by their purchasers and thereby enhances negotia-
bility.51 The court refused to dismiss suit against the agent because
there was an ambiguity on the face of the promissory note the agent
signed.
2. Authority for Signature
An agent generally will be liable on a negotiable instrument if he
signs in his principal's behalf but without the principal's authority.52
The Official Comment elaborates: " 'Unauthorized signature' . . .in-
cludes both a forgery and a signature made by an agent exceeding his
actual or apparent authority. ' 53 In hearings in which it decided to
adopt the U.C.C. for the District of Columbia, the District of Colum-
bia Committee in the House of Representatives noted that the Code
was not an abrupt change from existing law; it merely settled several
questions as it codified current commercial law concepts.54 Principles of
law and equity, including the law of principal and agent, supplement
Walton Drug Co., Inc. d/b/a Touchton
Drugs and/or
(seal) (seal)
Bob Edrington, Owner
Bob Edrington, President.
(seal)
The court refused to dismiss the suit because reasonable people could differ over
whether the parties intended the agent to be bound. The opinion noted that the word
"President" after Edrington's signature may have been used either to identify the
signer or to show representative capacity. Id. at 1236-37.
50. Id. at 1237.
51. Id.
52. See U.C.C. § 3-404(1), which provides:
Any unauthorized signature is wholly inoperative as that of the person
whose name is signed unless he ratifies it or is precluded from denying it;
but it operates as the signature of the unauthorized signer in favor of any
person who in good faith pays the instrument or takes it for value.
An exhaustive study of agency law is beyond the scope of this note. The author
presents the following discussion as an overview to applicable law and practice.
53. U.C.C. § 3-404 official comment 1.
54. Hearing on H.R. 5338 Before Subcommittee Five of the Committee on the
District of Columbia, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1963), HousE MISCELLANEOUS RE-
PORTS ON PUBLIC BILLS, serial set 12, 540 at 3.
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the Code except when these principles are clearly inconsistent with the
Code's provisions.5" This is fortunate; article 3 does not delineate the
possible sources of an agent's authority to bind his principal. The offi-
cial Comment to section 3-403 provides some insight but does not clar-
ify adequately the possible sources of authority.56 The Code directs the
practitioner to other legal sources, particularly the common law, for
interpretation of agent's authority.57
The second Restatement of Agency recognizes five sources of an
agent's power to bind his principal: express authority,58 implied author-
ity,59 apparent authority,60 inherent power, 61 and ratification. 62
a. Express Authority
Express authority is easy to recognize and, if written, is easy to
prove. 63 The essential requirement is a communication by the principal
to the agent indicating that the agent may act on the principal's be-
half.64 Courts will only consider the statement by the principal; the
principal's unexpressed intent is irrelevant.6 5 An agent who relies on an
express conferral of authority by the principal and who signs according
to the form provided in U.C.C. section 3-403 will bind the principal but
will not obligate himself on the instrument.66
b. Implied Authority
The Restatement of Agency defines implied authority as actual
55. U.C.C. § 1-103.
56.
The power to sign for another may be an express authority, or it may be
implied in law or in fact, or it may rest merely upon apparent authority. It
may be established as in other cases of representation, and when relevant
parol evidence is admissible to prove it or deny it.
U.C.C. § 3-403 official comment.
57. See U.C.C. § 1-403.
58. RESTATEMENT § 7.
59. Id. at § 35.
60. Id. at §§ 8, 159.
61. Id. at § 8A.
62. Id. at § 82; U.C.C. § 3-404 official comment 3.
63. See generally RESTATEMENT § 7 at 28-29, § 26 at 100.
64. Id.
65. Id. § 26 at 100.
66. Id. §§ 320, 324.
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authority to perform acts that are incidental to the purpose of the
agency. 67 Communications between principal and agent determine ap-
plicability of both express and implied authority.68 An agent should be
loath to rely on implied authority in the absence of such factors as
business emergencies69 or a principal's statements to third parties by
which the principal recognizes the agent's authority to act.70 The Re-
statement clarifies the scope of implied authority. Unless otherwise
agreed, authority to manage a business includes authority to make inci-
dental or reasonably necessary contracts, to buy necessary equipment
and supplies, to make necessary repairs, to employ or discharge em-
ployees as reasonably necessary, to sell products in accordance with
business purposes, to receive payment on the principal's behalf, and to
pay business debts.7
c. Apparent Authority
A principal's statement to a third party that his agent has author-
ity to act will confer apparent authority on the agent and will empower
the agent to bind the principal, even if the principal privately ordered
the agent not to act. 2 Courts limit the scope of apparent authority by
requiring the third party's reliance to be reasonable.7 3 In Taillie v.
67. "Unless otherwise agreed, authority to conduct a transaction includes author-
ity to do acts which are incidental to it, usually accompany it, or are reasonably neces-
sary to accomplish it." Id. § 35.
68. Ebasco Services, Inc. v. Pa. Power & L. Co., 402 F. Supp. 421, 445 (E.D.
Pa. 1975).
69. RESTATEMENT § 47 recognizes the agent's authority to do whatever he rea-
sonably believes necessary to prevent a substantial loss to his principal in an unforeseen
situation. The unforseen situation and reasonable belief as to what is necessary may be
difficult to establish. Courts, therefore, have considered relatively few cases in which
agents relied on implied or emergency authority.
70. See "apparent authority," infra notes 72-80 and accompanying text.
71. RESTATEMENT § 73.
72. Id. § 8 and comment a; § 160.
73. In Stephens v. Yamaha Motor Co., Ltd., 627 P.2d 439 (Okla. 1981), the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that plaintiff was not entitled to rely on the appear-
ance of an agency relation. Id. at 442. The Stephens plaintiff had the defendant repair
a motorcycle tire because plaintiff believed defendant was affiliated with Conoco. The
only reason for believing there was a connection between defendant's service station
and Conoco was the small Conoco sign defendant displayed. When his tire deflated,
plaintiff sued defendant's service station and Conoco, Inc., arguing that defendant had
apparent authority to bind Conoco to express and implied warranties. Id. at 440. The
Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment for Conoco as it noted, "Ap-
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Chedester7' the Tennessee Court of Appeals based a finding of appar-
ent authority on a course of dealing. The unanimous opinion found that
plaintiffs were entitled to rely on apparent authority of Chedester's
fiancee' because of her supervision of construction and the course of
changes she ordered. 5
Similarly, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals found apparent au-
thority in a course of dealing in Southline Equipment Co. v. National
Marine Service, Inc., 6 but noted that estoppel is the basis for apparent
parent authority exists only to the extent that it is reasonable for the third person
dealing with the agent to believe that the agent is authorized. Id. at 441 (quoting
RESTATEMENT § 8 comment c. The court quoted Rosser-Moon Furniture Co. v.
Oklahoma State Bank, 192 Okla. 169, 135 P.2d 336 (1943)):
"Apparent authority" of an agent is such authority as the principal know-
ingly permits the agent to assume or which he holds the agent out as pos-
sessing. And the elements that must be present before a third person can
hold the principal for the acts of the agent on the theory of apparent au-
thority are (a) conduct of the principal, (b) reliance thereon by the third
person, and (c) change of position by the third person to his detriment.
Stephens, 627 P.2d at 441.
74. 600 S.W.2d 732 (Tenn. App. 1980). Chedester entered an agreement with a
general contractor to build his home. Chedester's fiancee watched the work and pro-
posed changes in plans. The contractor considered her Chedester's agent, and made all
changes she proposed. When she asked to change cabinets, the contractor introduced
her to plaintiffs, who were cabinet makers. She agreed to proposed plans and cost.
When Chedester did not pay for the change, plaintiffs sued Chedester and the general
contractor. The court rejected Chedester's argument that he had never authorized his
fiancee to act on his behalf. Id. at 733-35.
75. Id. at 735. The court quoted 3 AM. JUR. 2d Agency § 73 (1962):
[S]o far as concerns a third person dealing with an agent, the agency's
"scope of authority" includes not only the actual authorization conferred
upon the agent by the principal, but also that which has apparently been
delegated to him. Apparent authority, or ostensible authority, as it is also
called, is that which, though not actually granted, the principal knowingly
permits the agent to exercise, or which he holds him out as possessing. In
effect, therefore, an agent's apparent authority is, as to third persons deal-
ing in good faith with the subject of his agency and entitled to rely upon
such appearance, his real authority, and it may apply to a single transac-
tion, or to a series of transactions.
600 S.W.2d at 734-35.
76. 598 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980). National sued Southline for amounts
due for repair of Southline's forklift. Southline claimed its employees, Whitey and
Plaunty, did not have authority to enter in a contract for Southline. Plaunty previously
placed orders; Plaunty and Whitey were present while plaintiff worked on the forklift,
with their employer's implicit approval. Id. at 341-42.
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authority. Apparent authority7 exists if the principal causes a reasona-
bly prudent person to believe the agent has authority to act."8 The
court agreed with defendant that only manifestations by the principal
are relevant; an agent may not create apparent authority by his own
words or conduct.79 In this case, however, the court found sufficient
evidence of manifestations by the principal to invoke apparent
authority.8 0
d. Inherent Agency Power
Drafters of the Restatement attempted to find a theoretical justifi-
cation for judicial decisions imposing liability on the principal for acts
of the agent when the principal had conferred neither actual nor appar-
ent authority.81 Section 8A of the Restatement adopts the term inher-
ent agency power which refers to "the power of an agent which is de-
rived not from authority, apparent authority or estoppel, but solely
from the agency relation and exists for the protection of persons
harmed by or dealing with a servant or other agent." 2
Neither the U.C.C. nor the official comments mentions inherent
power as a basis for freeing an unauthorized agent from liability under
section 3-404. It also appears that no appellate tribunal has directly
addressed the issue. The Code indicates, however, that courts should
follow a traditional analysis of the law of principal and agent as they
evaluate the scope of an agent's authority. 3 In Musulin v. Woodtek,
Inc., 4 the Oregon Supreme Court suggested that inherent power, de-
77. Id. at 343.
78. Id. at 343, citing Chastain v. Cooper & Reed, 152 Tex. 322, 257 S.W.3d 433
(1953).
79. Id. at 343 (citing Bugh v. Word, 424 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968)).
80. Id. at 343.
81. See, e.g., Butler v. Maples, 76 U.S. 766 (1869).
82. RESTATEMENT § 8A.
83. U.C.C. § 3-403(1) recognizes that the agent's authority may be established
as in other cases of representation.
84. 491 P.2d 1173 (Or. 1971). Charles Benert, Woodtek's general manager and
vice president, signed an $80,000 promissory note on behalf of Woodtek. Id. at 1174.
Woodtek defended subsequent suit on the grounds of lack of consideration and lack of
actual or apparent authority for Benert to obligate the corporation. The court cited a
pre-U.C.C. case, DuBois Matlack Lumber Co. v. Davis Lumber Co., 149 Or. 571, 573,
42 P.2d 152, 154 (1935), for the proposition that neither the president nor the vice
president has inherent power to obligate a corporation on a negotiable instrument. See
also Capital Bank v. American Eyewear, Inc., 597 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980),
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fined in the case as "power flowing from the nature of the office," 85
may be relevant only if no other source of authority is available. A
mere vice president or president may not have inherent power to bind a
corporation. If the corporate officer signs an instrument without actual
or apparent authority he will bind himself and the court will require a
high threshold of proof to establish inherent power.
Courts are most likely to invoke inherent power to obligate the
principal of a general agent.8" A general agent may have power to bind
his principal in transactions that usually accompany, or that are inci-
dental to, work he is authorized to perform if the third party reasona-
bly believes the agent is authorized to act.87
e. Ratification
The U.C.C. provides that a principal may ratify the unauthorized
signature of his agent if the agent purported to sign in his behalf.88 The
Official Comment recognizes that ratification is retroactive, and that it
may relieve an unauthorized agent from personal liability on the instru-
ment.89 An unauthorized signer, however, may be liable to the principal
even after ratification.90 A court may find ratification in express state-
ments by the principal or in the principal's retention of benefits after he
learns of the unauthorized signature.91 The Restatement would place a
heavy burden on a principal. Section 43 finds ratification in a princi-
pal's acquiescence in an unauthorized act.9 Section 94 suggests that
failure to take active measures to repudiate an unauthorized act may
in which the court held that a bank president did not have actual or apparent authority
or inherent power to sign a lease on the bank's behalf. The Musulin court did not
address the issue of agent's liability as it affirmed judgment for plaintiff.
85. Musulin, 491 P.2d at 1177.
86. A general agent is "an agent authorized to conduct a series of transactions
involving a continuity of service." RESTATEMENT § 3(1); Ebasco Services, Inc. v. Penn.
Power & Light Co., 402 F. Supp. 421, 445 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
87. RESTATEMENT § 161; Ebasco Services, Inc. v. Penn. Power & Light Co., 402
F. Supp. 421, 446 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
88. U.C.C. § 3-404(2).
89.U.C.C. § 3-404(2) official comment 3: "[T]he word 'ratified' is used in order to
make it clear that the adoption is retroactive... [tlhe ratification relieves the actual
signer from liability on the signature."
90. U.C.C. § 3-404(2) and official comment 3.
91. U.C.C. § 3-404 official comment 3.
92. RESTATEMENT § 43.
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imply affirmance.9 3 The extent of this burden remains unclear.
f. Termination of Authority
An agent acting within the apparent scope of authority may find
himself personally obligated under U.C.C. section 3-404(1) if the
agency relation terminates before he signs an instrument on behalf of
his principal. This result protects innocent principals and third parties
and it places a substantial burden on the agent to verify his status
before each representative act. The Restatement enumerates estab-
lished grounds for termination of the agency relation.94 Actual author-
ity ends at the time specified in the agent's contract with the princi-
pal. 95 If the original agreement does not provide for duration of
authority, the relation will cease when the agent accomplishes the au-
thorized act96 or when specified events occur.97 In most cases a princi-
pal may unilaterally terminate an agent's employment or an agent may
expressly or implicitly renounce the relation 8 However, a party who
wrongfully terminates the relation may be liable in damages for breach
of contract or for other grounds. Actual authority will also end if either
principal or agent loses capacity to contract.99 This most often occurs
upon death of the principal or of the agent or upon the winding up of a
corporate principal or agent.
The Supreme Court of Arizona followed the majority rule in Mubi
v. Broomfield'00 as it held that death of the principal instantaneously
93. RESTATEMENT § 94 official comment a (limiting the broad ramifications of
this rule). The drafters would leave broad discretion to the factfinder by basing the test
for ratification on whether the principal failed to object when "according to the ordi-
nary experience and habits of men, one would naturally be expected to speak if he did
not consent." Id.
94. See RESTATEMENT §§ 105-39.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 63-66.
96. RESTATEMENT § 106.
97. Id. § 107.
98. Id. § 118.
99. Id. § 122.
100. 108 Ariz. 39, 492 P.2d 700 (1972). Petitioner's decedent sued Walter and
Jane Doe Tribble for injuries he suffered in a car accident. On August 5, 1970,
defendants filed an offer of judgment. Rule 68 of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure
required any offer to be accepted in writing within ten days or it would be deemed
withdrawn. Before he died on August 11, 1970, petitioner's decedent told his wife to
accept the offer. She immediately instructed their attorney to accept the proposal but
he did not file the required acceptance until after decedent's death. Id. at 40-41, 492
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ends agency authority by operation of law. 101 The court considered
whether the attorney had authority after his client's death to carry out
instructions made before death. In holding that the acceptance was not
valid, the unanimous opinion noted, "[w]here there is only a naked au-
thority, not coupled with an interest, the death of the principal without
notice ends the agent's authority to act in his principal's behalf." 02
This decision is noteworthy for two reasons. First, it does not require
any notice to the agent before his authority is terminated. Second, it
does not apply to a power coupled with an interest.0 3 The court ob-
served, however, that courts sometimes make an exception to protect
innocent third parties who deal with an agent in good faith and without
knowledge of the principal's death. 04
The Supreme Court of Washington considered requirements for
termination of apparent authority in Lazov v. Black. 0 5 The court noted
the general rule protecting third parties from revocation of an agent's
authority without notice, by stating that "generally, termination by a
principal of an agency relationship is not effective as to the agent and
third parties who have previously dealt with the agent in that capacity
until notice of the termination of the relationship is conveyed to
them."'0 6 The court found the general rule inapplicable in this case
because statutes required filing of a revocation of power of attorney
and provided that filing was constructive notice to third parties. 0 7
Mubi and Lazov indicate that an agent's authority may terminate
immediately upon the death or incapacity of the principal-even with-
out notice to the agent or third party. An agent or third party, how-
ever, may continue to rely on an agent's appearance of authority after
P.2d at 701-702.
101. Id. at 41, 492 P.2d at 702.
102. Id.
103. See infra text accompanying notes I 10-114.
104. Mubi, 108 Ariz. at 42 n. 1, 492 P.2d at 703 n. 1.
105. 88 Wash. 2d 883, 567 P.2d 233 (1977). Spridon Lazov executed and re-
corded a general power of attorney naming his wife attorney in fact. He left the state
and his wife purchased a home in their names from appellants. Mrs. Lazov then con-
veyed her husband's interest to Mr. and Mrs. Boyce. Mr. Lazov returned to the state,
filed suit for divorce, and told his wife he intended to revoke the power of attorney. He
accepted a quitclaim deed from Mr. and Mrs. Boyce and filed a revocation of the
power of attorney. The wife then conveyed their interest in the property to appellants.
The husband sued and the trial court declared the deed void. Id. at 884-85, 567 P.2d at
234.
106. Id. at 886, 567 P.2d at 234.
107. Id. at 885-6, 567 P.2d at 234-5.
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they have dealt together and until they receive notice that the principal
has revoked the agent's authority. The Mubi court reconciled this ap-
parent inconsistency; the agent's authority is derivative-if the princi-
pal does not have capacity to contract the agent can have no power to
contract on his behalf.108 However, an agent claiming that his apparent
authority remains does not assert a greater capacity than his principal
enjoys; he merely asserts that he retains a power he once possessed.
The Mubi opinion suggests, furthermore, that an agent whose power is
coupled with an interest in the transaction may retain authority even
after the principal's death or attempted revocation. 109
The Arizona Supreme Court clarified the doctrine of power cou-
pled with an interest in Phoenix Title and Trust Co. v. Grimes.110 The
trial court entered summary judgment for defendants and the Supreme
Court reversed, holding that agency power to sell the land passed to the
agent's estate because the agent had a power coupled with an economic
interest in the underlying transactions."' The court limited this rule by
noting that personal service contracts may not be assignable if they can
only be performed by the initial person employed." 2 The unanimous
opinion found that the agent's power in this case:
was a power coupled with an interest, and is irrevocable. It is of
course the general rule that the death of either principal or agent
terminates the relationship. However, the exception to the rule is
that if the agency or power of the agent is coupled with an interest
in the subject matter of the agency, the power so coupled will sur-
vive to the personal representative of the agent upon the death of
the agent." 3
The court found that the decedent's rights survived his death"14 be-
108. Mubi, 108 Ariz. at 41-42, 492 P.2d at 702-3.
109. See supra text accompanying note 102.
110. 101 Ariz. 182, 416 P.2d at 979 (1966). Plaintiff's decedent was a coven-
turer in a land development plan. He owned an undivided 7/24 interest in the property,
and the other investors signed a contract giving him the exclusive right to subdivide,
advertise, develop, and sell the land for a commission; the agreement explicitly pro-
vided that this right would pass to decedent's heirs or assigns. Defendants refused to
permit the executor to continue performing the contract. Id.
111. Id. at 184-85, 416 P.2d at 981-82.
112. Id. at 185, 416 P.2d at 982.
113. Id. at 184-85, 416 P.2d at 981-82 (citing Commercial Nursery Co. v. Ivey,
164 Tenn. 502, 51 S.W.2d 238 (1932)).
114. See also Matter of Estate of Gray, 541 P.2d 336 (Colo. App. 1975), in
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cause the decedent was a conventurer with an economic interest in ad-
dition to his interest in the exercise of the power to manage the
property.
C. Summation
An attorney advising an agent should recommend that the agent
have a written statement establishing the scope of authority because
the agent's subsequent attempt to prove implied authority or inherent
power may be especially difficult. If an agent acts pursuant to written
authorization, particularly a power of attorney, he should follow its
terms strictly. The agent should show on the instrument both his repre-
sentative capacity and the identity of his principal. An attorney deter-
mining who is liable on a negotiable instrument must consider several
questions. Did the agent name the principal? Did the agent properly
acknowledge his representative capacity? Did the agent have authority
to bind the principal? If the agent did not have authority to bind the
principal, then did the principal ratify his agent's conduct?
These questions are essential to determination of liability not only
on negotiable instruments in the United States, but also on countries
that adopted the English Bills of Exchange Act"' and the Geneva Con-
ventions on negotiable instruments. 116
III. England
A. Negotiable Instruments
The English law of negotiable instruments is based on the Bills of
Exchange Act and the Cheques Act.1 17 The Bills of Exchange Act was
the basis for the United States Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law
which the Colorado Court of Appeals found decedent had a sufficient interest in oil
wells for his power as agent to pass to his estate.
115. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
117. Section 1 of the Cheques Act protects bankers who pay cheques in good
faith, without negligence, and in the ordinary course of business; Sections 2 and 4
protect bankers who participate in the cheque collection process. Section 5 of the Che-
ques Act adopts Bills of Exchange provisions for crossed cheques. Further discussion of
the Cheques Act is beyond the scope of this note.
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and influenced the evolution of the Uniform Commercial Code."18 Ne-
gotiable instruments may be transferred as readily under the Bills of
Exchange Act as under the Uniform Commercial Code. If a holder
takes a negotiable bill of exchange in good faith, for value, and without
notice of any defect in title, he becomes a holder in due course" 9 and
will hold the bill free from any personal defenses or defect of title. 120
The United States practitioner should feel reasonably comfortable
when planning commercial transactions in any of the countries that
adopted the English Bills of Exchange Act. The Bills of Exchange Act
generally has the same effect as the Uniform Commercial Code. The
following discussion addresses provisions under the Bills of Exchange
Act that differ from commercial law in the United States.
The statute defines a negotiable bill of exchange:
A bill of exchange is an unconditional order in writing, addressed
by one person to another, signed by the person giving it, requiring
the person to whom it is addressed to pay on demand or at a fixed
or determinable future time a sum certain in money to or to the
order of a specified person, or to bearer.121
A drawer may write a bill of exchange on anything that is/not metal. 122
A bill of exchange must be payable to order or to bearer.123 The Act
construes a bill payable to a particular person as payable to that per-
son's order unless the face of the instrument prohibits transfer.124 No
one is liable on a bill of exchange unless his signature appears; 25 but a
118. M. MEGRAH & F. RYDER, BYLES ON BILLS OF EXCHANGE 3 (23d ed. 1972)
[hereinafter cited as BYLES ON BILLS OF EXCHANGE].
119. Bills of Exchange Act § 29.
120. Id. § 38(2).
121. Id. § 3(1).
122. BYLES ON BILLS OF EXCHANGE, supra note 118, at 8. The Coinage Act,
1870, 33 & 34 Vict., ch. 10, reprinted in 6 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 836
(3d ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as Coinage Act], forbids issuance of any metal as "a
token for money, or as purporting that the holder thereof is entitled to demand any
value denoted thereon." Coinage Act. § 5.
123. Id. § 8(2).
124. Id. § 8(4). Compare United States practice requiring use of words "order"
or "bearer." U.C.C. § 3-104(1)(d) and official comment 5 require the use of prescribed
language or a clear equivalent, and provide that in doubtful cases courts should hold
against negotiability. A statement "pay John Doe" would, therefore, be negotiable in
England but not in the United States.
125. Bills of Exchange Act § 23. Compare United States under U.C.C. § 3-
401(2), providing that a person may sign a trade or assumed name.
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person may be personally liable if he signs a trade or assumed name."'
The signature of a partnership's name acts as the personal signature of
every partner. 127 The drawer of indorser may add a statement such as
"without recourse to me" or "sans recours" to eliminate or limit his
liability on the instrument. 2 '
A check is a bill of exchange drawn on a bank.'29 The Bills of
Exchange Act permits the drawer to "cross" the check and thereby
eliminate negotiability.' Section 83(1) defines "promissory note" as
"an unconditional promise in writing made by one person to another
signed by the maker, engaging to pay, on demand or at a fixed or de-
terminable future time, a sum certain in money, to, or to the order of, a
specified person or to bearer." The maker of a note contracts to pay it
according to its tenor' and is subject to the same liability as in United
Sates practice.132
The Court of Appeals clarified requirements for checks and bills of
exchange and illustrated a difference from United States law13 3 in Or-
bit Mining & Trading Co., Ltd. v. Westminster Bank, Ltd. 34 In hold-
126. Bills of Exchange Act § 23(1).
127. Id. § 23(2).
128. Id. § 16(1). Compare United States practice permitting a drawer or in-
dorser to sign "without recourse" to eliminate personal liability. U.C.C. §§ 3-413, 3-
414. Under the U.C.C. a transfer without recourse does not eliminate all warranty
liability; the transferor then only warrants he has no knowledge of a valid defense
against him. U.C.C. § 3-417(3).
129. Bills of Exchange Act § 73. Lord Chorley defines "cheque" as follows:
A cheque is an unconditional order in writing drawn by one person upon
another, who must be a banker, signed by the drawer, requiring the banker
to pay on demand, or at sight, or on presentation or expressing no time for
payment, a sum certain in money to or to the order of a specified person or
to bearer.
R. CHORLEY, LAW OF BANKING 44 (6th ed. 1974).
130. A check bearing two parallel transverse lines across its face is "crossed,"
and is not negotiable. Bills of Exchange Act §§ 76-81.
131. Id. § 88.
132. U.C.C. §§ 3-413(1), 3-413(3).
133. U.C.C. § 3-111 provides that an instrument will be deemed payable to
bearer if it indicates it is payable to "(a) bearer or the order of bearer; or (b) a speci-
fied persons or bearer; or (c) 'cash', or any other indication which does not purport to
designate a specific payee." Id. The Bills of Exchange Act does not have a comparable
provision. The present court considered whether checks payable to cash could be
negotiable.
134. [1962] 3 All E.R. 565 (C.A.). Epstein was a secretary and a director of
Orbit Mining Company and was authorized to cosign checks with the other director,
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ing for the bank, the court found that the instruments were not
checks135 and that section 4(1)(a) of the Cheques Act protected the
bank from liability since the bank was not negligent in paying. 136 The
court noted that the Cheques Act is to be interpreted in conjunction
with the Bills of Exchange Act.3 7 The Bills of Exchange Act defines a
check as "a bill of exchange drawn on a banker payable on de-
mand. 13 8 A bill of exchange must be payable to a particular person, to
order, or to bearer. 3 9 Because the instruments were payable to cash
rather than to order, bearer, or a particular person, they were not bills
of exchange and could not be cheques.' 40 The court noted that section
7(3) of the Bills of Exchange Act provides that "[w]here the payee is a
fictitious or non-existing person the bill may be treated as payable to
bearer."'-' The opinion construed this provision strictly, finding that
"cash" was not a person so the Bills of Exchange Act was inapplica-
ble."" Although the instrument was not a check under section 4(2)(a),
it was a document under section 4(2)(b). 4 3 The court found that the
bank was not negligent in paying because there was nothing on the face
of the instrument to place the bank on notice of a defect. 44
B. Signature by Agent
Over one hundred and fifty years ago Chancellor Erskine wrote,
"[n]o rule of law is better ascertained, or stands upon a stronger foun-
dation, than this; that, where an agent names his principal, the princi-
Wolff. Before Wolff left town he signed blank checks so Epstein could continue busi-
ness in his absence. Epstein signed his name, made the instrument payable to cash, and
deposited it in his own account. Orbit Mining sued the drawee bank when it discovered
the fraud. Id.
135. Id. at 570.
136. Id. at 574.
137. Cheques Act § 6.
138. Bills of Exchange Act § 73.
139. Id. § 3(1).
140. Cf. U.C.C. § 3-111, providing that an instrument payable to cash will be
deemed payable to bearer.
141. [1962] 3 All E.R. at 570.
142. Id.
143. Cheques Act § 4(2)(b) provides: "This section applies to the following in-
struments ... (b) any document issued by a customer of a bank which, though not a
bill of exchange, is intended to enable a person to obtain payment from that banker of
the sum mentioned in the document."
144. [1962] 3 All E.R. at 570.
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pal is responsible: not the agent: but, for the application of that rule,
the agent must name his principal as the person to be responsible."' 45
Contemporary practice still follows this principle.
1. Form of Signature
The Bills of Exchange Act states how an agent must sign a negoti-
.able instrument to escape personal liability:
(1) Where a person signs a bill as drawer, indorser, or acceptor,
and adds words to his signature, indicating that he signs for or on
behalf of a principal, or in a representative character, he is not
personally liable thereon; but the mere addition to his signature of
words describing him as an agent, or as filling a representative
characer, does not exempt him from personal liability.
(2) In determining whether a signature on a bill is that of the prin-
cipal or that of the agent by whose hand it is written, the contruc-
tion most favorable to the validity of the instrument shall be
adopted.146
Parliament redrafted this section in committee, and may have liberal-
ized the strict common law presumption that the agent always was per-
sonally liable. 4 7 Courts even today find such terms as "agent" or
"manager" following a signature as mere designatio personae.'48
The form of signature is especially important in England.149 A per-
son who indicates on the instrument that he signs on behalf of another
and who identifies the claimed principal with reasonable certainty gen-
erally will not be liable on the instrument, even if he signs without
145. Ex parte Hartop, 33 Eng. Rep. 132, 133 (1806).
146. Bills of Exchange Act § 26.
147. J. BATT, CHALMERS ON BILLS OF EXCHANGE 80 (1947) [hereinafter cited as
CHALMERS ON BILLS OF EXCHANGE]. Lord Ellenborough followed the strict approach
in Leadbitter v. Farrow, 105 Eng. Rep. 1077, 1079 (K.B. 1816):
It is not a universal rule that a man who puts his name to a bill of ex-
change thereby makes himself personally liable, unless he states upon the
face of the bill that he subscribes it for another, or by procuration for
another, which are words of exclusion? Unless he says plainly "I am the
scribe" he is liable.
Id.
148. CHALMERS ON BILLS OF EXCHANGE, supra note 147, at 80.
149. Compare U.C.C. § 3-404(1), which provides that a person who signs in the
proper form but without authority is personally liable for the instrument.
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authority. 15 0 In deciding whether a signature binds the signer or his
principal, a court will adopt the interpretation most favorable to the
instrument's validity. 115 The Court of Appeals in Ernest Scragg &
Sons, Ltd. v. Perseverance Banking & Trust Co., Ltd.152 demonstrated
the results of failing to disclose the principal on the face of the instru-
ment. The Defendant claimed the plaintiff had actual knowledge that
the plaintiff was acting on behalf of Isranyl, but the court refused to
look beyond the face of the instrument as it found defendant liable for
conversion. The court noted, "English law will attribute to a document
its face value if the document is, or is in the nature of, a negotiable
instrument. . .or if it is what is sometimes called a quasi-negotiable
instrument (as, for example, a bill of lading). . .."153.
Maxform S.P.A. v. Mariani & Goodville Ltd.15 demonstrated the
interrelationship between the Bills of Exchange Act and the Companies
Act of 1948155 and their effect on personal liability of an agent who
fails to disclose his principal. Mariani appealed from the decision of the
trial court, arguing that he could not be liable as an acceptor under
section 17(2) of the Bills of Exchange Act because he was not the
drawee, that the only possible source of liability was section 108(4)(b)
of the Companies Act, which imposes personal liability on agents of
corporations who sign negotiable instruments on behalf of undisclosed
principals, 5 6 and that because the bill of exchange never mentioned
150. Bills of Exchange Act § 26(1).
151. Id. § 26(2).
152. [1973] 2 Lloyd's L.R. 101 (C.A.). Defendant ordered texturing machines
from plaintiffs. The order said it was from Preserverance Banking & Trust Co., Ltd.,
and was signed "for and on behalf of the Preserverance Banking & Trust Co." Pursu-
ant to agreement, plaintiff shipped the goods to Isranyl Ltd. in Israel. Plaintiff sent a
sight draft with invoice and bill of lading to defendant in London. Defendant did not
pay or accept the draft, but immediately forwarded the documents to Isranyl Ltd.
Plaintiff sued for breach of contract and for conversion of documents. Id. at 102.
153. Id. at 103 (citing Building & Civil Engineering Holidays Scheme Manage-
ment Ltd. v. Post Office, [1964] 2 Q.B. 430, 445).
154. [1981] 2 Lloyd's L.R. 54 (C.A.). Italian plaintiff manufac- -tured and sold
furniture to Goodville, Ltd., d/b/a/ Italdesign. Plaintiff drew four bills of exchange for
the purchase price of 4,969,080 lire; three bills totaling 4,073,680 lire were outstanding
at the time of suit. Of all three bills of exchange the drawee was "Italdesign," the
registered trading name for Goodwin, Ltd. The drawer had typed "per accettazione"
below the drawee's name. Mariani signed at the bottom of the bill without any descrip-
tion of his status. Id. at 56.
155. Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6 ch. 38, reprinted in 5 HALSBURY'S
STATUTES OF ENGLAND 110 (3d ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as Companies Act].
156. See id.
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Goodville Ltd. or Italdesign, Mariani could not have purported to sign
on their behalf. The Court of Appeals affirmed judgment for plaintiff
as it found that the face of the instrument revealed Mariani signed on
behalf of the drawee without disclosing his representative status.157 The
court agreed that Mariani could not be liable as acceptor, but rejected
his argument that section 26(1) of the Bills of Exchange Act required
the court to look only to the form of signature. 158 The court applied
section 26(2), which required the court to give the instrument the con-
struction most favorable to its validity, and which allowed the court to
look at the instrument as a whole. 159
In addition to disclosing the principal, the agent should avoid am-
biguities on the instrument. In Rolfe Lubbell v. Keith, 160 the Court
accepted plaintiff's agrument that the Bills of Exchange Act section
26(2) requires construction most favorable to the validity of the instru-
ment, 6' that because the principal, Grafton, was already required to
pay, defendants' signatures purportedly binding the company would be
meaningless "mercantile nonsense,' 162 and that the court should allow
parol evidence to determine the parties' intent because of the ambiguity
on the instrument. 163 The court held that the patent ambiguity permit-
ted admission of parol evidence of a course of dealing, and previous
requirement by the plaintiff of personal indorsements indicated a mu-
tual intent that the defendant be personally bound.6 The court noted
that the defendants did not argue that the plaintiff waived his right to
hold them personally liable by his failure to object to the stamp re-
157. Id. at 57.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. [1979] 2 Lloyd's L.R. 75 (Q.B.). Plaintiff supplied cloth to the manufactur-
ing firm Grafton Manquest Ltd. Grafton was delinquent in paying bills of over £9000.
Plaintiff drew three bills of exchange payable by Grafton to Rolfe Lubbell, and
presented them to Grafton for acceptance. After Grafton accepted the bills, Grafton's
managing director, Keith, and company secretary, Greenwood, indorsed the bill in ap-
propriate boxes labeled "managing director" and "company secretary," and immedi-
ately after their signatures stamped "for and on behalf of Grafton Manquest, Lim-
ited." Id. at 76-77.
161. Id. at 77.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 78. Cf. Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Bauman Ins. Agency, Inc.,
401 N.E.2d 614 (I11. App. 1980) (admitting parol evidence to show defendant intended
to bind himself on a contract that he signed in an ambiguous capacity).
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vealing the representative capacity of the signature.16
Ernest Scragg, Maxform, and Rolfe Lubbell demonstrate the im-
portance of an unambiguous signature revealing a representative capac-
ity and identifying the principal. A court may refuse to look beyond the
face of an instrument to determine whether the parties intended the
signer to be personally liable. An agent signing on behalf of a principal
should not permit his signature to appear in more than one place on the
instrument because a court may construe the second signature as a per-
sonal indorsement.
2. Authority for Signature
The Bills of Exchange Act provides that an unauthorized signature
generally will be completely inoperative and will not confer any rights
on the instrument. 6 An agent who signs in the proper form, therefore,
will not be personally obligated on the instrument even if he signs with-
out authority. English courts achieve results similar to personal liability
on the instrument by invoking a theory of breach of warranty of
authority.16 7
English law provides an exception by which agents who sign nego-
tiable instruments on behalf of principals may be liable even if they
indicate their representative capacity and identify their principal. A
promoter of a corporation who signs on the corporation's behalf before
the corporation is formed may be personally liable on the instrument
under the European Communities Act of 1972.168
165. Rolfe Lubbell, 2 Lloyds L.R. at 78.
166. Bills of Exchange Act § 24. Cf. U.C.C. § 3-404(1), providing that an agent
who signs without authority of the person he purports to obligate will bind himself.
167. See generally F. REYNOLDS & B. DAVENPORT, BOWSTEAD ON AGENCY
378-86 (14th ed. 1976) and cases cited therein. Analysis of warranty liability arising
off the instrument is beyond the scope of this article.
168. European Communities Act, 1973 ch. 68, reprinted in 42 HALSBURY'S
STATUTES OF ENGLAND 59 (3d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as E.E.C. Act of 1972].
Section 9(2) provies:
Where a contract purports to be made by a company, or by a person as
agent for a company, at a time when the company has not been formed,
then subject to any agreement to the contrary the company shall have the
effect as a contract entered into by the person purporting to act for the
company or as agent for it, and he shall be personally liable on the con-
tract accordingly.
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In Phonogram Ltd. v. Lane,169 the Court of Appeals applied this
statute for the first time170 to hold a corporate promoter personally lia-
ble to repay a loan made to his corporation before its formation.'1 ' De-
fendant's corporation was never formed. The plaintiff sued, claiming
that the defendant assumed liability by signing the letter acknowledg-
ing receipt of the loan, or that the defendant was liable under the EEC
Act.'72 In affirming the judgment of the trial court, Lord Denning
noted that the word "you" in the letter appeared to refer to tie defen-
dant personally, but he deferred to the determination of the trial
court. 173 The defendant argued that section 9(2) of the EEC Act of
1972 did not apply.' 74 European Economic Community Council Direc-
tive 68/151 of March 9, 1968, 17 was the basis for the EEC Act of
1972.176 Defendant argued that article 7 of the EEC Directive, as writ-
ten in the original French text, would only impose personal liability on
a promoter of a corporation who acted while the corporation was in the
process of formation.177 Defendant could not be liable since he acted on
169. [19811 3 All E.R. 182 (C.A.).
170. Id. at 186.
171. Musicians employed defendant, Brian Lane, as business agent to obtain
financing for their band and Fragile Management, Ltd., the corporation they proposed
to form to manage their business. Defendant obtained a commitment from plaintiff,
Phonogram, Ltd., for £12,000, payable to Jelly Music Ltd. on behalf of Fragile Man-
agement Ltd. (Defendant was a promoter of Fragile Management Ltd. and a director
of Jelly Music Ltd. Plaintiff executed the checks in this way for administrative conve-
nience. Plaintiff sent a letter to defendant with the check, in which it explained, "[iun
the unlikely event that we fail to complete within, say, one month you will undertake to
repay us the £ 6000." Plaintiff asked defendant to sign the letter on a line immediately
above the statement, "for and on behalf of Fragile Management Ltd." Defendant
signed and returned the letter. Id. at 184-85.
172. See supra note 168.
173. Lane, 3 All E.R. at 185.
174. Id. at 186.
175. Hereinafter cited as EEC Directive.
176. Lane, 3 All E.R. at 186.
177. Id. English was not an official language of the European Economic Commu-
nity in 1968. [1981] All E.R. at 186. The EEC Directive provided:
If acts are accomplished on behalf of a corporation while being formed but
before being incorporated and if the corporation does not take back the
obligations resulting from these acts, the people who have performed them
will be jointly and indefinitely liable in the absence of a contrary provision.
Id.
The French text refers to a corporation "en formation," which implies "while being
incorporated." Defendant's argument may fail because the original drafters did not use
the stronger terms "en train d'etre formke," or "en train de se former," which would
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behalf of the corporation before taking any steps to incorporate. The
defendant next argued he could not come within section 9(2) of the
EEC Act of 1972 because he did not "purport" to act for the com-
pany. 8 The defendant disclosed that the company did not yet exist. 17 9
The Court of Appeals rejected this argument without discussion, noting
that "[a] contract can purport to be made on behalf of a company, or
by a company, even though that company is known by both parties not
to be formed and that it is only about to be formed."' 80
C. Summation
The English Bills of Exchange Act influenced development of the
Uniform Commercial Code, and negotiable instruments in England
have substantially the same effect as in the United States. An agent
sued on an instrument may present the same defenses his principal
could assert. A holder in due course takes the instrument free from
personal defenses; a person signing a bill of exchange or promissory
note may wish to avoid negotiability and the possibility that a holder in
due course will sue for payment.
An agent signing a negotiable instrument on behalf of his principal
may avoid negotiability by making a bill of exchange payable to cash,
crossing a check, or failing to comply with requirements in the Bills of
Exchange Act. An agent generally will not be liable on the instrument
if he indicates his representative capacity and identifies his principal,
even if he exceeds his authority. The promoter of a corporation may,
however, be personally liable on an instrument he issues on behalf of
his corporation before it is formed.
refer more closely to the period during which promoters were working to incorporate.
178. Lane, 3 All E.R. at 186.
179. Id.
180. Id. G. CHESHIRE & C.H.S. FIFOOT, LAW OF CONTRACT 462 (9th ed. 1976),
discusses Section 9(2) of the EEC Act of 1972:
[T]his provision makes no change in the position of the company, which
still cannot ratify the contract. It is clearly intended however to increase
the number of cases where the agent is personally liable. How far it in fact
does so will depend on the meaning given to the words "subject to any
agrement to the contary" since it could be argued that words showing that
A signs as agent express an agreement that he is not to be personally
liable.
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IV. Civil Law Practice and the Geneva Convention
A. Overview
The Geneva Conventions'' are the basis for negotiable instru-
ments law in much of continental Europe.18 Commercial need led to
early attempts to unify commercial law. The Association for the Pro-
gress of Social Sciences first addressed the matter in a congress in
Ghent in 1863.83 In 1908 the Dutch government called an interna-
tional conference at the Hague. In 1912, this conference produced the
first draft of a uniform law.' 84 The League of Nations addressed the
concern in 1928, after the first World War interrupted efforts to codify
a uniform law.' 8 5 Drafters of the Geneva Conventions learned from the
Hague conferences that they could only achieve some degree of unifica-
tion of laws if they attempted merely to reduce the number of commer-
cial law systems to two-the Anglo-American system and the continen-
tal system.'86 Drafters modeled the form of bills of exchange after
German practice and eliminated bills payable to bearer to please the
French.187 Thirty-one states participated in the Geneva Conference
181. Convention Providing a Uniform Law on Bills of Exchange and Promissory
Notes, June 7, 1930, 143 L.N.T.S. 259 [hereinafter cited as Bills of Exchange]; Con-
vention Providing a Uniform Law for Cheques, March 19, 1921, 143 L.N.T.S. 355
[hereinafter cited as Cheques Convention].
182. The following nations ratified or acceded to all or part of both Conventions.
For reservations and dates of ratification or accession, see UNITED NATIONS, MULTI-
LATERAL TREATIES IN RESPECT OF WHICH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PERFORMS DE-
POSITORY FUNCTIONS 581-86 (1978), U.N.Doc. ST/LEG/SER.D/11 (1978). Greece,
Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria, Belgium, Finland, It-
aly, Japan, Germany, Portugal, Monaco, France, Poland, Brazil, Hungary and Luxem-
bourg. On February 21, 1974, the Secretary-General of the United Nations received
notification that the German Democratic Republic declared reapplication of the Con-
vention beginning June 6, 1958. On January 13, 1976, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many notified the Secretary-General that it would not recognize retroactive application
of the Convention in the German Democratic Republic beyond June 21, 1973. Id.
183. Hamel, The Geneva Conventions on Negotiable Instruments and Methods
of Unifying Private Law, in UNIFICATION OF LAW 270, 275 (1948).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Hudson & Feller, The Internat'l Unification of Laws Concerning Bills of
Exchange, 44 HARV. L. REV. 333, 347 (1931).
187. Hamel, supra note 183, at 276-77.
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May 13, 1930, through June 7, 1930.188 Participants adopted conven-
tions dealing with uniform law on bills of exchange and promissory
notes, 189 conflicts of laws in connection with bills of exchange and
promissory notes, 190 and stamp laws in connection with bills of ex-
change and promissory notes.' 9 ' On March 19, 1931, participants at a
second conference adopted three conventions unanimously, proposing a
uniform law on checks, conflicts of laws in connection with checks, and
stamp laws in connection with checks. 192 The following section will an-
alyze the law of France to illustrate negotiable instruments practice in
a civil law jurisdiction that has adopted the Geneva Conventions.
B. Practice in France
1. Negotiable Instruments
The Code de Commerce governs negotiable instruments in France
and gives effect to the Geneva Conventions. 9 ' Assignment of debts
generally requires formal notice to the debtor or the debtor's notarized
acceptance. 94 Debts represented by negotiable instruments are more
readily transferable and are better suited to commercial needs.195 Ne-
gotiability under French law is much like its Anglo-American
equivalent. Unlike United States and English provisions restricting ap-
plicability of personal defenses, the French Code de Commerce and the
Geneva Conventions do not distinguish between holders and holders in
due course.'96 Under the French law any holder in good faith receives a
188. Hudson & Feller, supra note 186, at 333. For proceedings of the Confer-
ence, see League of Nations Doc. C. 360. M. 151 11 (1930).
189. See League of Nations Doc. C. 346(1). M. 142(1) 11 (1930).
190. See League of Nations Doc. C. 347(1). M. 143(1) 11 (1930).
191. See League of Nations Doc. C. 348(1). M. 144(1) 11 (1930).
192. Conventions Concerning Negotiable Instruments, UNIFICATION OF LAW 363
(1948).
193. CODE DE COMMERCE art. 110-182 (Dalloz 1981-1982) control bills of ex-
change; art. 183-189 govern promissory notes, and the Decree of October 30, 1935,
modified by Law 72-10, January 3, 1972, and Law 75-4, January 3, 1975, 1935 Dalloz
Periodique et Critique IV 467 [hereinafter cited as Check Laws], controls checks.
194. CODE CIVIL art. 1690 (Dalloz 1981-1982).
195. F. LAWSON, A. ANTON, & L. BROWN, AMOS & WALTON'S INTRODUCTION
TO FRENCH LAW 365 (1967) [hereinafter cited as AMOS & WALTON].
196. 0. GILES, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL LAW 166 (1970). Compare U.C.C. § 3-
305 with Bills of Exchange Act § 29.
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negotiable instrument free from defects in title of earlier parties. 91
French law confers negotiability on a wide variety of instruments, in-
cluding bonds, bills of lading, bills of exchange, promissory notes, and
checks.'9 8 The Code de Commerce refers to bills of exchange, promis-
sory notes, and checks as effects de commerce, and commercial courts
have jurisdiction over all parties to these instruments. 99 The following
sections discuss essential characteristics of effects de commerce under
the French Commercial Code and the Geneva Conventions.
a. Bills of Exchange
A French bill of exchange has an effect similar to its counterpart
in England and to a draft in the United States."' It is a signed and
dated instrument in writing in which the drawer orders the drawee to
pay a sum certain in money to a named payee or his order at a fixed or
determinable time.20' Unlike its United States or English equivalents it
may not be payable to bearer' °2 and a drawer may prevent its transfer
by indorsement by making it payable "non hz ordre.120 3 The drawer has
the responsibility, enforced by fines and imprisonment, 20 4of supplying a
"provision" or fund from which the drawee will pay.205 The holder may
not enforce the bill of exchange until the instrument is stamped and the
stamp tax paid.206
A bill of exchange must contain: the term "bill of exchange" writ-
ten in the text in the language used in drawing the instrument, 207 an
197. Id. AMOS & WALTON, supra note 195, at 365.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See generally id. at 365-37.
201. C. COM. art. 110; Bills of Exchange Convention art. 2; AmIos & WALTON,
supra note 195, at 365.
202. C. COM. art. 110.
203. Id.
204. See, e.g.. CODE PtNAL art. 405 (Dalloz 1981-1982) which treats failure to
provide funds as a type of fraud.
205. C. COM. art. 116.
206. C. COM. art. 147.
207. The drafters of the Bills of Exchange Convention required the label "bill of
exchange" to provide a definite and quick way to distinguish between a bill of exchange
and a check or a promissory note, and to insure that the signer realizes he is entering a
serious legal obligation. Balogh, Critical Remarks on the Law of Bills of Exchange of
the Geneva Convention, 9 TUL. L. REv. 165, 184 (1935).
[Vol. 9
80
Nova Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [1984], Art. 10
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol9/iss1/10
International Negotiable Instruments
unconditional order to pay a sum certain, the name of the payor
(drawee), a statement of the time of payment, identification of the
place of payment, the name of the person to whom or to whose order
payment is to be made,2"' a statement of the date and place where the
bill was issued, and the signature of the person issuing the bill
(drawer). 09 The signature may be by hand or by any other method.210
A bill of exchange in which the time of payment is not specified is
deemed payable at sight. In the absence of any statement to the con-
trary, the place designated beside the drawee's name is deemed the
place of payment, and also the domicile of the drawee.21' A bill of ex-
change that does not identify the place where it was issued will be
deemed to have been drawn in the place mentioned beside the name of
the drawer.212 If the sum payable on a bill of exchange is expressed
both in words and in numbers, the sum expressed in words will govern
if there is a difference. If the sum payable on a bill of exchange is
expressed more than once in words or more than once in numbers, the
smaller amount will control if there is a difference.2"3
All drawers, acceptors, indorsers, or guarantors by ava1214 of a bill
of exchange are jointly and severally liable to the holder.21 5 The holder
has the right to proceed against all these people, individually or collec-
tively, without being required to follow the order in which they became
bound.216 Anyone who signs a bill of exchange and pays the holder
enjoys the same right the holder possessed. 17 Filing suit, by the holder,
against one of the parties, on the instrument does not constitute an
208. Compare Anglo-American practice requiring merely that the payee be iden-
tified with reasonable certainty. U.C.C. § 3-110; Bills of Exchange Act § 7.
209. C. COM. art. 110. Compare Bills of Exchange Convention art. 1, which does
not include the second clause of requirement (8).
210. Id.
211. Domicile is relevant in choice of law questions. See infra notes 417-423 and
accompanying text.
212. C. coai. art. 110; Bills of Exchange Convention art. 2. Place of issue is
relevant in choice of questions. See infra notes 417-423 and accompanying text.
213. C. COM. art. 113; Bills of Exchange Convention art. 6.
214. An aval is a guarantee of payment written on the bills or on an allonge. See
Bills of Exchange Convention art. 31; C. COM. art. 130. A guarantor may create an
aval with the signed statement "good as aval" or "bon pour aval," or any similar provi-
sion. Id.
215. C. coM. art. 151; Bills of Exchange Convention art. 47.
216. C. COM. art. 151; Bills of Exchange Convention art. 47.
217. Id. Compare the doctrine of subrogation in United States practice codified
in U.C.C. § 3-415(5).
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election of remedies and does not preclude later suit against the others,
even if they became obligated on the instrument after the person plain-
tiff sued first.2"8
b. Checks
France adopted the Checques Convention into its Code de Com-
merce by the Decree of October 30, 1935.219 Provisions related to
checks in both the French Code and the Cheques Convention are simi-
lar to those dealing with bills of exchange.22 The following discussion
addresses significant characteristics of checks and differences between
checks and bills of exchange.22'
A check is a written instrument by which a drawer orders a bank
or a similar financial institution to pay a sum certain on demand to a
specified person, his order, or to bearer.22 If a check specifies the payee
it may be negotiated by indorsement 23 The drawer may be subject to
criminal penalties if he does not provide the drawee adequate funds to
cover the check.224
The Cheques Convention and the French Check laws provide
stricter formal requirements than the English Bills of Exchange Act or
the United States Uniform Commercial Code. A check must contain
the term "cheque" in the body of the instrument in the language used
in the rest of the instrument, an unconditional order to pay a sum cer-
tain in money, the name of the drawee, identification of place of pay-
ment, statement of date and place that the check is drawn, and the
drawer's signature.225 The drawee will not be liable on the instrument
218. C. COM. art. 151; Bills of Exchange Convention art. 47.
219. 1935 PERIODIQUE ET CRITIQUE IV 467.
220. See generally AMOS & WALTON, supra note 195, 365-68.
221. The following discussion will not address French use of postal checks. In
1918 the French government attacked a wartime shortage of cash by establishing a
check service under direction of the postal administration. AMos & WALTON, supra.
note 195, at 369. Depositors may open accounts at post offices and then draw checks
against funds deposited in their names. The Cheque Convention does not address postal
checks and postal checks are governed by laws different from those controlling checks
drawn on banks. Id. See Decree 62-273, 1962 BULLETIN LGISLATIF DALLOZ 170
(Mar. 12, 1962).
222. Check Laws art. 1, § 3 Cf. Cheque Convention art. 3, which provides that a
check may only be drawn on a banker.
223. Check Laws art. 1, §§ 13, 17; Cheque Convention arts. 14, 17.
224. See, e.g., C. PtN. art. 405.
225. Check Laws art. 1, § 5; Cheque Convention art. 1.
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if the drawer fails to deposit adequate funds to pay the check,"2 6 and
the drawee may not accept a check. 227 The Check laws add that a pur-
ported acceptance is void (deemed "non &rite"), but the drawee may
initial the check to show that the drawer has provided adequate funds
to cover the check.228
c. Promissory Note
A promissory note contains the clause "to order" or the term
"promissory note" written in the text of the instrument in the same
language as the rest of the instrument, 229 and the following: an uncon-
ditional promise to pay a sum certain, a statement of the time of pay-
ment, a statement of the place where payment is to be made, the name
of the person to whom or to whose order payment is to be made, 3  a
statement of the date and place where the note was issued and the
signature of the person who issued the instrument (maker).23 ' A prom-
issory note that does not specify the time of payment is payable at
sight.23 2 In the absence of an explicit indication to the contrary, the
place where the instrument is issued is deemed to be the place of pay-
ment and the maker's domicile. 233 A promissory note that does not
state the place where it was issued is deemed to have been made at the
place mentioned beside the name of the maker.2 34 The maker of a
promissory note is liable in the same way as an acceptor of a bill of
exchange.235
2. Liability on the Instrument
Both the French Commercial Code and the Geneva Conventions
permit limited disclaimers of liability. In the absence of a provision to
226. Check Laws art. 1, § 3.
227. Check Laws art. 1, § 4; Cheque Convention art. 4.
228. Check Laws art. 1, § 4.
229. Cf. Bills of Exchange Convention art. 75, which requires "promissory note"
to be written in all cases.
230. Compare Anglo-American practice requiring merely that the payee be iden-
tified with reasonable certainty. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 3-110, Bills of Exchange Act § 7.
231. C. coM. art. 183; Bills of Exchange Convention.
232. C. com. art. 184; Bills of Exchange Convention.
233. Id. The maker's domicile and the placer of issue are relevant in choice of
law determinations. See infra notes 417-23 and accompanying text.
234. Id.
235. C. COM. art. 188; Bills of Exchange Convention art. 78.
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the contrary the indorser of a bill of exchange guarantees both accept-
ance and payment.23 6 He may prohibit any later indorsement, in which
case he does not make any guarantee to the person to whom the bill of
exchange is ultimately indorsed.2 37 The drawer also guarantees both ac-
ceptance and payment.2 38 He may release himself from guaranteeing
acceptance, but unlike an indorser, he may not release himself from the
guarantee of payment.23 9 The drawer of a check guarantees payment
and any statement purporting to release him from this guarantee will
be void.240 The indorser of a check guarantees payment in the absence
of a contrary stipulation.2 4'
The French Commercial Code's restriction on use of personal de-
fenses is similar to treatment of rights of holders in due course under
U.C.C. section 3-305. A person sued on a bill of exchange or a check
may not raise a defense based on his relations with the drawer or with
previous holders unless the holder knowingly acted to the debtor's det-
riment in acquiring the bill.242 These provisions are a compromise be-
tween the pre-Geneva Convention French and German rules that a
plaintiff could not maintain a cause of action if he knew of the debtor's
defenses when he acquired the instrument and the stricter view that a
plaintiff should prevail unless a plaintiff and the previous holder con-
spired to injure the debtor.24 3 The 1928 draft convention held that a
plaintiff's bad faith was a defense to suit on the instrument. The Ge-
neva Convention rejected this rule as too great an impediment to nego-
tiabiltiy.244 The Geneva Convention and the French Commercial Code
in effect define bad faith2 45 A majority of the delegates believed that
236. C. COM. art. 119; Bills of Exchange Convention art. 15. Compare U.C.C. §
3-414(1) which provides that "[u]nless the indorsement otherwise specifies... every
indorser engages that upon dishonor and any necessary notice of dishonor and protest
he will pay the instrument according to its tenor .. " Id.
237. C. coM. art. 119; Bills of Exchange Convention art. 15.
238. C. COM. art. 115; Bills of Exchange Convention.
239. C. COM. 115; Bills of Exchange Convention art. 9. Any provision purporting
to release him from the guarantee of payment will be deemed not not written, "non
&rite."
240. Cheque Convention art. 12; Check Laws art. I § 12.
241. Cheque Convention art. 18; Check Laws art. 1 § 18.
242. For treatment of liability on bills of exchange, see Bills of Exchange Con-
vention art. 17; C. COM. art. 121. For treatment of liability on checks, see Cheque
Convention art. 22; Check Laws art. 1 § 22.
243. 0. GILES, supra note 196, at 167.
244. Id.
245. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
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mere knowledge of defenses should not prevent a holder from asserting
a claim, but knowledge and intent to injure the debtor at the time the
holder acquired the instrument should be a defense.246 The French,
German, Austrian, and the Italian courts of last resort have all ad-
dressed the issue: when does a holder act knowingly to the debtor's
detriment by acquiring a negotiable instrument and thereby permit the
debtor to assert a personal defense?247
Several illustrative holdings indicate the scope of personal de-
fenses. If a holder has actual knowledge of a defense at the time he
acquires the instrument and he knows that he will deprive defendant of
that defense if he acquires it, his suit on the instrument will fail.24s If
the plaintiff knew of the business transaction between the drawer and
the previous holder but did not know details of the dispute, the defen-
dant may not assert the personal defense in an action on the instru-
ment.249 If facts surrounding the negotiation placed the plaintiff on no-
tice that the defendant could have pleaded fraud in defending a suit by
an earlier holder and that the earlier holder negotiated the instrument
to avoid that defense, the plaintiff's suit will fail even if he does not
know the exact basis for the claim of fraud.250 If a holder has reason to
know of defenses, and knows that he will injure the defendant by ac-
quiring the instrument, the defendant may maintain a successful de-
fense.25 If the defendant shows that a holder was grossly negligent in
failing to take precautions that a reasonably prudent businessman
should take, and if the holder had taken those precautions he would
have known of a defense, a court will exercise a rebuttable presumption
that the holder had actual knowledge of the defense.252
A court generally will consider a holder's state of mind at the time
he acquires a negotiable instrument. If the holder had no knowledge of
a defense when he obtained the instrument but later did something
closely related to the acquisition which damaged defendant, a court
will find that the later action related back to the time of acquisition.2 53
246. 0. GILES, supra note 196, at 167.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 168. For example, if the drawer of a bill of exchange sells goods to
the acceptor but fails to deliver the goods, and then discounts the bill to a bank that is
aware of the fraud, the acceptor may maintain a defense.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 168-69.
252. Id.
253. Id.
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3. Rationale for Personal Liability
The French Civil Code imposes almost strict liability for injuries
caused by "[a]ny act by anyone which causes any injury to another,
obliges the wrongdoer to repair the injury."254 The phrase "any act"
implies strict liability, but mention of the word "fault" suggests a more
lenient standard. This provision is ambiguous and courts sometimes
hold a principal liable for unauthorized acts of agents under this provi-
sion.155 Courts recently have turned toward application of apparent au-
thority to avoid broad interpretation of this act.256 Other authorities
explain that a business agent is responsible for damage to third parties
caused by his fault in the execution of his contract.257 Reference to
fault again implies less than strict liability.
In addition to personal liability for injuries he causes, an agent is
liable on the instrument if he exceeds his authority in issuing a negotia-
ble instrument. The French Commercial Code adopted article 8 of the
Bills of Exchange Convention. Anyone who signs a bill of exchange as
an agent for a person for whom he did not have authority to act is
personally bound on the instrument, and if he pays, he will have the
same rights that the claimed principal would have. 58 This rule treats
an agent who exceeds his authority in the same way as an agent who
acts without authority.25 9 The Report of the Drafting Committee inter-
prets this article to provide that an agent who executes a bill of ex-
change for an amount greater than he is authorized will be liable for
the full amount, not just for the amount by which the bill exceeds his
authorized limit.2 60 If one person without authority or capacity signs an
instrument, however, other signatures on the instrument remain
valid.261 Other authorities note that a third party may not take advan-
tage of his own negligence in failing to discover the scope of an agent's
authority when the agent signs without authority to bind his
254. "Tout fait quelconque de l'homme, qui cause d autrui un dommage, oblige
celui par la faute duquel il est arriv6, A le reparer." C. civ. art. 1382.
255. See infra text accompanying notes 313-318.
256. See, e.g., Banque Canadienne Nationale v. Directeur G6n6ral des Impots,
1963 Dalloz, Jurisprudence 277 (Cass. Ass. Plen. 1962).
257. 1 ENCYCLOPtDIE DALLOZ, Agent d'Affaires § 87 (1956).
258. C. coM. art. 114. Cf. U.C.C. § 3-404(1).
259. Id.
260. Hudson & Feller, supra note 186, at 351.
261. C. coM. art. 114; Bills of Exchange Convention art. 7.
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principal.26
In addition to liability on the instrument, if the agent exceeds his
authority, he may be liable for breach of warranty of authority. If an
agent's lack of authority injures a third party who in good faith relies
on the agent's manifestation of authority to bind the principal, the
third party may hold the purported agent liable, 63 but generally will
have no cause of action against the principal. 64 An agent may, how-
ever, disclaim this implied warranty. An agent who exceeds his author-
ity after giving a third party adequate notice of its proper scope will
not be liable unless he is personally bound on the contract.265 The law
is unclear as to what constitutes adequate disclosure but the agent
should show the third party the mandat, or agreement, authorizing him
to act along with all other relevant documents.
4. Signature by Agent
An agent may sign a negotiable instrument on the principal's be-
half.266 If the agent is authorized to sign the instrument only the princi-
pal is bound, provided that the instrument clearly acknowledges repre-
sentative capacity of the signature. If the agent's representative
capacity does not appear on the instrument, even if the agent signed for
the principal, the agent assumes personal liability on the negotiable in-
strument. 67 If the third party has actual knowledge of the agency rela-
tionship; however, the principal may be liable.26 a If a person claiming
to represent another signs as if he were an agent, but he either has no
authority or exceeds his authority, he will be personally obligated.269
An agent under the French Code may obtain authority by opera-
tion of law under a statute or court order, or by contract with the per-
262. See I ENCYCLOPtDIE DALLOz, Agent d'Affaires § 88 (1956).
263. Cf. C. civ. art. 1997. See infra text accompanying note 265.
264. M. PLANIOL & G. RIPERT, 6 TRAITE PRACTIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRAN;AIS
70 (1952).
265. C. civ. art. 1997.
266. R. RODItRE, DROIT COMMERCIAL 21 (7th ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as R.
RODItRE] For implicit recognition of an agent's authority to sign a bill of exchange on
his principal's behalf, see Bill of Exchange Convention art. 8, C. COM. art. 114. For
similar treatment of agents who sign checks, see Cheque Convention art. 11, Check
Laws art. 1, § 11.
267. C. COM. art. 114, Check Laws art. 1, § 11.
268. C. COM. art. 114, Check Laws art. 1, § 11.
269. C. COM. art. 114, Check Laws art. 1, § 11.
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son he represents.17 1 When there is a voluntary or consensual agency
relation, the principal confers authority by an act termed the procura-
tion or mandat.2 71 The procuration must follow the form prescribed by
law only if the underlying transaction is one that the law was designed
to govern and if the statute requires the prescribed form in the interests
of the parties 272 The procuration does not need to be written, 273 but the
prudent legal advisor will require a written contract for evidentiary
purposes. The contract creating an agency relation may be a public act
or document, a simple contract, or even a letter.2 74 It may be given
orally, but if there is a dispute the agency contract may only be proven
according to strict limitations prescribed in the Civil Code title "Con-
tracts or Conventional Obligations in General."'27 5 Acceptance of the
agency contract may be implied, and will then empower the agent to
bind the principal in matters within the scope of the authority
granted.276
The French Civil Code prevents unjust enrichment by recognizing
a principle related to the Anglo-American equitable doctrine of quasi
contract. The agent may bind the principal despite absence of pre-ex-
isting authority or ratification of the agent's act benefited the princi-
pal.277 The principal must satisfy all obligations contracted on his be-
half by his agent, and should reimburse the agent for all useful or
necessary expenses the agent incurred in a properly managed business
transaction.278 Planiol and Ripert note that by conferring representative
authority on anyone who, in certain situations, acts for the benefit of
another, this article supports the policy of avoiding unjust
enrichment.2 "
French businesses employ four general kinds of agents:
representants salaries, voyageurs-representants-placiers (V.R.P.s.
or representants statutaires), agents commerciaux, and representants
mandataires.280 The French Labor Code governs transactions with the
270. M. PLANIOL & G. RIPERT, supra note 264, at 67.
271. C. civ. art. 1984.
272. M. PLANIOL & G. RIPERT at 67.
273. C. civ. art. 1985.
274. Id. art. 1985.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. M. PLANIOL & G. RIPERT at 71-72, citing C. civ. art. 1375.
278. C. civ. art. 1375.
279. M. PLANIOL & G. RIPERT, supra note 264, at 72.
280. Hay & Miiller-Freienfels, Agency in the Conflict of Laws and the 1978
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representant salarie and the V.R.P.281 The V.R.P. enjoys special rights
but he may not engage in business on his own behalf or he will lose his
special status.218 Agents commerciaux are subject to Decree 58-1345 of
Decmeber 23, 1958. The French Civil Code governs agents
mandataires28 3 and defines the term as:
[A] representative who ordinarily carries on independently and
professionally (and otherwise than as an employee) the activity of
the negotiation or conclusion of contracts for the sale, purchase, or
letting on lease or hire of goods or other property, or the provision
of services, for and on behalf of manufacturers, producers or
merchants.2"4
A commercial agency contract must be written,285 and a commercial
agent may practice only after he registers in the commercial court.28 6
The National Federation of Commercial Agents prepares standard
form contracts providing a statement identifying principal and agent, a
statement specifying the scope of the agent's authority, conditions for
exercising authority, commission, duration of relation, amendment pro-
cedures, and dispute resolution. 87 Professor Guyenot 8a discussed the
role of the commercial agent:
The negotiation or conclusion of a contract by a commercial agent
does not involve him in liability to third parties who deal with him,
provided he acts within the limits of his authority, and they can not
have recourse to him if the principal does not fulfill his obligations
under the contract.289
Hague Convention, 27 Am. J. Comp. L. 1, 13 (1979).
281. CODE DE TRAVAIL art. L. 751-1 (Dalloz 1981-1982).
282. Hay & Miiller-Freienfels, supra note 280, at 13.
283. C. civ. art. 1984.
284. Decree of December 23, 1958, reprinted in and translated by G. GUYENOT,
THE FRENCH LAW OF AGENCY AND DISTRIBUTORSHIP AGREEMENTS 23 (1976).
285. G. GUYENOT, supra note 284, at 46, citing Decree of December 23, 1958,
art. 1(2).
286. G. GUYENOT, supra note 284, at 73, 75, citing Decree of December 23,
1958, art. 4, as amended by Decree of August 22, 1968, supplemented by Order of
August 22, 1968.
287. G. GUYENOT, supra note 284, at 48.
288. M. Guyenot is Chief Assistant in the Faculty of Law and Economic and
Social Sciences at the University of Paris.
289. G. GUYENOT, supra note 284, at 51.
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The remainder of the discussion of French agency law will focus
on the mandataire libre, or contractual agent. Because this type of
agency is purely consensual, characteristics of the agency relation vary
substantially. Authority may terminate by agreement between the par-
ties, by death of principal or agent, or by the bankruptcy of the princi-
pal.2 90 The Civil Code permits the agent to continue acting on behalf of
the principal until he learns that his power has terminated. 29 1 The
agent must continue to act even after he learns of his principal's death
if his failure to act could cause damage to the principal's estate. 92
5. Scope of Authority
The French Civil Code appears initially to construe agents' au-
thority strictly. The need to protect innocent third parties and to fur-
ther the negotiability of commercial instruments has led to a more lib-
eral interpretation of the Code. Whereas the English language
distinguishes between an agent's "authority" to act on behalf of a prin-
cipal and an agent's "power" to bind a principal,2 93 French texts use
the single word "pouvoir," which is a vaguer term denoting "power,"
or "ability to act." This linguistic difference causes interpretation of
the codes, treatises, and judicial opinions to be more difficult and
causes discussion of agent's liability to be less clear.
The Civil Code defines actual authority strictly. The agent may
not exceed the authority he received in the agency agreement; author-
ity to negotiate does not include authority to compromise the princi-
pal's rights.294 The agency agreement written in general terms only em-
powers the agent to perform administrative acts.295 If the agent intends
to alienate or pledge the principal's property the agency agreement
must provide expressly that the agent has such authority.296
Although the scope of an agent's actual authority may be con-
strued strictly, the Code treats its duration broadly. An agent's repre-
sentative capacity does not befin or end until the agent has actual no-
290. Id. at 148.
291. Id. at 63.
292. C. civ. art. 1991(2); G. GUYENOT, supra note 284, at 63.
293. "Authority" connotes rightful conduct; "power" denotes conduct that may
exceed the authority that the agent received from the principal.
294. C. civ. art. 1989.
295. C. clv. art. 1988.
296. Id.
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tice of the fact beginning or terminating his authority,"' or until he
receives a notification required by law.298 If a principal restricts or re-
vokes an agent's authority, even if he properly notifies the agent, he
may not assert this change in status as a defense to claims by third
parties who acted in good faith299 without knowledge of the change.300
In order to end all powers of the agent, the principal must notify third
parties according to statutory requirements for publicizing the change
or in the manner most likely to give the third parties actual notice of
the revocation of the agent's authority.30' The principal may require
the agent to return any document declaring the agent's representative
authority.0 2 This may not, however, be adequate notice to third parties
to free the principal from liability for later contracts the agent enters
on the principal's behalf.303 What constitutes adequate notice remains
unclear. A principal revoking or reducing an agent's authority should
give actual notice to all people with whom the agent has dealt and
should take reasonable measures to notify those with whom the agent is
likely to deal.
French courts recognize the need for predictability in business re-
lations and, therefore, sometimes find that an agent binds his principal
even when the agent exceeds his authority or acts without any author-
ity.304 The resulting judicial interpretations of the Civil Code resemble
apparent authority in Anglo-American law and inherent power in
United States practice. French courts are willing to protect a third
party who relies reasonably and in good faith on the appearance of
authority, if the purported principal is responsible for the appearance
of authority or if the third party relied on the existence of authority
normally granted to a permanent employee in the agent's position. 30 5
In some cases, statutes create an irrebutable presumption of au-
thority. Statutes creating limited liability corporations render any con-
tractual limitation on an agent's authority invalid as related to third
parties.306 Although the agent may have power to bind the principal he
297. C. civ. art. 2008.
298. M. PLANIOL & G. RIPERT, supra note 264, at 69.
299. C. civ. art. 2009; M. PLANIOL & G. RIPERT, supra note 264, at 69.
300. C. civ. art. 2005; M. PLANIOL & G. RIPERT, supra note 264, at 69.
301. M. PLANIOL & G. RIPERT, supra note 264, at 69.
302. C. civ. art. 2004.
303. M. PLANIOL & G. RIPERT, supra note 264, at 69.
304. Id. at 70.
305. Id.
306. Id.
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may be liable to the principal for exceeding his authority under the
contract. The French Cours de Cassation Civil met in plenary assembly
and extended the doctrine of apparent authority in Banque Canadienne
Nationale v. Directeur General des Impots. 07 The defendant relied on
Civil Code provisions and earlier judicial opinions to argue that it could
only be obligated on the instrument if it had acted in bad faith or given
actual authority to the director to sign the instrument on its behalf.
Since neither was applicable, the bank argued it should not be held
liable. The Cours de Cassation, however, found the defendant liable
under a new rule: an agent may bind his principal by exercise of appar-
ent authority, even if the principal is without fault, if the third party's
belief as to the extent of the agent's powers is reasonable and the cir-
cumstances justify the third party's failure to verify the precise scope of
the agent's authority. It is significant that the court did not refer to any
provisions of the French codes, rather it based its decision on a finding
that the agent acted within the normal scope of authority for a person
holding his office.
The commentator, Professor Jean Calais-Auloy, found the court in
Banque Canadienne Nationale had abandoned earlier established law
and recognized a new legal principle. The plaintiff did not assert that
the defendant held out the agent as having authority, or that it relied
on the defendant's representations implying that the agent had author-
ity. Calais-Auloy noted that the decision appeared inconsistent with the
Civil Code.308 Public policy, however, supported the decision.30 9 Busi-
nessmen must be certain of the validity of their acts without compli-
cated and time-consuming research. It is especially important for peo-
ple dealing with a company's agent to be able to rely on the agent's
apparent authority without painstaking study of corporate bylaws. 310
Professor Calais-Auloy questioned the efficacy of the holding. He
noted that modern business' need for quick decisions is not new; law
307. 1963 D. Jur. 277 (Cass. Ass. Plen. 1962). The president- director general of
the Canadian National Bank signed for the bank as surety on an instrument for fr.
700,000. The president did not have authority to bind the bank; the corporation's by-
laws required two signatures. When the drawee failed to pay the instrument, plaintiff
sued the bank. Id.
308. Id. The Civil. Code provides that a principal is bound by contracts entered
by his agent while the agent is acting within the scope of his authority; the principal is
only bound by his agent's ultra vires acts if the principal ratifies the acts expressly or
implicitly. C. civ. art. 1998.
309. 1963 D. Jur. at 277.
310. Id.
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has evolved to satisfy this need since the beginning of the century.311
Calais-Auloy noted that legislators might in the future fix the authority
of all agents as they had the authority of agents of limited liability
corporations.312
Before the Banque Canadienne Nationale opinion, courts based li-
ability of a principal for unauthorized acts of agents on a theory of
fault. 313 Courts invoked two provisions: article 1382 of the Civil Code,
which created liability for the defendant's own wrongful act and article
1384(5), which created liability for acts of defendant's managing of-
ficers and directors.314 Courts based corporate liability on article 1382
by finding that the principal acted wrongfully by concealing from third
parties the limitation on the agent's authority, and by holding that this
concealment injured innocent third parties who relied on the incorrect
belief that they were creditors of the principal." 5 Courts found that the
most adequate compensation to third parties was to hold the principal a
debtor to the contracting third party as if the agent had acted within
the scope of his authority.316 Unlike article 1382, article 1384(5) does
not impose liability on a principal for his personal fault, but for the
fault of an agent acting in a supervisory role. This provision has the
practical and theoretical advantage of imposing liability for the clear
fault of the agent rather than on the uncertain fault of the principal.1 7
As in suits under article 1382, the injured third party may have the
court require the principal to pay as if the agent acted within the scope
of his authority.318
6. Ratification
An agent who is personally liable on a negotiable instrument be-
cause he exceeded the scope of his authority1 9 may escape liability to a
third party by his principal's explicit or implicit ratification of his
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id. "The judges... preferred to rely on the solid ground of Civil Code arts.
1382 et seq. rather than on the quicksand of apparent authority." [translation by
author].
314. Id. See C. civ. § 1382.
315. 1963 D. Jur. 277.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 278.
318. Id.
319. See C. cor, . art. 114, Check Laws § 11.
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act.3 20 Not only will ratification cause a principal to become bound on
an instrument his agent executed without authority;321 ratification will
also confer actual authority to commit the act the agent already per-
formed. 22 Courts often find ratification, which relates back to the time
of the act, when an agent exceeds his authority or when the court finds
an apparent agency. 23 Ratification is a unilateral manifestation of con-
sent expressed by the principal or by a person authorized to act on his
behalf and it may occur at any time. 24 Although ratification may free
an agent from liability to a third party on a negotiable instrument, his
obligation to the principal is governed by a separate contract. The
agent, therefore, may be liable off the instrument for breach of his em-
ployment contract.
C. Summation
The Genva Conventions on negotiable instruments influenced com-
mercial law in continental Europe and Japan. The French experience is
typical; France adopted the rigid rules of the Convention into its Code
de Commerce. The French Commercial Code and the Geneva Conven-
tions on negotiable instruments prescribe rules similar to those gov-
erning negotiable instruments in the United States and England. An
agent who signs a negotiable instrument will be personally liable unless
the face of the instrument makes his representative capacity clearly ap-
parent and he signs with authority of the person he represents. The
existence and the scope of representative authority are essential issues
in determination of who is liable on the instrument. The French Civil
Code construes an agent's authority strictly. The Cours de Cassation,
however, appears willing to expand the statutory provisions to include
representative capacity analogous to apparent authority or inherent
power in United States practice.
V. Choice of Law
The essential similarity between commercial law among western
nations reduces somewhat the importance of choice of law principles.
320. C. civ. art. 1998.
321. Id.
322. M. PLANIOL & G. RIPERT, supra note 264, at 71.
323. Id.
324. Id.
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However, differences in local law remain and a substantial body of le-
gal theory has evolved to aid courts in determination of which local law
to apply. Each legal system balances concerns of party autonomy and
power to contract for application of a chosen law with a need for judi-
cial predictability and fear of overreaching. The following analysis dis-
cusses the efficacy of choice of law clauses and principles for selecting
local law in the absence of express provisions in the instruments.
A. United States
The Uniform Commercial Code and developing precedent32 fur-
ther party autonomy by permitting choice of applicable law, providing
that the parties select law of a state bearing a reasonable reaction to
the transaction.3 26 This limitation protects parties in a weak bargaining
position from overreaching by a more powerful potential adversary. It
also protects an overburdened judicial system from having to research
and apply the law of distant states and nations when application of the
law of the foreign jurisdiction is not foreseeable-and perhaps not de-
sired by at least one party to the transaction. Section 1-105(1) states
the Code's basic choice of law principles:
Except as provided hereafter in this section, when a transaction
bears a reasonable relation to this state and also to another state or
nation the parties may agree that the law either of this state or of
such other state or nation shall govern their rights and duties. Fail-
ing such agreement this Act applies to transactions bearing an ap-
propriate relation to this state.327
The drafting of the first sentence is unfortunate. The drafters intended
to permit parties to an instrument to select the law of any state with a
reasonable connection to the transaction.32 As written, however, if a
325. The following discussion of United States choice of law rules is included as
a basis for comparison with English and Continental approaches. For a more thorough
discussion, see Nordstrom & Ramerman, The Uniform Commercial Code and The
Choice of Law, 1969 DUKE L.J. 623; Tuchler, Boundaries to Party Autonomy in the
Uniform Commercial Code; a Radical View, 11 ST. Louis U.L.J. 180 (1967); Nord-
strom, Choice of Law and the Uniform Commercial Code, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 364
(1963); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 213-218 (1971).
326. See Annot., 63 A.L.R. 3d 341 (1975).
327. Section 1-105(2) states exceptions to the general rule that are not relevant
to discussion of negotiable instruments under article 3.
328. See U.C.C. § 1-105 official comment 1.
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party brings suit in a state that does not have a reasonable relation to
the instrument courts of that state may not be bound by the parties'
otherwise appropriate choice of law. 329
The term "agree" in Section 1-105(1) may include an implied un-
derstanding that the law of a certain state or nation should govern the
transaction.3 30 The Code does not define "agree," but provides that
"agreement" means "the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their
language or by implication from other circumstances including course
of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance. 3 1 If a transac-
tion has the closest connection with a jurisdiction other than the forum,
the parties did not specify the applicable law, and the parties are most
familiar with the law of the foreign jurisdiction, then courts should ap-
ply that jurisdiction's law. 3 2
The United States Supreme Court defined the appropriate stan-
dard3 33 for a "reasonable relation" in Seeman v. Philadelphia Ware-
house.33 4 The unanimous opinion authored by Justice Stone found the
place where the parties contracted irrelevant.-3 The Court recognized
the general rule that contracts are governed by the law of the jurisdic-
329. See Nordstrom & Ramerman, supra note 325, at 623, 629.
330. See U.C.C. § 1-201(3).
331. Id. (emphasis added).
332. Nordstrom & Ramerman, supra note 325, at 632.
333. U.C.C. § 1-105 official comment 1.
334. 274 U.S. 403 (1927). In Seeman, defendant pledged canned salmon to
plaintiff as collateral for a loan. Plaintiff executed a promissory note that named itself
debtor and that was payable to its own order. Plaintiff indorsed the note, discounted it
to its note banker, and forwarded the proceeds to the borrower-after subtracting a
commission of 3% per year for its services, the brokerage fee and discount. Defendant
agreed to repay the face amount of the loans at the end of one year or to pay additional
ch arges to refinance for another year. The effective interest rate varied between 8 %
and 10 % but the maximum legal rate for interest on loans was 6% under the laws of
New York and Pennsylvania. Plaintiff sued for conversion when defendant fraudulently
regained possession and sold the pledged salmon. Defendant argued that the transac-
tion involved a usurious loan, New York law applied and New York law made the
entire transaction void. Plaintiff argued that it made a loan of credit rather than of
money so the usury limits did not apply; even if the transaction were a usurious loan,
Pennsylvania law should apply to enforce repayment of principal and the maximum
legal rate of interest. Plaintiff was a Pennsylvania corporation, had its only place of
business in Pennsylvania, and required repayment of the loan in Pennsylvania. Defen-
dant argued that New York law applied since the parties conducted negotiations in
New York and plaintiff forwarded the funds to the borrower in New York. Id. at 404-
07.
335. Id. at 407.
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tion where they are to be performed.336 The law permitted plaintiff to
lend money to borrowers outside the state and to require repayment
within and according to the laws of plaintiff's state.337 Justice Stone
noted an exception to the rule allowing parties the power to select the
law governing the contract: the parties must act in good faith.,38 The
Court limited the scope of the rule:
The effect of the qualification is merely to prevent the evasion or
avoidance at will of the usury law otherwise applicable, by the par-
ties' entering into the contract or stipulating for its performance at
a place which has no normal relation to the transaction and to
whose law they would not otherwise be subject. . . . Assuming
their real, bona fide intention was to fix the situs of the contract at
a certain place which has a natural and vital connection with the
transaction, the fact that they were actuated in so doing by an in-
tention to obtain a higher rate of interest than is allowable by the
situs of some of the other elements of the transaction does not pre-
vent the application of the law allowing the higher rate.339
The Court concluded by noting that the plaintiff contracted for
payment in the forum where it was incorporated and where it con-
ducted its business. The selection of Pennsylvania law was not frivo-
lous, and was binding on the parties because Pennsylvania had a rea-
sonable relation to the transaction. 40
In Morgan Walton Properties, Inc. v. International City Bank &
Trust Co.,341 the Florida Supreme Court held that the Louisiana usury
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 408.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 409.
341. 404 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 1981). Defendants argued that the Florida criminal
usury statute applied and that it made the entire obligation unenforceable. See FLA.
STAT. § 687.071(2) (1972). The trial court held that Louisiana law applied and that
under Louisiana law there was no limit to interest chargeable to a corporation. 404 So.
2d at 1061. Defendants appealed and the Fifth Circuit certified the following question
to the Florida Supreme Court:
Are notes executed and payable in a state other than Florida, secured by a
mortgage on Florida real estate, providing for interest legal where made,
but usurious under Florida law, unenforceable in Florida courts due to
Florida's usury statute, public policy or otherwise, where (a) the interest
charged or paid exceeds 25 percent and (b) where the interest charged
does not exceed 25 percent, but exceeds the maximum interest rate al-
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statute should govern promissory notes executed in Louisiana but se-
cured by a mortgage on property in Florida.342 The Florida Supreme
Court noted that the law of the state where the parties entered into and
performed the contract traditionally governed the contract's validity
and interpretation.3 43 In an earlier case decided the same year, how-
ever, the Florida Supreme Court found that this traditional rule for
choice of law "is today of little practical value since these contacts are
so easily manipulated in our mobile society. ' 344 The Morgan Walton
Properties court held that Florida would apply Louisiana law to uphold
the parties' express or implied intent since Louisiana had a normal and
reasonable relation to the notes,345 the parties implicitly or explicitly
had agreed to be bound by Louisiana law,346 and Florida did not have a
sufficiently strong public policy to justify adoption of Florida law.347
The Morgan Walton Properties opinion relied heavily on Conti-
nental Mortgage Investors v. Sailboat Key, Inc.,348 in which the Flor-
ida Supreme Court reversed a lower court's holding that Florida's
usury law was applicable to a financing agreement between a Florida
corporation and a Massachusetts business trust. The district court of
appeal349 found that Massachusetts had no substantial connection to
the transaction and that the parties selected Massachusetts law solely
to avoid strong public policy expressed in the Florida usury law. On
appeal the Florida Supreme Court reversed and found that Massachu-
setts did have a reasonable relation to the transaction. 350 The Florida
lowed by law?
International Civil Bank and Trust Co. v. Morgan Walton Properties, Inc., 612 F.2d
227, 229 (5th Cir. 1980).
342. Morgan Walton Properties, Inc., 404 So. 2d at 1063.
343. Id. at 1061, citing Brown v. Case, 80 Fla. 703, 86 So. 684 (1920); Thomp-
son v. Pyle, 39 Fla. 582, 23 So. 12 (1897); Perry v. Lewis, 6 Fla. 555 (1856).
344. Morgan Walton Properties, Inc., 404 So. 2d at 1062, quoting Continental
Mortgage Investors v. Sailboat Key, Inc., 395 So. 2d 507, 510 (Fla. 1981).
345. Id. at. 1062-63. The court cited Seeman as it held courts should honor the
parties' choice of law if the choice bore a reasonable relation to the transaction, "even
if the parties' purpose in making ft was to avoid the restrictive effects of Florida's usury
law." Id. at 1063.
346. Id. at 1063.
347. Id.
348. 395 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 1981) [hereinafter cited as CMI].
349. Sailboat Key, Inc. v. Continental Mortgage Investors, 354 So. 2d 67 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
350. CMI, 395 So. 2d at 513. One of the parties was a Massachusetts business
trust with offices in Massachusetts, and the parties executed the agreement in Massa-
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public policy against usury was not strong enough to invalidate the par-
ties' choice of law even if they were motivated primarily be a desire to
avoid Florida's usury statute." 1
Drafters of the Code wanted to achieve as high a degree of uni-
formity in the law as possible. Only Pennsylvania had enacted the Code
by the time the drafters finished the first revision of section 1-105,351
and the Pennsylvania legislature may not have foreseen the nearly
unanimous enactment of the Code. Because the drafters preferred to
have cases decided according to the U.C.C., they provided in the sec-
ond sentence of section 1-105(1), so that the forum's version of the
code should govern if the parties did not select another jurisdiction's
law and if the forum bore an appropriate relation to the transaction. 53
What constitutes an appropriate relation remains unclear. The Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts discussed this provision in In-
dustrial National Bank of Rhode Island v. Leo's Used Car Exchange,
Inc. 3 4 as it held that Massachusetts law applied to a transaction in
which a Massachusetts corporation drew a check on a Massachusetts
bank payable to an automobile dealer in Connecticut and cashed by a
bank in Rhode Island.3 55 The court noted that Rhode Island, Connecti-
cut, and Massachusetts each bore a reasonable relation to the transac-
tion and the parties could have stipulated that the law of any of these
states should apply. 356 Because the parties did not explicitly choose the
applicable law and because Massachusetts bore an appropriate relation
to the transaction, the Massachusetts Uniform Commercial Code
governed.3 5
7
The Code gives preference to the forum's version of the U.C.C. if
the parties fail to agree upon applicable law;358 however, the Code does
not encourage application of the forum's non-U.C.C. substantive
law.359 Courts must apply traditional choice of law rules to determine
chusetts. Id. at 508.
351. Id. at 509.
352. See Note, Conflicts of Laws and the "Appropriate Relation" Test of Sec-
tion 1-105 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 40 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 797, 801 (1971-
1972).
353. See U.C.C. § 1-105 official comment 2.
354. 362 Mass. 797, 291 N.E.2d 603 (1973).
355. Id. at 800, 291 N.E.2d at 605.
356. Id. at 800 n.3, 291 N.E.2d at 605 n.3.
357. Id. at 800, 291 N.E.2d at 605.
358. See U.C.C. § 1-105 official comment 2.
359. Id.
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applicable law if the forum does not bear an appropriate relation to the
transaction, or to select appropriate non-code law in the absence of
agreement between the parties. The Restatement 60 discusses choice of
law principles for negotiable instruments,361 which are applicable if
neither the Code nor the parties' agreement designates appropriate law.
If the instrument designates a place of payment the local law of that
jurisdiction governs obligations of the maker of a note or the acceptor
of a draft.3 62 If the instrument does not designate a place of payment
the local law where the maker or acceptor delivered the instrument will
control his obligations. 63
The drafters of the Restatement noted the importance of predict-
ability in negotiable instruments and, therefore, proposed that a single
set of contacts govern choice of law for obligations of makers and ac-
ceptors.3 64 They recognized that fairness required keeping the obliga-
tions of makers and acceptors constant throughout the life of the in-
strument, and suggested that initial delivery or designation of place of
payment fix the parties' obligations. 6 5 Therefore, the local law of the
place where a drawer or indorser delivers the instrument controls the
obligations of an indoreser of a draft or a note and of the drawer of a
draft.366 The drafters noted the different responsibilities of drawers, in-
dorsers, makers, and acceptors, and concluded that a different set of
laws may govern the obligations of each party to the instrument.361
Therefore, the local law of the jurisdiction where presentment, pay-
ment, protest, or notice of dishonor occur governs details of each of
those transactions.3 68 Local law of the state where a negotiable instru-
ment is when a holder transfers his interest determines effect of the
transfer.369
In Exchange Bank and Trust Co. v. Tamerius,170 the Supreme
360. In this discussion "Restatement" refers to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CON-
FLICT OF LAWS (1971). Compare references to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
(1958) earlier in this article.
361. RESTATEMENT §§ 214-217.
362. Id. § 214(1).
363. Id. § 214(2).
364. Id. comment b at 702.
365. Id.
366. Id. § 215(1).
367. Id. comment b at 707.
368. Id. § 217.
369. Id. § 216.
370. 200 Neb. 807, 265 N.W.2d 847 (1978). Plaintiff sued on a delinquent
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Court of Nebraska reached the result suggested by the Restatement's
analysis.37 1 The unanimous court affirmed the lower court's decision
that Texas law was applicable because the promissory note provided
explicitly that the Texas Consumer Credit Code governed the transac-
tion.372 The court then noted alternatively that Texas law would govern
even if the parties did not choose Texas law . 73 The opinion cited pre-
U.C.C. cases for the proposition that the law of the place of payment
governs a promissory note unless the parties clearly prefer application
of law of the place where the note was made.7
The Georgia Court of Appeals considered relationships among fed-
eral, Georgia, and Virginia law in Fitzgerald v. United Virginia Bank
of Roanoke.Y15 The appellants signed the notes in Georgia and mailed
them to the appellee. 76 The notes were payable in Virginia. 77 The
United States Code permits national banks to charge the highest inter-
est rate that state banks may charge on similar loans.3 78 The court
found that Virginia law governed the interest rate because the notes
were to be paid in Virginia.3 79 The court held that the place of per-
formance prevails over the place where the instrument is executed."
promissory note bearing an interest rate of 12.83%. Defendants argued that the loan
was usurious and void under the laws of Nebraska. Plaintiffs contended that Texas law
governed the note and that the interest charged was valid under the applicable statute.
Id.
371. See RESTATEMENT § 214.
372. Tamerius, 200 Neb. at 810, 265 N.W.2d at 849.
373. Id. at 810, 265 N.W.2d at 850.
374. Id. at 810, 265 N.W.2d at 850, citing United Bank & Trust Co. v. McCul-
lough, 115 Neb. 327, 212 N.W. 762 (1927); Farm Mortgate & Loan Co. v. Beale, 113
Neb. 293, 202 N.W. 877 (1925).
375. 139 Ga. App. 664, 229 S.E.2d (1976). Appellee, a national bank doing bus-
iness in Virginia, sued appellant on two delinquent promissory notes. Appellants argued
that the notes prescribed a usurious rate of interest under Georgia law so they should
only be liable for outstanding principal. Id. at 664-65, 229 S.E.2d at 139.
376. Id. at 665, 229 S.E.2d at 139.
377. Id.
378. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (Supp. 1981).
379. Fitzgerald, 139 Ga. App. at 666, 229 S.E.2d at 140.
380. Id. (citing Vinson v. Platt & McKenzie, 21 Ga. 135 (1856)); Liberty Loan
Corp. v. Crowder, 116 Ga. App. 280, 157 S.E.2d 52 (1967). Cf. Gulf Collateral, Inc. v.
Morgan, 415 F. Supp. 319 (S.D. Ga. 1976) (in which the court cited the RESTATEMENT
§ 214(2) to support the proposition that the local law of the place where promissory
notes are executed governs their validity rather than the law of the state where they are
payable. This section is only applicable if the parties did not designate the place of
payment on the instrument).
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The United States Constitution requires each state to give full
faith and credit "to the public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings
of every other state." '' In 1948 Congress enacted legislation imple-
menting the following provision:
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof...
shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the
United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by
law or usage in the courts of each State, Territory or Possession
from which they are taken. 82
These provisions balance policies favoring res judicata and uni-
formity of decisions with policies supporting federalism. The practi-
tioner should consider the ramifications of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause before selecting a forum for litigation. The Missouri Court of
Appeals summarized the effects of the full faith and credit clause in
Jennings v. Klemme 83 The court noted that the only defenses that
may prevent entry of judgment under the full faith and credit clause
are that the original court did not have subject matter jurisdiction, that
the defendant did not have reasonable notice or opportunity to be heard
in the original suit, or that the judgment resulted from fraud."84 The
opinion then noted that the Full Faith and Credit Clause precludes
381. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. The Full Faith and Credit Clause only applies to
"Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings" of sister states; it does not apply to interna-
tional situations. See generally RESTATEMENT § 2, comment b.
382. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (Supp. 1981).
383. 620 S.W.2d 403 (Mo. App. 1981). In 1967 defendants executed a promis-
sory note to plaintiffs. The note contained a warrant of attorney to confess judgment if
defendant became delinquent in payments. The note did not mention a corporation, but
defendants sibned the note, "Lem Klemme, Pres.," and "Yvonne Klemme, Sec.-Treas."
The Illinois circuit court entered judgment by confession when defendants did not pay
the note. Illinois law only permits garnishment of salary if defendant has been served
with notice and given opportunity to appear. Plaintiff, therefore, served each defendant
with a summons stating that if he failed to appear, "A judgment by confession for
$39,893.68 entered against you on December 7, 1970, may be confirmed." Defendants
ignored the summonses and the Illinois court confirmed judgment. Plaintiffs then filed
a petition in Missouri court for registration of the Illinois judgment pursuant to the
Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Law. Defendants then sought to raise the
defense in U.C.C. § 3-403(2) by parol evidence that they signed on behalf of a partly
disclosed principal. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's holding for
plaintiffs. Id. at 404-07.
384. Id. at 406 (citing W.B.M. v. G.G.M., 579 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Mo. Ct. App.
1979)).
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consideration of the underlying cause of action, of the analysis of the
foreign judgment or of the law supporting the foreign court's
decision.385
B. England
English rules for choice of law are different from provisions of the
Restatement. The Bills of Exchange Act treats each contract on the
instrument separately, and applies the law of the jurisdiction where
that contract was entered to determine its validity and interpretation. 38
Section 72 states choice of law rules applicable to bills of exchange;
section 89 applies these rules to promissory notes.
The Bills of Exchange Act distinguishes between inland or foreign
bills of exchange. 87 Courts treat a bill of exchange as an inland bill
unless the face of the instrument shows it is foreign.388 The law of the
jurisdiction where a person draws, indorses, or accepts an instrument or
accepts a bill over protest generally governs interpretation of his rights
and obligations. 389 If a person indorses an inland bill in a foreign coun-
try, however, the courts will apply United Kingdom law to interpret the
indorsement's effect on rights and obligations of the payor.390
For choice of law purposes a party enters a contract on a bill of
exchange or a promissory note where he delivers the instrument rather
than where he attaches his signature. 391 If the defendant argues that an
instrument is invalid according to the law of the jurisdiction where it is
issued, he must prove the foreign law as a question of fact.392 The
Court of Appeals has found that law governing transfer of personal
property also controls negotiation of bills of exchange and checks in a
foreign country.393
385. Id. at 406 (citing Matter of Estate of Fields 588 S.W. 2d 50, 52 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1979)).
386. See Bills of Exchange Act §§ 72(1), 72(2).
387. Bills of Exchange Act § 4(1) defines inland and foreign bills: "An inland
bill is a bill which is or on the face of it purports to be (a) both drawn and payable
within the British Islands, or (b) drawn within the British Islands upon some person
resident therein. Any other bill is a foreign bill." Id.
388. Id. § 4(2).
389. Id. § 72(2).
390. Id.
391. CHALMERS ON BILLS OF EXCHANGE, supra note 147, at 235.
392. Id.
393. Embiricos v. Anglo-Austrian Bank, [1905] 1 K.B. 677, 683 (C.A.).
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The law of the place where an instrument was issued determines
formal validity. 394 The law of the place where a person accepts, pro-
tests, or indorses a negotiable instrument determines formal validity of
his contract.39 5 The statute states two provisos. First, a negotiable in-
strument issued outside the United Kingdom will not be invalid merely
because it was not stamped according to the law of the jurisdiction
where it was issued. Second, if a negotiable instrument satisfies re-
quirements for formal validity in the United Kingdom but is issued
abroad, courts may treat it as valid between all people who negotiate,
hold, or become parties to it in the United Kingdom.396
The following illustrations reflect choice of law principles for for-
mal validity: 9 7 (1) Law of country A requires a bill of exchange to
state the value received but law of B does not. A bill of exchange that
does not express the value received is valid if it was drawn in B but
payable in A;398 (2) A bill of exchange drawn and payable in A is
invalid according to A's law because it fails to state the value received.
If the bill is indorsed in B, where the bill is valid, a holder could sue
the indorser in B's court but would have no recourse against the
drawer; 99 (3) B's law will determine whether a bill of exchange drawn
in B against a drawee in A is unconditional. 00
The following situations illustrate the effect of section 72(2),
which provides rules for interpretation of instruments that are v.alid
under section 72(1): (1) If a negotiable instrument payable to bearer is
issued in England and negotiated by delivery in a country that does not
recognize bearer instruments, English courts will uphold validity of the
transfer;401 (2) If a holder sues in England on an instrument issued in
Belgium and indorsed in blank in France, French law will determine
the effect of the indorsement; °2 (3) French law governs an acceptance
occurring in France;403 (4) A check drawn abroad on an English bank
394. Bills of Exchange Act § 72(1).
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. See id.
398. CHALMERS ON BILLS OF EXCHANGE, supra note 147, at 235. Cf. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 214-217 (providing that place of performance
generally governs).
399. CHALMERS ON BILLS OF EXCHANGE, supra note 147, at 235.
400. Id.
401. Id. at 236; Bills of Exchange Act § 72(2) paragraph 2.
402. CHALMERS ON BILLS OF EXCHANGE, supra note 147, at 236.
403. Id.
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is stolen and the first indorsement is forged. An Austrian bank cashes
the check and acquires good title under Austrian law. The Austrian
bank sends the check to the drawee through the normal collection pro-
cess and receives the face value from the drawee. The drawee is not
guilty of conversion for improper payment.4 °4
The Cheques Act codified the result in illustration (4) by provid-
ing that a banker is not liable for paying an irregularly indorsed check
if he pays in good faith and in the ordinary course of business.4 " The
Embiricos decision on which this hypothetical situation is based406
found choice of law rules determinative, and created broader protection
for bankers than that codified in the Cheques Act.
C. Civil Law Practice and the Geneva Conventions
1. Overview
Delegates to the Geneva Conference which was held from May 13,
1930, to June 7, 1930, signed a convention to regulate choice of law
problems for bills of exchange crossing national boundaries.4 °7 On
March 19, 1931, delegates to a second conference signed a convention
regulating conflicts of law problems for checks.40 8 The Conventions
were registered with the secretariat and were entered into force on Jan-
uary 1, 1934.409 The Conventions provide that the law of the state of a
person's nationality governs his capacity to bind himself on a negotiable
404. Id. (citing Embiricos, I K.B. 677).
405. Cheques Act § 1, supra note 97.
406. See supra note 404.
407. Convention for the Settlement of Certain Conflicts of Laws in Connection
with Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes, June 7, 1930, 143 L.N.T.S. 319 [herein-
after cited as Bills of Exchange Conflicts Convention].
408. Convention for the Settlement of Certain Conflicts of Laws in Connection
with Cheques, March 19, 1931, 143 L.N.T.S. 409 [hereinafter cited as Cheques Con-
flicts Convention]. The following states ratified or acceded to the Convention: Austria,
Belgium, Brazil, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, German Democratic Republic,
declaring reapplication of the Convention as of June 6, 1958, Hungary, Indonesia, It-
aly, Japan, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Sweden and Switzerland. UNITED NATIONS, MULTILATERAL TREATIES IN RESPECT OF
WHICH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PERFORMS DEPOSITORY FUNCTIONS 580 (1978),
U.N.Doc. ST/LEG/SER.D/11 (1978).
409. Cheques Conflicts Convention, 143 L.N.T.S. at 319.
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instrument.410 If choice of law rules in his country provide for applica-
tion of another's law, that nation's local law will determine capacity.4"'
The law of the jurisdiction where a person enters a contract arising
from a negotiable instrument controls that contract's form.41 2 The law
of the jurisdiction where a bill of exchange or promissory note is paya-
ble controls the obligations of the acceptor of the bill or maker of the
note.413 The law of the country in which any other person signs the
instrument governs the effect of his signature.
4 14
The Convention's emphasis on place of signature, domicile, and
jurisdiction where the instrument is payable has the advantage of bas-
ing a person's liability on the law with which he is generally is most
familiar and which he generally expects to apply. Emphasis on a single
criterion such as place of signature or payment increases predictability
of effects of commercial instruments by facilitating determination of
appropriate law. The Genva Conventions on Conflicts of Laws do not
include any provisions permitting contractual selection of law or forum;
the drafters emphasized uniformity of selection of law at the expense of
party autonomy.
2. France
France did not adopt the Geneva Conventioins on Conflicts into its
legal codes. Commentators deplore the lack of codification and the re-
sulting need to follow archaic law.415 Conflicts of law principles appli-
cable to negotiable instruments remains unclear. Unlike the Geneva
Conventions on Conflicts of Law, France permits parties to exercise
substantial discretion in choice of law. The Cours de Cassation has rec-
ognized that the law applicable for formation, conditions, or effects of
410. Bills of Exchange Conflicts Convention art. 2, 143 L.N.T.S. at 325; Che-
ques Conflicts Convention art. 2, 143 L.N.T.S. at 415.
411. Bills of Exchange Conflicts Convention art. 2, 143 L.N.T.S. at 325; Che-
ques Conflicts Convention art. 2, 143 L.N.T.S. at 415.
412. Bills of Exchange Conflicts Convention art. 2, 143 L.N.T.S. at 325; Che-
ques Conflicts Convention art. 2, 143 L.N.T.S. at 415. Cf. U.C.C. § 1-105 (providing
that the forum's version of the Code will govern the form); Bills of Exchange Act § 72
(providing that the place of delivery after execution determines applicable law).
413. Bills of Exchange Conflicts Convention art. 2, 143 L.N.T.S. at 325.
414. Id.; Cheques Conflicts Convention art. 2, 143 L.N.T.S. at 415.
415. See, e.g., ENCYCLOPtDIE DALLOZ, Droit international- Conflicts de lois §
82 (1968).
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contracts is the law that the parties expressly adopt.416 In the absence
of a stipulation by the parties, the court considers circumstances of
each case to determine which law should govern the contract.417 The
court also presumes that the parties intend the law of the place of per-
formance to control their obligations. 418 A French principal and a man-
dataire or contractual agent are generally free to choose any nation's
law to control their contract.419 Claims to compensation by a V.R.P.420
are subject to French law when the agent lives and performs the con-
tract in France, and parties may not avoid mandatory provisions of the
labor code by a choice of law provision in the contract.42'
The Cours de Cassation developed special choice of law principles
applicable to negotiable instruments. If a party contests his obligations
under a bill of exchange drawn outside France and payable within
France, a French court generally will apply the law of the jurisdiction
where the drawees are domiciled.422 If the instrument is domiciled the
court will apply law of the jurisdiction where it is payable, or where
plaintiff signed a protest.423
D. Summation
The practitioner should advise an agent executing negotiable in-
struments that he expects to cross national or state boundaries to in-
clude an explicit choice of law clause. United States courts generally
will uphold the provision if the parties select the laws of a jurisdiction
with a reasonable relation to the transaction. What constitutes a rea-
sonable relation remains unclear, but the domicile of one of the parties
or the place of performance of some part of the transaction should have
sufficient connection to satisfy U.C.C. section 1-105(1). Unlike the
Uniform Commercial Code, the English Bills of Exchange Act empha-
sizes uniformity at the expense of party autonomy. A practitioner
whose client does business with the United Kingdom should review
416. Ste. des Fourrures Renel v. Allouche, reprinted in 48 REVUE CRITIQUE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVt 708 (1959), citing C. civ. art. 1134.
417. Id.
418. 3 JURISPRUDENCE FRANIAISE, Conflit de lois § 419 (1967).
419. E. Hay & Muller-Freienfels, supra note 280, at 14.
420. See supra text accompanying note 280.
421. Hay & MuIler-Freienfels, supra note 280, at 14.
422. 3 JURISPRUDENCE FRANCAISE, Conflit de lois § 476 (1967), citing REVUE
CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVt 116 (1939).
423. Id.
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choice of law rules in section 72 of the Bills of Exchange Act. The
Geneva Conventions on Conflicts of Law differ substantially from the
United States approach as they base choice of law largely on the place
where a party signs the instrument or where the instrument is payable.
Although France acceded to the Convention, it did not adopt it into its
Commercial or Civil Codes. French law remains poorly defined and al-
lows parties to a negotiable instrument substantial direction in selecting
applicable law.
VI. Proposals for Reform
A. Hague Convention on Agency
When the General Meeting of the Thirteenth Hague Session was
unable to complete work on a convention on agency, a special commis-
sion of the Thirteenth Session of The Hague Conference on Private
International Law convened on June 6, 1977, to draft a final agree-
ment.424 France was the only country to sign the Convention when it
was opened for signature in March, 1978,425 and France has not
adopted its provisions. The Hague Convention adopts a flexible ap-
proach to choice of law in international agency relations and it may
form the basis for future developments in the area.
The Hague Convention deals solely with choice of law questions; it
contains no provisions prescribing standards for local law. Article 5 al-
lows complete party autonomy by permitting principal and agent to se-
lect applicable law. 426 Article 6427 indicates applicable law when the
parties do not record any preference in their contract. In the absence of
agreement by the parties, the courts of law of the nation where the
agent has his place of business should apply the local law where the
agent has his habitual residence.42s The local law of the place of per-
formance applies if it is also the principal's place of business or the
424. Hague Conference on Private International Law, 3 Actes et Documents de
la Treizieme Session 42 (1978), 26 AM. J. COMP. L. 438 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Hague Convention]. See Comment, The Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to
Agency, 26 AM. J. COMP. L. 434 (1978).
425. Hay & Muller-Freienfels, supra note 280, at 36 n. 184.
426. Cf. U.C.C. § 1-105(1) (permitting express or implied selection of the law of
any jurisdiction with a reasonable relation to the transaction).
427. Hague Convention art. 6.
428. Id.
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principal's habitual residence, if he does not have a place of business.429
The law found applicable under the Convention determines the exis-
tence and scope of an agent's authority.4 30 Additionally, the applicable
law also governs relations between an agent and a third party when the
agent exceeds or misuses his authority.4"' The Convention combines el-
ements from several legal systems as it balances policies favoring party
autonomy with a need for uniform and predictable decisions.43 2 The
drafters placed special importance on the parties' choice of applicable
law. Unlike the Uniform Commercial Code, the Hague Convention
does not limit the right to choose law.4"3 Although they may be ex-
pected to select law with which they are most familiar, complete party
autonomy allows the principal or agent to make frivolous or unfair se-
lections that may burden courts with a need to research and apply rules
from a distant jurisdiction.
The Hague Convention furthers policies for uniformity and pre-
dictability by stating objective criteria for choice of law in the absence
of a stipulation by the parties. In the absence of agreement between
parties as to choice of law, the Convention applies law of the state in
which the agent does business:43 4
because it is the law indicated by the connecting factor most
closely connected with the party who performs the obligation char-
acteristic of the agreement; secondly, because the agent's principal
place of business is more likely to coincide with the place where he
acts than is the principal's principal place of business; and thirdly,
because this solution seems to do justice to the pivotal role of the
agent, at the center of the complex of relationships arising in an
agency situation. As a connecting factor, the agent's principal place
of business has the advantage of being clear and readily
ascertainable. 435
The Convention is particularly significant because it reflects a con-
429. Id.
430. Id. art. 8(a).
431. Id. art. 15.
432. See generally Hay & Muller-Freienfels, supra note 280.
433. Cf. § 1-105(1) (requiring selection of the law of a jurisdiction that bears a
reasonable relation to the transaction).
434. Hague Convention art. 6.
435. Karsten, Report on the Preliminary Draft Convention, Prel. Doe. No. 5 at
14, Hague Conference on Private International Law, 1 Actes et Documents de la
Treizieme Session (1976), reprinted in 27 AM. J. COMP. L. at 41.
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cerned effort to unify choice of law rules and because the drafters were
able to further competing policy concerns by borrowing from several
legal systems.
B. UNCITRAL Proposal
The United National Commission on International Trade Law at
its second session in Geneva in March, 1969, discussed methods for
unifying law governing negotiable instruments in international com-
merce.4 36 The Commission noted that three competing legal regimes
controlled bills of exchange and promissory notes transactions among
western nations. The delegates concluded that the most effective way to
achieve uniformity would be by creation of a new instrument to be used
in international commerce and subject to a new uniform law.4 37 The
final draft of UNCITRAL's Uniform Law on International Bills of Ex-
change and Promissory Notes (ULIB)4 38 allows private parties to
choose whether the UNCITRAL proposal or traditional law should
govern each instrument.4 39 Although eighteen nations participated in
the UNCITRAL draft,440 the Convention has not been adopted into
law.
Parties to a negotiable instrument may choose to have the ULIB
govern only if the instrument satisfies requirements of article 1. The
instrument must be written and must state in the text "pay against this
international bill of exchange, governed by [the Convention of -]."441
436. Blomquist, The Proposed Uniform Law on International Bills of Exchange
and Promissory Notes: A Discussion of Some Special and General Problems Reflected
in the Form and Content, Choice of Law, and Judicial Interpretation Articles, 9 CAL.
W. INT'L. L. J. 30 (1979).
437. Id. at 32.
438. International Bills of Exchange and International Promissory Notes, Draft
Report of the Working Group on International Negotiable Instruments on the Work of
its Fifth Session (July 18-29, 1977), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.IV/CRP.11 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as ULIB].
439. Id. at 35.
440. Members of the working group include France, India, Mexico, Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, and United States of America. Observers
included Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Burundi, Chad, Chile, Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Liberia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Turkey. Organizations represented
on the Commission included International Monetary Fund, European Banking Federa-
tion, European Economic Community, and the Hague Conference on Private Interna-
tional Law. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG. IV/INF. 2, July 27, 1977.
441. ULIB art. 1(2). Cf. Bills of Exchange Convention art. 1, C. COM. art. 110
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It must include an unconditional order to pay a definite sum of money
to a specified person or to his order, be payable on demand or at a
definite time, and be signed by the drawer and dated.442 An interna-
tional bill of exchange subject to the ULIB must show that at least two
of the following places are in different countries: the place of payment,
the place indicated next to the name of the drawee, and the place writ-
ten beside the name of the payee.443 The ULIB has similar require-
ments for a promissory note, but the text must include the provision
"against this international promissory note, governed by [the Conven-
tion of _]", and must show that at least two of the following are in
different countries; the place where the instrument was made, the place
identified next to the signature of the maker or the name of the payee,
or the place of payment.444
The ULIB paraphrases Uniform Commercial Code provisions dis-
cussing an agent's liability on negotiable instruments but rejects admis-
sion of parol evidence if it is unclear whether the agent signed in a
representative capacity. 445 A person can only be liable on an instrument
(requiring statement "bills of exchange" written on the instrument).
442. ULIB art. 1.
443. Id.
444. Id. art. I, § 3.
445.
(1) An instrument may be signed by an agent.
(2)The signature on an instrument by an agent with authority to sign and
showing on the instrument that he is signing in a representative capacity
for a named person imposes liability thereon on that person and not on
the agent.
(3)The signature on an instrument by an agent without authority to sign,
or by an agent with authority to sign but not showing on the instrument
that he is signing in a representative capacity for a named person, or
showing on the instrument that he is signing in a representative capacity
but not naming the person whom he represents, imposes liability thereon
on such agent and not on the person whom the agent purports to
represent.
(4)The question whether a signature was placed on the instrument in a
representative capacity may be determined only with reference to what
appears on the face of the instrument.
(5)An agent who is liable pursuant to paragraph 3 and who pays the in-
strument has the same rights as the person for whom he purported to
act would have had if that person had paid the instrument.
ULIB art. 30. Cf. U.C.C. §§ 3-403 and 3-404(1), which provide rules for agents' per-
sonal liability. Compare art. 30(5) with § 3-415(5), concerning the doctrine of
subrogation.
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under the ULIB if he signs it or if an agent signs it on his behalf.446 A
signature may be by fascimile, symbols, or by any mechanical
means.447 Furthermore, a person signing another's name without au-
thority is deemed to have signed his own.448 An agent who signs on his
principal's behalf, but without authority, is treated as a forger and is
liable for any damages his signature causes.449
The ULIB follows United States practice by recognizing separate
classes of holder and protected holder.450 A protected holder takes the
instrument free from any claims by any person,451 free from all de-
fenses but incapacity4 2 or the signer's excusable ignorance that his sig-
nature made him a party to a negotiable instrument, 453 and free from
any claim that the instrument was not presented for acceptance or pay-
ment, or that dishonor was not protested.4 4 A drawer, maker, or in-
dorser may protect himself from a protected holder by writing a state-
ment on the instrument such as "not negotiable," "not transferable,"
"not to order," or "pay X only. " 4 5 The transferee of an instrument
bearing these words will become a holder only for the limited purposes
of collection.456
If the ULIB is adopted, it will provide practitioners greater flex-
ibility in advising their clients. The third draft is patterned closely after
the Uniform Commercial Code, and a practitioner should provide simi-
lar advice to an agent as to form of signature and necessary authority
446. ULIB art. 22.
447. Id. Cf. U.C.C. § 1-201(39), which defines "signature" as "any symbol exe-
cuted or adopted by a party with present intention to authenticate a writing." Id.
448. ULIB art. 22. Cf. U.C.C. § 3-404(1) (providing that an unauthorized signa-
ture obligates the signer on the instrument).
449. ULIB art. 22.
450. ULIB art. 5, §§ 6-7. A protected holder has rights similar to those of a
holder in due course under U.C.C. § 3-305. See ULIB art. 25(1). Compare practice
under the Geneva Convention in which there is only one class of holder.
451. Cf. U.C.C. § 3-305(1) (granting the same right to a holder in due course).
452. Cf. U.C.C. § 3-305(2)(a) (providing the defense of infancy to the extent
that local law provides defendant did not have capacity to obligate himself, and § 3-
305(2)(b), granting a defense of incapacity to the extent that defendant's act was void
rather than voidable).
453. Cf. U.C.C. § 3-305(2)(c) (providing a defense for "fraud in the factum" or
"real fraud" for misrepresentation that prevented the signer from learning the nature
or essential terms of the instrument he signed).
454. These rights of a protected holder are governed by ULIB art. 25.
455. See ULIB art. 16.
456. Id.
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in order to prevent his client's unintended personal liability on the in-
strument. Drafters of the ULIB intend its provisions to be optional.
Lawyers should evaluate their clients' right if the ULIB is applied and
also if the client acts under the law of another jurisdiction. The ULIB
furthers both party autonomy and uniformity of law because applica-
tion of the ULIB would be subject to the parties' agreement, and its
application would supply substantive law rather than rules for choice of
law.
VII. Conclusion
Negotiable instruments receive similar treatment under the Uni-
form Commercial Code, the English Bills of Exchange Act, and the
Geneva Conventions. Differences remain, however, and choice of law
principles become increasingly important as the size and frequency of
international transactions increase. An agent signing a negotiable in-
strument in his representative capacity may always escape personal lia-
bility on the instrument if he has authority to sign and he signs in the
proper form.
In the United States, a person who signs an instrument in an-
other's behalf is personally liable on the instrument, if he did not have
authority to obligate the person he claimed to represent. A signer may
escape personal liability if he establishes that he had actual or apparent
authority, or any other source of power to obligate the principal. The
authorized agent should indicate on the instrument that he signs in a
representative capacity, and should identify the person in whose behalf
he signs.
The English Bills of Exchange Act influenced development of the
U.C.C., and negotiable instruments in England have substantially the
same effect as in the United States. An agent generally will not be
liable on the instrument if he indicates his representative capacity and
identifies his principal, even if he exceeds his authority.
The Geneva Conventions are the basis for negotiable instruments
law in several nations in western Europe. France adopted these Con-
ventions and French treatment of negotiable instruments follows their
provisions. The Code de Commerce provides more stringent formal re-
quirements for negotiability than the Bills of Exchange Act or the
U.C.C. France requires the maker or drawer to indicate in the text of
the instrument the kind of instrument he is executing and to state the
name of the payor. An agent may obligate his principal and escape
personal liability on the instrument only if he has authority to bind the
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principal and he clearly acknowledges the representative capacity of his
signature. The Code Civil suggests that representative authority is
strictly construed in France. The Cours de Cassation, however, recog-
nizes a source of authority similar to apparent authority or inherent
agency power in United States practice.
The U.C.C. allows parties to an instrument to select the law gov-
erning the instrument provided that they choose the law of a state
which has 'a reasonable relation to the transaction. If they do not
choose applicable law the forum will apply its own version of the
U.C.C., provided that the forum has an appropriate relation to the
transaction. If the parties do not choose applicable law and the forum
must look beyond its version of the U.C.C. to resolve the dispute, the
court will apply general choice of law rules from outside the U.C.C.
The English Bills of Exchange Act treats each contract on the in-
strument separately, and applies the law of the jurisdiction where that
contract was entered into, in order to determine its validity and inter-
pretation. The Bills of Exchange Act furthers predictability at the ex-
pense of party autonomy. Courts will choose applicable law on the basis
of objective and uniform criteria rather than on the parties' choice of
law.
The Geneva Conventions on negotiable instruments include con-
ventions on conflicts of law. These conventions emphasize objective cri-
teria in choice of law, such as place of signature, domicile, and jurisdic-
tion where the instrument is payable. The Geneva Conventions do not
contain any provisions permitting contractual selection of law or forum.
The drafters of the Conventions emphasized uniformity of selection of
law at the expense of party autonomy.
Although France acceded to the Geneva Conventions it did not
adopt their provisions on conflicts of laws. France permits parties to
exercise substantial discretion in choosing applicable law. If the parties
have not selected governing law, courts generally will apply the law
with which the parties are most familiar.
Perhaps the most intriguing proposal for reform is UNCITRAL's
final draft of a Uniform Law on International Bills of Exchange and
Promissory Notes. If this draft is adopted, parties to an international
transaction may select a comprehensive body of rules that borrows
from each of the major systems of negotiable instruments. Adoption of
this proposal would further potentially conflicting policies favoring
party autonomy and uniform application of law. Parties to an interna-
tional transaction could choose to be subject to the ULIB, and the
ULIB then would provide the rules governing their rights and obliga-
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tions. The transnational practitioner should consult each regime of law
as he determines when an agent will be personally liable on a negotia-
ble instrument which the agent signed on his principal's behalf.
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Constitutional Considerations Pertaining to Florida's
Citrus Freeze Embargo: Are Due Process and
Delegation of Power Problems Frustrating the
Purposes of the Citrus Code?
I. Introduction
On Christmas night and into the early morning hours of December
26, 1983, a freeze descended upon most of Florida's citrus groves.' The
most serious freeze damage was centered in the state's northern citrus
counties such as Marion, Lake and Orange.2 Southern portions of the
State were less affected by the cold temperatures. Farms from Dade to
Palm Beach counties suffered no freeze-related damage,3 however,
some portions of the southern-most citrus district, including the Indian
River production area,4 sustained below freezing temperatures with
some reported fruit icing.5 Subsequent to the cold spell, the Florida
Citrus Commission held an emergency meeting and public hearing on
December 29, 1983. The meeting resulted in an administrative order
which placed an embargo on all citrus fruit within the state.6 Except
1. Florida Agriculture Weather & Crop News, Dec. 27, 1983, at 1, col. 2. Dam-
age to citrus will occur when temperatures of 28 degrees Fahrenheit or below are sus-
tained for six hours or longer. Miami Herald, Dec. 26, 1983, at IA, col. 3. Another
hard freeze hit Florida's citrus belt during the morning of January 22, 1985, and au-
thorities feared the cold temperatures would damage citrus which escaped harm during
the Christmas freeze of 1983. The New York Times, Jan. 22, 1985, at 13, col. 1. On
January 24, 1985, the Florida Citrus Commission ordered a seven-day, state-wide em-
bargo to be followed by a fourteen-day ban on the shipment of any fruit showing signs
of spoilage. Miami Herald, Jan. 25, 1985, at 1A, col. 2.
2. Miami Herald, Dec. 27, 1983, at 6A, col. 2.
3. Miami Herald, Dec. 26, 1983, at 16A, col. 2.
4. Indian River County, as well as Brevard, St. Lucie, Martin, Palm Beach,
Broward, Dade and a portion of Volusia County comprise Citrus District Five. FLA.
STAT. § 601.09(5) (1983). However, the Indian River production area is not confined
to Indian River County. Its boundaries travel through several Florida counties, from
Volusia in the north to Palm Beach in the south. FLA. STAT. § 601.091(2) (1983).
5. Florida Agriculture Weather & Crop News, Dec. 27, 1983, at 1, col. 2.
6. Florida Citrus Commission Order No. 0-83-16 (Dec. 29, 1983). Two years
earlier the Commission issued a similar embargo after a serious January freeze. New
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for citrus fruit used for processing purposes, the embargo banned the
preparation for market, sale or shipment of any Florida citrus for seven
days.7
Under Chapter 601, section 90(2)(a) of the Florida Citrus Code,8
York Times, Jan. 14, 1982, at 7D, col. 1.
7. Florida Citrus Commission Order No. 0-83-16 (Dec. 29, 1983).
8. FLA. STAT. § 601.90 (1983). The complete text of the statute follows:
(1) Whenever freezing temperatures of sufficient degree to cause seri-
ous damage to citrus fruit occur in any section of the citrus-producing ar-
eas of the state, the commission, upon call of the chairman and with such
notice as may be appropriate under the circumstances, shall meet within
96 hours of the last occurrence of such freezing temperatures to determine
whether or not such freezing temeperatures have caused damage to citrus
fruit as defined in s. 601.03 and, if so, the degree of such damage.
(2) If the commission, at such meeting, determines that serious dam-
age, as defined in § 601.89(1), has occurred to such citrus fruit, it may,
upon majority vote, enter an emergency embargo order providing for one
or more of the following:
(a) Prohibiting the preparation for market, sale, offering for sale, or
shipment of citrus fruit for a period not to exceed 10 days after com-
mencement of the embargo period.
(b) Prohibiting the sale, offering for sale, or shipment of any citrus
fruit showing "damage," as defined by § 601.89(2), for a period not to
exceed 14 days after commencement of the embargo period.
(c) Prohibiting the preparation for market, sale, offering for sale, or
shipment of citrus fruit for a period not to exceed 10 days after com-
mencement of the embargo period, and further prohibiting the sale, offer-
ing for sale, or shipment of citrus fruit showing "damage," as defined by §
601.89(2), for a subsequent period not to exceed 14 additional days.
(d) Prohibiting the sale, offering for sale, or shipment, in offshore ex-
port trade channels, of citrus fruit showing any degree of internal freeze-
related injury, as defined by § 601.89(3), for a period not to exceed 30
days from commencement of the embargo period.
(3) Any emergency order entered pursuant to this section shall be-
come effective upon adoption by the commission, the provisions of chapter
120 to the contrary notwithstanding, and shall have the full force and ef-
fect of law. The embargo period shall commence at a time established by
the commission in its order, but not sooner than 36 hours following adop-
tion of the order.
(4) Emergency embargo orders shall not be applicable to any citrus
fruit sold or transported to a citrus processing plant for processing pur-
poses or to any citrus fruit inspected, packed, and certified for shipment
prior to commencement of the embargo; however, any such citrus fruit not
shipped within 48 hours of commencement of the embargo shall be rein-
spected, on a random basis, and recertified as damage-free.
(5) Any order may provide for reasonably extended packinghouse in-
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the state Citrus Commission may issue an embargo order banning the
sale and transportation of all Florida citrus when fruit in any area of
the state has sustained serious damage as the result of freezing temper-
atures. The broad scope of this statute raises two constitutional issues
which form the basis of this note. The first question explores the sub-
stantive due process rights of certain citrus businessmen who are sub-
ject to the impact of an embargo. A second constitutional consideration
concerns the propriety of the legislature's delegation of power to the
Citrus Commission under the embargo statute. The statutes of two
other major citrus-producing states, California and Texas,9 afford very
different and less drastic approaches to citrus freezes. The quarantine
provision within Florida's Agricultural Code10 also represents a feasible
alternative to a state-wide embargo. Under the Florida Agricultural
Code's provisions, as with the California and Texas laws, no restrictions
on the movement of fruit may be issued unless the fruit is known or
suspected to be damaged or infested.1"
The Florida Citrus Code contains the embargo statute. The state
legislature enacted the Code as an exercise of its police power, to pro-
tect the health and welfare of those directly or indirectly involved in
the citrus industry and to protect the State's "major agricultural enter-
prise." 2 The Citrus Code recognizes the great public interest in the
spection hours prior to commencement of the embargo period.
9. CAL. ADMIN. CODE TIT. 3, R. 1430.98 (1983), TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN. §
71.002, 73.004 (Vernon 1984). While the Texas statute speaks of quarantines issued
against crop pests and diseases it is nevertheless applicable when a citrus freeze occurs.
See infra text accompanying note 121.
10. FLA. STAT. § 581.031(7) (1983).
11. Id.
12. FLA. STAT. § 601.02 (1983). The section details the purposes of the Citrus
Code as follows:
This chapter is passed:
(1) In the exercise of the police power to protect health and welfare
and to stabilize and protect the citrus industry of the state.
(2) Because the planting, growing, cultivating, spraying, pruning, and
fertilizing of citrus groves and the harvesting, hauling, processing, packing,
canning, and concentrating of the citrus crop produced thereon is the ma-
jor agricultural enterprise of Florida and, together with the sale and distri-
bution of said crop, affects of health, morals, and general economy of a
vast number of citizens of the state who are either directly or indirectly
dependent thereon for a livelihood, and said business is therefore of vast
public interest.
(3) Because it is wise, necessary, and expedient to protect and en-
hance the quality and reputation of Florida citrus fruit and the canned and
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industry and the necessity of protecting its reputation.'" The legislature
designed the Code to promote the general welfare of the citrus indus-
try, which in turn will benefit Florida's overall economy.' 4
Section 601.04 of the Citrus Code' 5 establishes the Citrus Com-
concentrated products thereof in domestic and foreign markets.
(4) To provide means whereby producers, packers, canners and con-
centrators of citrus fruit and the canned and concentrated products thereof
may secure prompt and efficient inspection and classification of grades of
citrus fruit and the canned and concentrated products thereof at reasona-
ble costs, it being hereby recognized that the standardization of the citrus
fruit industry of Florida by the proper grading and classification of citrus
fruit and the canned and concentrated products thereof by prompt and
efficient inspection under competent authority is beneficial alike to pro-
ducer, packer, shipper, canner, concentrator, carrier, receiver, and con-
sumer in that it furnishes them prima facie evidence of the quality and
condition of such products and informs the carrier and receiver of the
quality of the products carried and received by them and assures the ulti-
mate consumer of the quality of the products purchased.
(5) To stabilize the Florida citrus industry and to protect the public
against fraud, deception, and financial loss through unscrupulous practices
and haphazard methods in connection with the processing and marketing
of citrus fruit and the canned or concentrated products thereof.
(6) Because said act is designated to promote the general welfare of
the Florida citrus industry, which in turn will promote the general welfare
and social and political economy of the state.
13. FLA. STAT. § 601.02(3) (1983).
14. FLA. STAT. § 601.02(6) (1983).
15. FLA. STAT. § 601.04 (1983). The section details the selection and composi-
tion of the Commission:
(1)(a) There is hereby created and established within the Department
of Citrus a board to be known and designated as the "Florida Citrus Com-
mission" to be composed of 12 practical citrus fruit men who are resident
citizens of the state, each of whom is and has been actively engaged in
growing, growing and shipping, or growing and processing of citrus fruit in
the state for a period of at least 5 years immediately prior to his appoint-
ment to the said commission and has, during said period, derived a major
portion of his income therefrom or, during said time, has been the owner
of, member of, officer of, or paid employee of a corporation, firm, or part-
nership which has, during said time, derived the major portion of its in-
come from the growing, growing and shipping, or growing and processing
of citrus fruit.
(b) Seven members of said commission shall be designated as grower
members and shall be primarily engaged in the growing of citrus fruit as
an individual owner, or as the owner of, a member of, an officer of, or a
stockholder of a corporation, firm, or partnership primarily engaged in cit-
rus growing, and none of whom shall receive any compensation from any
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mission. The Commission is comprised of twelve governor-appointed
licensed citrus fruit dealer or handler, as defined in § 601.03, other than
gift fruit shippers, but any of said grower members shall not be disquali-
fied as a member if, individually, or as the owner of, a member of, an
officer of, or a stockholder of a corporation, firm, or partnership primarily
engaged in citrus growing which processes, packs, and markets its own
fruit and whose business is primarily not purchasing and handling fruit
grown by others, and one of said seven grower members shall be a resident
of and appointed from each of the seven citrus districts as defined in §
601.09. Five members of said commission shall be designated as grower-
handler members and shall be engaged as owners, or paid officers or em-
ployees of a corporation, firm, partnership, or other business unit engaged
in handling citrus fruit. Two of said five grower-handler members shall be
engaged in the fresh fruit business and three of the said five grower-han-
dler members shall be engaged in processing of citrus fruits. One of the
said five grower-handler members shall be appointed from Citrus District
No. 7 and the remaining four shall be appointed from the state at large
but of these four no two members shall be appointed from the same citrus
district.
(2)(a) The members of such commission shall possess the qualifica-
tions herein provided and shall be appointed by the Governor, subject to
confirmation by the Senate, for terms of 3 years each, and four members
shall be appointed each year. Such members shall serve until their respec-
tive successors are appointed and qualified. The regular terms shall begin
on June I and shall end on May 31 of the third year after such appoint-
ment. The members of the commission in office on July 1, 1969, shall con-
tinue to serve until the expiration of the present term of office. Beginning
with their successors, confirmation by the Senate shall be required for re-
moval from the commission.
(b) When appointments are made, the Governor shall publicly an-
nounce the actual classification and district, or state at large as the case
may be, that each appointee represents. A majority of the members of said
commission shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of all business
and the carrying out of the duties of said commission. Before entering
upon the discharge of their duties as members of said commission, each
member shall take and subscribe to the oath of office prescribed in § 5,
Art. II of the State Constitution. The qualification of each member as
herein required shall continue throughout the respective term of his office,
and in the event a member should, after appointment, fail to meet the
qualifications or classification which he possessed at the time of his ap-
pointment as above set forth, said member shall resign or be removed and
be replaced with a member possessing the proper qualifications and
classification.
(3) The commission is authorized to elect a chairman and vice chair-
man and such other officers as it may deem advisable. The chairman, sub-
ject to commission concurrence, may appoint such advisory committees or
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state residents who are involved in the citrus growing, packing and
processing industries. Seven of the members are "grower members," 16
each of whom represents one of the state's seven citrus districts. The
five remaining appointees are "grower-handler members."1 7 Two of
these five are involved in fresh fruit retailing and packing and the re-
maining three are citrus processors. 8 The Commission represents not
only each of the state citrus districts but also the interests of the vari-
ous aspects of the citrus industry.
When the Citrus Code was enacted in 1949, section 90 detailed
the power of the Commission in the event of a serious citrus freeze.' 9
The Commission was given the power to order a ban on the sale and
transportation of citrus for a period of not more than seven days. 0 Al-
though section 90 was considerably amended in 195921 and again in
1981,22 the power to ban the movement of all Florida citrus subsequent
to a serious freeze has remained intact during the thirty-six year his-
tory of the Code.
The 1981 amendment employed the term "embargo" for the first
time and represented a substantial change in the existing law.2" The
1959 text gave the Commission a choice between ordering a ten-day
ban on the movement of all state citrus, a fourteen-day ban on the
movement of freeze-damage fruit, or a combination of the two.24 The
1981 amendment makes an additional provision for fruit destined to be
sold in offshore trade channels.2 5 This provision bans the exportation of
councils composed of industry representatives as the chairman deems ap-
propriate, setting forth areas of committee or council concern.
16. FLA. STAT. § 601.04(1)(b) (1983).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Florida Citrus Code, ch. 25149, § 90(2), 1949 Fla. Laws 280, 340.
20. Florida Citrus Code, ch. 25149, § 90(2)(a), 1949 Fla. Laws 280, 340.
21. The 1949 version of section 90 required the Commission to meet within sev-
enty-two hours of the freeze. Id. at 348. This was extended to ninety-six hours in the
1959 amendment. Florida Citrus Code, ch. 59-7, § 601.90(2), 1959 Fla. Laws 12. The
1959 amendment also extended the permissible length of the ban from seven to ten
days and further held that the order would become effective at a time "fixed" by the
Commission, compared to the twenty-four hour time limit set out in the original stat-
ute. Id. at 13.
22. Florida Citrus Code, ch. 81-97, § 601.90(2), 1981 Fla. Laws 177, 179.
23. Id. at 177.
24. Florida Citrus Code, ch. 59-7, § 601.90(2), 1959 Fla. Laws 12.
25. Florida Citrus Code, ch. 81-97, § 601.90(2)(d), 1981 Fla. Laws 177, 179.
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fruit showing any internal freeze damage for a period of thirty days.26
Further, the 1981 version of the law states that any emergency order
will become effective upon adoption by the Commission.2 7 But, while
the order is immediately effective, the embargo period may not com-
mence any sooner than thirty-six hours following the issuance of the
order by the Commission.28 Despite these changes in embargo options
and procedures, since its inception, the Citrus Commission has had
considerable power in the event of a citrus freeze. In such a situation
the Commission has been able to prohibit the sale and transportation
for sale of all citrus in the state when it determines that a freeze has
resulted in serious damage in any area of the citrus belt.29
In view of an embargo order's harsh impact on the citrus industry,
it is surprising that the constitutionality of section 601.90 has not been
challenged in the Florida courts. When an embargo is ordered pursuant
to section 601.90(2)(a), no Florida citrus may be prepared for market,
sold, offered for sale or shipped for the length of the embargo period."0
This prevents growers from picking fruit and transporting it to packing
houses. In turn, packing houses and retail outlets may not sell any fruit
other than the fruit brought in and inspected before the embargo goes
into effect. Grove owners whose entire crop escapes freeze damage, as
well as the packing houses and retail outlets which primarily rely on
these groves are subject to the effects of an embargo no less than those
whose fruit has sustained serious freeze damage. The harshness of an
embargo is somewhat mimimized by the thirty-six hours which must
pass between the issuance of the order and the commencement of the
embargo. That time may be used to harvest quality fruit and forward it
to packing houses. After Department of Citrus inspectors certify this
harvested fruit, it may be shipped forty-eight hours into the embargo
26. Id.
27. Florida Citrus Code, ch. 81-97, § 601.90(3), 1981 Fla. Laws 177, 179.
28. Id. The immediate effectiveness of an emergency order prevents interested
parties from seeking a hearing or judicial review. The statute itself notes that the reme-
dies provided by Florida's Administrative Code, chapter 120, which include hearings
and review by the courts, are not available in the face of an embargo. The non-access
of these remedies to those who are adversely affected by a Commission order may
present a question as to whether those parties are being deprived of their rights to
procedural due process. However, that issue is beyond the scope of this note.
29. 1949 Florida Citrus Code, ch. 25149, § 90(2)(a), Fla. Laws 280, 348; ch. 59-
7, § 601.90(2)(a), 1959 Fla. Laws 12; ch. 81-97, § 601.90(2)(a), 1981 Fla. Laws 177,
179.
30. FLA. STAT. § 601.90(2)(a) (1983).
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period."' But even with this provision, for the remainder of the embargo
period the citrus industry, with the exception of processors, is at a vir-
tual standstill.
After considering the effects of an embargo, a number of constitu-
tional questions may be raised. The remainder of this note will address
two specific constitutional issues and will ultimately suggest an alterna-
tive to the present statute. It appears that an emergency embargo or-
der, pursuant to section 601.90(2)(a), is a violation of the substantive
due process rights of those in the citrus industry whose fruit or major
sources of fruit remain damage-free after a serious freeze. Further, the
delegation of power by the Florida legislature to the Citrus Commis-
sion in section 601.90 is inadequately defined and not sufficiently lim-
ited in scope, resulting in a failure to protect against unfair and arbi-
trary application. Both the Florida Constitution and state caselaw
forbid such a delegation of power.32
II. Constitutional Questions Raised by Section 601.90(2)(a)
The Florida embargo statute has not yet been constitutionally
challenged in Florida courts. Nevertheless, there is ample Florida case
law available which may be used to examine the judicial standards em-
ployed to determine whether there has been either a due process viola-
tion or an improper delegation of legislative power. This case law in-
cludes Florida Supreme Court decisions pertaining to alleged
constitutional violations resulting from the administration of plant con-
trol and Citrus Code statutes. None of the laws challenged in these
cases called for a state-wide embargo, as does section 601.90(2)(a);
however, the issues raised by these controversies are analogous to the
constitutional questions presented in this note.
A. Substantive Due Process
Both the federal and Florida constitutions afford an individual a
guarantee against deprivation of rights without due process of law." It
is well-settled that the dictates of the due process clause are satisfied if
31. FLA. STAT. § 601.90(4) (1983).
32. See infra text accompanying notes 84-88.
33. "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law .. ", U.S. CONST. amend. xiv, § 1. The Florida Constitution
states, "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law .. " FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
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there is no unauthorized or arbitrary exercise of government powers. 34
The requirement of substantive due process forbids a state from depriv-
ing a person of life, liberty or property by any act which fails to bear a
reasonable relationship to a legitimate government purpose.
3 5
Before one can claim that his or her rights to due process are
threatened, it must be demonstrated that a legitimate liberty or prop-
erty interest exists.36 Citrus operators who are subject to a state-wide
embargo clearly suffer an interference with their business operations at
the hand of a government agency, since they are forced to curtail the
sale and transportation of fruit for possibly as long as ten days. It has
been variously held that the right to pursue a legitimate occupation is a
property right37 and therefore aggrieved people within the citrus indus-
try meet the first hurdle necessary to successfully allege a violation of
due process.
Once it has been ascertained that a right guaranteed under the
due process clause has been affected, further inquiry must be made to
determine whether it is a fundamental right, since if no fundamental
right is involved in the controversy a much less rigorous standard of
review is employed. 38 In the case of Sotto v. Wainwright39 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit furnished a list of funda-
mental rights, including the right to vote, to associate, to have free ac-
cess to the courts and "assorted freedoms against state intrusion into
34. Ozan Lumber Co. v. Union County Nat'l Bank of Liberty, 207 U.S. 251
(1907), relied on in Adams v. American Agricultural Chemical Co., 78 Fla. 362, 82
So. 850 (1919) and Davis v. Fla. Power Co., 64 Fla. 246, 60 So. 759 (1913).
35. State ex rel. Furman v. Searcy, 225 So. 2d 430, 433 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1969).
36. Thurston v. Dekle, 531 F.2d 1264, 1271 (5th Cir. 1976), vacated on other
grounds, 438 U.S. 901 (1978). It should be mentioned that while many of the parties
who are adversely affected by an embargo order may be corporations, it is settled law
that a corporate concern is a person for the purposes of a due process challenge. See
Dutton Phosphate Co. v. Priest, 67 Fla. 370, 65 So. 282 (1914); State v. Atlantic Coast
Line Ry. Co., 56 Fla. 617, 47 So. 969 (1908); Freidus v. Freidus, 89 So. 2d 605 (Fla.
1956), holding this principle is true at least where property rights are concerned.
37. See generally State ex rel. Fulton v. Ives, 123 Fla. 401, 167 So. 394 (1936);
State ex rel. Davis v. Rose, 97 Fla. 710, 122 So. 225 (1929); Paramount Enterprises v.
Mitchell, 104 Fla. 407, 140 So. 328 (1932); Palm Beach Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Strong,
300 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 1974).
38. Ferrara v. Handry County School Bd., 362 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1978). Courts employ a reasonable relationship test when no fundamental right is
involved, see infra text accompanying note 43.
39. 601 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1979).
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family life and intimate personal decisions."4 Further, an early Florida
case declared that under both the Florida and federal constitutions the
right to pursue a legitimate occupation is also a fundamental right.4 ' If
it is alleged that a state regulation has infringed on a fundamental
right, the state must demonstrate a compelling interest in order to sus-
tain the regulation. 42 Although the right to pursue an occupation is ap-
parently a fundamental right, a state-wide citrus embargo does not pre-
vent citrus operators from pursuing their livelihoods. Rather, the due
process problem which arguably stems from the application of a freeze
embargo takes the form of an unreasonable interference with the pur-
suit of an occupation, which, as noted earlier, is an infringement of a
property right.43 Therefore, the compelling state interest standard is
admittedly not applicable to the problem faced by the citrus business-
people due to section 601.90.
When a right other than a fundamental one is the subject of an
alleged due process violation under the Florida Constitution, a court
will employ a reasonable relationship test in order to determine if the
state action is arbitrary.44 Under this standard of review the regulation
of a trade or business will be upheld if it bears any reasonable relation-
ship to a legitimate government purpose and is not arbitrary or dis-
criminatory. More recently, Florida courts have employed a balancing
of interests test to aid in due process decisions.46 Under this approach,
in order to determine if a state regulation offends one's rights to due
process a court must weigh the need for the protection of individual
guaranteed rights against the state's interest in promoting the public
welfare.46 After balancing the respective interests of the parties, the
40. See id. at 191.
41. State ex rel. Hosack v. Yocum, 136 Fla. 246, 251, 186 So. 448, 451 (1939).
42. Sotto v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 184, 191 (5th Cir. 1979).
43. See supra text accompanying note 36.
44. Miami Laundry Co. v. Florida Dry Cleaning and Laundry Bd., 134 Fla. 1,
183 So. 759 (1938). See also Heller v. Abess, 134 Fla. 610, 184 So. 122 (1938) (hold-
ing courts may not void a regulation as violative of due process if there is any conceiva-
ble, reasonable basis for that regulation); Lasky v. State Farm Insurance Co., 296 So.
2d 9 (Fla. 1974) (stating that the test to be employed is whether a statute bears a
reasonable relationship to a state goal). See also Johns v. May, 402 So. 2d 1166 (Fla.
1981); United Yacht Brokers, Inc. v. Gillespie, 377 So. 2d 668 (Fla. 1979); Belk-
James, Inc. v. Nuzum, 358 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 1978).
45. Hadley v. Dep't of Admin., 411 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 1982) (recognizing there is
no simple unchanging test to apply in due process controversies). See also City of
Miami v. St. Joe Paper Co., 364 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 1978).
46. Hadley v. Dep't of Admin., 411 So. 2d 184, 188 (Fla. 1982).
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court must decide which interests weigh heaviest in the balance.4 7
It is clear that the Florida Constitution's broad prohibition of state
actions which deprive an individual of guaranteed rights is not meant
to hinder Florida in the exercise of its police power.48 However, any
exercise of that power must be designed to promote public health,
safety and morals49 and if a regulation fails to bear any reasonable
relationship to the proper ends of the police power, it will be held to
violate the due process clause.50 This failure to comply with the com-
mand of Florida's Constitution may be shown if an individual can
demonstrate that the application of a police power regulation is arbi-
trary and unreasonable.5 "
It is clear that the principles of due process apply to all govern-
ment officers and agencies to whom power or authority is delegated. 2
Therefore, a state agency such as the Citrus Commission is bound to
comply with those principles. Since a primary purpose of the Citrus
Code is "to protect health and welfare and to stabilize and protect the
citrus industry of the state,"53 the embargo statute is at least facially
valid. However, this does not preclude the possibility that the statute
may be unconstitutional as applied to certain individuals.54
Four Florida cases dealing with due process challenges against
plant control and citrus regulations not only help to illustrate how the
reasonable relationship standard is implemented, but also support the
thesis that there are due process problems in the application of an em-
bargo under section 601.90(2)(a). In State ex rel. Wolyn v. Apalachi-
cola Northern R.R. Co.,5 the Florida Supreme Court held that a Flor-
ida Plant Board order "must be based upon facts sufficient to support
it. .. " in order for it to be valid. 56 The Plant Board had ordered a
47. Id.
48. State ex rel. Pennington v. Quigg, 94 Fla. 1056, 114 So. 859 (1927); Scar-
borough v. Newsome, 150 Fla. 220, 7 So. 2d 321 (1942); Powell v. State, 345 So. 2d
724 (Fla. 1977).
49. Kass v. Lewin, 104 So. 2d 572, 578 (Fla. 1958).
50. Conner v. Cone, 235 So. 2d 492, 494 (Fla. 1970).
51. L. Maxcy Inc. v. Mayo, 103 Fla. 552, 139 So. 121 (1939). See also Graham
v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1981).
52. State ex rel. Lawson v. Woodruff, 134 Fla. 437, 184 So. 81 (1938); Williams
v. Kelly, 133 Fla. 244, 182 So. 881 (1938).
53. FLA. STAT. § 601.02(1) (1983).
54. See supra note 50.
55. 81 Fla. 383, 87 So. 909 (1921).
56. Id. at 392, 87 So. at 912.
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quarantine prohibitng the shipment of sugar cane in a number of Flor-
ida counties where it was determined that the cane was likely to be
infected with Mosaic disease.57 The plaintiff sought to ship Japanese
cane, a variety known to be immune from the disease, from one of the
quarantined counties. 58 Without ruling on the constitutionality of the
quarantine statute, the court held that, since plaintiff's cane posed no
threat, no proper basis existed for the quarantine order.59 The shipment
was allowed. Wolyn, a 1921 case, clearly shows that quarantine orders
are inapplicable against crops that are free of pests or pose no threat of
infestation, since in such a situation the order bears no reasonable rela-
tionship to a legitimate state purpose. An extension of this reasoning
suggests that an embargo order which is issued pursuant to a severe
freeze should not be applied against undamaged citrus.
In L. Maxcy, Inc. v. Mayo, 0 a Florida law banning any arsenic
spraying of citrus was held a valid exercise of the police power. The
plaintiffs alleged the regulation was arbitrary and unreasonable since it
was possible that moderate use of arsenic was not harmful to citrus"'
and, therefore, a total ban was unfair. The court noted that the use of
arsenic did not change the appearance of the fruit, but affected its inte-
rior quality. This tended to defraud consumers and in turn injure the
reputation of Florida citrus.6' The difficulty in facially recognizing cit-
rus treated with arsenic led the Florida Supreme Court to uphold the
regulation. The court noted that in cases where an "evil tendency" can-
not be easily distinguished, the legislature may impose regulations
which prohibit innocent activity, "as a means of insuring a statute's
effectiveness against the dominant evil of acts of that same general
class regardless of degree." 3 In applying a reasonable relationship
standard, the Maxcy court was able to find that the no-arsenic statute
promoted the general welfare. Further, even as applied to individuals
who were using arsenic in safe doses, the Florida Supreme Court sus-
tained the regulation because of the difficulty inherent in recognizing
57. Id. at 386-7, 87 So. at 910. Mosaic disease is an insect-vectored virus of
sugarcane which causes stunting and death of the plant. It can be spread by insects.
Telephone interview with Peter D. Spyke, M.S., St. Lucie County Extension Agent
(Nov. 28, 1984).
58. 81 Fla. at 385, 87 So. at 909-10.
59. Id. at 393, 87 So. at 912.
60. 103 Fla. 552, 139 So. 121 (1932).
61. Id. at 574, 139 So. at 130.
62. Id. at 572, 139 So. at 129.
63. Id.
[Vol. 9
127
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1984
Florida's Citrus Freeze Embargo
citrus that was improperly treated.64 Arguably, however, there is no
similar problem when a citrus freeze occurs, for two reasons: first, dam-
age will be known to occur if cold weather remains for a specified
length of time, and second, inspection will readily determine if fruit is
harmed. Therefore, the Maxcy reasoning, based on an inherent identifi-
cation problem, is not applicable when considering the Florida embargo
law.
In Corneal v. State Plant Board,6 5 a regulation resulted in the de-
struction of healthy as well as infected citrus trees. It was held that
grove owners must be compensated for the destruction of their
uninfected trees.66 Noting that the police power may be broadly em-
ployed, the Florida Supreme Court stressed that even the police power
is subject to "constitutional limitations, and it cannot properly be exer-
cised beyond such reasonable interferences with the liberty of action of
individuals as are really necessary to preserve and protect the public
health, safety and welfare. ' 67 The court approved the Plant Board's
treatment program aimed at eradicating the burrowing nematode 68 in
citrus groves, and further held that infected trees could be pulled and
burned.69 However, the destruction of healthy trees in close proximity
to those found to be diseased robbed grove owners of profits and ex-
ceeded the proper limits of the police power.70
Corneal's holding rests in part on the concept of eminent domain.
The Court stated that "the compulsory program requires the destruc-
tion of one owner's healthy trees for the purpose of protecting the
healthy trees of his neighbors. '71 While a citrus embargo order fails to
destroy property of unaffected grove owners to the extent it constitutes
a taking without compensation, 2 it nevertheless infringes upon the
64. Id. at 575, 139 So. at 130. The court suggested that in order to monitor a
mere regulation of arsenic spraying the state would require "an army of enforcement
officers" to administer the law. Id.
65. 95 So. 2d I (Fla. 1957), modified, 101 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1958).
66. Id. at 6-7.
67. Id. at 4. The plaintiff in this case attacked the Plant Board order under both
the Florida and federal constitutions. Id.
68. The burrowing nematode, Radolophus similis, is a worm which attacks the
roots of citrus trees and is the only mobile nematode. Potential damage is greater due
to the fact that a localized infestation may spread. Telephone interview with Peter D.
Spyke, M.S., St. Lucie County Extension Agent (Nov. 28, 1984).
69. 95 So. 2d at 6.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. "No private property shall be taken except for a public purpose and with full
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property rights of those in the citrus business. Also, an embargo order
has at least a temporary effect on profits since no sale of citrus may be
made for the duration of the order. There is, therefore, some similarity
between the unfair effects of the tree destruction in Corneal and an
embargo which halts the business operations of citrus operators in pos-
session of undamaged fruit. Since the Corneal court felt that the de-
struction of healthy trees was not reasonably related to the general wel-
fare, it may arguably follow that an embargo order which prohibits the
movement of undamaged, quality citrus would likewise be held
impermissible.
More recently, in Flake v. Department of Agriculture,73 Florida's
Fifth District Court of Appeal held that a Florida quarantine order was
constitutionally valid since the order constituted a precautionary mea-
sure. The plaintiffs, Mr. Flake and others, had illegally imported a new
strain of citrus from Texas which was susceptible to foot rot74 and a
ringspot virus.7 5 One of the plaintiff's trees was subsequently found to
be infected with ringspot and the quarantine order was issued.7e The
court held "[i]n enacting regulatory measures which protect but do not
destroy property, the law need not restrict itself to conditions actually
harmful but may require precautions within the whole range of possible
dangers. . . .,,' This reasoning might lead one to view an embargo
order as a precaution and therefore within the ambit of the police
power. However, Flake's trees were known to be infected with a plant
disease, which rendered the quarantine reasonably related to the police
power since there was a legitimate concern that other trees would be-
come diseased. Again, an argument may be made that no such reasona-
ble relationship exists when an embargo affects grove owners and re-
tailers dealing in undamaged fruit since the Florida citrus industry is
compensation. . . ." FLA. CONST. art. x, § 6. An interesting argument may be made
that an embargo effectuates a temporary taking of property. Such a discussion is be-
yond the scope of this note.
73. 383 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
74. Foot rot, Phytophthora parasitica, is a fungus disease which occurs naturally
in the soil. It attacks the stems, roots and fruit of citrus, causing root rot, girdling of
the trunk and decay of fruit on the tree. Telephone interview with Peter D. Spyke,
M.S., St. Lucie County Extension Agent (Nov. 28, 1984).
75. The Necrotic Ringspot Virus is not known in Florida. It causes lesions, stunt-
ing, and in some cases, death of the tree. Telephone interview with Peter D. Spyke,
M.S., St. Lucie County Extension Agent (Nov. 28, 1984).
76. 383 So. 2d at 287.
77. Id. at 289 quoting Corneal v. State Plant Bd., 95 So. 2d 1 (1957).
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not threatened by the sale or transportation of quality citrus.
In all of the foregoing cases, only plants or crops which were dis-
eased, susceptible to disease, or of a nature where contamination was
difficult to ascertain were allowed to be regulated under the police
power. This case law arguably strengthens a due process argument
aimed at section 601.90(2)(a). In addition, none of these cases applied
the balancing of interests test.7 8 If the test is applied to a hypothetical
situation where an embargo has virtually shut down a citrus retailing
operation for two weeks, additional problems with the constitutionality
of the embargo law become apparent. Initially, the balance would seem
to weigh heavily on the side of the state's interest in protecting those in
the citrus industry and the reputation of Florida fruit. In 1915, the
Supreme Court of the United States recognized that citrus is "one of
the great industries of the state of Florida 7 9 and that its reputation is
in need of protection in foreign markets." More recently it has been
held that the citrus business is of such import to state welfare that the
police power may be used to safeguard the industry. 1 If this interest is
being weighed against the property rights of a citrus operator whose
fruit is freeze-damaged, the embargo statute would certainly prevail,
since the sale of such fruit would injure the reputation of Florida fruit.
However, if the property rights subject to this hypothetical balance are
those of a retailer in possession of only quality fruit, the balance argua-
bly shifts. When the retailer is allowed to continue to sell this undam-
aged fruit, the purposes of the Citrus Code are well-served since the
retailer's business to some degree enhances the reputation of Florida
citrus and helps the economy of the state. When an embargo forces a
retailer in possession of quality citrus, and others in a similar situation,
to refrain from selling or transporting fruit, the purposes behind the
Citrus Code are frustrated since the nation is kept from consuming un-
damaged Florida fruit. Furthermore, the publicity of the state-wide
ban likely has a negative impact on out-of-state consumers. Under the
balancing of interests standard, the retailer should prevail, not simply
because of a desire to protect individual rights that are in no way af-
fected by the exigencies of a citrus freeze, but also because of a recog-
nition that this result is better for the state's welfare. As the balance
tips in favor of individual citrus businessmen, one may arguably sug-
78. See supra text accompanying note 44.
79. Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52, 61 (1915).
80. Id.
81. Dep't of Citrus v. Griffin, 239 So. 2d 577, 578 (Fla. 1970).
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gest that the application of section 601.90(2)(a) in such a hypothetical
situation bears no reasonable relationship to the purposes which under-
lie the Citrus Code.
This hypothetical situation represents what actually resulted from
the embargo order of December 29, 1983. The suggested due process
flaw within section 601.90 takes on greater proportions when one is
reminded that people involved in the citrus industry throughout several
counties were forced to comply with a state-wide embargo order despite
the fact their fruit escaped any freeze damage. This potential due pro-
cess problem affected more than a few isolated businesses; it forced all
citrus operators throughout the southern portion of the State, except
for processing plants and their suppliers, to halt the sale and transpor-
tation of citrus for the duration of the embargo period. s2
B. Delegation of Power
The Florida Constitution expressly provides for the creation of cer-
tain administrative agencies,83 but the Citrus Commission does not fall
within this category. It is well settled, however, that legislative creation
of administrative agencies is compatible with the Florida Constitu-
tion.84 The Florida legislature provided for the creation of the Citrus
Commission in section 601.04 of the Florida Citrus Code of 1949.5
The Commission is an administrative board within the Department of
Citrus 6 and its creation is a valid legislative act.87 In addition to creat-
82. The contribution of the counties in the southern portion of the citrus belt is
not insignificant. For example, in January, 1983, the total shipments of state citrus
numbered 8,157,560 4/5 bushel boxes. This was during a peak citrus shipping month
in a year without a citrus freeze. Of that total, the southern citrus counties of Broward,
Palm Beach, Martin and St. Lucie contributed 1,319, 639 4/5 bushel boxes. FLA. Divi-
SION OF FRUIT & VEGETABLE INSPECTION ANN. REP. 30 (1982-3).
83. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 8(c) (creation of Parole Commission); art. IV, § 6(b)
(boards to grant and revoke occupational licenses); art. IV, § 9 (Game and Fresh
Water Commission).
84. Storrs v. Pensacola & A.R., 29 Fla. 617, 11 So. 226 (1982), for example,
upheld the constitutionality of the Railroad Commission Act, which authorized railroad
commissioners within the state to fix fair passenger and freight rates.
85. See supra note 15.
86. FLA. STAT. § 601.04(1)(a) (1983).
87. See supra note 80. See also Richardson v. Baldwin, 124 Fla. 233, 168 So.
255 (1936) (the state may authorize laws to protect agricultural industries and may
confer authority on administrative agencies to make rules and regulations to enforce
those laws); State ex rel. Davis v. Fowler, 94 Fla. 752, 114 So. 435 (1927); Milk
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ing an administrative agency, the legislature may confer upon an
agency the right to exercise the state police power."8 But while the leg-
islature may empower an administrative body to make determinations
in accord with its policy in a certain area, this type of delegation is
limited by article III, section 1 of the Florida Constitution. 9 Any stat-
ute which creates or grants power to an administrative agency is pre-
sumptively constitutional,90 but whenever the legislature delegates dis-
cretionary authority to an administrative agency, it must guide the
agency with standards and policy.91 These standards must be sufficient
to preclude the agency from exercising arbitrary power.92
It follows that in order to make an argument that section 601.90
represents an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, one must
ask three questions: 1) whether section 601.90 grants power to an ad-
ministrative agency; 2) if section 601.90 grants such power, whether
the Code furnishes that agency with standards to guide it in the exer-
cise of its power; and 3) if these standards exist, whether they suffice to
prevent an arbitrary exercise of power on the part of the administrative
body.
The title of the embargo statute, "Freeze-damaged citrus fruit;
power of commission," may easily answer the first question. The text of
the section93 specifically details the extent of the power, which includes
the authority to enter an emergency embargo order. An affirmative an-
swer also exists for the second question, since the section does give the
Commission standards to follow in considering whether an embargo
should be issued. Particularly, the Commission must determine that se-
Comm'n v. Dade County Dairies, Inc., 145 Fla. 579, 200 So. 83 (1940).
88. Bailey v. Van Pelt, 78 Fla. 337, 82 So. 789 (1919); Fla. Canners Ass'n v.
State Dep't of Citrus, 371 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979), affd, 406 So. 2d
1079 (1981); Coca-Cola Co. v. State Dep't of Citrus, 406 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 1981),
appeal dismissed, 456 U.S. 1002 (1982). The Citrus Code specifically states it is en-
acted "[iun the exercise of the police power. . . ." FLA. STAT. § 601.02(1) (1983).
89. FLA. CONST. art III, § I states in pertinent part, "The legislative power of
the state shall be vested in a legislature of the State of Florida. .. ."
90. State ex rel. Atlantic C.L.R. Co. v. State Board of Equalizers, 84 Fla. 592,
94 So. 681 (1922).
91. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Anderson, 74 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1954).
92. Barrow v. Holland, 125 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 1960). "An agency of government
having the power to regulate is not permitted to arrogate to itself or to delegate to its
employees the arbitrary power to determine private rights with an unbridled discre-
tion." Id. at 752. See also Delta Truck Brokers, Inc. v. King, 142 So. 2d 273 (Fla.
1962).
93. See supra note 1.
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rious damage has occurred to citrus fruit before it may issue an emer-
gency order. The standard of serious damage is defined in the preced-
ing section.94 The final question is whether the guidelines provided in
section 601.90 as to "serious damage" 95 are sufficient to prevent the
Commission from exercising its power in an arbitrary manner. This
note has suggested that an embargo order fosters arbitrary and dis-
criminatory results when cold weather damages only a portion of the
state's citrus. In such a situation the order forces those with quality
fruit to curtail business activity. This activity, if allowed to continue
without interference, would actually promote the purposes of the Citrus
Code. The fact that such an unfair infringement of rights96 may result
when the Commission follows the present system indicates that the
94. FLA. STAT. § 601.89 (1983) provides:
(1) Citrus fruit shall be deemed "seriously" damaged by freezing
when such freezing causes:
(a) Marked dryness to extend into the segments of oranges and
grapefruit more than one-half inch at the stem end; or into segments of
mandarin or hybrid varieties more than one-fourth inch at the stem end; or
more than an equivalent amount by volume of dryness to occur in any
other portions of the fruit.
(b) Internal freeze-related injury, as defined in subsection (3), when
such condition or combinations of conditions is determined to affect the
fruit to a degree equal in seriousness to that described in paragraph (a).
(2) Citrus fruit shall be deemed "damaged" by freezing when such
freezing causes:
(a) Marked dryness to extend into the segments of oranges and
grapefruit more than one-quarter inch but less than one-half inch at the
stem end; or into segments of mandarin or hybrid varieties more than one-
eighth inch but less than one-fourth inch at the stem end; or more than an
equivalent amount by volume of dryness to occur in any other portions of
the fruit.
(b) Internal freeze-related injury, as defined in subsection (3), when
such condition or combinations of conditions is determined to affect the
fruit to a degree equal in seriousness to that described in paragraph (a).
(3) Internal freeze-related injury to citrus fruit, caused by freezing,
shall consist of any of the following:
(a) Wet cores or wet segment walls;
(b) Water soaking;
(c) Juice cell breakdown;
(d) Mushy condition;
(e) Honeycomb or open spaces in pulp; or
(f) Other evidence of internal breakdown, decay, or moldy condition.
95. FLA. STAT. 601.90(1) (1983).
96. See supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
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standards currently set forth in section 601.90 are insufficient.
Several Florida cases recognize that sufficiently restrictive stan-
dards are required in a valid delegation of legislative power. In Mahon
v. County of Sarasota,9" the need for proper standards was emphasized
when an agency regulation prohibiting the accumulation of garbage
and vegetation was held invalid for failing to sufficiently limit the dis-
cretion of the county. A few years later, in Dickinson v. State,98 Flor-
ida's Supreme Court held that the legislative delegation of power to a
state agency for the purpose of administering the operation of cemeta-
ries was unconstitutional since it was not clearly defined and suffi-
ciently limited in scope. The court held that a delegation of power is
invalid if it fails to afford adequate protection against unfairness and
favoritism.99
Individuals alleging an over-broad delegation of power have also
attacked agriculture and citrus statutes. In Hutchins v. Mayo, °0  the
State Supreme Court held that, under the Florida Constitution, in or-
der to determine whether a statute unlawfully delegates legislative au-
thority, the test is "whether or not the act defines a pattern by which
the rule or regulation must be made to conform."'' In Hutchins, the
plaintiffs challenged a statute which gave the Citrus Commission the
power to fix various citrus standards and make regulations pertaining
to grading, stamping or certifying citrus fruit as well as the power to
collect assessments. The Hutchins court sustained the delegation of
power because the powers that were delegated to the Commission were
necessary to carry out the legislative policy of regulating the citrus in-
dustry. 0 12 An argument may be made that allowing the Citrus Com-
mission to order a state-wide ban on the sale and transportation of cit-
rus when only certain portions of the state have suffered freeze damage
falls short of fulfilling the purpose of the Citrus Code. As has been
suggested, such a ban actually hurts legislative policy.103
97. 177 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1965).
98. 227 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 1969).
99. See id. at 37.
100. 143 Fla. 707, 197 So. 495 (1940).
101. See id. at 496 (quoting Arnold v. State, 140 Fla. 610, 612, 190 So. 543, 544
(1939)). In this case, the pertinent portions of the Florida Constitution were article II,
dealing with division of powers and article III, § 1, which vests legislative power in the
state House of Representatives and the Senate.
102. See id. at 497.
103. See supra text accompanying note 77.
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In Conner v. Joe Hatton, Inc., 04 a statute which allowed the Com-
missioner of Agriculture to assess on all individuals involved in the
sweet corn industry their pro-rata share of the expenses necessary to
fund its marketing orders was held invalid. The statute was fatally de-
fective since it failed to set any ceiling on the amount of money the
Commissioner could spend on marketing orders as well as the amount
which could be assessed against the individual members of the indus-
try.10 5 In Department of Citrus v. Griffin,'0 6 the Florida Supreme
Court held that in determining whether a legislative delegation of au-
thority is sufficiently restrictive, due consideration must be paid to "the
practical context of the problem sought to be remedied or the policy
sought to be effected."10 7 In Griffin, plaintiffs challenged the Orange
Stabilization Act, 08 which empowered the Department of Citrus to is-
sue marketing orders and to fund them through limited assessments on
boxed oranges. The Griffin plaintiffs also attacked a marketing order
that had been issued pursuant to the act. 09 Both the Act and the order
were upheld. The court noted that legislative delegation of power may
be permissible in situations where it is impractical for the legislature to
handle administrative matters on a year-round basis." 0 However, rely-
ing on Dickinson v. State"' the Florida Supreme Court held that even
when constantly changing conditions allowed a general scheme to be
delegated, statutes may not be "so general and unrestrictive that ad-
ministrators are left without standards for the guidance of their official
acts."" 2
Admittedly, it may be impractical for the legislature to deal di-
rectly with the exigencies of a citrus freeze. If this is so, Griffin would
appear to allow a general delegation of powers to an administrative
body such as the Citrus Commission. Nevertheless, Griffin would likely
demand that the empowering statute sufficiently limit the Commis-
104. 203 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 1967).
105. See id. at 155. The portion of the Florida Constitution violated in this in-
stance of delegation was article IX, § 3, which states that "[n]o tax shall be levied
except in pursuance of law."
106. 239 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 1970).
107. See id. at 580.
108. See id. at 578.
109. Id.
110. See id. at 580.
111. See supra note 94.
112. 239 So. 2d 577, 581 (Fla. 1970).
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sion's power. 113 Section 601.90 fails to state that the Commission may
order an embargo against only that citrus which shows serious damage.
It is this missing standard which renders the statute's validity question-
able. Without this guideline, the application of the embargo statute to
those who survive a freeze with quality fruit is unfair and
unreasonable.
Another provision of the statute indicates that power has been in-
sufficiently limited. Section 601.90 allows the Commission to choose
between four types of embargos."14 Each type of embargo may have an
impact on different people within the citrus industry. Further, the im-
pact may be felt for various lengths of time depending on the Commis-
sion's choice. However, even though each embargo may have different
results, the same single standard (that serious damage has occurred to
any citrus within the state) applies to all of the choices. Without any
further guide the Commission may use the fact that citrus in the north-
ern portion of the state has sustained serious damage to order a ban on
the sale and transportation of citrus in other, possibly unaffected, por-
tions of the state.
III. Alternatives to a State-wide Embargo and a Suggested
Approach
Upon consideration of the constitutional questions raised by the
existing freeze procedure, one must also consider alternatives to the
present embargo system. Statutes of two other major citrus-producing-
states, California and Texas, provide an illuminating study of more
flexible approaches to freeze emergencies. Florida may profit by using
these alternative approaches as sound guides toward a more acceptable
freeze procedure.
The State of California demands that its citrus be free from seri-
ous damage." 5 A detailed inspection program has been developed to
prevent damaged fruit from leaving the state. Once a freeze occurs,
citrus fruit is inspected by examining the segment walls of the fruit."'
This method of inspection continues until a survey provides additional
evidence of the extent of actual freeze damage, a point known as "date
113. Griffin states that "[e]ven where a general approach would be more practi-
cal than a detailed scheme of legislation," constitutional limitations exist. Id. at 581.
114. See supra note 1; FLA. STAT. § 601.90(2) (1983).
115. CAL. ADMIN. CODE TIT. 3, R.1430.89 (1983).
116. CAL. ADMIN. CODE TIT. 3, R.1430.92(a) (1983).
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A." 17 From date A forward, inspection may be made either by inspec-
tion of the segment walls or by a transverse cut through the center of
the fruit."' This double method of inspection remains in effect until it
is possible to make a reasonably precise determination of the full extent
of freeze damage."l 9 After this point, known as "date B,"120 inspection
is made by the transverse cut method.' 2' The determination that a cit-
rus freeze has triggered the drying process is based upon inspection of
fruit in only those areas of California where freeze damage has
occurred.12
2
The California approach focuses on inspection of fruit in areas hit
by a freeze, leaving those citrus producers in other areas free from in-
spection or any interference with their business. This procedure avoids
the constitutional problems faced by Florida's section 601.90. First, by
allowing those citrus operators who escape any freeze damage to con-
tinue to pursue their livelihood, there is no danger of an arbitrary dep-
rivation of property rights. This eliminates any violation of substantive
due process through application of the freeze statute. Second, there is a
valid delegation of power to the agricultural administrative body, since
the California law states that inspections shall be made only in areas of
the state which sustain freeze damage.'23 The statutes further detail
the methods of inspection for freeze-damaged fruit.'24 These precise
standards sufficiently limit the discretionary power of the officials so as
to prevent any arbitrary and unfair application of the law.
The Texas Agricultural Code provides another citrus freeze proce-
dure which is worthy of examination. The damage caused to citrus as
117. Id.
118. CAL. ADMIN. CODE TIT. 3, R.1430.92(c) (1983).
119. CAL. ADMIN. CODE TIT. 3, R.1430.92(b) (1983).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. CAL. ADMIN. CODE "T. 3, R.1430.98 (1983) states:
The determination by the Director of the Department of Food and Agri-
culture as required by Section 1430.92 of the California Administrative
Code, that the drying process resulting from freezing damage has been
developed (a) "to such extent as to furnish additional evidence of the ex-
tent of actual damage to the fruit" and (b) "to such extent as to permit
reasonably accurate determination of the full extent of freezing damage by
such examination, without regard to the damage on the segment walls,"
shall be based upon an investigation of the condition of orange fruits in the
areas of the State where freezing damage to oranges has occurred.
123. Id.
124. See supra notes 112-117.
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the result of a freeze falls into the category of "Citrus fruit and storage
rot" on Texas' list of dangerous diseases and pests.125 The Department
of Agriculture may quarantine an infected area if it is determined that
one of these plant diseases exists within the state. 2 This quarantine
procedure deals with plant diseases which are not widely distributed in
the state.12 7 Texas also allows the Department of Agriculture to estab-
lish an emergency quarantine, without notice or public hearing, when a
public emergency exists.'28 While this type of quarantine may immedi-
ately extend to the state borders, it is unlikely to be used in the face of
a citrus freeze. Freeze damage occurs as the result of cold tempera-
tures, and damage may be readily predicted and discovered. Texas'
emergency quarantine is aimed at controlling the "introduction or dis-
semination of an insect pest or plant disease," 29 indicating it is chiefly
concerned with plant diseases which are of a spreading and uncertain
nature. Freeze damage does not fall into this category. Therefore, the
general quarantine provision of the Texas Agricultural Code 30 would
most likely be followed in the event of a citrus freeze.
The Texas quarantine, like the California inspection program, fo-
cuses a freeze procedure only on areas that are affected by the citrus
freeze.' 3' Therefore, the Texas approach protects the property of people
125. TEx. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 73.004(27) (Vernon 1982).
126. Tnx. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 71.002 (Vernon 1982) states:
"If the department determines that a dangerous insect pest or plant dis-
ease not widely distributed in this state exists within an area of the state,
the department shall quarantine the infested area."
127. Id.
128. TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 71.004 (Vernon 1982) provides:
(a) The department may establish an emergency quarantine without
notice and public hearing if the department determines that a public emer-
gency exists in which there is the likelihood of introduction or dissemina-
tion of an insect pest or plant disease that is dangerous to the interests of
horticulture and agriculture in this state.
(b) The department may establish the emergency quarantine at the
boundaries of the state or in other areas within the state.
(c) The emergency quarantine and rules adopted in order to prevent
the introduction or spread of the pest or disease are effective immediately
on establishment or adoption.
(d) An emergency quarantine expires 30 days following the date on
which it was established unless reestablished following notice and hearing
as provided by this subchapter.
129. Id.
130. See supra note 122.
131. Quarantines are established against "the infested area." TEX. AGRIC. CODE
1984]
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in the citrus business whose fruit is undamaged and also sufficiently
limits the Department of Agriculture's administrative power.
Florida, too, has a quarantine law. 132 The Plant Industry Division
of the Florida Department of Agriculture has the power to declare a
quarantine against an orange grove if plant pests are discovered."' The
statutory quarantine prohibits the movement, sale or other disposal of
any plant or plant product included in the quarantined area. 34 Orders
are issued "in reference to plant pests,' ' 3 5 indicating they must be pre-
mised on a plant-threatening situation. 36 This statute ensures that the
harsh effect of a quarantine only affects those plant growers and dis-
tributors whose property lies within the infested area.
Just as it is possible to determine the extent of pest infestation,
freeze damage may be ascertained by monitoring cold temperatures
and inspecting suspect fruit. Therefore, it is possible that Florida's
quarantine laws could be modified to expressly govern a citrus freeze
situation. However, this would result in placing the quarantine decision
in the hands of the Plant Industry Division, not the Citrus Commission.
Since the Commission fairly represents all the interests within the cit-
rus industry"17 it is best that that body retain power over citrus freeze
situations.
Arguably, the better alternative is to correct the problems within
section 601.90. The Commission should be authorized to order an em-
bargo against any area of the state which sustains citrus damage as the
result of a freeze. This would include both "serious damage" and
"damage" as defined by the Citrus Code." 8 The length of the embargo
should correspond to the length of time needed for the Department of
Citrus inspectors to ascertain the degree of citrus damage. Any fruit
showing damage to the extent that its sale would injure the reputation
of Florida citrus or pose a threat to the general welfare should be pro-
ANN. § 71.002 (Vernon 1982). Texas also allows the commissioners court of any
county to request that the department investigate the possibility of a plant pest or dis-
ease within the county. TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 71.008 (Vernon 1982).
132. FLA. STAT. § 581.03(7) (1983).
133. Id.
134. FLA. STAT. § 581.101(1) (1983).
135. FLA. STAT. § 581.031(7) (1983).
136. A recent quarantine went into effect in the Greater Miami area on June 27,
1984, upon discovery of five adult Mediterranean fruit flies in the Little Havana neigh-
borhood. Miami Herald, June 27, 1984, at 4D, col. 1.
137. See supra note 15.
138. FLA. STAT. § 601.89 (1983).
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hibited from further movement, unless that fruit is to be used for
processing purposes. 139 Under this system, quality fruit could continue
to be packed and sold, lessening the negative impact a state-wide ban
would have on consumers. 40 This negative consumer attitude is
thought to outlast the embargo period.' 4 ' South Florida citrus operators
who were unreasonably subject to the 1983 embargo felt that a state-
wide embargo ultimately resulted in consumer fear of Florida fruit. 42
This consumer fear has two causes: the absence of Florida citrus in the
marketplace for a period of time, and the long time needed for citrus
prices to stabilize. 43 The businessmen also expressed concern that the
after-effect of an embargo, perhaps more than its immediate impact,
hurts the industry. 44
The suggested revisions to section 601.90 would result in a freeze
procedure that would be technically different from the procedures fol-
lowed in either California or Texas, but would rid the current law of
the serious problems created by its application. A regional embargo
system would not interfere with business pursuits in an unreasonable or
arbitrary manner. Further, the suggested amendment to 601.90 would
limit the power of the Commission, preventing it from being used in an
unfair manner. The end result would well serve the two primary pur-
poses of the Citrus Code: to enhance the reputation of Florida citrus
and to promote the state's economy. A regional embargo would indi-
cate to national consumers that only part of Florida's citrus belt sus-
tained freeze damage. This would translate into more consumer confi-
dence when purchasing Florida citrus. Consumer confidence would
139. Under the proposed revision, § 601.901 would remain unaffected. This sec-
tion enables the Commission to establish the maximum permissible degree of freeze
damage in fruit to be used for processing. FLA. STAT. § 601.901 (1983).
140. At the emergency meeting on Dec. 29, 1983 which resulted in the embargo
order, four telephone messages were read from grove owners who escaped freeze dam-
age. All four were against the embargo. One caller specifically mentioned his concern
about negative media coverage. He felt widespread publicity about an embargo implies
to the country that Florida is without any fresh citrus whatsoever. Emergency Meeting
and Public Hearing of the Florida Citrus Commission, Dec. 29, 1983 at 6.
141. Id.
142. Emergency Meeting and Public Hearing of the Florida Citrus Commission,
Dec. 29, 1983 at 7.
143. Id.
144. Id.
1984]
140
Nova Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [1984], Art. 10
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol9/iss1/10
140 Nova Law Journal [Vol. 9
result in continued sales, ultimately benefiting all those directly and
indirectly concerned with Florida's greatest agricultural industry.
Nancy Perkins Spyke
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The Warren S. Henderson Wetlands Protection Act
of 1984: Enough Protection?
I. Introduction
With the enactment of the Warren S. Henderson Wetlands Pro-
tection Act of 1984' the Florida Legislature took a first step toward
comprehensive wetlands protection, joining seven other states that have
enacted comprehensive wetlands legislation.2 While the passage of the
Act is in itself recognition of the importance of wetlands to Florida, the
language of the Act reflects the influence of other strong competing
interests.
"Wetlands" are variously defined, 3 typically calling for saturated
soil conditions and a prevalence of vegetation adapted for life under
those conditions. They are unquestionably important to the health and
welfare of future generations.' Wetlands are especially valuable re-
1. FLA. STAT. §§ 403.91-.929 (Supp. 1984), entitled the Warren S. Henderson
Wetlands Protection Act of 1984 [hereinafter cited as the Wetlands Protection Act].
2. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 131, § 40 (West 1974 & Supp. 1984); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-36 to -45 (West 1975 & Supp. 1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 2-
1-13 to -27 (1976 & Supp. 1984); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 281.701 to -.722
(West Supp. 1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 105.37 to -.71 (West 1979 & Supp. 1984);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 483-A:1 to -7 (1983 & Supp. 1984); N.Y. ENVIR. CON-
SERV. LAW §§ 24-0101 to 25-0601 (Consol. 1982 & Supp. 1983).
3. See FLA. STAT. § 403.817 (1983) (The Vegetative Index is ratified by FLA.
STAT. § 403.8171 (Supp. 1984). The Department of Environmental Regulation's
(DER) dredge and fill authority is based on a Vegetative Index which identifies plant
species which are indicative of wetlands. See also 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (1982), which
defines wetlands as "[t]hose areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or ground
water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal circum-
stances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil
conditions. Wetlands generally include swamps, marshes, bogs and similar areas."
4. S. REP. No. 370, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1977). Senator Muskie's report
favoring the passage of S. 1952, Clean Water Act of 1977, stated that "[t]here is no
question that the systematic destruction of the Nation's wetlands is causing serious,
permanent ecological damage. The wetlands and bays, estuaries and deltas are the Na-
tion's most biologically active areas." See also E. ODUM, WATER RESOURCES ASSOCIA-
TION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON WETLANDS (1978).
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sources5 due to their biological productivity, water storage capacity,
ability to reduce flood damage, recharge aquifers, and remove organic
pollutants by natural processes. With more than ten million acres of
wetlands in Florida,6 wetlands are, as the legislature recognized
through the Act, a major component of the essential characteristics
that make Florida an attractive place to live, performing economic and
recreational functions that would be costly to replace should their vital
character be lost.7
While Florida's Wetlands Protection Act purports to regulate the
uncontrolled development of wetlands,8 the Act may include sufficient
exemptions to hamper its effectiveness. This note will chart the history
of wetlands legislation in Florida leading up to the adoption of the
Wetlands Protection Act, analyze this Act in light of its expressed pur-
poses, and make recommendations for possible changes which may in-
crease the protection of wetlands in Florida.
II. History of Environmental Protection in Florida
The Preamble to the Wetlands Protection Act 9 reflects a historical
indifference to the protection of the environment. This indifference,
5. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, OUR NATION'S WETLANDS, AN IN-
TERAGENCY TASK FORCE REPORT 2 & 19-29 (1978). See also United States v. Hol-
land, 373 F. Supp. 665, 674-75 (M.D. Fla. 1974), which discusses the purposes of
federal section 404 legislation and recognizes the value of wetlands. Moviematic Indus.
Corp. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Metropolitan Dade County, 349 So. 2d 667 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977), addresses zoning for preservation of ecological systems. See
generally Florida Wildlife Fed'n v. Goldschmidt, 506 F. Supp. 350 (S.D. Fla. 1981);
Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971); Gra-
ham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1981); Avoyelles Sportsmen's
League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983).
6. See generally NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, FLORIDA'S WETLANDS NEED
PROTECTION (1980).
7. 1984 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 84-79 (West).
8. Id. The preamble to the Wetlands Protection Act states:
Whereas, the economic, urban, and agricultural development of this state
has necessitated the alteration, drainage, and development of wetlands.
While state policy permitting the uncontrolled development of wetlands
may have been appropriate in the past, the continued elimination or distur-
bance of wetlands in an uncontrolled manner will cause extensive damage
to the economic and recreational values which Florida's remaining wet-
lands provide. . ..
FLA. STAT. §§ 403.91-.929 (Supp. 1984) preamble.
9. 1984 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 84-79 (West).
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however, began to change for the first time in 1968 when, as a part of a
considerable Constitutional revision,10 the Florida Constitution was
amended to include article II, section 7: "Natural resources and scenic
beauty-It shall be the policy of the state to conserve and protect its
natural resources and scenic beauty. Adequate provision shall be made
by law for the abatement of air and water pollution and of excessive
and unnecessary noise.""
During and after the period of development of the 1968 Constitu-
tional revisions, the legislature passed legislation attempting to control
air, 2 water,13 noise14 and solid waste pollution.15 In addition, the legis-
lature enacted laws to regulate water consumption and supply.' 6 Also,
the United States Congress passed several laws relating to the environ-
ment whose administration were the primary responsibility of the
states: the Federal Water Pollution Control Act amendments of 1972,'
the Clean Air Act, 18 and the Safe Drinking Water Act.' 9
The difficulty with efforts to protect the environment following the
Constitutional amendment and the federal legislation was the lack of
coordination between the various agencies of state government in the
absence of comprehensive legislation. 0 This created impediments to ef-
fective regulation and frustration for those interests being regulated.
Despite efforts at reorganizing state agencies in 1969, the responsibility
for environmental protection remained divided between four different
21agencies. With additional environmental legislation during the early
10. Florida, like many other states, found that constitutional revision was neces-
sary in the mid-1960's to meet the shifts in power to Congress and the federal courts.
Much of this revision was prompted by federal court reapportionment decisions. Conse-
quently, in 1968 Florida made considerable revisions to its constitution, including the
addition of article II, section 7.
11. FLA. CONSr. art. II, § 7.
12. FLA. STAT. § 403 (1983) (effective 1967).
13. FLA. STAT. §§ 380.012 to -.10 (1983) (effective 1972).
14. FLA. STAT. §§'403.011 to -.261 (1983) (effective 1967).
15. FLA. STAT. § 403 (1983) (effective 1971).
16. FLA. STAT. §§ 373.012 to -.191 (1983) (effective 1972).
17. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (1982) (Water Pollution Control Act as amended
1972).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1982).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 300(0 (1982).
20. Landers, Function of the Department of Environmental Regulation, 50 FLA.
B.J. 269 (1976).
21. Id. Responsibility for environmental protection was split between the Depart-
ment of Pollution Control, the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, the
1984]
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1970's, problems caused by overlapping agency responsibility, lack of
accountability, and permit processing delays created great pressure to
consolidate environmental regulation.2
The Florida legislature made two unsuccessful efforts to consoli-
date control between 1971 and 1974.23 A year later the legislature en-
acted the Environmental Reorganization Act of 1975.24 This Act cre-
ated the Department of Environmental Regulation (DER) by
absorbing the Department of Pollution Control, with its responsibility
for air, water, noise, solid waste and power plant siting, and by assum-
ing responsibility for navigable waters permitting from the Trustees of
the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, the public drinking water supply
oversight from the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services,
and water management responsibilities from the Department of Natu-
ral Resources.25
Because the widely divergent geography of Florida creates signifi-
cantly different water use and management requirements, the Environ-
mental Reorganization Act of 1975 provided that the DER delegate
"to the greatest extent practicable" its water management power under
Florida Statutes Chapter 373.26 In requiring this delegation, the legis-
lature desired to better regulate differing geographical water use de-
mands through regional water management. While the Act made
mandatory the delegation of responsibility for enforcement of Chapter
373 to the water management districts, it did not give explicit direc-
tions to the DER under section 403.812 of the Florida Statutes to dele-
gate water quality management. The implication was that water man-
agement districts were responsible for permitting quantitative water use
while the DER remained responsible for water quality,27 unless a valid
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, and the Department of Natural
Resources.
22. Id.
23. id.
24. FLA. STAT. § 373.016(3) (1983).
25. Landers, supra note 20, at 270.
26. FLA. STAT. § 373.016(3) (1983).
27. Wershow, Legal Implications of Water Management for Florida's Future,
54 FLA. B.J. 527, 527-28 (1980). FLA. STAT. § 373.016(3) directs that "to the greatest
extent practicable, such power should be delegated to the governing board of a water
management district" and makes no reference to water quality standards in FLA. STAT.
§ 403.812. That statute provides that the water quality functions of the department
may be delegated when the secretary determines that a water management district has
the financial and technical capability to carry out these functions. Hence, the legisla-
ture seems to create a bifurcation between the functions of water quantity management
[Vol. 9
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delegation was made by the DER to those districts which the secretary
determined had the financial and technical capability to carry out
water quality management.28
This lack of clear delineation of responsibilities between the water
management districts and the DER became apparent when water man-
agement districts began writing water quality standards into their regu-
lations without a valid delegation of authority, creating the potential
for confusion among regulatees.29 The historical concern that a bifur-
cated system of enforcement results in confusion to regulated inter-
ests30 continues to play a role in water managenent in Florida. As de-
tailed below, some provisions of Florida's Wetlands Protection Act
again raise this issue by arguably fostering this confusion.
III. The Development of Wetlands Protection in Florida
The process of recognizing the growing need for wetlands protec-
tion has been a long one. As an understanding of the impact of the loss
of wetlands31 increased, so too did the need to provide measures for
protecting them. In 1973, the Florida Wildlife Federation hosted a wet-
lands legislative conference which resulted in the development of "A
Statement on Wetlands Protection."32 This Statement outlined five
goals which would provide greater protection for wetlands: 1) explicit
criterion to define the lands to be protected; 2) explicit specifications as
to uses which are prohibited and those that are not; 3) measures for
bringing lands into public ownership where necessary to carry out the
purposes of the act; 4) strong enforcement sanctions, and 5) funding
measures necessary to carry out the purposes of the act.3
and water quality management which has created some overlapping and confusion
when water management districts adopted regulations relating to quality.
28. FLA. STAT. § 403.812 (1983 & Supp. 1984).
29. Wershow, supra note 27, at 528.
30. Letter from Randall E. Denker to Johnny Jones, Executive Director, Florida
Wildlife Federation (May 9, 1984).
31. Address by Victoria Tschinkel, Secretary of DER, Florida Wildlife Federa-
tion Annual Meeting (Sept. 8, 1984). Florida has lost 40% of its wetlands from 1900-
1973. For the period since 1952, Florida has lost 1.5 million acres of wetlands.
32. Florida Wildlife Federation Wetlands Legislative Conference, A Statement
on Wetlands Protection (Sept. 6-8, 1973).
33. Id. at 3. In addition, the Conference stated:
[The] power to regulate should be backed up by the power to obtain the
fee or lesser estate as required in wetlands by negotiation, gift, or the exer-
cise of the power of eminent domain in cases where the regulation is held
1984]
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Of these goals, the Florida legislature addressed that of compen-
sating owners for a "taking" due to a reduction of property values
caused by permit denial in 1978.1' The passage of Florida Statutes sec-
tion 380.08531 allowed, among other things, for the payment of appro-
priate damages.36 Since then, courts reviewing the taking issue have
recognized that restrictions on land use which deny the highest and
best use are not takings 7 and that "[a]n owner of land has no absolute
and unlimited right to change the essential natural character of his
land so as to use it for a purpose for which it was unsuited in its natu-
ral state and which injures the rights of others."3" So, while there were
measures to bring lands into public ownership, and judicial determina-
tions that limit public compensation to only that environmentally sensi-
tive property where the regulations preclude all economically reasona-
ble uses,39 there was no comprehensive legislation to address the
additional identified goals geared to the actual protection of the wet-
lands. Not until eleven years after the Conference did the Florida legis-
by a court to be invalid in application and the administering agency deter-
mines that the taking is necessary to carry out the purposes of the
act .... In addition, special wetlands tax incentives, analogous to green-
belt laws as applied to agricultural lands, should be provided to encourage
the retention and protection of wetlands in private ownership. The wet-
lands tax incentives should apply as appropriate to all regulated wetlands.
Id.
34. FLA. STAT. § 380.085 (1983) allows any person substantially affected by final
agency action to initiate an action in circuit court after exhausting Chapter 120 admin-
istrative remedies. If the court decides that an agency action is an unreasonable exer-
cise of the state's police power, constituting a taking without just compensation, the
court will remand the matter to the agency. The agency must then take one of three
actions: (1) agree to issue the permit, (2) agree to pay appropriate damages, or (3)
agree to modify its decision to remedy its unreasonable action. See also Rhodes, Com-
pensating Police Power Takings: Chapter 78-85, Laws of Florida, 52 FLA. B.J. 741 at
743 (1978).
35. FLA. STAT. § 380.085 (1983).
36. Id.
37. Graham, 399 So. 2d at 1382. See also Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657
F.2d 1184, 1193 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982). Both of these cases are
similar to Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972), a
landmark Wisconsin Supreme Court decision involving interdependent wetlands,
swamps, water quality, and natural resources such as fish and wildlife habitat. That
case denied an owner's absolute right to change the natural condition of his land if that
change creates a public harm.
38. Graham, 399 So. 2d at 1382.
39. See supra note 37.
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lature comprehensively address the need for wetlands protection.40
IV. The Warren S. Henderson Wetlands Protection Act of
1984
Undoubtedly, the passage of the Wetlands Protection Act en-
hances Florida's ability to protect wetlands. Key achievements 4' of the
Act include: 1) increased jurisdiction over wetlands by the addition of
over two hundred species to the Vegetative Index, the DER's principal
method of jurisdiction determination;42 2) expansion of the DER's cri-
teria for granting or denying permits, including the ability to consider
fish and wildlife habitat;43 3) the clarification of the DER's jurisdiction
during times of drought;44 4) consideration of the cumulative impact of
projects in granting or denying permits; 45 5) the naming of the Ever-
40. FLA. STAT. §§ 403.91-.929 (Supp. 1984).
41. Tschinkel, supra note 31.
42. FLA. STAT. §§ 403.817(l)-(5) (1983) (The Vegetative Index is ratified by
Fla. Stat. §403.8171 (Supp. 1984).
43. FLA. STAT. § 403.918(2) (Supp. 1984). In pertinent part:
(2) No permit shall be issued under ss. 403.91-403.929 unless the appli-
cant provides the department with reasonable assurance that the project is
not contrary to the public interest. However, for projects which signifi-
cantly degrade or are within an Outstanding Florida Water, as provided
by department rule, the applicant shall provide reasonable assurance that
the project will be clearly in the public interest. (a) In determining
whether a project is not contrary to the public interest, or clearly in. the
public interest, the department shall consider and balance the following
criteria: . . . (2) Whether the project will adversely affect the conservation
of fish and wildlife, including endangered or threatened species, or their
habitats. ...
Id.
44. FLA. STAT. § 403.913(2) (Supp. 1984). In pertinent part, the Act states:
The landward extent of waters shall be determined as provided in s.
403.817 [Vegetative Index], except that the department may exert its ju-
risdiction to the ordinary or mean high water line of waters whenever the
landward extent, if determined in accordance with ch. 17-4.022, Florida
Administrative Code, occurs waterward of the ordinary or mean high
water line. . ..
Id.
45. FLA. STAT. § 403.919 (Supp. 1984).
The department, in deciding whether to grant or deny a permit for an
activity which will affect waters, shall consider:
(I) The impact of the project for which the permit is sought;
(2) The impact of projects which are existing or under construction, or
1984]
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glades as waters of the state;4" and 6) the ability of the DER to con-
sider mitigation in the permitting process. 7
The Wetlands Protection Act is long and complex. It addresses a
biologically complicated issue through legislation which is, in its own
right, procedurally and politically complicated. 8 While Florida has
gained much through passage of the Act, the complexities of negotiat-
ing such an Act led to the creation of statutory exemptions which may
not be consistent with the express legislative intent49 or the public
interest.
Florida's Wetlands Protection Act clearly represents a compromise
between very strong development, mining and agricultural interests on
the one hand and environmentalists on the other. Despite the com-
promises necessary to insure the passage of the bill, the Wetlands Pro-
tection Act is largely a success. Considering the fact that the DER and
environmental groups have been trying without success to win legisla-
tive passage of just one of the concepts, the fish and wildlife permit
criterion, the Act's drafters consider the comprehensive Wetlands Pro-
tection Act an extremely significant accomplishment."
for which permits or jurisdictional determinations have been sought;
(3) The impact of projects which are under review, approved, or vested
pursuant to s. 380.06, or other projects which may reasonably be expected
to be located within the jurisdictional extent of waters, based upon land
use restrictions and regulations.
Id.
46. FLA. STAT. § 403.031(12)(a) (Supp. 1984).
47. FLA. STAT. § 403.918(7)(b) (Supp. 1984).
If the applicant is unable to otherwise meet the criteria set forth in this
subsection, the department, in deciding to grant or deny a permit, shall
consider measures proposed by or acceptable to the applicant to mitigate
adverse effects which may be caused by the project. If the applicant is
unable to meet water quality standards because existing ambient water
quality does not meet standards, the department shall consider mitigation
measures proposed by or acceptable to the applicant that cause net im-
provement of the water quality in the receiving body of water for those
parameters which do not meet standards. Reclaimation and restoration
programs conducted pursuant to s. 211.32 may be considered as mitigation
to the extent that they restore or improve the water quality and the type,
nature, and function of biological systems present at the site prior to the
commencement of mining activities.
Id.
48. Tschinkel, supra note 31.
49. See infra notes 61, 74, 80 & 83.
50. Letter from State Representative Jon Mills, Chairman of the Committee on
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Drafters of the Wetlands Protection Act set for themselves five
goals, which are somewhat different from those expressed by the 1973
Florida Wildlife Federation Conference,5 yet similar in their desire to
begin comprehensive wetlands protection efforts.52 Those goals were: 1)
the creation of legislative intent recognizing the importance of wet-
lands; 2) the combining of Florida Statute Chapters 253 and 403; 3)
the creation of new permitting criteria, principally the impact of pro-
posed projects upon fish and wildlife habitat; 4) defining the Everglades
as named waters of the State; and 5) the adoption of the amended
Vegetative Index.53
Addressing these goals is a significant accomplishment. Fully
achieving wetlands protection will require additional legislative action.
A. Legislative Intent
While the Florida legislature failed to follow the lead of most
other states54 in enacting their intent as an integral part of their com-
prehensive wetlands legislation, the intent is nonetheless clear. The lan-
guage of the preamble to the Act 55 recognizes the economic and recrea-
tional values of the wetlands.56 That language also commits the state to
the establishment of reasonable regulatory programs for the preserva-
tion and protection of Florida's remaining wetlands consistent with bal-
ancing other vital interests of the state.57
Natural Resources, Florida House of Representatives to V. Don Hilley (Aug. 20,
1984).
51. Conference, supra note 32.
52. Mills, supra note 50.
53. Id.
54. Six of the seven other states enacting comprehensive wetlands protection
measures have legislatively enacted their intent/policy regarding wetlands protection:
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-36 (West 1975 & Supp. 1984); R.I. GEN. LAWs § 2-1-
18 (1976 & Supp. 1983); N.Y. ENVIR. CONSERV. LAW § 24-0103, § 24-0105 (Consol.
1982 & Supp. 1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105.38 (West 1979); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 483-A: 1-b (1983 & Supp. 1983); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 281.703 (West
Supp. 1984).
55. See supra notes 7 & 8 and accompanying text.
56. Id.
57. 1984 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 84-79 (West). In pertinent part the preamble
reads:
"Whereas, it is the policy of this state to establish reasonable regulatory
programs which provide for the preservation and protection of Florida's
remaining wetlands to the greatest extent practicable, consistent with pri-
vate property rights and the balancing of other state vital interests ......
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In addition to the Act's language, the Conference Committee in-
corporated the legislature's intent into its report to ensure the applica-
tion of the preamble to the amended legislation.5 8 Although this lan-
guage may be clear enough to support administering agencies against
challenges to their authority under the Act, the legislature's failure to
enact its intent may be read by some to exhibit a lack of sincerity to
provide the level of wetlands protection needed in Florida.59 While the
lack of an enacted intent distinguishes Florida from the majority of
other states60 that have passed comprehensive wetlands legislation, only
future challenges to authority given by the Act will determine whether
this omission is significant. To avoid any possibility of future difficulties
related to the lack of express statutory intent, the legislature should
enact its intent, making it a part of the substance of the Act.
B. The Stormwater Ditch Exemption
Section 403.913(4) exempts owners of land within a water man-
agement district that has been delegated stormwater permitting author-
ity by the DER from obtaining a dredge and fill permit for irrigation or
drainage ditches constructed in the uplands.6 ' This exemption extends
Id.
58. CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT ON CS/CS/HB 1187, REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT OF THE FLORIDA SENATE AND THE SPEAKER OF THE FLORIDA HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES 2 (May 25, 1984).
59. Interview with Johnny Jones, Executive Director, Florida Wildlife Federa-
tion, in West Palm Beach, Fla. (Aug. 29, 1984).
60. J. KUSLER, OUR NATIONAL WETLAND HERITAGE: A PROTECTION GUIDE-
BOOK 21, 65 (1983).
61. FLA. STAT. § 403.913(4) (Supp. 1984), reads:
Within those areas of the state where a water management district has
been delegated stormwater permitting by the department, no dredge or fill
permit shall be required for the construction of, and dredging and filling
in, irrigation or drainage ditches constructed in the uplands, including
those connecting otherwise isolated areas owned entirely by one person and
dominated by the plant indicator species adopted pursuant to s. 403.817.
This exemption shall only apply to ditches where the point of connection to
other waters of the state is no more than 35 square feet in total cross-
sectional area and normally having a water depth of no more than 3 feet.
The total cross-sectional area at the point of connection to other waters of
the state shall be maintained by the landowner so as not to exceed the
design limitations of this exemption. This exemption does not authorize
dredging in waters of the state other than ditches as described herein. All
applicable permits, except dredge and fill permits, shall be required for
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to otherwise isolated areas owned entirely by one person and dominated
by those plant species which are not indicative of wetlands.6 2 The ex-
emption is lost if the point of connection to other waters of the state is
more than thirty-five square feet in total cross-sectional area and the
ditch has a normal water depth of more than three feet.63 The legisla-
ture created the stormwater ditch exemption to reverse a 1981 adminis-
trative law decision 64 which made artificial waterways and de minimis
connections, waters of the state.65
Stormwater discharges pose a potentially serious source of pollu-
tants into Florida's waters. 6  The difficulty with maintaining consistent
enforcement is a potential problem in protecting wetlands. In some re-
gions of the state, stormwater discharge permitting is delegated to
water management districts67  by the DER. In other regions,
stormwater permitting is retained by the DER. Because of the possibil-
ity of inconsistent regional regulation, this bifurcation has the potential
to become reminiscent of the historical reasons for the original consoli-
dation of environmental enforcement under one agency.
Sensitivity to the need for consistency is a central theme of Gover-
nor Graham's Directive to the Water Management Districts of June 4,
discharges to these ditches or connected areas. This exemption shall not
apply to ditches in or connected to the waters described in s.
403.031(12)(a) and (b), Outstanding Florida Waters, Class I waters, or
Class 11 waters.
Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Letter from State Senator Pat Neal, Chairman of the Committee on Natural
Resources and Conservation, Florida Senate, to V. Don Hilley (Aug. 14, 1984).
65. Occidental Chemical Co. v. State of Florida Department of Environmental
Regulation, Case No. 77-2051, Fla. Admin. Law Reports 1029-A (1980). This admin-
istrative decision involved a dispute as to the DER's jurisdiction over Roaring Creek
under applicable statutes and regulations. While the intent of legislators may have been
to clarify and limit the DER's jurisdiction in similar situations, the addition of wet-
lands plant species to the Vegetative Index and the enactment of criterion allowing
consideration of wildlife habitat in the permitting process would seem to negative that
intention.
66. E.P.A. OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE MONITORING, PUB. No.
EPA-330/I-84-001, SOUTH FLORIDA DRINKING WATER INVESTIGATION BROWARD,
DADE AND PALM BEACH COUNTIES V-22, V-23 (1984).
67. Mills, supra note 50. Only the South Florida Water Management District
and the Southwest Florida Water Management District have received stormwater per-
mitting delegations.
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1984,8 relating to the implementation of programs required by the
Act. The Directive mandates that there be rules established by every
water management district by October 1, 1984.69 This requirement cre-
ates a "safety net" such that no major areas or activities that are cur-
rently protected by the DER and exempted by the water management
districts shall be unregulated by that date.7" Specifically, the Governor
directs the water management district boards to manage and protect
wetlands in their agricultural regulatory program consistent with how
other industries are regulated by environmental agencies. 71 This Direc-
tive also requires the protection of water quality, consistent agricultural
programs, including uniform rules, permitting, mitigation, enforcement
and coordination efforts by all water management districts.72
While the Governor's Directive is a positive step toward consistent
wetlands protection efforts, the water management districts and the
DER should have been similarly statutorily mandated to develop model
rules73 for the implementation of the Act so that continued consistency
is assured. Furthermore, the legislature should statutorily establish
guidelines or criterion applicable to both agencies to reduce the difficul-
ties inherent in a bifurcated system of enforcement.
C. Mining Exemption
Section 403.913(8) provides an exemption for existing sand, limer-
ock, or limestone mining activity7 4 from the more stringent require-
ments of the Act. Arguably, there is no environmental reason for this
68. OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, GOVERNOR'S DIRECTIVES TO THE WATER MAN-
AGEMENT DISTRICT[S] FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WETLANDS BILL (June 4, 1984).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. Section VII requires the following: "A joint committee of water manage-
ment district and DER staff shall develop 'model rules' for implementation of the bill.
The DER will coordinate this effort in consultation with regulated interests and conser-
vation groups. This rule shall be available by July 15 [1984] for presentation to the
water management boards." Id.
74. FLA. STAT. § 403.913(8) (Supp. 1984) provides an exemption for those min-
ing operations currently in compliance with department rules or for which the depart-
ment previously determined no jurisdiction in areas east of the Dade-Broward levee or
which holds a department permit on the effective date of the Act. These activities will
continue to be regulated pursuant to the department's dredge and fill jurisdiction, as it
existed prior to January 24, 1984, for a period of 10 years.
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exemption. Mining activities pose great potential for contamination of
groundwater supplies75 by reducing the effectiveness of the wetland's
aquifer recharge and pollution filtration capabilities. As an example,
continued destruction of wetlands through mining in Dade County fur-
ther exposes the Biscayne Aquifer to direct contamination from pollu-
tants.7 6 The Aquifer is the sole source of drinking water for millions of
people living in the south Florida area, 77 and the "health" of the Aqui-
fer is a matter of serious concern to the people of south Florida.7 8
Despite the threat to the Aquifer, section 403.913(8) of the Wet-
lands Protection Act79 permits mining activity to continue to be regu-
lated pursuant to the department's dredge and fill jurisdiction as it ex-
isted prior to January 24, 1984, for a period of ten years from the
effective date of the Act, provided such activity is continuous and car-
ried out on land contiguous to mining operations existent on or before
the effective date of the Act.80 Although sponsors of the Act believe
that limerock mining operations pose no significant threat to the envi-
ronment,8' the removal of the wetlands filtering capacity may expose
south Florida's water supply to increased pollution.82
Until there is a clear consensus on the effect of limerock mining on
ground water supplies, with its concurrent effect of wetlands destruc-
tion, the legislature should have chosen to regulate mining interests us-
ing the same standards for existing mining operations as are applicable
to new ones. Since there is no apparent environmental reason for this
exemption, one may assume that its inclusion was a "tradeoff" to en-
sure the Act's approval by mining and development interests. It re-
75. Deutsch, Natural Controls Involved in Shallow Aquifer Contamination, in
WATER QUALITY IN A STRESSED ENVIRONMENT: READINGS IN ENVIRONMENTAL HY-
DROLOGY 99 (W. Pettyjohn ed. 1972). See also J. KUSLER, supra note 60, at 42; and
see Tripp and Jaffe, Preventing Groundwater Pollution. Towards a Coordinated Strat-
egy to Protect Critical Recharge Zones, 3 HARV. ENVTL. L.R. 1 (1979).
76. Goldschmidt, 506 F. Supp. at 355 (testimony of Gerald C. Parker, Sr.,
hydrologist).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 354.
79. See supra note 74.
80. FLA. STAT. § 403.913(8) (Supp. 1984): "Such sand, limerock, or limestone
mining activity shall continue to be regulated pursuant to the department's dredge and
fill jurisdiction as it existed prior to January 24, 1984, for a period of 10 years ..
Id.
81. See supra notes 50 & 64.
82. Tripp and Jaffe, supra note 75; see also J. KUSLER, supra note 60, at 42; and
see E. ODUM, supra note 4.
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mains to be seen if the people of south Florida have lost more than they
have gained through the Act.
D. Agricultural Exemption
Perhaps the most serious potential problem with the Wetlands
Protection Act is its exemption for agricultural interests.83 Agricultural
practices are the principal threat to wetlands in many areas of the
country,84 and Florida is no exception. The fact that agricultural inter-
ests in Florida are politically powerful can be demonstrated through
their exemption from other environmental legislation.8 5 This influence
over the legislature heightens concerns of environmentalists who see ag-
ricultural development of wetlands as a precursor to more intense and
more ecologically destructive development.86 As the legislature consid-
ered the Wetlands Protection Act, agricultural interests actively lob-
bied against increased DER agricultural jurisdiction.87 During the
course of negotiations, even with the DER willing to write special lan-
83. FLA. STAT. § 403.927(2) (Supp. 1984), states:
Agricultural activities and agricultural water management systems are au-
thorized by this section and shall not be subject to the provisions of s.
403.087 or this part or ss. 403.91-403.929, nor shall the department en-
force water quality standards within an agricultural water management
system. The department may require a stormwater permit or appropriate
discharge permit at the ultimate point of discharge from one or a group of
connected agricultural water management systems. Impacts of agricultural
activities and agricultural water management systems on groundwater
quality shall be regulated by water management districts.
Id.
84. J. KUSLER, supra note 60, at 41.
Drainage destroys wetland vegetation and wildlife. Diking interferes with
wetland water and nutrient supplies. Other impacts include nutrient en-
richment from agricultural runoff (fertilizers, manure), sedimentation
from the erosion and discharge of soil into waterways, introduction of toxic
chemicals from agricultural pesticides and herbicides, disturbance of wet-
land water supplies by agricultural pumping. . .and destruction of wetland
vegetation and wildlife by plowing, harvesting and other practices.
Id.
85. Agricultural interests have been previously exempted from FLA. STAT. §
380.06.
86. See supra note 59.
87. Farm Bureau, Wetlands Bill Gives Ag A Cleaner Bill of Health,
FloridAgriculture, May 1, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
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guage into the Act, agricultural interests "bolted."88 They refused to
consider DER regulation and expressed a desire to be regulated by
water management districts with whom they were already being regu-
lated.89 To salvage the Act, the DER and the water management dis-
tricts developed a workable compromise. 90 That compromise is section
403.927 of the Wetlands Protection Act.91
Section 403.927 exempts agricultural activities from the provisions
of the Act and directs the creation of agricultural water management
systems under Florida statutes governing activities of water manage-
ment districts.92 The water management districts are responsible for
water quantity and water quality management for both surface and
groundwater. The DER may only require a stormwater permit or ap-
propriate discharge permit at the ultimate point of discharge from one
or a group of connected agricultural water management systems.9"
Mandating responsibility for the management of agricultural ac-
tivities to the water management districts under the statute governing
the activities of water management districts, without first establishing
similar criteria to that created for the DER, recreates the same oppor-
tunity for confusion amongst regulatees 4 discussed earlier in this note.
At the very least, this mandate creates a bifurcated system of agricul-
tural regulation whereby the water management districts regulate agri-
cultural activities and the DER regulates discharges from those activi-
ties with no statutory assurance of compatible guidelines. The
possibility that at some future time the absence of common statutory
direction will provide the necessary ambiguity to permit a policy
change by the executive branch, reversing the present policy, is a seri-
ous potential problem.
Therefore, the effectiveness of the water management districts in
regulating agricultural water management activities will depend upon
the quality of the rules promulgated by the water management districts
in carrying out their mandated responsibilities. 95 As noted earlier, Gov-
ernor Graham has directed water management districts to promulgate
88. Tschinkei, supra note 31.
89. Id.
90. FLA. STAT. § 403.927 (Supp. 1984).
91. Id.
92. Id. The statute creating and governing the activities of the water manage-
ment districts is FLA. STAT. § 373 (1983) (Florida Water Resources Act of 1972).
93. See supra note 61.
94. See supra note 29.
95. See supra note 50.
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equivalent standards to those of the DER. Responses to the Directive
have been varied by the water management districts, largely dependent
upon how far they had progressed prior to the Act and subsequent Di-
rective in implementing Part IV authority under Chapter 373.11 For
example, the South Florida Water Management District had extensive
Part IV implementation prior to the enactment of the Wetlands Protec-
tion Act.97 The impact of the Act on its regulations has been mini-
mal.98 The Southwest Florida Water Management District had just be-
gun Part IV implementation prior to the Act and as a result was
required to expedite the development of their regulations, drawing
largely from regulations established by the South Florida Water Man-
agement District.99
On the other hand, the Suwannee River Water Management Dis-
trict, in reaction to the Act and the Governor's Directive has developed
only interim regulations for surface water management associated with
agriculture and forestry to provide the minimum required "safety net"
until a comprehensive surfacewater management permitting program
as contemplated in Part IV of Chapter 373 can be enacted. °00 The dis-
parity between the comprehensive of water management district regu-
lation of surface water activities is in part due to the geographical dif-
ference between north and south Florida. The Suwannee River Water
Management District serves an area in which the DER received only
twelve permit applications per year' 0 ' for activities to be similarly per-
mitted by the water management district under the Wetlands Protec-
tion Act. However the difference in the quantity of these activities
should not reduce in any way the quality of enforcement efforts. The
legislature failed to statutorily mandate the necessary equivalent re-
quirements for both the DER and water management districts and
equivalent requirements between and among the various water manage-
ment districts.
Although the Governor's Directive0 2 provides guidelines for the
development of consistent district rules, in so doing, the directive accen-
96. Interview with Irene Quincey, attorney, South Florida Water Management
District, in West Palm Beach, Fla. (Aug. 29, 1984).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Proposed rules for Chap. 40-44, 10 Fla. Admin. Weekly 2258 (July 20,
1984).
100. Id. at 2250.
101. Id.
102. See supra note 68.
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tuates the Act's statutory deficiencies. This directive is clearly an effort
to address the need for consistency among regulators which the legisla-
ture failed to address through the Act. To avoid the consequences of
the kind of uncoordinated efforts which have historically plagued envi-
ronmental legislation in Florida, the legislature should establish statu-
tory guidelines under either Florida Statutes Chapter 373 or section
403.061, similar to those required in the Governor's Directive.
V. The Future of Wetlands Protection in Florida
Florida's Wetlands Protection Act is a step in the right direction.
Issues relating to wildlife, pollution of groundwaters and the destruc-
tion of the environment which go to the vital character of Florida are
consistently before the public. 10 3 With the ever increasing demands
placed on Florida's finite resources by a burgeoning population, there
should be little doubt that further restrictions will be necessary to pro-
tect wetlands.
The Act creates a wetlands monitoring system'0 4 to provide relia-
ble information regarding the magnitude of the loss of wetlands in
Florida. It is difficult to assess both the impact of this Act on the pro-
tection of wetlands, and the need for additional protective measures
without such a system. The wetlands' monitoring system will determine
the general location and acreages of wetland areas in the state 0 5 and
identify the impact to, and losses of, wetlands due to permitting prac-
tices of the DER and water management districts or from unregulated
or exempted activities. 06 The DER will provide this information yearly
to the legislature. 07 Over time, this information will become an impor-
tant indicator of the need for additional wetlands protection legislation.
103. Typical of the kinds of articles written: County OK's Project Near Water
Catchment Area, Palm Beach Post, Aug. 25, 1984, at B-I, col. 1; Abuse of Wetlands
Law Loophole Feared, Palm Beach Post, Aug. 6, 1984, at B-10, col. 1; Wetlands Cru-
cial to Ecology, Expert Says, Times-Union and Journal, Jacksonville, Oct. 22, 1983, at
A-5, col. 3; Wodraska Says Public Threatened by Rapid Development, Palm Beach
Post, July 21, 1984, at B-4, col. 1.
104. FLA. STAT. § 403.929 (Supp. 1984) establishes a wetlands monitoring sys-
tem which will determine the general locations and acreages of wetlands, identify im-
pacts to and losses of wetlands due to DER or water management district permitting as
well as from unregulated or exempted activities and changes in natural conditions and
report this information to the legislature annually.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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VI. Conclusion
The importance of wetlands to Florida can not be overstated.
Through the Warren S. Henderson Wetlands Protection Act of 1984,
the legislature has recognized their importance and taken steps to pro-
vide for wetlands protection. In doing so, however, the legislature has
allowed exemptions which may hinder the effectiveness of the Act. To
strengthen the Act, the legislature should consider statutorily mandat-
ing criterion applicable to both the DER and water management dis-
tricts for the stormwater ditch exemption. It should mandate consis-
tency between the DER and water management districts as to the
quality of enforcement efforts, especially in light of the agricultural ex-
emption. Additionally, because of the great potential for damage to
groundwater supplies, especially in south Florida, all mining operations
should be required to comply with the more restrictive provisions of the
Act.
The legislatively created wetlands monitoring system will provide
the kind of information necessary to determine the need for more strin-
gent controls over wetlands development. The question remains, how-
ever, whether prior to the time when reliable information is available
irreparable damage to the environment will occur. The potential for
this possibility may be lessened if the Florida legislature considers the
issues raised here and responds with corrective legislation.
V. Donald Hilley
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The Current State of Termination of Medical
Treatment Case Law
I. Introduction
A particularly unsettled area of the law in recent years has been
the sensitive and emotionally-charged subject of termination of medical
treatment.' Until recently, the most common question presented to the
courts was whether to allow the removal of a respirator2 from a coma-
tose patient existing in a chronic vegetative state.3 The 1976 landmark
case4 involving Karen Ann Quinlan was the beginning of the evolution
of case law recognizing a patient's right to have treatment discontinued
based on the fundamental right to privacy.5 Today, the removal of a
respirator is routinely performed without judicial intervention.
A new aspect to this area of medical-legal ethics however, has re-
1. This discussion will focus on discontinuation of medical care, as opposed to
compelling treatment. Compelling treatment involves such cases as ordering blood
transfusions for a Jehovah's Witness or surgery for a severely deformed newborn. See,
e.g., United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D.C. Conn. 1965); Wis. v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972).
2. A respirator can be inserted in one of three ways: through the mouth or
through the nose into the trachea (windpipe), or if needed for a long period of time it
can be surgically inserted in an incision in the throat. DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDI-
CAL DICTIONARY 1347 (25th ed. 1974).
3. Since the reader may not be familiar with some of the medical terms, they
will be defined. A chronic vegetative statemeans "a condition in which one retain[s]
the capacity to maintain some of the vegetative portions of neurological functions, such
as body temperature, breathing, blood pressure, heart rate, chewing, swallowing, sleep-
ing, and walking . . . but . . . no longer possess[es] any cognitive functions. [Such a
patient has] lost the sapient functions of the brain, which control one's relation to the
outside world via the capacity to talk, see, feel, sing and think." In re Quinlan, 70 N.J.
10, 24, 355 A.2d 647, 654 (1976).
4. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976). The widely publicized case of
Karen Ann Quinlan was initiated when this twenty-one year old woman became coma-
tose, following ingestion of alcohol and drugs, and was placed on a respirator. When it
became apparent that she was in a chronic vegetative state, her father requested court
permission to discontinue the respirator since her physicians were unsure of the state of
the law. Quinlan did not die after the respirator was removed and remains alive in a
nursing home hooked up to a nasogastric feeding tube and IVs.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 31-39.
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cently come to light. This issue is whether there is a corresponding
right to remove intravenous lines (IVs) and nasogastric feeding tubes6
which are keeping hopeless patients alive indefinitely. Until very re-
cently this ethical issue was not even within the imagination of the le-
gal or medical communities. However, the rapid technological advance-
ments occurring daily in the field of medicine has left the law in a state
of confusion. Medical progress has given us the ability to delay death
with methods unheard of several decades ago.7 Arguably, when a ter-
minally ill patient is subjected to increased pain and suffering and to a
loss of dignity in exchange for a longer life span in an unconscious,
irreversible state, this medical progress is not humanitarian progress.
Courts have been reluctant to lay down specific guidelines for the fami-
lies and doctors of such unfortunate patients. The resulting uncertainty
about the legal ramifications of removing IVs and feeding devices often
causes doctors to practice medicine more out of concern for the legal
consequences than out of concern for the patient's well being.8
This note reviews the latest developments in the area of termina-
tion of medical treatment. In particular, a recent California Court of
Appeals decision, Barber v. Superior Court,9 provides a useful frame-
work for analyzing the issues. It will be shown how several courts have
taken the logical view that the judicial process is too cumbersome and
unresponsive in this area of the law. Judicial intervention in these cru-
cial medical decisions is often untimely. 10 There is a pressing need for
specific legal guidelines so that physicians and families can make intel-
ligent decisions without facing potential civil or criminal liability.
After a review of the background of the medical and legal issues,
6. Nasogastric tubes are thin rubber catheters inserted through a patient's nose
which extend into the stomach to provide liquid nourishment. Artificial feeding can
also be provided through an artificial surgical opening into the stomach (a gastros-
tomy). DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 637 (25th ed. 1974).
7. Twenty or thirty years ago an unconscious patient would have had to be hy-
drated by intravenous feeding only, since nasogastric tubes were not yet in use. Rust,
Lifelines, Fine Lines, STUDENT LAW., Jan. 1984, at 12, 15.
8. "The modern proliferation of substantial malpractice litigation and the less
frequent but even more unnerving possibility of criminal sanctions would seem, for it is
beyond human nature to suppose otherwise, to have bearing on the practice and stan-
dards as they exist." Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 46, 355 A.2d at 666.
9. 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983).
10. Decisions are often handed down after the patient has died. In re Colyer, 99
Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983); In re Conroy, 190 N.J. Super. 453, 464 A.2d 303,
cert. granted, 95 N.J. 195, 470 A.2d 418 (1983); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420
N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
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Termination of Medical Treatment
this note will focus on the most recent decisions which conclude that
there is no need for routine judicial supervision to authorize ending
treatment. Finally, this note outlines the logical guidelines these cases
present for withdrawing life-support equipment from incompetent pa-
tients, so that appropriate decisions can be made without fear of
liability.
II. The Historical Development of Termination of Medical
Treatment Case Law
How society has approached the issues of death, dying, and eutha-
nasia in the past requires some clarification in order to properly narrow
the specific area covered in this note. Mercy killing is medically defined
as "an easy or painless death."11 The legal definition is "the act or
practice of painlessly putting to death persons suffering from incurable
and distressing disease as an act of mercy."12 Euthanasia comes from
the greek words eu, meaning painless, and thanatos, meaning death.
Active euthanasia means ending the life of an incurable patient
through positive action, as by administering a drug overdose. Passive
euthanasia means failure to take positive action to sustain an incurable
patient's life. Euthanasia can also be with the patient's consent, volun-
tary euthanasia, or without the patient's consent, nonvoluntary eutha-
nasia. Euthanasia refers to mercy killing of all types. This note is re-
stricted to discussing passive euthanasia, 13 meaning the intentional
withdrawal or withholding of available medical means for the prolonga-
tion of life of a patient who has little or no hope of survival.' 4
As medical technology becomes more sophisticated, medical and
legal opinion as to when death occurs also evolves.15 Prior to 1968 the
11. DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 553 (25th ed. 1974).
12. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 497 (5th ed. 1979).
13. The distinctions between these forms of euthanasia can mean the difference
between first degree murder and legally permissible conduct. See generally Foreman,
The Physician's Criminal Liability for the Practice of Euthanasia, 27 BAYLOR L.
REV. 54 (1975).
14. Ward, Euthanasia: A Medical and Legal Overview, 49 J. KAN. B.A. 317
(Winter 1980).
15. This medical-legal dilemma is commensurate with the medical- legal di-
lemma at the other end of the spectrum, determining when life begins. Justice
O'Connor, dissenting in Akron v. Akron Center for Reprod. Health recognized that
due to advances in medical technology, past decisions are often on a collision course
with each other in the abortion context. 462 U.S. 416, -, 103 S. Ct. 2481, 2507
(1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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commonly accepted standard to determine death was the permanent
cessation of respiration and circulation.16 But advances in the medical
field, such as respirators, pacemakers, and cardiac medications, have
enabled physicians to generate artificial breathing and circulation when
the capacity to do so naturally has been irreversibly lost.17 Therefore,
the traditional means for determining death is no longer satisfactory
when dealing with artificially maintained bodies. 18 As a result of this
inadequacy the brain-death standard for determining death emerged
and is now widely accepted.' 9 Brain death has been further defined as
16. The classical definition of death is "a total stoppage of the circulation of the
blood, and a cessation of the animal and vital functions consequent thereon, such as
respiration, pulsation, etc." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 488 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
17. See generally Brennan & Delgado, Death: Multiple Definitions or a Single
Standard?, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 1323 (1981).
18.
The most frequent causes of brain death are massive head injuries, massive
spontaneous brain hemmorhage secondary to complications of hyperten-
sion, or rupture of a congenital berry aneurysm, and lack of blood pumped
into the brain because of cardiac arrest or systemic hypotension. Brain
death occurs when the swelling is so severe that the pressure within the
cranial cavity exceeds the pressure of blood flowing into the brain and the
brain stem, causing cerebral circulation to cease. In this condition, there is
no clinical evidence of brain function. Intense stimulation may bring no
response or voluntary motor movements, and there are no eye movements
at the brain stem level. Spontaneous respiration ceases because the vital
respiratory centers of the brain have been destroyed. The patient depends
entirely on mechanical support to maintain cardiorespiratory function.
Normal cardiac functioning can be achieved, mechanically, even in the
presence of total brain destruction, and can continue for as long as an hour
after a patient is pronounced dead and the respirator discontinued.
However, mechanical maintenance of heartbeat and circulation can be
continued only for a limited period of time when the brain stem has been
destroyed. It is this limited survival period that distinguishes between brain
death and the persistent vegetative state. In the later state, irreversible
damage occurs to the cerebral cortex, but the brain stem continues to
function. Considerations involved in dealing with this condition are entirely
different from these [sic] involved in brain death and require the drawing
of a line between severe dysfunction and no function at all. ...
Determination of whether cessation of brain function has occurred may be
made in a matter of minutes. The decision as to whether it is irreversible
may require several days. Ingestion of suppressant drugs and low body
temperature may cause a reversible loss of brain function, so these pos-
sibilities must be screened out before a person is pronounced brain dead.
In re Bowman, 94 Wash. 2d 407, 417-18, 617 P.2d 731, 736-37 (1980).
19. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Ex-
[Vol. 9
163
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1984
Termination of Medical Treatment
either partial or complete.
For medical and legal purposes, partial brain impairment must be
distinguished from complete and irreversible loss of brain functions
or 'whole brain death.' The cessation of the vital functions of the
entire brain - and not merely portions thereof, such as those re-
sponsible for cognitive functions - is the only proper neurologic
basis for declaring death. This conclusion accords with the over-
whelming consensus of medical and legal experts and the public.2 0
Even though the brain death standard is now universally accepted,
often a court will authorize the withdrawal of life-prolonging equip-
ment when, even by the brain wave criteria, the patient's brain is not
dead. This was the situation in Leach v. Akron General Medical
Center,21 which recognized the patient's right, through a guardian, to
refuse life-sustaining treatment after four months on a respirator, arti-
ficial feeding and urinary catheter, even though she was not brain
dead.22 The court addressed the medical, moral, and legal dilemma
which often accompanies termination of treatment decisions. The
Leach court allowed life-sustaining equipment in general to be discon-
nected when it is clear that a person is near certain death, but sus-
tained by artificial means.23 Leach, however did not address the ques-
amine the Definition of Death, A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 J. A.M.A. 337
(1968) reports the criteria for brain death as:
1. lack of receptivity and response to painful stimuli;
2. no spontaneous movements or breathing;
3. no reflexes; and a flat EEG, indicating a total absence of brain activity
(these tests must then be repeated with the same results twenty four hours
later);
4. no evidence of hypothermia or central nervous system depressants.
Id. at 338-40.
20. Abram, The Need for Uniform Law on the Determination of Death, 27
N.Y.L.ScH. L. REV. 1187, 1189 (1982).
21. 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d 809 (1980).
22. See Note, Constitutional Law: Right to Privacy - Removal of Life-Support
Systems, 16 AKRON L. REV. 162 (1982).
23.
While she cannot be classified as dead, she can be classified as being very
near death, and that is the crux of the problem.
The problem before this court is not life or death. That question has
already been decided. Edna Marie Leach is going to die. She is on the
threshold of death, and man has, through a new medical technology, de-
vised a way of holding her on that threshold. The basic question is how
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tion of whether IVs or artificial feeding are part of a life-support
system.24
Passive euthanasia can be viewed as a "humanitarian easing of
terminal suffering."2 5 The medical community acknowledges that pas-
sive euthanasia is a common occurrence, even with the ever-present
threat of malpractice and criminal sanctions. As many as seventy-five
percent of American physicians permit patients to die by withdrawing
life-prolonging equipment, usually when so requested by the patient or
a family member.26 In In re Quinlan27 the court noted that "it is per-
fectly apparent . . . that humane decisions against resuscitative or
maintenance therapy are frequently a recognized de facto response in
the medical world to the irreversible, terminal, pain-ridden patient, es-
pecially with familial consent. And these cases, of course, are far short
of " 'brain death.' "28
Courts often make a distinction between ordinary and extraordi-
nary treatment. Ordinary measures are regarded as obligatory, but ex-
traordinary measures are not. A more precise distinction would be to
refer to the use of a respirator as extraordinary treatment, while com-
fort or pain relief measures would be considered ordinary treatment. 29
Courts recognize that physicians distinguish between curing the ill and
easing the dying. The Quinlan court acknowledged that it is a balance
"particularly difficult to perceive and apply in the context of the devel-
opment by advanced technology of sophisticated and artificial life-sus-
taining devices." 30 Although such devices are valuable and even essen-
tial for the curable patient and thus ordinary treatment, they are
"'extraordinary' in the context of the forced sustaining by cardio-re-
long will society require Mrs. Leach and others similarly situated to re-
main on the threshold of certain death suspended and sustained there by
artificial life supports.
Leach, 68 Ohio Misc. at 6, 426 N.E.2d at 812.
24. This issue is first addressed in Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d
1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983). See infra text accompanying notes 58-88.
25. See THE DILEMMAS OF EUTHANASIA 69 (J. Behnke & S. Bok eds. 1975).
26. See C., BARNARD, GOOD LIFE/GOOD DEATH: A DOCTOR'S CASE FOR Eu-
THANASIA AND SUICIDE 52 (1980); see also Medical Ethics: The Right to Survival:
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Health of the Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1974).
27. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
28. Id. at 47, 355 A.2d at 667 (emphasis original).
29. Ward, supra note 14, at 5.
30. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 48, 355 A.2d at 667.
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spiratory processes of an irreversibly doomed patient."'1 As a result,
many doctors "have refused to inflict an undesired prolongation of the
process of dying on a patient in irreversible condition when it is clear
that such 'therapy' offers neither human nor humane benefit.
32
A. Constitutional and Common-Law Issues
The Quinlan court was the first to recognize a person's fundamen-
tal right to privacy as justification for authorizing withdrawal of a res-
pirator. Although there is no explicit right to privacy in the Constitu-
tion, the Quinlan court determined that the penumbra of specific
guarantees of the Bill of Rights includes the right of personal privacy,
including terminating medical treatment.3 3 This constitutionally-pro-
tected interest in personal privacy is often found to have its source in
the language of the first, fourth, fifth, ninth and fourteenth amend-
ments.34 The Supreme Court had already included such personal deci-
sions as the right to use contraception and to receive an abortion as
falling within the protection of the right of privacy. In the celebrated
case of Roe v. Wade35 the Supreme Court extended the right to privacy
to a woman's decision to terminate a first trimester pregnancy. In
Quinlan, the New Jersey Supreme Court found the fundamental right
to privacy "broad enough to encompass a patient's decision to decline
medical treatment under certain circumstances .. "36
Although the United States Supreme Court has never addressed
the specific question of an incompetent, terminally ill patient's right to
terminate treatment, some of the Justices have articulated that the
right to privacy assures control over one's own body and self-auton-
omy.3 7 As early as 1891 in the case of Union Pacific R.R. v. Botsford,38
the Court first recognized the privacy interest as the right of "every
31. Id. at 48, 355 A.2d at 668.
32. Id. at 47, 355 A.2d at 667.
33. Id. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663; see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
484 (1965) (concluding that the penumbra of the first, third, fourth and fifth amend-
ments protects privacy).
34. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (a narrow holding
stressing the constitutional interest in the privacy of the home).
35. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
36. 70 N.J. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663.
37. See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 219 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(another abortion decision based on the theory of the right of privacy).
38. 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
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individual to the possession and control of his own person."'39 The right
to be left alone as mentioned in the 1969 Supreme Court decision of
Stanley v. Georgia40 appears to extend this concept. Even Justice Car-
dozo as early as 1914 stated that "every human being of adult years
and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his
own body .... "41
Each individual's inalienable right to self-determination was ex-
tended into the medical field as the tort doctrine of informed consent.42
This doctrine requires that a patient must give consent to any medical
procedure after the risks, alternatives and nature of the treatment have
been explained. Medical malpractice suits have been initiated under va-
rious theories, such as assault, battery, negligence or trespass, but the
patient's right to bodily control remains the basis of informed consent.
According to this premise, even if an individual makes decisions irra-
tionally or incorrectly, he must nonetheless be permitted the right of
choice. This is also known as the common-law right to be free from
bodily invasion which is essentially a matter of private concern beyond
the reach of the courts.
Consequently, the constitutionally based right of privacy and the
recognized common-law right to be free of bodily invasion support a
strong argument for allowing patients to assert their choice of the time
of death in a natural manner without unwanted medical intervention.
However, courts have not yet recognized an absolute right to discon-
tinue life support systems. There is a limitation on such conduct if it is
outweighed by public policy considerations. Courts use a traditional
balancing test. If the state's interest in protecting its citizens outweighs
the individual's fundamental right to privacy, the state may be able to
deny that right. In Superintendent of Belchertown State Schools v.
Saikewicz4 3 the court enumerated and considered the following four
state interests:
(1) the preservation of life;
(2) the protection of innocent third parties;
(3) the prevention of suicide; and
39. Id. at 251.
40. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). See supra note 34.
41. Scholendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E.
92, 93 (1914).
42. See generally Cantor, A Patient's Decision to Decline Life-Saving Medical
Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus the Preservation of Life, 26 RUTGERS L. REv. 228-
64 (1973).
43. 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
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(4) the maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical
profession.44
The preservation of life is the most important of the state's inter-
ests. But courts afford it less weight when there is no reasonable possi-
bility that the patient will return to a cognitive and sapient condition.
As noted in Quinlan: "We think that the state's interests contra weak-
ens and the individual's right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily
invasion increases and the prognosis dims. Ultimately, there comes a
point at which the individual's rights overcome the state interest." '45
This emphasis on the quality of life is at the heart of these decisions. A
terminally ill comatose patient often no longer has a life he would wish
to prolong. Accordingly, as in Saikewicz, the courts should distinguish
between an artificially maintained vegetative life and a valuable, cura-
ble life.46
Joseph Saikewicz was a profoundly retarded sixty-seven year old
patient afflicted with terminal, incurable leukemia. The court allowed
his guardian to refuse the use of chemotherapy as in his best interests,
since the disease was invariably fatal and treatment would cause signif-
icant side effects and discomfort.47 The court distinguished between
curing the ill and comforting the dying:
The essence of this distinction in defining the medical role is to
draw the sometimes subtle distinction between those situations in
which the withholding of extraordinary measures may be viewed as
allowing the disease to take its natural course and those in which
the same actions may be deemed to have been the cause of death.48
B. The Physician's Liability
Any physician making a decision to terminate medical treatment
faces the possibility of criminal and civil liability. The two doctrines
which are applicable to the physician's liability are informed consent 49
and standard of care. Without consent, a medical treatment or opera-
44. Id. at 425.
45. 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664 (emphasis original).
46. 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
47. Id. at 729-30, 370 N.E.2d at 420. This is the case most often quoted in
support of a requirement of judicial intervention.
48. Id. at 738, 370 N.E.2d at 423.
49. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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tion can be a technical battery, even if the results are satisfactory.50
The standard of care doctrine requires that a physician use "that skill,
knowledge, and training possessed by an average member of the profes-
sion in the same or similar locality."51
There is little precedent on the subject of criminal liability when
medical treatment has been terminated without judicial approval. It
appears that a physician will be protected as long as he uses good faith
judgment that is not unreasonable by medical standards.52 Although
the possibility of criminal actions against doctors is a deterrent to prac-
ticing good medicine, it should be noted that there are relatively few
prosecutions and virtually no convictions under these circumstances. 53
Juries often return verdicts of not guilty in recognition of the humanity
of ending treatment, although the letter of the law may be clearly
different.
This discrepancy between the written law, which considers with-
drawal of treatment illegal, and the reality of what courts and juries
actually do, leaves the medical practitioner in a quandary. 54 Physicians
are often forced to practice defensive medicine, ordering unnecessary
diagnostic tests or superfluous treatment simply to avoid legal liability.
As a result, terminal, comatose patients are often left in a virtual state
of suspended animation, held on the threshold of death by modern
machines.
C. Living Wills
It should be noted that twenty-two states have enacted natural
death legislation 55 which in essence legalizes passive euthanasia if there
is a properly executed living will. 56 As admirable as the concept of liv-
50. See generally Comment, Euthanasia: The Physician's Liability, 10 J. MAR.
J. PRAC. & PROC. 148 (1976).
51. Ward, supra note 14, at 322.
52. See Collester, Death, Dying and the Law: A Prosecutorial View of the Quin-
lan Case, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 304, 310-11 (1977).
53. See generally Foreman, The Physician's Criminal Liability for the Practice
of Euthanasia, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 54-61 (1975).
54. See generally Note, In re Storar: Euthanasia for Incompetent Patients, A
Proposed Model, 3 PACE L. REV. 351-74 (1983).
55. Tifft, Debate on the Boundary of Life, TIME, April 11, 1983 at 70; see also
Flaherty, A Right to Die?, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 14, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
56. A living will is "a document, similar to a will, executed by a person during
his lifetime setting forth his wishes concerning medical treatment in contemplation of
illness or death." Note, In re Living Will, 5 NOVA L. J. 445 (1981).
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ing wills may be, however, even its proponents acknowledge that only
the most motivated of individuals are likely to take the anticipatory
step of preparing such a document.57 It is typical human nature to pro-
crastinate and ignore the need for such arrangements. Therefore, the
vast majority of difficult decisions involving terminating treatment will
not have the advantage of a written directive to help guide the
physician.
III. Recent Case Law
The courts in several states have been extremely active in recent
years in handling medical decisionmaking cases. Many courts have
taken new approaches and suggested rational and practical guidelines
for terminating treatment. These guidelines provide caregivers and
families of irreversibly ill patients some reassurance as to the propriety
and legality of their decisions concerning discontinuation of medical
treatment.
A. Barber v. Superior Court
The preceding background material on how termination of treat-
ment cases have been handled in the past can be compared with the
recent enlightened decision handed down in the case of Barber v. Supe-
rior Court.5 8 The California Court of Appeals dismissed murder
charges against two doctors who had removed the feeding tubes from
fifty-five year old Clarence Herbert, a man severely brain-damaged fol-
lowing routine abdominal surgery. After general anesthesia during an
operation to remove a colostomy bag, Mr. Herbert suffered a cardi-
opulmonary arrest in the recovery room. Attempts to resuscitate him
were successful only to the point of leaving him permanently brain-
damaged and in a coma.5" His family insisted on removal of all life
support devices, including IVs and nasogastric feeding tubes, stressing
that Mr. Herbert had clearly stated before surgery that he did not
want to be kept artificially alive.
After consultation with the family and in compliance with the
57. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1016, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
58. Id. at 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 484 (1983). Los Angeles County District At-
torney Robert Philibosian, in a brief to the California Supreme Court, asked them to
decertify the case. Reaves, Cutting Off the IV, 70 A.B.A. J. 31 (Feb. 1984).
59. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1010, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
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family's wishes, the physicians found themselves embroiled in a dra-
matic precedent-setting medicolegal episode when charged with murder
by Los Angeles prosecutors.6" The court of appeals acknowledged that
this case belies the commonly expressed belief that such decisions
would most likely not become the subject of criminal prosecution. 61
Many physicians in private consultation with families of hopeless pa-
tients routinely withdraw IV and nasogastric tube nourishment. The
case of Clarence Herbert appears to be the first instance of a criminal
prosecution for the medical decision of removing life-sustaining
equipment.62
The appeals court reviewed the superior court finding that al-
though the doctor's conduct was well motivated, ethical, and sound in
the eyes of the medical profession, it was unlawful under California
law. 63 The court also defined the concepts of excusable or justifiable
homicide, stating that they "evolved and were codified at a time well
prior to the development of the modern medical technology which is
involved here, which technology has caused our society to rethink its
concepts of what constitutes 'life' and 'death' ".64 The Barber prosecu-
tion resulted from the gap between the statutory law and recent medi-
cal developments. In discussing this gap between technology and the
law, the court clearly was aware that extremely personal and painful
decisions concerning terminally ill patients are made even more difficult
because of the lack of clear legal guidelines.6 5
The Barber court recognized that although Clarence Herbert was
not brain dead, the physician was left with the responsibility of al-
lowing him to remain in a vegetative state without higher cognitive
brain functions. 6 Similarly, the Delaware Supreme Court in a 1980
case67 recognized the physician's dilemma and stated the issue:
60. Reaves, supra note 56 at 31.
61. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1014, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
62. Id. at 1015, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 488. Prior to the Barber case, courts were
usually involved merely for the purpose of obtaining declaratory judgments or guide-
lines for hospitals and physicians to follow before ending treatment, and not in a crimi-
nal context.
63. Id. at 1012, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 487.
64. Id. at 1013, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 487.
65. Id. at 1015, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
66. Id. at 1014, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
67. Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980);
Mr. Herlihy, attorney for Mr. Severns, originally asked for a court order to remove the
fifty-seven year old Mrs. Severns from the respirator and artificial feeding, but the
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Now, however, we are on the threshold of new terrain-the penum-
bra where death begins but life, in some form, continues. We have
been led to it by the medical miracles which now compel us to
distinguish between "death" as we have known it, and death in
which the body lives in some fashion but the brain (or a significant
part of it) does not.68
1. IVs and Nasogastric Feeding Tubes
As the issue of removing hydration and nourishment is sure to
arise in the future, the Barber opinion will likely be quoted as the first
ever to compare the removal of IVs and feeding tubes as being similar
to the removal of respirators. Prior to Barber no court had ever specifi-
cally allowed the removal of IVs and artificial feeding devices. This was
a very important comparison, reflecting the court's view that there is no
morally relevant distinction between the two forms of mechanical
devices.
In examining this issue we must keep in mind that the life-sus-
taining technology involved in this case is not traditional treatment
in that it is not being used to directly cure or even address the
pathological condition. It merely sustains biological functions in or-
der to gain time to permit other processes to address the pathology.
The question presented by this modern technology is, once under-
taken, at what point does it cease to perform its intended function
and who should have the authority to decide that any further pro-
longation of the dying process is of no benefit to either the patient
or his family? 9
The result of the Barber decision was that the surgeon and the
request was later amended to mean only the respirator. She was weaned from the respi-
rator in the five months it took the Delaware Supreme Court to reach a decision and
remains in a vegetative state in a nursing home. The reasons given for asking only that
the respirator be removed were first, the husband and family were somewhat queasy
about the artificial feeding request, and second, in discussion with the doctors involved
and the hospital, it was determined that the hospital personnel would have some diffi-
culty handling such a situation. Also, the attorney recognized that by asking for an end
to feeding, the decision would be going beyond Quinlan and would cause the case to be
considerably prolonged. Telephone interview with Thomas Herlihy III, attorney for
Mr. Severns (July 19, 1984).
68. Id. at 1344.
69. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1017, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
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internist would not have to go to trial for the death of Clarence Her-
bert because their medical decision, "though intentional and with
knowledge that the patient would die, was not an unlawful failure to
perform a legal duty. ' 70 The court did not consider the withdrawal of
heroic life support measures as an affirmative act, but rather an omis-
sion of further treatment.7' Once the treatment has been proven inef-
fective the physician no longer has a duty to continue it.72 This reason-
ing resolved the critical issue of determining the duties owed by a
physician to a patient who was extremely unlikely to have any mean-
ingful recovery of cognitive brain function. 73
In this monumental decision, the court touched on what is perhaps
the crux of the medical-legal-ethical dilemma involved. There is a psy-
chological burden inherent in the thought of, as opponents of the deci-
sion may put it, starving and dehydrating a patient to death. The court
was aware of "the emotional symbolism of providing food and water to
those incapable of providing for themselves. . . . Plainly, food and
water normally provide a net benefit to most patients most of the
time.75 Naturally, if there is any doubt as to the benefit provided, feed-
ing may be continued because of the usual moral standards and be-
cause food is symbolic of human life that is "inescapably social and
communal. ' 76 Treatment may be appropriate for most patients but not
be suitable in a particular case because of the burdens it would place
on the patient. In judging all forms of medical care, it seems proper to
determine whether the particular patient will derive a net benefit.
Since hospitals routinely remove respirators from hopeless patients
without fear of legal action, the court rationally extended the Quinlan
standards to artificial feeding in the same type of situation. Since air
provided by artificial means is allowed to be discontinued, the court
also allowed food provided by artificial means to be withdrawn. It has
been noted that this decision was the natural culmination of this is-
70. Id. at 1022, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
71. Id. at 1016, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
72. Id. at 1017, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
73. Id. at 1017, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
74. Id. at 1016, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
75. See Brief for Amicus Curiae, Commissioners and Professional Staff of the
Recent President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and
Biomedical and Behavioral Research at 19, In re Conroy, 190 N.J. Super. 453, 464
A.2d 303 (1983), rev'd, - N.J. - (1985) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Amicus
Curiae].
76. Callahan, On Feeding the Dying, 13 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 22 (Oct. 1983).
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sue.71 For years, much of society has accepted this point of view as
proper. Although it may offend many people to dehydrate a patient, the
Barber decision appears to be the natural evolution in the law. The
Barber case appears to reflect the feeling that "[w]here a terminally ill
patient's coma is beyond doubt irreversible and there are adequate
safeguards to confirm the accuracy of the diagnosis, all means of life
support may be discontinued."7
The Barber decision could have a tremendous impact on the body
of case law that allows treatment to be terminated and may relieve
some physicians from having their conduct viewed in a criminal con-
text. It is important to recognize that life support decisions are essen-
tially medical determinations with facts unique to each. As far back as
the Quinlan case, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated:
[T]here must be a way to free physicians, in the pursuit of their
healing vocation, from possible contamination by self-interest or
self-protection concerns which would inhibit their independent
medical judgments for the well-being of their dying patients. We
would hope that this opinion might be serviceable to some degree
in ameliorating the professional problems under discussion.19
2. Barber's Guidelines for Future Conduct
The landmark case of Clarence Herbert may give families and
physicians of terminal patients additional reassurance in their decision-
making. While noting that the legislature is better suited for adopting
specific procedural rules, the court laid down "general guidelines for
future conduct." 80
Three difficult determinations to be made in each case were enu-
merated as follows:
(1) the point at which further treatment will be of no reasonable
benefit to the patient;
(2) who should have the power to make that decision; and
77. See Reaves, supra note 56, at 31. Barry Silberman, a Los Angeles attorney,
has written several articles on this issue.
78. In re Conroy, 190 N.J. Super. 453, 463, 464 A.2d 303, 313 (1983), rev'd, -
N.J. - (1985) (citing AMERICAN MEDICAL AssoCIATION'S COUNCIL ON JUDICIAL
OPINIONS 2.11 (Jan. 10, 1981)).
79. 70 N.J. at 49, 355 A.2d at 668.
80. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1019, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
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(3) who should have the authority to direct termination of
treatment.8'
3. Proportionate Treatment
In discussing the issue of which life-prolonging procedures must be
used and for how long, the Barber court rejected the ordinary versus
extraordinary treatment approach.82 Instead the court suggested it
would be more rational to determine whether the proposed treatment is
proportionate to "the benefits to be gained versus the burdens
caused."'83 It defined proportionate treatment as that which "has at
least a reasonable chance of providing benefits to the patient, which
benefits outweigh the burdens attendant to the treatment."84 Although
an IV or feeding tube may be minimally painful and not as intrusive as
a respirator, if there is no chance of recovery, the treatment is dispro-
portionate to the potential benefits.
Whether treatment is worth enduring depends on facts unique to
each case. The Barber court follows the Quinlan standard that "the
focal point of decision should be the prognosis as to the reasonable pos-
sibility of return to cognitive and sapient life, as distinguished from the
forced continuance of [a] biological vegetative existence. . . ."85 If a
patient has virtually no chance of recovery and the medical consensus
is that he will remain in a chronic vegetative state, then there appears
little reason to force continued IV hydration or nasogastric tube feed-
ing, especially since the law permits a respirator to be removed without
controversy. Courts in various jurisdictions continue to distinguish be-
tween artificially sustained vegetative existence and cognitive existence.
Cognitive existence is the state of being able to communicate, think,
feel, express emotions, and relate to one's surroundings.86 In other
words prolonging life does not mean merely suspending an inevitable
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1020, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491; see also President's Commission for the
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, De-
ciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment, A Report on the Ethical, Medical and
Legal Issues in Treatment Decisions (Mar. 1983) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSIO N]. This Commission reported on an array of bioethical topics and issued
eleven reports addressing issues of medical practice and public policy.
85. 70 N.J. at 51, 355 A.2d at 669.
86. See infra note 95.
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death, but would at least hope to provide "a remission of symptoms
enabling a return towards a normal, functioning, integrated
existence.""7
4. Substituted Judgment and Best Interests Standards
The second issue the Barber court addressed was who should make
the decision to end treatment. The patient, of course, should make the
decision when possible. However, the most controversial cases involve
patients incapable of such decisionmaking. Appropriate decisionmaking
in the medical field is aided by judicial recognition of two legal stan-
dards when dealing with incapacitated patients. These are substituted
judgment and best interests.88 The substituted judgment standard al-
lows a surrogate decisionmaker to make a choice that as closely as pos-
sible reflects the desires of the incapacitated person. The best interests
standard is used when there is no evidence of what the patient would
want. The latter is more of an objective criteria than the former. The
substituted judgment standard reflects the incapacitated patient's indi-
vidual wishes. Any concrete evidence of prior conversations or expres-
sions of opinion as to what the patient would want should be consid-
ered. Arguably, examining a patient's earlier stated preferences should
be morally and legally necessary, and honoring the person's preference
should be a clear obligation. Only when a patient's preferences are un-
known should it be left to the surrogate decisionmaker to make the
decision that serves the patient's best interests. The decision should
take into account the interest in sustaining life, the relief of suffering,
possible side effects of continued treatment, as well as the quality of
life.89
5. Who has Authority to Make the Decision
The final issue addressed by the Barber court was the necessity of
judicial intervention in these cases. The court's conclusion was that it is
unnecessary and unwise to require prior judicial approval before with-
87. In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 470, 380 N.E.2d 134, 138 (1978).
This decision went to the issue of whether it was proper to withhold resuscitation from
an elderly, terminally ill patient, without judicial approval. It permitted a no code order
by the attending physician which directs the hospital personnel not to use extraordinary
measures to resuscitate a patient in cardiac or respiratory arrest.
88. PRESIDENT'S CoMMIssIoN, supra note 84, at 134.
89. Id. at 135.
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drawing treatment. On this issue Barber again agreed with the Quinlan
court: "We consider that a practice of applying to a court to confirm
such decisions would generally be inappropriate, not only because that
would be a gratuitous encroachment upon the medical profession's field
of competence, but because it would be impossibly cumbersome." 90 In
other words, the courts discourage routine requests to the judiciary on
these decisions. The judicial system does remain available in controver-
sies where there is family disagreement over the incompetent's wishes
or the physicians disagree as to the prognosis. A court may intervene if
malpractice or wrongful motives are in evidence. Thus, the court sys-
tem is a final safeguard.
B. In Re Colyer9'
Another recent decision, In re Colyer, examined the roles of
guardians, physicians and courts, in these treatment decisions. Recog-
nizing that determining a particular patient's prognosis is a medical
decision, the Washington Supreme Court's suggestion is that a progno-
sis board should confirm the attending physician's diagnosis.92 This pro-
cedure would provide protection against those who possibly may be mo-
tivated by other interests, such as an inheritance. The vast majority of
physicians take their professional oaths seriously and consider their pa-
tients' interests above all others'. The Quinlan court was the first to
address the issue of possible impropriety in medical decision making
and recommended formation of a hospital ethics committee. Such a
group is composed of doctors, attorneys, social workers and theologians.
The purpose of such a diverse selection is to allow the responsibility for
such a momentous decision to be spread over a large component of so-
ciety with divergent views. The Quinlan court held that if the recom-
mendations of such a committee are followed, no civil or criminal lia-
bility would ensue.
The Colyer court agreed with others who have criticized such an
ethics committee "for its amorphous character, for its use of nonmedi-
cal personnel to reach a medical decision, and for its bureaucratic in-
90. 70 N.J. at 50, 355 A.2d at 669.
91. 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983). It should be noted that all these
courts take the view that the legislature is better suited to establish these guidelines,
but that in the absence of such guidance, the judiciary does suggest procedures to be
followed.
92. Id. at 134, 660 P.2d 749.
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termeddling. ' '9 3 It felt that a prognosis board composed of professional
colleagues who have an understanding of the patient's medical condi-
tion would be adequate protection "against erroneous diagnoses as well
as questionable motives." '94 A unanimous concurrence that the patient
cannot return to a sapient state within any reasonable medical
probability is sufficient to allow discontinuance of life-prolonging
treatment.
95
As to the potential criminal liability for such conduct, as long as
there is good faith compliance with the court's suggested procedure, the
action would not be criminal.96 The Quinlan court gave two reasons for
not considering an ensuing death homicide. First, death would be from
existing natural causes, not from stopping the treatment. Second, it
would not be unlawful even if it were homicide because "the action
would be based on the exercise of a constitutional right and, as such,
would be protected from criminal prosecution. 9 7
93. Id. Sixty-nine year old Bertha Colyer had a zero chance of returning to any
meaningful existence after a heart attack resulting in massive brain damage. She had a
close family familiar with her beliefs and character.
While we do not accept the Quinlan court's view that judicial intervention
is an encroachment upon the medical profession, we do perceive the judi-
cial process as an unresponsive and cumbersome mechanism for decisions
of this nature. This fact is borne out by a number of the leading cases in
which arguments were heard and opinions written long after the patient
had died. (Citations omitted). Obviously, the court system could not re-
spond in a timely manner to the relief sought in those situations. More-
over, the formalities of a legal determination might chill a guardian's re-
solve to assert the rights of his ward.
Id. at 127, 660 P.2d at 746.
94. Id. at 138, 660 P.2d at 749.
95. An expert witness, Dr. Fred Plum, at the Quinlan trial explained vegetative
and sapient brain function:
We have an internal vegetative regulation which controls body tempera-
ture, which controls breathing, which controls to a considerable degree
blood pressure, which controls to some degree heart rate, which controls
chewing, swallowing and which controls sleeping and waking. We have a
more highly developed brain which is uniquely human which controls our
relation to the outside world, our capacity to talk, to see, to feel, to sing, to
think.
Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 24, 355 A.2d at 654.
96. Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 138, 660 P.2d at 751.
97. Id.
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C. In Re Conroy9
The New Jersey Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of
appropriate guidelines for stopping artificial feeding in the case of In re
Conroy. Conroy involved another patient who died before a final deci-
sion was handed down. Conroy was in a nursing home suffering from
severe organic brain syndrome, necrotic decubitus ulcers, urinary tract
infection, arteriosclerotic heart disease, diabetes and hypertension. 9
The New Jersey Superior Court originally held that nasogastric tube
feeding could be stopped, at her nephew's request, after determining
that Conroy "had no cognitive or volitional functioning."'100 The state
won a stay of the order from the appellate court. With the nasogastric
tube still in place, Conroy died of natural causes two weeks later.
Although Claire Conroy had already died, making the conflict
merely hypothetical, the appellate court concluded that the issues
should be resolved because of their great public importance. Even when
patients have died, courts consistently agree to decide terminally ill pa-
tients' rights to refuse life-sustaining treatment.101 The Conroy court
decided that since the issues involved are recurring, yet typically avoid
review because of the patient's death, the case should continue; other-
wise, future parties of interest would have no guidance. 102
The New Jersey Superior Court would not have allowed the artifi-
cial feeding to be stopped because they concluded that Claire Conroy
was not comatose, not facing imminent death, nor in a chronic vegeta-
tive state.10 3 They interpreted the medical testimony to hold that since
Conroy was sapient, the state's interest in preserving life was substan-
tial and overrode the patient's right to privacy. This court distinguished
her from the Quinlan case by pointing out that she was not subject to
twenty-four hour intensive nursing care and not maintained on any
mechanical devices. The fact that Conroy was awake but very confused
98. Conroy, 190 N.J. Super. 453, 464 A.2d 303 (1983), rev'd, - N.J. - (1985).
99. Organic brain syndrome is manifested by disorientation, intellectual and
memory impairment and unstable emotional response. 1 SCHMIDT'S ATTORNEYS' Dic-
TIONARY OF MEDICINE B-99 (17th ed. 1984). It is not the same as senile dementia,
which is "[a] chronic brain disorder caused by organic (structural) changes, associated
with old age." 3 id. at S-65.
100. In re Conroy, 188 N.J. Super. 523, 524, 457 A.2d 1232, 1233 (1983).
101. Conroy, 190-N.J. Super. at 456, 464 A.2d at 306.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 459, 464 A.2d at 309.
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was determinative.104 She was a substantially different type of patient
from the asleep, vegetative Quinlan. The court would, however, more
likely have allowed termination of treatment had Conroy been incur-
able and terminally ill, brain dead, comatose or vegetative.
The court pointed out that withholding artificial feeding under
Conroy's circumstances would violate general ethical precepts. In re-
viewing both sides of the ethical debate, the court noted, "[t]here is
substantial disagreement among ethicists whether the provision of food
and water should ever be considered extraordinary treatment. . . .To
some, the natural and ordinary quality of feeding dictates that it should
never be withdrawn.' 0 5 U.S. Surgeon General C. Everett Koop holds a
similar view: "Withholding fluids or nourishment at any time is an im-
moral act."' 0 6 Others feel that if the patient is hopeless the "burden of
continued feeding is disproportionate to the benefit it will effect.'1 0 7
The appeals court expressly declined to resolve that particular issue,
however, and the New Jersey Supreme Court decision in early 1985
provided specific guidelines which help to clarify the issue.
After discussing general ethical concepts, the Conroy appellate
court then looked to the medical ethics involved. The Hippocratic Oath
provides that the physician's main obligation is never to harm any-
one.10 8 The Conroy court was convinced that removing the feeding tube
would violate medical ethics as well as general ethics, since active eu-
thanasia has always been considered unethical. 0 9 In Conroy's situation,
since she was not comatose, the appeals court felt that nourishment was
an essential element of ordinary care which her physicians were ethi-
cally obligated to provide."10
The appeals court concluded that removing the feeding tube under
Conroy's circumstances amounted to active euthanasia rather than the
generally accepted passive euthanasia. The court was concerned that
Conroy would die from dehydration and starvation rather than from
104. Id. at 460, 464 A.2d at 310.
105. Id. at 463, 464 A.2d at 313.
106. Tifft, Debate on the Boundary of Life, TIME, April 11, 1983 at 68, 69.
107. Conroy, 190 N.J. Super. at 463, 464 A.2d at 313.
108. The Hippocratic Oath, the ethical guide of the medical profession, states: "I
will prescribe regimen for the good of my patients according to my ability and my
judgment and never do harm to anyone. To please no one will I prescribe a deadly
drug, nor give advice which may cause his death ... " DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 715 (25th ed. 1974).
109. Conroy, 190 N.J. Super. at 464, 464 A.2d at 314.
110. Id.
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her existing medical condition.11 The New Jersey Supreme Court re-
cently reversed the appellate court and clarified the issue so that fami-
lies and physicians can have some reassurance that their decisions will
not result in criminal or civil liability.
IV. Proposals
The Barber decision in California was an important step in clarify-
ing the law on terminating artificial feeding. When the New Jersey
Supreme Court decided the issue in Conroy it provided needed guid-
ance to families and physicians. 1 By reversing the appellate court's
decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court now allows life-sustaining
treatment to be withdrawn or withheld when it is clear that the patient
would have refused the treatment. Since there is so little legal prece-
dent in this narrow body of case law, many patients in other jurisdic-
tions will be affected by the legal implications of this decision.
The crux of the problem lies in allowing courts to establish general
standards for all patients, when, arguably decisions should be made
based on facts unique to each case, preferably within the patient-physi-
cian-family unit. Medical intervention is normally allowed when it will
improve the patient's well-being, but the benefits and burdens such
treatment will afford must be judged depending on the individual pa-
tient's values and goals, and not on a court's holding that establishes as
a matter of law that artificial feeding always provides a substantial
benefit." 3
Allowing treatment to be stopped when the patient is unlikely to
gain any medical benefit from continued treatment is a less restrictive
and more satisfactory legal standard." 4 A treatment appropriate for
most patients may be unsuitable in an individual case where it imposes
unbearable burdens. 115 Courts should not be relied on to make actual
treatment decisions. This often turns out to be the case when there are
misunderstandings about what procedures are correct. Since the judi-
cial route tends to be time-consuming and costly these medical deci-
sions should remain the responsibility of physicians and family. It
should be made clear that medical treatment should be judged by
!11. Id. at 465, 464 A.2d at 315.
112. Id. at 456, 464 A.2d at 306.
113. Id. at 478, 464 A.2d at 314.
114. Id. at 466, 464 A.2d at 310.
15. See Brief for Amicus Curiae supra note.75, at 21.
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whether a particular patient will benefit from it.
Medical decision-making often involves caregivers and surrogates
acting on behalf of incapacitated patients. Collaboration between at-
tending physician and family, in advancing the patient's best interests,
will eliminate the risks of self-interest and superficiality which some-
times occur. If a decision is made based on full informdtion and delib-
eration, carelessness and discriminatory behavior are less likely to
occur.
Because recourse to courts as a routine matter is unduly cumber-
some, institutional ethics committees can still play an important role in
the decision-making process. These committees can review each case in
a less expensive and more suitable setting. Institutional ethics commit-
tees can act more quickly than the courts; however, the committees
may still refer to the courts when intractable disagreement occurs.
Even when the committee refers the matter to the judicial process, the
court should rely on the ethics committee's full report, enabling the
court to make an informed decision which is less subject to error and
less expensive. Of course, the court's decision should still be limited to
a question of fact whether the treatment accomplishes a medical
benefit.
The judiciary has proposed many suggestions and guidelines in the
years since the landmark Quinlan decision. Because of these evolving
legal and medical standards, attorneys and physicians need to be aware
of legal precedent as it exists today. In many states only lower court
opinions exist and often are in conflict with those of other jurisdic-
tions." 6 Courts should address this pressing medico-legal problem by
delegating responsibility to the patient-doctor-family unit.1 7 Thus,
116. D. MEYERS, MEDICO-LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF DEATH AND DYING 5
(1981).
117. The American Medical Association Judicial Council believes that courts or
legislatures may not provide the best forums for discussion of issues of euthanasia or
terminal illness. It recommends the following standard:
(1) The intentional termination of the life of one human being by an-
other-mercy killing or euthanasia-is contrary to public policy, medical
tradition, and the most fundamental measures of human value and worth.
(2) The cessation of the employment of extraordinary means to prolong
the life of the body when there is irrefutable evidence that biological death
is imminent is the decision of the patient and/or his immediate family
and/or his lawful representative, acting in the patient's best interest.
(3) The advice and judgment of the physician or physicians involved
should be readily available to the patient and/or his immediate family
and/or his lawful representative in all such situations.
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courts would be relieved from making life-and-death decisions more ra-
tionally left to the medical realm. The inconsistency of the various
courts' approaches, understandable since euthanasia is such a complex
issue, points out the necessity for allowing physicians, patients and
families to use their own discretion in termination of treatment
decisions.
If courts set forth principled standards, it would ensure that health
care professionals and families would be responsible for acting accord-
ing to the patient's desires, if known, otherwise in the patient's best
interests. The courts should also substantially defer to careful decisions
made in accordance with such standards.
Mary Stetson Lingerfeldt
(4) No physician, other licensed health care providers, or hospital should
be civilly or criminally liable for taking any action pursuant to these guide-
lines, nor should there be any criminal or civil penalties of any sort im-
posed for conduct pursuant to these guidelines.
(5) Except as stated above, all matters not in the public domain relating to
a patient's terminal illness are the private right of the patient and are pro-
tected from public scrutiny by the privacy and confidentiality of the physi-
cian-patient relationship.
Conroy, 190 N.J. Super. at 465, 464 A.2d at 315 (citing AMERICAN MEDICAL ASS'N
JUDICIAL COUNCIL, OPINIONS AND REPORTS 5.17 (1979)).
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Recovery for Lost Parental Consortium: Nightmare or
Breakthrough?
I. Introduction
Loss of parental consortium is a cause of action which allows a
child to recover damages against third parties who tortiously injure a
child's parent.' Specifically, it provides a method of recovery for loss of
parental "care, comfort, society and . . . companionship."2 The child's
recovery for loss of parental consortium is distinct from the parent's
recovery of lost wages which already provides for the child's economic
losses, such as food, clothing and shelter. The parent's recovery from
the same tortfeasor replaces the money the parent would have earned
and used to support his child.
In 1976, the Florida Second District Court of Appeal declined to
recognize a child's right to recover for lost parental consortium in
Clark v. Suncoast Hospital, Inc.3 In 1979, and again in 1982, the
Third District Court of Appeal issued per curiam decisions, following
Clark without analysis.4 In 1984, however, the Fifth District Court of
Appeal, recognizing the signs of changing societal needs, and the be-
ginnings of a trend, broke new ground in Florida by permitting a child
to recover for lost parental consortium in Rosen by and through Rosen
v. Zorzos.5 The Rosen Court certified its decision to the Florida Su-
preme Court since it is in direct conflict with the Clark decision.6 The
Supreme Court has the opportunity to settle the conflict currently ex-
isting among the districts.
This note presents a general history of a child's right to recover for
1. See, e.g., Rosen by and through Rosen v. Zorzos, 449 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
2. Id. at 360.
3. 338 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
4. Fayden v. Guerrero, 420 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Ramirez v.
Comm'l Union Ins. Co., 369 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
5. 449 So. 2d at 359.
6. The Florida Supreme Court has discretionary jurisdiction to review a district
court decision "that is certified by it to be in direct conflict with a decision of another
district court of appeal." FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(4).
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lost parental consortium in the United States, in general, and Florida
in particular. The note traces the development of other relevant Florida
law as a comparison. Finally, the article will review the arguments for
and against acceptance of the derivative action which were raised in
Clark and Rosen.7
II. Historical Development of Children's Rights
In 1894, a child named Mary Ellen8 lived in New York City. Her
mother and father had beaten and starved Mary Ellen routinely. An
interested social worker tried to protect the child but found there were
no laws against child abuse. The social worker's compassion inspired
her to find a way to protect the right of the child from abuse. Appalled
that New York City protected its dogs and cats better than its children,
the social worker went to the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals for help. She convinced the Society that children are a specie
of animal and Mary Ellen, a child, was entitled to protection as an
animal from cruelty and abuse. The state successfully prosecuted the
parents under then existing cruelty to animals laws. Subsequent public-
ity prompted the enactment of child abuse laws throughout the coun-
try.9 However, it was the court, not the legislature, who protected little
7. In addition to the parties, amicus curiae briefs have been filed by the Florida
Defense Lawyers Asociation, the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers, and the Ameri-
can Trial Lawyers Association; Marjorie G. Graham, Post Office Drawer E, West
Palm Beach, Florida, 33402; Professor Michael L. Richmond, Nova University Center
for the Study of Law, 3100 S.W. Ninth Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 33315 (for
defendant/petitioner); Richard A. Kupfer, Esquire, Cone, Wagner, Nugent, Johnson,
Hazouri & Roth, Post Office Box 3466, West Palm Beach, Florida, 33402 (for AFTL);
Richard A. Kupfer; David S. Schrager, Esquire, co-counsel ATLA President, 17th
Floor, 810 Center Plaza, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 19103 (for ATLA).
8. See generally L. HOULGATE, THE CHILD & THE STATE xi (1980); Paulsen,
Legal Protections Against Child Abuse, 13 CHILDREN 42 (1966); B. GRUMET, THE
PLAINTIFFS: VICTIMS OF THE BATTERED CHILD SYNDROME, THE YOUNGEST MINORITY
I (S. Katz ed. 1974).
9. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 5101 (1978); FLA. STAT. § 415.501 (1983); see also
ALA. CODE § 26-14-2 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.010 (1979); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13.3552 (1978); 1983 ARK. ACTS § 42-807; CAL. [PENAL] CODE § 273a (Deer-
ing 1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-102 (1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-21 (1983);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 301 (1982); FLA. STAT. § 768.21 (1983); GA. CODE ANN. §
49-5 (1984); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 350 (1983); IDAHO CODE § 16-1601 (1983); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 23 § 2052 (Smith-Hurd 1983); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-11 (Burns
1984); IOWA CODE § 235 (1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38.716 (1981); KY. REV. STAT.
§ 405.030 (1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 403 (West 1984); ME. REV. STAT.
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Mary Ellen.
Common law did not recognize the legal rights of wives and chil-
dren as being on par with the rights of a man. The legal relationship
between parent and child was essentially that of servant to master."0 In
fact, a man's dominion over his family was so absolute that a woman
who killed her husband was not only subject to punishment for murder,
but also for petit treason."' Ancient Greek and Roman fathers had the
right to kill unwanted or defective children or to allow the children to
die from starvation or exposure by leaving them in a field or on a hill-
side.1 2 At the beginning of this century, a sixteen year old American
boy was sent to reform school for an infraction which would have re-
sulted in a twenty-five cents to one dollar fine if it had been committed
by an adult.'3 His crime was swearing at a church meeting.
Common law afforded no protection to children except as property
owned by the parents.' 4 Children owed their labor to their father.'6 A
child could not sue his parents for committing torts against the child.' 6
Parents had no statutory duty to support their children prior to the
ANN. tit. 15 § 3501 (1983); MD. [Crimes & Punishment] CODE ANN. § 35A (1983)
tit. 27; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119 § 1 (West 1984); MICH. COMP. LAWS §
722.561, (1984); MINN. STAT. § 260 (1984); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-15 (1983
Supp.); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.125 (Vernon 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3 (1984);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-707 (1977); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.501 (1983); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 169-C-2 (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN § 9:6-8.8 (West 1984); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 30-6-1 (1984); N.Y. (Soc. Serv.) LAW § 411 (McKinney 1983); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7A-542 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1 (1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2151.01 (Page 1983); OKLA STAT. tit. 21, § 843 (1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 418.740
(1983); 11 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2202 (Purdon 1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11
(1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-10 (Law Co-op. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §
26-10 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-402 (1983); TEX. (Fam.) CODE ANN. § 34.05
(Vernon 1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-19 (1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 1351
(1984); VA. CODE § 63.1-248 (1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.010 (1984); W.
VA. CODE 49-6 (1984); Wis. STAT. § 940.201 (1983); Wyo. STAT. § 14-3-201 (1978).
10. See, e.g., F. POLLOCK, EXPANSION OF THE COMMON LAW 150-51 (1904); T.
PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 545 (5th ed. 1956).
11. See F. POLLOCK, supra note 10, at 151.
12. See, e.g., B. GRUMET, supra note 8.
13. Roberts v. State, 82 Neb. 651, 118 N.W. 574 (1908).
14. See, e.g., Wilkie v. Roberts, 91 Fla. 1064, 109 So. 225 (1926).
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891); but see Ard v.
Ard, 414 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1982) and Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 471 P.2d 282
(1970), which propound the view that a parent may be liable to his children for negli-
gently-caused injuries.
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passing of the British Statute, 43rd Elizabeth Ch. 2."7 Similarly, mod-
ern parents have a right to the earnings of their minor children, and
can even sue to recover those earnings from third parties whose wrong-
ful conduct deprive them of the earnings."' Courts recognized a man's
right to sue third parties for wrongfully causing familial loss of consor-
tium as early as 1619 in England 9 and 1852 in America. 0 Society
thought that a man's right to his family's society and fellowship was so
important to his well-being that negligent or intentional interference
was actionable.
American courts first protected a wife's right to her husband's so-
ciety in 1950 in Hittafer v. Argonne Co.2 The Hittafer court allowed a
woman to recover against her husband's employer for negligently-in-
flicted injuries. In Hitaffer, the court merely applied standard negli-
gence and proximate cause tests in holding that an employer was liable
for a wife's loss of her husband's consortium when the husband was
injured by the employer's negligence.22 Gates v. Foley2" gave the Flor-
ida Supreme Court an opportunity to recognize the right of a woman to
recover for loss of her husband's consortium in 1971. Writing for an
unanimous court, Justice Adkins said, "[m]edieval concepts which have
no justification in our present society should be rejected. 24 With that
decision, Florida became the twenty-fifth state to recognize a wife's
right to recover for loss of her husband's consortium.25
17. See, e~g., Borchet v. Borchet, 185 Md. 586, 45 A.2d 463, 465 (1946); see
also I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *449.
18. See, e.g., Lessard v. Great Falls Woolen Co., 83 N.H. 576, 578, 145 A. 782,
784 (1929); Youngblood v. Taylor, 89 So. 2d 503, 506 (Fla. 1956); Wilkie, 91 Fla. at
1064, 109 So. at 225; Tucker v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co. of Shelby, Ohio, 343 So. 2d 1357
(Fla. 1977).
19. Hyde v. Scyssor, 79 Eng. Rep. 462 (1619).
20. See Fuller v. Naugatuk R. Co., 21 Conn. 557 (1852).
21. Hittafer, 87 App. D.C. at 57, 183 F.2d at 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950), overruled
on other grounds, Smither & Co. v. Coles, 100 App. D.C. 68, 242 F.2d 220, cert.
denied, 354 U.S. 914 (1957).
22. Id.
23. Gates, 247 So. 2d at 40 (Fla. 1971).
24. Id. at 44.
25. The cases which previously recognized the wife's cause of action are: Mis-
souri Pac. Transp. Co. v. Miller, 227 Ark. 351, 299 S.W.2d 41 (1957); Stenta v.
Leblang, 55 Del. 181, 185 A.2d 759 (1962); Brown v. Geo.-Tenn. Coaches, Inc., 88
Ga. App. 519, 77 S.E.2d 24 (1953); Nichols v. Sonneman, 91 Idaho 199, 418 P.2d 562
(1966); Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960); Troue v. Marker,
Inc., 252 N.E.2d 800 (Ind. 1969); Acuff v. Schmit, 248 Iowa 272, 78 N.W.2d 480
(1956); Kotsiris, v. Ling, 451 S.W.2d 411 (Ky. 1970); Deems v. Western Md. R. Co.,
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It was not until Yordon v. Savage" in 1973 that Florida recog-
nized that a wife's right to recover for loss of an injured minor child's
consortium applied equally to the husband's. There, the parents sued
for damages allegedly caused to their son by medical malpractice. The
defendant moved successfully to strike the mother from the plaintiffs'
complaint as an improper party. On direct appeal, the Florida Supreme
Court held that either or both parents had a cause of action for loss of
a child's consortium.2 7
Today, Florida law is beginning to recognize and protect the rights
of children in much the same way as the law developed rights for
women. Children have the right to freedom from abuse.2 8 They are pro-
tected by child labor laws. 9 They have the right to parental support.30
Florida children have a statutory right to counsel in juvenile proceed-
ings. 1 Florida has consistently recognized childrens' needs for nurtur-
ing, special care and sensitivity.32 Children also have the right to a free
public education. 33
Florida's legislature and its courts have expressly recognized that a
247 Md. 95, 231 A.2d 514 (1967); Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 101
N.W.2d 227 (1960); Thill v. Modern Erecting Co., 284 Minn. 508, 170 N.W.2d 865
(1969); Delta Chevrolet Company v. Waid, 211 Miss. 256, 51 So. 2d 443 (1951); No-
vak v. Kansas City Tr., 365 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. 1963); Duffy v. Lipsman-Fulkerson &
Co., 200 F.Supp. 71 (D. Mont. 1961); Cooney v. Moomaw, 109 F.Supp. 448 (D. Neb.
1953); Ekalo v. Constructive Serv. Corp. of America, 46 N.J. 82, 215 A.2d 1 (1965);
Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498, 239 N.E.2d 897, 293
N.Y.S.2d 305 (1968); Clem v. Brown, 3 Ohio Misc. 167, 32 Ohio Op. 2d 477,-207
N.E.2d 398 (1965); Ross v. Cuthbert, 239 Or. 429, 397 P.2d 529 (1964); Hayes v.
Swenson, Pa. 14 D. & C.2d 708 (1957); Mariani v. Nanni, 95 R.I. 153, 185 A.2d 119
(1962); Hoekstra v. Helgeland, 78 S.D. 82, 98 N.W.2d 669 (1959); Page v. Scaramozi,
288 S.W. 2d 909 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956); Moran v. Quality Aluminum Casting Co., 34
Wis. 2d 542, 150 N.W.2d 137 (1967).
26. 279 So. 2d at 846 (Fla. 1973).
27. The Yordon court adopted the Wilkie reasoning and held that loss of paren-
tal consortium includes medical, hospital and related expenditures, costs of caring for
the child, as well as loss of the child's companionship, society and services.
28. FLA. STAT. § 768.21 (1983); see generally supra note 9.
29. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 212 (1982); FLA. STAT. § 450 (1983).
30. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 742.031 (1983).
31. FLA. STAT. § 39.071 (1983); see also State ex rel Alton v. Conkling, 421 So.
2d 1108 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (construing FLA. STAT. § 39.071 (1979)).
32. FLA. STAT. § 39.04(2)(e)(4) (1983) (child's right to have criminal charges
transferred for adjudicatory proceedings as a child).
33. School Bd. of Orange County v. Blackford, 369 So. 2d 689 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct.
App. 1979).
1984]
188
Nova Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [1984], Art. 10
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol9/iss1/10
Nova Law Journal
child's need to have its parents' comfort, society and guidance to grow
into a healthy adult is "crucial."34 Obviously, the law cannot force par-
ents and their children to love each other. However, the beliefs ex-
pressed by the actions of the legislature and the courts clearly show
their recognition of the importance of such love.35 Furthermore, they
create a public policy which announces a desire to encourage family
strength and unity.36 Consequently, a spouse has a cause of action
against third parties for loss of consortium37 even though a spouse
could not get a mandatory injunction for love and affection or involun-
tary services. In addition, parents can sue third parties for tortiously
causing a loss of their children's services and consortium, even though
they cannot sue their child for a mandatory injunction to enforce such
right to services.38
III. Modern Law Developments
Tnere are more laws oday .than ever before which recognize and
protect children's rights.39 Every state has laws against child abuse.4 0
Nevertheless, twenty-nine states have not even considered the issue of
whether a child should have the right to recover for lost parental con-.
sortium against third parties.4 Seventeen states have refused to recog-
nize a child's right to recover for tortiously caused loss of his parents'
34. Finn v. Finn, 312 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1975). FLA. STAT. § 23.131 (1983).
The Legislature finds and declares that the early childhood years are cru-
cial to the mental, physical and emotional development of children, and
that the experiences of early childhood years are highly significant with
respect to later development, including educational and vocational success.
The Legislature further recognizes the primary role and responsibility of
the family for the development of children and the importance of strength-
ening the family members' abilities to foster the development of young
children . ..
FLA. STAT. § 23.131 (1983).
35. See supra note 34.
36. See supra note 34.
37. See, e.g., Gates, 247 So. 2d 40.
38. See, e.g., Fox v. City of West Palm Beach, 383 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1967).
39. See generally supra note 9.
40. Id.
41. States which have not yet decided the issue are: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas,
Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Ver-
mont, Virginia, West Virginia and Wyoming.
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consortium.42 The District of Columbia also refused to recognize the
child's right based on statutes which have since been repealed.4 3 An
Iowa court recognized the cause of action," but the Iowa decision was
later overruled in Audubon-Exira Ready Mix, Inc. v. Ill. Central Gulf
R.R. Co.45 As a result of statutory construction, the Audubon court
decided that the Iowa legislature already granted the right.4" The Iowa
court did not disturb the reasoning of its previous case, however. Iowa
now recognizes the cause of action as a derivative, but not an indepen-
dent, cause of action. Federal courts sitting in Alaska,47 Nebraska48
and South Carolina4" rejected the cause of action, but none of the state
courts in those states have specifically addressed the issue. In each of
those three states, the Federal courts presumed that those states would
probably reject the cause of action if they had to address the issue.50
42. Turner v. Atlantic Ry. Co., 159 F.Supp. 590 (N.D. Ga. 1958); Jeune v. Dell
E. Webb Construction Co., 77 Ariz. 226, 269 P.2d 723 (1954), overruled on other
grounds, 108 Ariz. 580, 503 P.2d 803 (1972); Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19
Cal.3d 441, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302, 563 P.2d 858 (1977); Hinde v. Butler, 35 Conn. Supp.
292, 408 A.2d 668 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1979); W.J. Bremer, Co., Inc. v. Graham, 169
Ga. App. 115, 312 S.E.2d 806 (1984), cert. denied, 312 S.E.2d 787; Halberg v. Young,
41 Hawaii 634 (1957); Koskela v. Martin, 91 Ill. App. 3d 568, 414 N.E.2d 1148
(1980); Schmeck v. City of Shawnee, 647 P.2d 1263 (Kan. 1982); Kelly v. United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 353 So. 2d 349 (La. Ct. App. 1977), appeal dis-
missed, 357 So. 2d 1144 (La.); Salen v. Klomempken, 322 N.W.2d 736 (Minn. 1982);
Stout v. Kansas City Terminal R. Co., 172 Mo. App. 113, 157 S.W. 1019 (1913);
General Electric Co. v. Bush, 88 Nev. 360, 498 P.2d 366 (1972); Russell v. Salem
Transportation Co., 61 N.J. 502, 295 A.2d 862 (1972); DeAngelis v. Lutheran Medical
Center, 58 N.Y.2d 1053, 449 N.E.2d 406, 462 N.Y.S.2d 626, (1983); Morgel v.
Winger, 290 N.W.2d 266 (N.D. 1980); Gibson v. Johnston, 75 Ohio L. Abs. 413, 144
N.E.2d 310, (1956), appeal dismissed for want of debatable question, 166 Ohio St.
288, 2 Ohio Ops.2d 174, 141 N.E.2d 767; Northwest v. Presbysterian Intercommunity
Hospital, 631 P.2d 1377, a ffd, 652 P.2d 318 (Or. 1982).
43. Pleasant v. Washington Sand & Gravel Co., 104 App. D.C. 374, 262 F.2d
471 (1958).
44. Weitl v. Moes, 311 N.W.2d 259 (Iowa 1981) (permitting an independent
cause of action for lost parental consortium).
45. 335 N.W.2d 148 (Iowa 1983).
46. IOWA CODE ANN. § 611.22 (West 1983) (permitting the cause of action as a
derivative claim only).
47. Early v. United States, 474 F.2d 756 (9th Cir. 1973).
48. Hoesing v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 484 F. Supp. 478 (D. Neb. 1980).
49. Turner v. Atlantic Coastline Ry. Co., 159 F. Supp. 590 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
50. Early, 474 F.2d at 758; Hoesing, 484 F. Supp. at 478; Turner, 159 F. Supp.
at 590.
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The three federal court decisions were in 1973, 1980 and 1958."' Of
the cases which rejected the cause of action, five were decided in the
1950's,52 six in the 1970's, 53 two in 1980,11 three in 1982,55 one in
1983,56 and one in 1984.57 The District of Columbia last addressed the
issue in 1958.58
Of the seventeen states which rejected a cause of action for a
child's loss of his parents' consortium, seven did not recognize the
wife's right to consortium at the time, either.59 Recognition of the
wife's cause of action seems to be almost a prerequisite for recognition
of a child's right to recover for the loss of parental consortium. Every
state which recognized the child's cause of action first recognized the
wife's cause of action for loss of her husband's consortium.6 0 Some of
these courts rejected only an independent cause of action for loss of
parental consortium, fearing double recovery. 61 In this context, double
recovery means that the child would recover once when the child's eco-
nomic, and arguably, non-economic, damages are recovered in the par-
ent's cause of action, and a second time when the child recovers for his
own cause of action for loss of parental consortium.
51. Early, 474 F.2d at 756; Hoesing, 484 F. Supp. at 478; Turner, 159 F. Supp.
at 590.
52. Jeune, 77 Ariz. at 226, 269 P.2d at 723; Turner, 159 F. Supp. at 590;
Halberg, 41 Hawaii at 634; Gibson, 75 Ohio L. Abs. at 413, 144 N.E. 2d at 310.
53. Borer, 19 Cal. 3d at 441, 563 P. 2d at 858, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 302; Hinde, 35
Conn. Supp. at 242, 408 A. 2d at 668; Kelly, 353 So. 2d at 349; Bush, 88 Nev. at 360,
448 P. 2d at 366; Russell, 61 N.J. at 502, 295 A. 2d at 862.
54. Koskela, 91 111. App. 3d at 568, 414 N.E. 2d at 1148; Morgel, 290 N.W. 2d
at 266.
55. Schmeck, 647 P.2d at 1263; Salen, 322 N.W.2d at 736; Northwest, 631 P.2d
at 1377.
56. De Angelis, 58 N.Y.2d at 1053, 449 N.E.2d at 406, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 626.
57. Bremer, 169 Ga. App. at 115, 312 S.E.2d at 806. Florida's Fifth District
Court of Appeal recognized the child's cause of action in Rosen, 449 So. 2d 359. How-
ever, it would be inaccurate to say that the State of Florida has recognized the action,
since the Florida Supreme Court has not yet resolved the issue.
58. Pleasant, 262 F.2d at 471.
59. These states are Arizona, Hawaii, Ohio, Washington, Connecticut, Louisiana
and Kansas. See supra note 42.
60. See supra note 25, which lists the cases from Iowa, Michigan and Wisconsin.
The Massachusetts case recognizing the wife's right is Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 364
Mass. 153, 302 N.E.2d 555 (1973).
61. The states rejecting the cause of action for fear of double recovery are: Cali-
fornia, Washington, D.C., Hawaii, Kansas, New Jersey and Washington. See supra
note 42.
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Five states have recognized a child's right to recover for loss of a
parent's consortium. 2 In Weitl v. Moes63 a pregnant mother of three
children suffered permanent brain damage and permanent blindness as
the result of medical malpractice. Her fetus was stillborn. In allowing
her three children to maintain a cause of action for loss of parental
consortium, the court reviewed Iowa law which already allowed causes
of action for spousal loss of consortium and for parental loss of a child's
consortium and found that loss of parental consortium is consistent
with these holdings. In addition, the Iowa court made a thorough anal-
ysis of the reasoning for and against the child's cause of action which
was later presented in Rosen.64
In Berger v. Weber,65 the court analyzed the arguments that dam-
ages were too speculative, that double recovery would result from rec-
ognition of the cause of action and that any changes should be made by
the legislature instead of the court. In Berger, the mother of a mentally
retarded girl was severely injured in an auto accident. The court held
that the child's damages were comparable to pain and suffering, intan-
gible losses in wrongful death actions and spousal loss of consortium.
The court went on to say "[e]valuating the child's damages is no more
speculative than evaluating these other types of intangible losses."66
Addressing the issue of double recovery the court held that recognition
of the child's cause of action would lessen the possibility of double re-
covery, since the jury would be required to consider the child's loss
separately from the parent's loss.67
Finally, the Berger court noted that other loss of consortium
claims were developed by the judiciary, and the child's claim was ap-
propriately decided there, too.68 In recognizing the child's cause of ac-
tion for loss of parental consortium, the Berger court said "[c]onvinced
as we are that we have too long treated the child as [sic] second-class
citizen or some sort of nonperson, we feel constrained to remove the
disability we have imposed."6 9
62. Weitl, 311 N.W.2d at 259; Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 413
N.E.2d 690 (Mass. 1980); Berger v. Weber, 303 N.W.2d 424 (Mich. 1981); Theama
by Bichler v. City of Kenosha, 344 N.W.2d 513 (Wis. 1984).
63. 311 N.W.2d at 259.
64. Id. at 265-70.
65. 303 N.W.2d at 424.
66. Id. at 427.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. But cf. id. (Levin, J., dissenting), for a thorough analysis of the reasoning
1984]
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The Supreme Court of Wisconsin addressed the issue in 1984 in
Theama by Bichler v. City of Kenosha.70 Robert Theama was severely
and permanently injured as the result of a motorcycle accident. Alleg-
edly, a pothole in a negligently maintained road was the proximate
cause of the accident. The Theama court adopted the cause of action
for a child's loss of consortium primarily because the court perceived
an increasing recognition and protection of children's rights throughout
society. 71 The Theama court also analyzed arguments similar to those
propounded in Weitl72 and Berger, and approved the reasoning of those
courts.
73
In Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc.,74 a father was negli-
gently injured while at work. The court recognized the children's right
to recover for loss of parental consortium where the children could
show that their dependence was not only economic, but also rooted in
"filial needs for closeness, guidance and nurture. '75 The Ferriter court
analyzed the traditional arguments similarly to the Weitl, Berger and
Theama courts, reaching the same conclusion that a minor child has a
cause of action for lost parental consortium where the parent is tor-
tiously injured.76
In Rosen by and through Rosen v. Zorzos,77 a negligently caused
automobile collision killed a young mother and severely injured her
husband. The parties settled before trial and the settlement included
damages for the children's loss of consortium for their deceased
mother, which is a recognized cause of action under Florida's Wrongful
Death Act.7 After settling with Michael Zorzos on the other claims,
Stephen Rosen filed a lawsuit on behalf of his children for their loss of
his companionship, guidance, love and the like.79 The lawsuit for the
children's loss of Mr. Rosen's consortium was dismissed for failure to
state a cause of action.80 On appeal, the Florida Fifth District reversed,
against acceptance of the child's cause of action.
70. See 344 N.W.2d at 513.
71. Id. at 517.
72. 311 N.W.2d at 259.
73. 303 N.W.2d at 424.
74. 413 N.E.2d at 690.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. 449 So. 2d at 359.
78. FLA. STAT. § 768.21(3) (1983).
79. Rosen, 449 So. 2d at 359.
80. Id.
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adopting reasoning similar to Weitl, Berger and Ferriter.a1
The most recent case addressing the issue whether a child should
be permitted a cause of action for lost parental consortium is Ueland v.
Pengo Hydra-Pull Corp.82 In Ueland, the court held that the child's
cause of action is consistent with other Washington law, which permits
a husband's cause of action for loss of his wife's services, a wife's cause
of action for loss of her husband's consortium and Washington's wrong-
ful death statute, which permits a cause of action for intra-family loss
of consortium. The Ueland court cited Rosen, Theama, Berger and
Ferriter and held that "the emerging trend is to recognize the child's
cause of action. 8 3 In permitting the cause of action, the Ueland court
held that the child's claim must be joined with the parent's claim un-
less there is just cause not to join the child's claim.
In contrast to the older cases rejecting the cause of action the
cases recognizing the child's right are relatively new.84 Arguably, this
contrast indicates the beginnings of a trend toward recognizing a minor
child'b iight to secuvui fIunm third parties for tortiously caused loss of
parental consortium when the parent is injured but does not die. Per-
haps those courts which have recognized the cause of action are judi-
cial renegades, as some charge.a5 On the other hand, it is at least
equally probable that they are the leading edge of the American judi-
cial system in this area. They do comprise almost forty percent of the
states which have addressed the issue in the last five years. These re-
cent cases, together with the increasing number of judicial decisions
and statutes recognizing and enforcing children's rights, suggest an in-
creasing legal recognition of children as persons. In addition, there is
an apparent heightened public interest in children's rights in general,
as evidenced by the almost daily media coverage of programs and
events concerning the needs and rights of children.
IV. Analysis of Arguments Against Recognition
There are eight reasons generally offered in opposition to recogniz-
81. Id.
82. Ueland v. Pengo Hydra-Pull Corp., 103 Wash. 2d 131 (1984).
83. Id.
84. Cases which rejected the cause of action are an average of more than twelve
years old. In contrast, those decisions which recognize the action were written, on an
average, less than four years ago. In Florida, Clark was decided nine years ago (1976),
whereas Rosen was decided only last year (1984).
85. Brief for Petitioner at 11, Rosen, 449 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984).
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ing a child's right to recover for lost parental consortium. They are: 1)
The child has no enforceable claim for the parents' services; 2) Ab-
sence of precedent; 3) Speculative nature of damages; 4) Double Re-
covery; 5) Multiplicity of litigation; 6) Possible upset of settlements
with parents; 7) Fabrication of claims; 8) Increased insurance costs.86
These reasons also form the basis of the petitioner's position in Rosen, 7
and are the same arguments used in opposition to recognizing a wife's
right to recover for lost consortium in Gates.88
In Florida, the Clark court rejected a claim for lost parental con-
sortium based on the above eight reasons. In addition, the Clark court
held that public policy as announced by the so-called heart balm8 9 stat-
ute proscribed the child's cause of actionY0 This statute abolished the
torts of alienation of affection, criminal conversation, seduction and
breach of contract to marry. The express legislative intent in the heart
balm statute was to stop the harassment, embarassment, blackmail and
other abuses which resulted from the torts. The Clark court did not
analyze the reasons it listed. it mereiy accepted them. However, even
the Clark court held that the argument for recognizing a child's right
to recover against third parties for lost parental consortium could have
merit from a public policy viewpoint if the "[c]laims asserted by the
plaintiffs were properly circumscribed."'"
A. The Argument That A Child Has No Enforceable Claim for
His Parents' Services.
It is true that a Florida child cannot obtain an injunction to force
his parents to love him and care for him.92 On the other hand, a child
in Florida does have an enforceable right to physical support.9 That
right is based on either parentage or contract.94 By way of analogy, it
should be noted that Florida's Wrongful Death Act9" does create the
86. See, e.g., Clark, 338 So. 2d
87. 449 So. 2d at 359.
88. 247 So. 2d at 40.
89. FLA. STAT. § 771 (1983) (
(1945)).
90. Clark, 338 So. 2d at 1119.
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., Fox v. City of W
93. Armour v. Allen, 377 So. 2
94. Albert v. Albert, 415 So. 2
95. FLA. STAT. § 768.21(3) (19
at 1117.
originally enacted as Ch. 23138, LAWS OF FLA.
est Palm Beach, 383 F. 2d 189 (5th Cir. 1967).
d 798 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
d 818 (Fla. 2nd Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
83).
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right of a child to recover for lost parental consortium when the parent
dies. A child certainly could not enforce that right against his dead
parent, but can recover against third parties.
B. Absence of Precedent.
"Every public action which is not customary, either is wrong or, if
it is right, is a dangerous precedent. It follows that nothing should ever
be done for the first time."' 96 While precedent is an important factor in
considering the wisdom of a decision, it should not be controlling. If
everyone failed to act until a precedent was set, there would be no
great legal decisions. On the other hand, previous landmark decisions
by the Florida Supreme Court such as abolition of contributory negli-
gence and lex loci conflicts of law, and the recognition of products lia-
bility causes of action and the seat belt defense show that lack of prece-
dent is not a sufficient reason to fail to make a sound judicial
decision. 97 Even if lack of precedent were a valid argument, it cannot
be applicable when the Florida Supreme Court decides Rosen. When
Clark was decided, there were no states that recognized the derivative
action. At this time five states judicially recognize such recovery for the
minor child.98 Nonetheless, at this time there are clearly more states
against a child's right to recover for loss of parental consortium than
are in favor of the cause of action.
C. Speculative Nature of the Award
The third argument is that damages for loss of consortium are too
speculative. One would expect that a jury would decide damages based
upon evidence of the parent-child relationship, viz: time spent together,
closeness, overall quality of the relationship. 99 Admittedly, it is impossi-
ble to put an absolute value on a father's or mother's love for a child.
However, the same valuation problem exists in measuring punitive
damages, physical and mental pain and suffering, diminished capacity
96. THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS, 162.23 (1979).
97. Gates, 247 So. 2d at 40; Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973) (ab-
rogation of contributory negligence); Bishop v. Florida Specialty Paint Co., 389 So. 2d
999 (Fla. 1980) (abrogation of lex loci conflicts of law doctrine); West v. Caterpillar
Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976) (adopting strict product liability); Ins. Co. of
North America v. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 1984) (seat belt defense).
98. See supra note 62.
99. See, e.g., Berger, 303 N.W.2d at 424.
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to earn, parents' loss of a child's consortium and spousal loss of consor-
tium. The courts have for several years permitted recovery for these
damages and, in fact, have found them necessary to insure fair and
adequate compensation. 10 The real issue is whether the speculation can
be reduced to tolerable levels. 1 1 Arguably, our country and our judicial
system have been modernized by allowing such noneconomic damages.
It is hard to see how loss of parental consortium is radically different.
Proper jury instructions and other safeguards, such as an elemental
definition and special verdicts, would keep speculation within tolerable
limits.
D. Double Recovery
A major concern with permitting a child's right for loss of parental
consortium is that the minor child will recover again for damages
which are already included in the parents' verdict for lost wages when
the child sues the same defendant.' This could, and probably would,
happen if the tort were to be recognized as an independent cause of
action. A child's loss of parental consortium, however, is more properly
classified as a derivative action. Requiring the child to join his claim
with the primary claim, 0 3 along with a limiting jury charge on the
child's claim and perhaps a special verdict, will obviate the problem.
Double recovery is a potential problem in any complicated or multiple
plaintiff case, but just as with the problem of speculation, courts are
sophisticated enough to deal with the complexities of each case to avoid
the occurrence of double recovery. The jury should always be alert to
guard against double recovery. 04
E. Multiplicity of Litigation
The opponents of the child's cause of action for lost parental con-
sortium fear that each child will bring separate suits and further tax
the already overburdened court system. Multiplicity of litigation was a
legitimate concern of the Gates court as well when that court recog-
100. See generally FLA. STAT. § 768.21 (1983).
101. See, e.g., General Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Dahlman, 310 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Bould v. Touchette, 349 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 1977).
102. See, e.g., Halberg v. Young, 41 Hawaii 634 (1957).
103. This notion is consistent with the requirement for spousal loss of consortium
claims and claims under Florida's Wrongful Death Act, FLA. STAT. § 768.21 (1983).
104. See, e.g., Berger, 303 N.W.2d at 427.
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nized a wife's cause of action for lost spousal consortium."0 5 The Gates
court addressed the problem by requiring the spouse to join her claim
in the primary complaint. The Rosen court could take the same ap-
proach with the child's claim for lost parental consortium. The Florida
legislature has also addressed this concern in a similar context. In en-
acting Florida's Wrongful Death Act, 106 the legislature addressed the
issue by requiring all parties who have claims arising out of the death
to raise them in a single complaint through the personal representative
of the estate. The same process of compulsory joinder will work effec-
tively in Rosen and its progeny. The children should be required to join
their claims for loss of parental consortium with the parent's claim.
F. Red Tape
Because a Florida statute requires court approval of all settlements
in excess of $5,000, made on behalf of minors, opponents of a cause of
action for a child's loss of parental consortium argue that the cause of
action will increase red tape.10 7 The statute would require approval in
loss of parental consortium cases as well as others. However, such ap-
proval does not preclude the child's claim for loss of parental consor-
tium in wrongful death cases. Arguably, there would be an increased
burden on the courts, but its impact would be minimal. Moreover, the
very existence of this statute illuminates Florida's public policy of rec-
ognizing and protecting the rights of its minor citizens. In enacting
such a safeguard, the Florida legislature demonstrated its recognition
of the vulnerability of children and its desire to guard their best
interests.
G. Upset of Previous Settlements
The opponents of recognition of a child's right to recover for lost
parental consortium argue that such recognition will upset previous set-
tlements.0 8 Unquestionably, retroactive recognition would cause such
results. The same concern arose in Gates v. Foley,0 9 but the court
stated that "[t]he problem has not troubled other courts seriously and
105. Gates, 247 So. 2d at 40.
106. FLA. STAT. § 768.21-.27 (1983).
107. FLA. STAT. § 744.387 (1983).
108. Brief for Petitioner at 32, Rosen, 449 So. 2d at 359. Oral argument was
heard January 10, 1985 (case no. 65239).
109. 247 So. 2d at 40.
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may be easily resolved." 110 The court allowed the wife's claim to be
joined with the husband's claim only if the wife's claim was not time-
barred and the husband's claim was still pending. Where the husband's
claim "has been terminated by adverse judgment on the merits, this
should bar the wife's cause of action for consortium." ''
In Rosen, the children brought their claim for loss of their father's
consortium after all other issues were settled out of court. However, the
Rosen family has had the willingness to pursue the issue. In addition,
the Florida Supreme Court has the unquestioned authority to recognize
this cause of action in Rosen and pending and prospective cases only. 1 2
Arguably, this is the only logical approach to take since it would avoid
reopening cases already settled. This method would also be consistent
with the court's decision in Gates,1 13 giving direction and stability to
Florida jurisprudence. In any case, the child's cause of action is only
for lost consortium, and not for anything the parent recovered. In addi-
tion, a jury instruction will clarify the fact that recovery for the chil-
dren should not include loss of financial support, which is already cov-
ered in the parent's settlement or verdict.
H. Fabrication of Claims
Fabrication of claims is a traditional argument in opposition to
causes of action arising from intra-family relationship. 1 The Florida
Supreme Court addressed the argument in Ard v. Ard, when it par-
tially abrogated parent-child tort immunity."15 The Ard court held that
the possibility of fraud does not constitute a valid justification to reject
the child's cause of action for negligent torts of the parent, since the
court can capably guard against fraud." 6 The court went on to reason
110. Id. at 45.
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 346 So. 2d 1012 (Fla.
1977) (prospective application of new rule requiring special verdicts in all comparative
negligence cases); In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1977) (change in standard of
proof for civil commitment prospective application only); State ex rel Dade County v.
Nunzum, 372 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 1979) (prospective only application of revenue sharing
court order); Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980) (declaration of unconstitu-
tionality of medical malpractice act prospective only).
113. 247 So. 2d at 40.
114. Ard v. Ard, 414 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1982).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1069.
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that the testimony of the family members would be extremely vulnera-
ble to impeachment and that juries are fully able to use their common
sense to arrive at the truth."1 ' The Ard court plainly discounted the
possibility of fraudulent claims as a good reason to bar a cause of ac-
tion or to grant relief.lla The opinion seems to state the court's feeling
in general, unrestricted to the Ard decision.
I. Insurance Rates
The final argument made in opposition to recognizing a child's
right to recover for lost parental consortium is that recoveries will raise
insurance rates. The argument is that society cannot afford to pay for
all types of losses. Assuming that recognition of the derivative action
would impact on insurance rates, a conflict of public policies arises. On
one hand, members of society want to be able to afford insurance. On
the other hand, they should be able to seek recovery for certain losses,
including insured losses. The issue then becomes whether recognition of
the derivative action would have a prohibitively adverse effect on insur-
ance rates.
Arguably, every insured loss affects insurance rates. Examples in-
clude a burning house, a destroyed car, appendicitis and thousands
more. Insurance rates are an important concern to the public, as are all
expenses. On the other hand, the public, through its purchase of nu-
merous types of non-required insurance coverages has arguably demon-
strated that it is far more interested in having insurance coverage in
the event of a loss than it is concerned about increased rates. The
child's right to recovery for lost parental consortium is consistent with
other allowable losses. The only reason to deny the action is that some
demarcation should be made to limit a wrongdoer's liability, and here
is where public policy draws the line.1 9
There is no reported or available evidence that the child's cause of
action will have a significant impact, if at all, on insurance rates. It is a
matter of common knowledge that rates differ according to risk catego-
ries. Drivers with bad driving records will pay higher rates than those
117. Id. (citing Brooks v. Robinson, 259 Ind. 16, 284 N.E.2d 794 (1972)).
118. Ard, 414 So. 2d at 1069.
119. Last year, the Florida Medical Association sponsored Proposition 9, a con-
stitutional amendment which would have limited recovery for non-economic damages
to $100,000.00. However, it did not meet the constitutional requirements to be allowed
on the ballot.
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with good records, and they should. There is no credible argument that
children should be denied full and fair compensation merely to main--
tain insurance rates for negligent wrongdoers.
The Florida Supreme Court has reviewed and rejected each of the
arguments raised in opposition to the child's cause of action in Clark2 '
and repeated in Rosen, 2' at one time or another and rejected them.'22
While some of these arguments present valid concerns, they are not,
individually or in aggregate, sufficient to bar a child's right to recover
for lost parental consortium.
V. Analysis of Arguments in Favor of Recognition
There should be a rational, positive basis to recognize a cause of
action. The reasons given in favor of the action in Rosen are: 1) Recog-
nition is consistent with Florida legislative enactment which recognizes
the claim when the parent dies; 23 2) Recognition is consistent with
Florida law which recognizes a claim for loss of a wife's consortium; 2 4
3) Recognition is consistent with Florida law which recognizes a par-
ent's right to recover for loss of a child's consortium; 12 5 and 4) Recog-
nition is required by the Florida Constitution." 6
A. Legislative Enactments Recognize The Cause of Action
The Florida Wrongful Death Act 127 allows minor children of the
decedent to "[r]ecover for lost parental companionship, instruction, and
guidance and for mental pain and suffering .... ,,1218 The legislative
intent is clearly stated in the statute. "It is the public policy of the
State to shift the losses resulting when wrongful death occurs from the
survivors of the decedent to the wrongdoer. ,,129 Turlington v.
120. 338 So. 2d at 1117.
121. 449 So. 2d at 359.
122. Gates, 247 So. 2d at 40; Rosen, 449 So. 2d at 359.
123. FLA. STAT. § 768.21 (1983).
124. Gates, 247 So. 2d at 40.
125. See Wilkie, 109 So. at 225.
126. Rosen, 449 So. 2d at 359. The Florida Constitution declares that: "The
courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be
administered without sale, denial or delay." FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21.
127. FLA. STAT. § 768.16-.27 (1983).
128. FLA. STAT. § 768.21(3) (1983).
129. FLA. STAT. § 768.17 (1983).
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Tampa Electric Co.'3 0 stated similar public policy. In Tampa Electric
Co. the court stated, "[w]here, by virtue of the relationship toward
each other existing between parties, the law implies a duty from one to
another, a breach of that duty that proximately causes or contributes to
causing a substantial injury to another may constitute" an actionable
wrong. Thus, the legislative and judicial view in Florida is wholly con-
sistent with the general view that a person is responsible for all the
injuries that he negligently inflicts upon others. 3 '
Some argue that consortium always includes the husband-wife sex-
ual relationship and, therefore, excludes children. 132 However, Florida's
Wrongful Death Act lists each of the elements of consortium recover-
able by minor children and, of course, omits conjugal relations.'3 3 Logi-
cally, if the legislature allows the recovery, then it certainly recognizes
the real injury to a child who is deprived of his parents' "companion-
ship, instruction and guidance." 34 Any material disruption of the par-
ent-child relationship causes injury to the child. Providing a remedy for
the child whose parent is injured, but not killed, is consistent with Flor-
ida public policy as stated in the Wrongful Death Act.
B. Florida Recognizes Loss of Spousal Consortium
The issue of a wife's claim for loss of her husband's consortium
which was presented in Gates3 5 is parallel to the issue of lost parental
consortium in Rosen.3 6 The Gates court recognized that societal
changes in the woman's status required recognition of her right to re-
cover for loss of her husband's consortium. Like Rosen, the Gates court
referred to Florida Constitution Article I Section 21, as well as Sec-
tions 2 and 9. Unlike Rosen, Gates went on to discuss the wife's rights
under the United States Constitution and various federal statutes. 3 7
The Gates court reasoned that, in addition to state law and public pol-
icy, the federal constitution and federal laws against discrimination'38
mandated recognition of the wife's claim. The court held that discrimi-
130. 62 Fla. at 398, 56 So. at 696.
131. See, e.g., Barnfield v. Addington, 104 Fla. 661, 140 So. 893 (1932).
132. See, e.g., Tremblay v. Carter, 390 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
133. FLA. STAT. § 768.21 (1983).
134. Id.
135. 247 So. 2d at 40.
136. 449 So. 2d at 359.
137. Gates, 247 So. 2d at 40.
138. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
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nation on the basis of sex by not allowing a wife's cause of action for
loss of her husband's consortium was against federal law and was
unconstitutional.
Florida's recognition that a loss of a husband's consortium injures
a wife supports the view that loss of parental consortium injures a
child. Whereas a wife is supposedly a mature adult, the minor child
does not have the benefit of life's experience. The child is far more
dependent for guidance and nurture than the wife. Since the law recog-
nizes that a wife's loss of her husband's consortium is a real loss, a
fortiori, the child's loss of parental consortium is cognizable also for
the same reason.
C. Florida Recognizes A Parent's Right to a Child's
Consortium
In Florida, a parent has the right to sue for loss of a child's con-
sortium. 139 In Wilkie,'"1 the court noted that such right was not a com-
mon-law right, but it decided that, "[t]he father's right to the custody,
companionship, services, and earnings of his minor child are valuable
rights, constituting a species of property in the father, a wrongful in-
jury to which by a third person will support an action in favor of the
father."' "4 This cause of action was independent of the injured child's
right to recover for his direct injuries.
Arguably, an adult, who is also a parent, is far better equipped to
deal with emotional and financial crises. Yet Florida recognizes that
the injury of one's child creates a palpable loss in the parent. The same
reasoning leads to the conclusion that a child's injury caused by the
loss of parental consortium would be no less than a parent's loss. Rec-
ognizing the child's right to recover for lost parental consortium is con-
sistent with recognition of the parent's right to recover for loss of a
child's consortium. It is equivalent to recognizing a child as a complete
person.
D. The Florida Constitution Guarantees Redress of Any Injury.
The Rosen court held that recognition of a child's right to recover
139. Wilkie, 109 So. at 225.
140. Id.
141. Id. But see petitioner's brief, Rosen, 449 So. 2d at 359, which asserts that
recovery is limited to economic damages.
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for loss of parental consortium is required by the Florida Constitu-
tion.' 42 Article I, Section 21, states "[t]he courts shall be open to every
person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered with-
out sale, denial or delay." 43 The article's simplicity seems to defy any
attempt to interpret away the right insured by the provision.
The Constitution guarantees such an opportunity of redress for
any injury.144 Therefore, the question is whether the Florida Supreme
Court will decide that a child's loss of parental consortium is an injury.
If the decision is yes, then the court seems bound to affirm Rosen. Ar-
guably, the Florida Constitution does not require recognition if public
policy is better served by rejection of the child's cause of action. 4 5 Of
course, if the court decides there is no injury as a matter of law, public
policy or otherwise, then it will not recognize the cause of action any-
way. The court could probably recognize the injury but limit recovery
without violating the Florida Constitution. 46
Conclusion
Studies demonstrate conclusively that parents' love, society, sup-
port, training, role model and the like are essential to the physical,
mental and emotional health of children. 4 The incidence of juvenile
delinquency and psychological problems increases when there is a re-
duced functioning of the family unit. 48 This increased awareness and
scientific knowledge should contribute to the recognition of a child's
right to recover for loss of parental consortium.
By affirming the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Rosen, the Flor-
ida Supreme Court can write another important chapter in the history
of Florida jurisprudence. Recognition of the child's natural right to his
142. FLA. CONST. art 1, § 21 (1968).
143. Id.
144. Accord Ellison v. Northwest Eng'g Co., 521 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Fla. 1981)
(construing Fla. Const. art. I § 21 to allow workman to sue a manufacturer for breach
of implied warranty, negligence and strict liability).
145. See, e.g., Abdin v. Fischer, 374 So. 2d 1379 (Fla. 1979) (statute limiting
liability of owners and lessees who provide public park areas does not violate the consti-
tutional provision that the courts shall be open to every person for redress of any
injury).
146. See generally id.
147. B. BERELSON & G. STEINER, HUMAN BEHAVIOR: AN INVENTORY OF SCIEN-
TIFIC FINDINGS 316-17 (1964).
148. Id.
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parents' love, companionship, education and protection, will signal the
Court's continued belief that government is a servant of the people
rather than people the servants of government. Affirmance will be con-
sistent with the court's policy of protecting the rights and needs of
Florida's fast changing society. This policy was previously laid down in
cases where the Court abrogated the contributory negligence rule,149
where it abrogated the obsolete doctrine of lex loci delecti,150 where it
adopted strict liability in tort and product cases,' 5' and where it
adopted the seat belt defense, 52 to name a few.
When little Mary Ellen had nowhere to turn, the courts protected
her natural rights, even though previous law did not. The case of
"Mary Ellen" was a social breakthrough in 1894.111 Now, the Florida
Supreme Court is presented with the opportunity to make another posi-
tive social breakthrough. By affirming Rosen, the court will continue
society's movement toward recognizing and protecting the rights and
needs of its children.
Rodney Guy Romano
149. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
150. Bishop v. Fla. Specialty Plant Co., 389 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1980).
151. West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976).
152. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 457.
153. See supra note 8.
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Children: Limits, Logic & Legality
I. Introduction
Throughout history, children have had a tendency to cause mis-
chief, damage and often injury to people and the property of others.1
Under common law, minors are personally responsible for their torts.
2
However, children rarely possess the means to compensate their vic-
tims.3 This creates a dilemma: Either the children's victims are left
without a remedy, or the children's parents must be held liable for the
damages.
At common law, the mere existence of the parent/child relation-
ship was not a sufficient basis to invoke liability upon parents for the
torts of their minor children.4 The growth of modern tort law, however,
1. M. HASKELL & L. YABLONSKY, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 2 (3d ed. 1982); H.
SANDHU, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY CAUSES, CONTROL, AND PREVENTION 5 (1977).
2. See Bieker v. Owens, 234 Ark. 97, 99, 350 S.W.2d 522, 524 (1961); W. PROS-
SER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 123-at 912, 913 (5th ed. 1984); Note,
Criminal Liability of Parents for Failure to Control their Children, 6 VAL. U.L. REV.
332 (1972); Note, Parent and Child-Civil Responsibility of Parents for the Torts of
Children-Statutory Imposition of Strict Liability, 3 VILL. L. REV. 529 (1958).
Section 8951 of the second Restatement of Torts provides: "One who is an infant
is not immune from tort liability solely for that reason unless the liability depends upon
the enforceability of a contractual promise that the infant is privileged to disaffirm."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8951 (1979).
Comment (a) clarifies this general principle, adding that
[i]n intentional torts, the state of mind of the actor is an essential element.
For example, an intent to bring about a harmful or offensive physical con-
tact is essential to battery. . . .A child may be of such tender years that
he. . .is in fact incapable of the specific intent that is iequired. It may
thus be found that the tort has not been committed. ...
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8951 comment a (1979).
3. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 2.
4. See Bieker, 234 Ark. at 98, 350 S.W.2d at 523-24 (1961); Martin v. Barrett,
120 Cal. App. 2d 625, 628, 261 P.2d 551, 552-53 (1953); Condel v. Savo, 350 Pa. 350,
352, 39 A.2d 51, 52 (1944); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 2; Comment,
Liability of Negligent Parents for the Torts of their Minor Children, 19 ALA. L. REV.
123 (1966); Note, A Constitutional Caveat on the Vicarious Liability of Parents, 87
NOTRE DAME LAW. 1321 (1972).
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has generally acknowledged the fact that parents, more than anyone
else, have the ability and opportunity to regulate the conduct of their
children.5 It has even been postulated that "[t]here are no delinquent
children; there are only delinquent parents."'6 Thus, with this ability
and opportunity to control has come a duty to exercise this control over
one's child;7 and a breach of this duty can result in liability.
The final acceptance of a policy establishing parental liability re-
quires the resolution of numerous issues. Three questions are foremost
among these: 1) When should this duty arise? 2) What will constitute
a breach of this duty? and 3) What should the legal consequences be
for a breach?
Focusing on the law in Florida, this note will discuss these and
other related questions and will offer resolutions to the dilemma
presented. An examination of the family's role in the causes of juvenile
delinquency will exemplify the need for this parental duty. Moreover, a
survey of existing case law and legislation will demonstrate how Florida
and other jurisdictions have dealt with this sensitive issue. With specific
attention given to a case presently certified to the Florida Supreme
Court,8 this note will present alternatives for clarification and modifica-
tion of existing law.
II. Juvenile Delinquency - The Family's Role
Although legal use of the term was not established until 1899,'
juvenile delinquency10 has plagued civilization throughout history."
5. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 637-639 (1978); Bieker, 234 Ark. at 99,
350 S.W.2d at 524; W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 2 at 914; Comment, Lia-
bility of Negligent Parents for the Torts of their Minor Children, 19 ALA. L. REV. 123
(1966); cf. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRA-
TION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME
215 (1967) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT].
6. Ludwig, Delinquent Parents and the Criminal Law, 5 VAND. L. REV. 719
(1952).
7. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 2 at 914.
8. Snow v. Nelson, 450 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
9. R. TROJANOWICZ & M. MORASH, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: CONCEPTS AND
CONTROL 12 (3d ed. 1983).
10. A "Delinquent Child" is defined as "[a]n infant of not more than specified
age who has violated criminal laws or engages in disobedient, indecent or immoral
conduct, and is in need of treatment, rehabilitation, or supervision." BI.ACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 385 (5th ed. 1979).
11. See H. SANDHU, supra note 1.
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Studies have attempted to determine the causes of and solutions to this
problem; 12 with sociologists, psychologists, theorists and commentators
all submitting opinions as to the causes of the maladjusted child. 13
Summarizing these philosophies, one commentator noted that "widely
accepted theories of causation fall into . . . [five] basic categories: (1)
personality factors (including biological, psychological, character and
behavior); (2) companions and peer group influence; (3) economic, cul-
tural and environmental conditions; (4) . . . home and family condi-
tions . . . [and] (5) opportunity as evoked by the victim
himself. . .1.4
As a primary source for the inculcation of one's morals and values,
the family has perhaps the greatest influence on the development of a
'good' or 'bad' child. The mixture of affection and discipline received in
the home has a great effect on a child's ability to deal with authority. 5
Studies reflect the fact that children from homes in which parents are
consistent and fair in their means of discipline are less likely to become
delinquents; whereas homes in which parents are inconsistent or use
extreme measures of corporal punishment 6 are subject to a greater risk
of turning out a recalcitrant, unbalanced and often delinquent child.' 7
This risk intensifies when there is a lack of affection present in the
home combined with an aura of parental apathy and acquiescence."8
The cumulative effect of these elements is crucial as "[r]ejected or ne-
glected children who do not find love and affection, as well as support
and supervision, at home, often resort to groups outside the family; fre-
quently these groups are of a deviant nature."' 9 While the state cannot
mandate familial love and harmony, arguably these studies evidence a
need to encourage, if not demand, parents to act responsibly in raising
12. See, e.g., S. GLUEK & E. GLUEK, OF DELINQUENCY AND CRIME, A PANO-
RAMA OF YEARS OF SEARCH AND RESEARCH (1974); JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELIN-
QUENCY PREVENTION, NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STAN-
DARDS AND GOALS (1976); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 209-11.
13. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 188-221; R. TROJA-
NOWICZ & M. MORASH, supra note 9 at 38-132.
14. Shong, The Legal Responsibility of Parents for Their Children's Delin-
quency, 6 FAM. L. Q. 145, 152 (1972).
15. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 199.
16. Corporal Punishment is defined as "physical punishment as distinguished
from pecuniary punishment or a fine; any kind of punishment of or inflicted on the
body." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 306 (5th ed. 1979).
17. See H. SANDHU, supra note 1 at 53.
18. Id. at 53, 54.
19. R. TROJANOWICZ & M. MORASH, supra note 9 at 90.
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their children.
III. Snow v. Nelson: 20 A Question is Raised
Randall Snow was seriously injured while playing a game with
Mark Nelson. The game, which Mark had invented,2 was played in
the street and required "the use of two croquet mallets, two tennis balls
and 'speed.' "22 With each player continuously hitting his ball down the
street, racing toward a pre-designated target,23 the younger and faster
Randall gained the lead.24 In an effort to catch up, Mark took a "'fast
swing' . . . [despite the fact] that he saw 'a person' the whole time
.... -"25 Mark's errant swing struck Randall in the eye26 causing the
loss of his eye, as well as the permanent loss of his senses of taste and
smell.2 7
Randall's parents sued Mark's parents for negligent supervision of
their son.28 At trial, evidence indicated that Mark had a history of
playing roughly with other children. Testimony of Mark's neighbors
and playmates revealed that he was "a bully;"' 29 that he "push[ed] .. .
kids together ... to make them fight;" 30 and that he "hit little kids
because 'they did not listen to him.' "1 Other neighbors, including
Randall's father, testified "that they had never complained to Mark's
parents ... [about] Mark's activities." 2 Apparently, Mark's father
did have some prior notice of Mark's aggressive behavior,33 although
through testimony he characterized this notice as "normal kids tattling
type things ... [such as] 'Mark's playing too rough,' or one of the
20. Snow v. Nelson, 450 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
21. Brief for Appellant at 2, Snow v. Nelson, 450 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1984).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 2, 3.
28. Id. at 3.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Brief for Appellee at 2, Snow v. Nelson, 450 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1984).
33. Id. at 1.
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other kids are [sic] playing too rough. .. .
The trial judge granted a directed verdict in favor of Mark's par-
ents, the Nelsons, finding them totally free from negligence as a matter
of law.35 The Snows appealed that decision to the Third District Court
of Appeal of Florida, which reluctantly affirmed the trial judge's deci-
sion.36 Although the court of appeal appeared sympathetic with the
Snow's circumstances, it was bound by prior case law. 7 The Supreme
Court of Florida had ruled on this issue in 195538 in the case of Gissen
v. Goodwill.3 That decision established very narrow requirements40 for
the finding of parental negligence, and the Snows did not fall within
those requirments.
The Third District Court of Appeal, in a strongly worded Snow
opinion, urged a modification of these rules, leaving no doubt that
Gissen was the only barrier between an affirmance and a reversal of the
trial court's directed verdict.4 ' Finding an issue of great public impor-
34. Id.
35. Brief for Appellant at 5, Snow v. Nelson, 450 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1984).
The trial judge did not immediately rule on the defendant's motion for a directed
verdict. He reserved this decision and instructed counsel to proceed with their closing
remarks to the jury. The jury was then instructed to consider the following issue in
their deliberations:
Whether the defendants were negligent in the supervision of their child,
Mark Nelson, and if so, whether such negligence was a legal cause of loss,
injury or damage sustained by the plaintiffs, Robert E. Snow and Cynthia
Snow, as parents and natural guardians of Randall K. Snow ...
Id. at 4.
After the jury left the courtroom to deliberate, the judge gave counsel a final op-
portunity to settle the case. Informed that a settlement was out of the question, he then
granted the motion for the directed verdict and stated:
Keeping with the Court's policy, of course, the jury will still determine this
matter. They will consider it and come back with a verdict. That verdict
will not be filed, but will be available so that if, upon appeal, in the unlike-
lihood that this Court is reversed in its directed verdict, then we will not
have to try the case again and the jury verdict will be reinstated.
Id. at 5.
Upon its return, the jury found Mark Nelson's parents seventy-five percent at
fault, with damages totaling $135,000. Snow, 450 So. 2d at 271.
36. Snow, 450 So. 2d at 270.
37. Id.
38. Gissen v. Goodwill, 80 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1955).
39. Id.
40. See infra text accompanying note 46.
41. Snow, 450 So. 2d at 270. Portraying the Gissen opinion as "harsh doctrine
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tance, the district court of appeal certified the following question to the
Supreme Court of Florida: "To what extent and in what manner may
parents be held legally responsible for injuries inflicted by their minor
children upon third parties?"4 2
Under the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, the state Su-
preme Court is not compelled to answer a certified question from a
district court of appeal. A query of this type falls within the Supreme
Court's discretionary jurisdiction.43 In Snow v. Nelson, however, the
Florida Supreme Court has granted certiorari, scheduling oral argu-
ment for early 1985.
IV. Judicial Expansion of the Common Law Standard
A. Florida
The necessity of the Snow certified question is a product of the
confusion arising out of Gissen v. Goodwill." Involving the claim of a
Miami Beach hotel employee against the parents of a child-tortfeasor,
Gissen established specific criteria in Florida for the determination of
parental liability.45 The Supreme Court of Florida delineated these
standards as follows:
It is basic and established law that a parent is not liable for the
tort of his minor child because of the mere fact of his paternity.
However, there are certain broadly defined exceptions wherein a
parent may incur liability: 1. Where he intrusts his child with an
created in a distant and dissimilar era," Judge Jorgenson declared:
Because we are restrained by supreme court precedent, we affirm the trial
court's direction of a verdict for the parents of the alleged tortfeasor. How-
ever, because we are unable to reconcile the precedential supreme court
holding, or our own with what we feel to be the dictates of justice and
fairness and feel that it is time for a more enlightened approach to the
questions involved, we respectfully certify to the Supreme Court of Florida
that the present case passes upon a question of great public importance
and warrants a re-examination of the principles announced in Gissen v.
Goodwill.
Id. (citation omitted).
42. Id. at 275 (emphasis supplied).
43. FLA. R. App. P. 9.030(a)(2)(A)(v).
44. 80 So. 2d at 701.
45. Id. at 703.
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instrumentality which because of the lack of age, judgment, or ex-
perience of the child, may become a source of danger to others. 2.
Where a child, in the commission of a tortious act, is occupying the
relationship of a servant or agent of its parents. 3. Where the par-
ent knows of his child's wrongdoing and consents to it, directs or
sanctions it. 4. Where he fails to exercise parental control over his
minor child, although he knows or in the exercise of due care
should have known that injury to another is a probable
consequence.16
Mr. Julius Gissen, the -plaintiff, asserted in his complaint that
eight-year-old Geraldine Goodwill and her parents were "business invi-
tees"4 7 at a Miami Beach hotel where Gissen was employed when the
claimed tort took place.48 His complaint further alleged that Geraldine
was a constant source of turmoil for the hotel's guests and employees,49
and that these tantrums continued without any attempts by her parents
to exercise restraint.50 This conduct culminated in Mr. Gissen's injury
when Geraldine slammed a hotel door, violently severing a portion of a
finger from his hand. 5 Alleging parental negligence in the "exercise of
needful parental influence and authority," Mr. Gissen sued Geraldine's
parents, claiming that their acquiescence was, in effect, a "sanctioning,
ratif[ication], and consenting to the wrongful act . . . [thus causing]
injury to another . . . [to be] a probable consequence .... ",52
The Gissen court looked to the language of section 316 of the sec-
ond Restatement of Torts53 and to prior decisions from seven other ju-
risdictions 54 for guidance in its ruling. From these cases, the court
46. Id.
47. Id. at 702.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. id.
53. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 316 (1965) states:
A parent is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his minor
child as to prevent it from intentionally harming others or from so con-
ducting itself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if
the parent
(a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control his
child, and
(b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercis-
ing such control.
54. See Bateman v. Crim, 34 A.2d 257 (D.C. 1943) (affirmed directed verdict in
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found "[o]ne common factor .. . [to be] salient in the assessment of
liability to the parents, . . . [this being] that the child had the habit of
doing the particular type of wrongful act which resulted in the injury
complained of."55 This holding, creating what has since been referred
to as the "particular acts rule, ' 56 precluded Julius Gissen from ob-
taining compensation for his injury. The Florida Supreme Court en-
tered judgment against him because he had not claimed that Geraldine
"had a propensity to swing or slam doors at the hazard of persons using
such doors."15 7 In the absence of an assertion of such particular acts, his
petition failed to allege actionable negligence.
At first blush, this holding appeared to logically follow from the
rule which the court set down. A discrepancy, however, surfaced when
the opinion apparently contradicted this particular act requirement
with the subsequent declaration that "a wrongful act by an infant
which climaxes a course of conduct involving similar acts may lead to
favor of defendants as there was no evidence to indicate that boys who injured plaintiff
while playing football in street "had previously played with a football on the public
streets or had conducted ... [themselves] in other than an orderly manner." Id. at
258.); Steinberg v. Cauchois, 249 A.D. 518, 293 N.Y.S. 147 (N.Y. App. Div. 1937)
(parents were not liable as evidence was not sufficient to show that they had notice that
child who hit plaintiff with bicycle on sidewalk was accustomed to riding on sidewalk);
Condel v. Savo, 350 Pa. 350, 39 A.2d 51 (1944) (parents who had been notified of
their child's "habit of mauling, pummeling, assaulting and mistreating smaller chil-
dren," were negligent in failing to exercise reasonable care so to control . . .[him and]
prevent him from intentionally . . .[assaulting the plaintiff's child and throwing him]
down a steep and precipitous embankment." Id. at 351, 39 A.2d at 52.); Norton v.
Payne, 154 Wash. 241, 281 P. 991 (1929) (child with "habit of striking smaller chil-
dren in the face with sticks . . . struck [plaintiffs' child] in the eyeball with a stick...
and parents encouraged her in her habit." Id. at 241, 281 P. at 991); Martin v. Barrett,
120 Cal. App. 2d 625, 261 P.2d 551 (1953) (see infra notes 102, 103 and accompany-
ing text); Ellis v. D'Angelo, 116 Cal. App. 2d 310, 253 P.2d 675 (1953) ("'parents
negligently ...failed to warn ...[babysitter of their] child's ...[habit of] 'vio-
lently attacking and throwing himself forcibly ... against other people' . . . and
shortly after plaintiff entered . . .[their] home the child attacked her to her resultant
injury." Id. at 317, 261 P.2d at 679.); Ryle v. Lafferty, 45 F.2d 641 (D. Idaho 1930)
(child with "habit of persuading and inveigling smaller boys into secluded places ...
and of beating, bruising, maiming, and punishing [them] ...persuaded and inveigled
the plaintiff. . . to go with him to a secluded place . . . and . . . beat . . . him . . ..
[Defendant P]arents had knowledge of. . .[this habit] and had failed to take steps to
restrain him from continuing. ... Id. at 641-643).
55. Gissen, 80 So. 2d at 705.
56. See, e.g., Snow, 450 So. 2d at 274 (emphasis supplied).
57. Gissen, 80 So. 2d at 705.
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the parents' accountability."58 A question arises as to the specific effect
of this additional "similar acts" language: Whether the decision actu-
ally established a "particular acts rule" or a "similar acts rule" for the
state of Florida. From the result in Gissen it would appear that a par-
ticular act rule is the standard.59 Arguably, Mr. Gissen's claim did
demonstrate a course of conduct involving similar acts by Geraldine
Goodwill.60 However, that showing was insufficient for the court to im-
pose liability. 1
At least one Florida district court of appeal has followed the nar-
row interpretation of the Gissen standard. In the 1972 case, Spector v.
Neer,62 the Third District Court of Appeal held that the plaintiffs
failed to establish negligence on the part of the parent/defendants"
because the plaintiffs did not allege that the defendant's child "had a
habit of doing the particular type of wrongful act which resulted in the
injuries. . . ."64A review of other case law, however, indicates that
Gissen has been subject to various interpretations. 5 In Seabrook v.
Taylor,6 6 for example, the Fourth District Court of Appeal stated:
58. Id. (emphasis supplied).
59. The Third District Court of Appeal in Snow was convinced of this fact,
Judge Jorgenson emphatically stating:
[W]e feel that as the rule was applied to the facts in Gissen even fact
patterns where the injury should reasonably have been foreseen to flow,
under the similar acts rule, as a natural and probable consequence from
the child's course of conduct involving similar acts would be insufficient to
survive a legal preclusion of submission to the factfinder. If the facts in
Gissen were not sufficient for a determination that the child's course of
behavior would naturally and probably result in injury, what facts could
be?
Snow, 450 So. 2d at 274.
60. Mr. Gissen's complaint alleged that prior to the door slamming incident, Ge-
raldine Goodwill "committed . . .[other acts] about the hotel premises, such as strik-
ing, knocking down and damaging objects of furniture . . . disturbing and harassing
the guests and employees ... [as well as] striking ... [them] so that ... [her]
persistent course of conduct would as a probable consequence result in injury to an-
other." Gissen, 80 So. 2d at 702.
61. Id. at 705-706.
62. 262 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
63. Id. at 690.
64. Id.
65. The Snow court made this assertion in harsher terms. See infra, text accom-
panying note 76.
66. 199 So. 2d 315, (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied mem., 204 So. 2d 331
(Fla. 1967).
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[T]he Gissen case does not hold specifically that those exceptions
enumerated therein are exclusive. In all cases the question of liabil-
ity is to be determined on the broad basis of whether or not the
parent has been guilty of negligence, that is, a failure to exercise
due care in the circumstances.67
The latter part of this language was subsequently cited with approval
in Southern American Fire Insurance Co. v. Maxwell,68 a case falling
within the dangerous instrumentality exception 69 asserted in Gissen.
Also coming within this exception was Bullock v. Armstrong,70 where
the Second District Court of Appeal looked to the states of Georgia"'
and North Carolina 71 for guidance. From these states Bullock quoted
case law which effectively held that parental liability is to be deter-
mined by "'the ordinary rules of negligence and not upon the relation
of parent and child.' "'
While these Florida cases do not expressly disaffirm the holding in
Gissen,"4 the Third District's opinion in Snow v. Nelson75 stated the
following:
Implicit in these holdings is a rejection of the rule expressed in
Gissen, both in its broader, similar acts, and narrower particular
acts, senses and an adaptation of what we here characterize as the
reasonable care in the circumstances rule: a determination based
upon the unique facts of each case and an application of the lan-
67. Id. at 317.
68. 274 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), cert. dismissed mem., 279 So. 2d 32
(Fla. 1973) ("trial judge was correct in submitting ...case to the jury to conclude
whether or not ... [defendants] failed to exercise the ... parental duty to ascertain
if the[ir five year old] child was competent to control [a] bicycle without supervision."
Id. at 581.)
69. See the exceptions enumerated in Gissen, supra text accompanying notes 45,
46.
70. 180 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (the negligence of a "parent
entrusting a [five year old] child . . . with a stroller, with instructions to push it in a
crowded department store without supervision [was] ...a jury question rather than
one of law .. " Id. at 481.)
71. Hulsey v. Hightower, 44 Ga. App. 455, 161 S.E. 664 (1931).
72. Langford v. Shu, 258 N.C. 135, 128 S.E.2d 210 (1962).
73. Bullock, 180 So. 2d at 481 (quoting Langford, 258 N.C. at 139, 128 S.E.2d
at 213.
74. 80 So. 2d at 701.
75. 450 So. 2d at 269.
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guage of [section 316 of] the Restatement [(Second) of Torts]."
It is apparent that confusion does exist within the state of Florida as to
not only what the standard is, but also what it should be. A survey of
the laws of other jurisdictions will be helpful in achieving an objective
resolution of these controversies.
B. The Law in Other Jurisdictions
Most courts recognize, as a general rule, the common law caveat
that parents cannot be held liable for their children's acts simply be-
cause of the parent-child relationship.7 7 In fact, any such vicarious lia-
bility, 78 imposed as an exception to the general rule, occurs only when
provided by statutes, which allow limited monetary damages, 79 or when
the family relationship is not a determining factor. For example, when
the parent and the child maintain a master/servant relationship, s" the
laws of agency81 and respondeat superior 2 govern their acts and the
parent/master will be vicariously liable for the child/servant's torts.
Parental liability, in most cases, is based on the parent's own negli-
gent conduct which has caused or at least allowed the child's wrongful
acts to occur. Parental liability is, therefore, direct rather than vicari-
76. Id. at 274.
77. See supra note 4.
78. Vicarious liability is defined as "[i]ndirect legal responsibility; for example,
the liability of an employer for the acts of an employee, or, a principal for torts and
contracts of an agent." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 1404 (5th ed. 1979).
79. See infra note 115.
80. As defined in the Restatement of Agency:
(1) A master is a principal who employs an agent to perform service in his
affairs and who controls or has the right to control the physical conduct of
the other in the performance of the service.
(2) A servant is an agent employed by a master to perform service in his
affairs whose physical conduct in the performance of the service is con-
trolled or is subject to the right to control by the master.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 (1958).
81. An agency is defined as "the fiduciary relation which results from the mani-
festation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and
subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act." Id. at § 1.
82. Respondeat superior is a maxim meaning "that a master is liable in certain
cases for the wrongful acts of his servant. [This d]octrine applies only when relation of
master and servant existed between defendant and wrongdoer at time of injury sued
for, in respect to very transaction from which it arose." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1179 (5th ed. 1979). (citation omitted).
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ous." For example, parents have been held responsible for damage
which results from the accessibility 84 or entrustment85 of dangerous in-
strumentalities to their children. These devices are either inherently
dangerous,"' or they become so due to the young age or lack of experi-
ence of the child. 87 The parental indiscretion in making these instru-
ments available to the child is the basis for liability in these cases. In
fact some jurisdictions impose a duty on parents to be aware of their
child's inability to use certain instruments responsibly.88 Direct liability
is also levied on parents who consent to,89 ratify9" or direct 1 the delin-
83. See supra note 78.
84. See, e.g., Seabrook, 199 So. 2d at 315 (parents who kept loaded pistol in
unlocked place were not negligent as a matter of law as case was properly submitted to
jury). But see Bell v. Adams, 111 Ga. App. 819, 143 S.E.2d 413 (1965) (intentional
shooting of plaintiff's son by defendant's son was an independent criminal act interven-
ing between the defendant's negligence and the injury and thus could not have been
foreseen by the defendant).
85. See Gissen, 80 So. 2d at 703. The Second Restatement of Torts describes
under what circumstance a person is liable for negligent entrustment:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for the use of
another whom the supplier knows or has reason to know to be likely be-
cause of his youth, inexperience, or otherwise, to use it in a manner involv-
ing unreasonable risk of physical harm to himself and others whom the
supplier should expect to share in or be endangered by its use, is subject to
liability for physical harm resulting to them.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 (1965).
See also W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 2, at 914; Comment, Liability of
Negligent Parents for the Torts of their Minor Children, 19 ALA. L. REV. 123 (1966).
86. An inherently dangerous object is defined as one "which has in itself the
potential for causing harm or destruction, against which precautions must be taken.
Dangerous per se, without requiring human intervention to produce harmful effects;
e.g., explosives." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 703 (5th ed. 1979).
87. See infra NOTE 91; see also Southern American Fire Insurance Co. v. Max-
well, 274 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Gudziewski v. Stemplesky, 263
Mass. 103, 106, 160 N.E. 334, 335 (1928) (question of defendant's son being fit to
possess and use an air gun was for the jury); Wilbanks v. Brazil, 425 So. 2d 1123 (Ala.
1983) (mother was not liable for entrusting golf clubs to eight year old son. "If it is
found to be negligent to entrust golf clubs to an ordinary eight-year-old, then parents
would have to keep the golf clubs and similar sports equipment. . . under lock and key
and never allow a child to play with them except when he or she is under some sort of
expert supervision." Id. at 1125.); Thibodeau v. Cheff, 24 Ont. L.R. 214 (Div. Ct.
1911) (child with habit of lighting matches destroyed plaintiff's property-father liable
for failure to control upon notice).
88. See supra note 87.
89. See, e.g., Ryle v. Lafferty, 45 F.2d 641, 642 (D. Idaho 1930); Gissen v.
Goodwill, 80 So. 2d at 703; Langford v. Shu, 258 N.C. 135, 139, 128 S.E.2d 210, 212;
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quent acts of their minor children.
This note focuses upon the most controversial type of direct paren-
tal liability: Parental negligence for the failure to control one's child.
Such negligence stems from the parental duty to exercise restraint and
control over the child. 92 Recognizing this "guiding role of parents in
the upbringing of their children" 93 the Supreme Court of the United
States declared:
[D]eeply rooted in our Nation's history and tradition, is the belief
that the parental role implies a substantial measure of authority
over one's children. Indeed, 'constitutional interpretation has con-
sistently recognized that the parents' claim to authority in their
own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the
structure of our society.' "1
Thus, it is clearly established that parents must exercise some degree of
control over the conduct of their children. However, questions still exist
as to when this duty should be imposed and how its breach should be
treated. Arguably, the best method for determining these questions is
to apply the same test necessary to establish a prima facie case in any
other negligence action;95 i.e. a failure to exercise reasonable care
W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 2, at 914.
90. See, e.g., Ryle, 45 F.2d at 642; Gissen, 80 So. 2d at 703; Hulsey v.
Hightower, 44 Ga. App. 455, 458, 161 S.E. 664, 666 (1931); W. PROSSER & W. KEE-
TON, supra note 2, at 914.
91. See, e.g., Gissen, 80 So. 2d at 703; Seabrook, 199 So. 2d at 317; Ryle, 45
F.2d at 642; W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 2, at 914.
92. When imposed, this duty is based on the parents' opportunity and ability to
control the child, as was stated by the Supreme Court of Arkansas in Bieker v. Owens,
234 Ark. 97, 350 S.W.2d 522 (1961):
[H]ere we are not concerned with the negligence of a child but with the
negligence of the parent in permitting, either actively or passively, a minor
willfully or negligently to commit such acts which could reasonably be ex-
pected to cause injury to another. It is within reason and good logic to say
that the parent has a responsibility to control minor children while they
are in their formative years. For while they are not in the custody of the
parents, absent any official action to the contrary, no other source of con-
trol may be found.
Id. at 99, 350 S.W.2d at 524. See also W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 2, at
914.
93. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 637 (1979).
94. Id. at 638.
95. See, e.g., Lane v. Chatham, 251 N.C. 400, 402, 111 S.E.2d 598, 601 (1959);
Hulsey v. Hightower, 44 Ga. App. 455, 460, 161 S.E. 664, 667 (1931); Langford v.
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under the circumstances.96 This seems to be the true essence of the
language which is found in section 316 of the second Restatement of
Torts. Moreover, it is also the standard applied in the Florida cases of
Seabrook v. Taylor,97 Bullock v. Armstrongt 8 and Southern American
Fire Insurance Co. v. Maxwell9 and advocated by the Third District
Court of Appeal in Snow v. Nelson.100
As an alternative to this general negligence approach, some courts
require specific criteria to be present before this parental duty arises
and its breach occurs. The most restrictive of these alternatives is found
in states which hold parents liable only if their child has had a propen-
sity or habit to commit the same exact wrongful act as that being al-
leged. 01 The narrower, particular act interpretation of Gissen would
bring Florida within this category of states.
In Martin v. Barrett'02 a California district court of appeal estab-
lished such a rule by affirming the dismissal of a complaint against the
parents of a twelve-year-old boy who shot the plaintiff's child in the eye
with an air rifle. The court found that the defendant/father was una-
ware of any prior misuse of the gun or that his boy was using it on the
occasion of the injury. Although the boy's mother was aware of the
gun's use on this occasion, she had no previous notice of any prior mis-
use of the gun by her son.'0 3 In Bieker v. Owens'04 the Arkansas Su-
preme Court found that the defendants had knowledge of their two
sons' habits of "striking, beating and abusing other younger men less
physically endowed than themselves. . . .,111 Despite this knowledge
the parents took no action to correct this behavior. Thus, the parents
Shu, 258 N.C. 135, 139, 128 S.E.2d 210, 213 (1962); cf. Mitchell v. Wiltfong, 4 Kan.
App. 2d 231, 234, 604 P.2d 79, 82 (1979).
96. See supra note 53.
97. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
99. 274 So. 2d at 581; see supra note 68.
100. See supra text accompanying note 76.
101. This is the nature of the controverted 'particular acts' rule which may or
may not currently exist in Florida. See, e.g., Ross v. Souter, 81 N.M. 181, 464 P.2d
911 (N.M. Ct. App. 1970); Horton v. Reaves, 186 Colo. 149, 526 P.2d 304 (1974);
Bocock v. Rose, 213 Tenn. 195, 373 S.W.2d 441 (1963); Norton v. Payne, 154 Wash.
241, 281 P. 991 (1929); Linder v. Bidner, 50 Misc. 2d 320, 270 N.Y.S.2d 427 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1966).
102. 120 Cal. App. 2d 625, 261 P.2d 551 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1953).
103. Id. at 628, 261 P.2d at 553.
104. 234 Ark. 97, 350 S.W.2d 522 (1961).
105. Id. at 98, 350 S.W.2d at 523.
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were held liable for the injuries when their sons dragged the plaintiff
from a car and severely beat him. In Caldwell v. Zaher'0 6 the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts found that a cause of action was stated against
the parents of a child with a "tendency and propensity toward assault-
ing, accosting, tormenting, and molesting young children.' 0 7 This
cause of action was predicated on the fact that they had received notice
of this conduct.'
The general negligence approach to the resolution of this issue is a
fairly broad means of determining liability while the particular acts
approach, on the other hand, is highly restrictive, with liability imposed
in a very limited scenario. A compromise or middle ground can be
found between these two extremes in the 'similar acts' or 'course of
conduct' approach. This latter method, employing features of the other
two, ' 9 is the less restrictive interpfetation of the standard set down in
Gissen.
While these various applications of parental negligence contain
different degrees of notice requirements, it seems that the failure to
attempt some type of restraint over the child is fundamental to the
finding of liability under each theory. This is reflected in cases in which
the plaintiff has failed to establish this point." 0 In Ross v. Souter,"'
106. 344 Mass. 590, 183 N.E.2d 706 (1962).
107. Id. at 591, 183 N.E.2d at 706.
108. Id. at 591, 183 N.E.2d at 706-07; cf. Lane v. Chatham, 251 N.C. 400, 111
S.E.2d 598 (1959) (mother with prior knowledge of son's misuse of air rifle found
liable, while father with no such knowledge was not liable).
109. See, e.g., Moore v. Crumpton, 306 N.C. 618, 295 S.E.2d 436 (1982). In
this case the Supreme Court of North Carolina declared:
Before it may be found that a parent knew or should have known of the
necessity for exercising control over the child, it must be shown that the
parent knew or in the exercise of due care should have known of the
propensities of the child and could have reasonably foreseen that failure to
control those propensities would result in injurious consequences. This does
not mean that the particular injury occurring must have been foreseeable,
but merely that consequences of a generally injurious nature might have
been expected.
Id. at 624, 295 S.E.2d at 440. (citations omitted).
110. See, e.g., Horton v. Reaves, 186 Colo. 149, 526 P.2d 304 (1974). In that
case plaintiff's infant was severely injured when assaulted by the defendant's two chil-
dren. Testimony indicated that the defendant/mother had "reprimanded her children
for ...previous assault-like behavior." The Supreme Court of Colorado found this
"testimony [to] indicate . . . that [the mother] ...exercised due care in watching
over [her sons]. . . ." Thus the Court of Appeals decision that the "issue of . . . [de-
fendant/mother's] negligence should not have been submitted to the jury . . ." was
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for example, evidence indicated that the parents of a minor tortfeasor
had knowledge of their child's "disposition to engage in fights and in-
jure other children." 112 However, the plaintiff's case did not demon-
strate a failure to act by the defendants. In fact a school principal testi-
fied that the defendant/mother had reprimended her son in the school
office."13 Thus, New Mexico's Court of Appeals, in Ross, held that the
defendants were not responsible for the injuries sustained by the plain-
tiff's child.
While these various theories hold parents directly liable for their
own negligence, modern tort law has seen a movement among Ameri-
can states to hold parents vicariously liable, at least to a limited extent,
for some torts committed by their minor children.
V. Statutory Vicarious Liability
As previously indicated, common law did not allow the imputation
of parental liability from the mere existence of the parent/child rela-
tionship." 4 Today, however, every American state" 5 has statutorily im-
upheld. Id. at 154, 526 P.2d at 307.
111. 81 N.M. 181, 464 P.2d 911 (1970).
112. Id. at 184, 464 P.2d 914.
113. Id.
114. See supra note 4.
115.
MAX PI AGE STATE OF
RECOV. COV? LIMITS MIND
ALA. CODE § 6-5-380 (1975). 500 N 18 Int/M/W
ALASKA STAT. § 34.50.020 (1975). 2000 N 18 M/W
ARZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-661 (1956 & Supp.
1982). 2500 Y Minor M/W
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 50-109 (Supp. 1983). 2000 N 18 M/W
CAL. CiV. CODE § 1714.1 (Deering 1984). 10000 Y Minor M/W
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-107 (Supp. 1973 & 1983). 3500 Y 18 M/W
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572 (West Supp. 1984). 3000 Y Minor M/W
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 3922 (1974 & Supp. 1980). 5000 N 18 Int/R
FLA. STAT. § 741.24 (1983). 2500 N 18 M/W
GA. CODE ANN. § 51-2-3 (1976 & Supp. 1984). 5000 N 18 M/W
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 577-3 (1976). none T Minor
IDAHO CODE § 6-210 (1979). 1500 N 18 M/W
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70 §§ 53-57 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1983). 1000 Y 11-19 M/W
IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-31-1 (Burns Supp. 1984). 2500 Y Child Int
IOWA CODE ANN. § 613.16 (West Supp. 1983). 1000 Y 18 Unlaw
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-120 (1981). 1000 Y 18 M/W
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 405.025 (Supp. 1982). 2500 N Minor W
LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2318 (West 1979). none D Minor *
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 217 (Supp. 1979). 800 Y 7-17 M/W
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-829 (1984). 5000 Y Child
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posed some type of vicarious liability upon parents for their children's
acts. Legislatures give consideration to numerous issues when compos-
ing these statutes. For example, twenty of the fifty states permit redress
for property damage only, while the remainder redress personal injury
as well. 116 Age of the tortfeasor is often a consideration, with some
states establishing a minimum age"17 and all setting a maximum. Other
criteria for recovery include a requirement in most states that the
child's actions be willful, wanton or malicious." 8
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85G (West 1984). 2000 Y 7-18 W
MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2913 (1983). 2500 Y Minor M/W
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 540.18 (West 1984). 500 Y 18 M/W
MiSS. CODE ANN. § 93-13-2 (1983). 2000 N 10-18 M/W
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.045 (Vernon 1984). 2000 Y 18 Pur
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-237 (1983). 2500 N 18 M/W
NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-801 (1978). 1000 Y Minor W/Int
NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.470 (1979). 10000 Y Minor W
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 592-A:16 (1974). fine N Minor *
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-15 (West 1984). none N 18 M/W
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-46 (1981). 2500 Y Child M/W
N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 78-a (Consol. 1983). 1500 N 10-18 M/W
N.C. GEN. STAT. .§ 1-538.1 (1983). 1000 Y Minor M/W
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-39 (1976). 1000 N Minor M/W
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3109.9 to 3109.10 (Page
1980). 3k/2k Y 18 M/W
OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 10 (West Supp. 1983). 2500 Y 18 Crim
OR. REV. STAT. § 30.765 (1983). 5000 Y Minor Int
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 2001-2005 (Purdon Supp.
1983). 1000 Y 18 W/T
R.I. GEN. LAWS 8 9-1-3 (Supp. 1983). 1500 Y Minor M/W
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-340 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1983). 1000 N 17 M/Int
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-5-15 (Supp. 1983). 750 Y 18 M/W
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 37-10-101, -102, -103 (1984). 10000 N 18 M/W
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 33.01, -.02 (Vernon 1975 &
Supp. 1984). 15000 N 12-18 M/W
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-11-20, -21 (1977). 1000 N Minor Int
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 901 (1974). 250 Y 17 M/W
VA. CODE §§ 8.01-43, -44 (1984). 500 N Minor M/W
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.190 (Supp. 1984). 3000 Y 18 M/W
W. VA. CODE § 55-7A-2 (Supp. 1984). 2500 Y Minor M/W
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.035 (West 1983). 1000 Y Minor M/W
WYo. STAT. § 14-2-203 (1978). 300 N 10-17 M/W
MAX RECOV. = Maximum amount recoverable from tortfeasor's parent(s).
none = no limit; k = thousand; fine = fine imposed on parent.
PI COV? = Personal Injury Covered by statute.
Y = Yes; N = No; T = Torts; D = Damages.
AGE LIMITS = Limits on age of tortfeasor.
STATE OF MIND = Tortfeasor's state of mind at time tort was committed.
M = Malicious; W = Willful; Unlaw = Unlawful; Int = Intentional; R = Reckless;
Pur = Purposeful; Crim = Criminal; Del = Delinquent; T = Tortious; * = Statute does not
refer to state of mind.
116. See table of statutes in note 115.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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Florida enacted a Parental Liability Statute in 1965.119 In its cur-
rent form it provides victims with recovery of "actual damages . . . not
to exceed $2,500. ' ' 120 This is characteristic of all such statutes which
usually reward the victim a limited sum, no matter how great his or her
loss.' These limits are fairly low, ranging from $250 to $15,000, de-
pending on the jurisdiction. 122 The imposed cap on these rewards indi-
cates that the legislative intent of such statutes is to punish parents and
discourage juvenile delinquency, while compensation of victims seems
to be a secondary consideration. 23
If the legislative goal in enacting these laws is indeed the preven-
tion of juvenile delinquency through parental responsibility, one com-
mentator suggests that a barrier might exist to the fulfillment of this
objective.
An underlying assumption of the legislation is that parents, indif-
119. FLA. STAT. § 45.20 (1965).
120. FLA. STAT. § 741.24 (1983) is entitled "Civil action against parents; willful
destruction or theft of property by minor." It provides:
(1) Any municipal corporation, county, school district, or department
of Florida; any person, partnership, corporation, or association; or any reli-
gious organization, whether incorporated or unincorporated, shall be enti-
tled to recover damages in an appropriate action at law in an amount not
to exceed $2,500, in a court of competent jurisdiction, from the parents of
any minor under age of 18 years, living with the parents, who shall mali-
ciously or willfully destroy or steal property, real, personal, or mixed, be-
longing to such municipal corporation, county, school district, department
of the state, person, partnership, corporation, association, or religious
organization.
(2) The recovery shall be limited to the actual damages in an amount
not to exceed $2,500, in addition to taxable court costs.
121. See Note, The Iowa Parental Responsibility Act, 55 IOWA L. REv. 1037,
1041 (1970).
122. See table of statutes in note 115.
123. The Supreme Court of North Carolina explicitly noted its observation of
this factor in General Insurance Company of America v. Faulkner, 259 N.C. 317, 130
S.E.2d 645 (1963):
[These] statutes appear to have been adopted not out of consideration for
providing a restorative compensation for the victims of injurious or tortious
conduct of children, but as an aid in the control of juvenile delinquency.
Thus, the limitation . . . of liability to malicious or wilful acts of children,
as well as the limitation of liability to an amount not to exceed ...[X
dollars] ...fails to serve any of the general compensatory objectives of
tort law.
Id. at 323, 130 S.E.2d at 650.
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ferent to the current activities of their children, have a sufficient
interest in the law to be familiar with the limitations of the existing
rules concerning their liability for consequences of those activities.
It is further assumed that those indifferent parents, informed of the
change made by the legislature, will undertake their responsibilities
of instruction and supervision of their children.1 14
While this may often be the case, it is submitted that the parent who is
penalized for his or her child's activities will have no choice but to take
notice of such laws and act accordingly. With this threat, perhaps the
parent will begin to undertake these responsibilities in a more serious
manner.
These statutes have been the subject of other types of criticism as
well.125 For example, it has been contended that many states have
passed laws which are inherently vague.'26 The main assertion is that
statutes which purport to apply to "parents" do not specify as to the
scope of this word. In Florida this question was raised in Wyatt v. Mc-
Mullen' 127 with the First District Court of Appeal holding that "[t]here
is no difference, so far as common law tort liability is concerned, be-
tween one in loco parentis' 28 and a natural parent."' 2 9
In a number of cases these statutes have been challenged as un-
constitutional. a30 However, in only one instance has a statute been ad-
124. Note, Parental Liability for Wilful and Malicious Acts of Children, 36
WASH. L. REv. 327, 327-28 (1961).
125. See, e.g., Note, supra note 124 at 327-331; Note, supra note 121 at 1041-
1048; Note, A Constitutional Caveat on the Vicarious Liability of Parents, 87 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 1321, 1326-34 (1972).
126. Note, supra note 121 at 1044.
127. 350 So. 2d 1115 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
128. One who is in loco parentis is said to be "[i]n the place of a parent;
charged, factitiously, with a parent's rights, duties and responsibilities." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 708 (5th ed. 1979).
129. Wyatt, 350 So. 2d at 1117.
130. See Bryan v. Kitamura, 529 Fed. Supp. 394 (D. Hawaii 1982); Alber v.
Nolle, 98 N.M. 100, 645 P.2d 456 (1982); Stang v. Waller, 415 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Haywood v. Ramick, 248 Ga. 841, 285 S.E.2d 697 (1982); Board
of Education of Piscataway Township v. Caffiero, 173 N.J. Super. 204, 413 A.2d 981
(1980), aff'd, 88 N.J. 308, 431 A.2d 799, appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 1025 (1981);
Vanthournout v. Burge, 69 Il1. App. 3d 193, 387 N.E.2d 341 (1979); Rudnay v. Cor-
bett, 53 Ohio App. 2d 311, 374 N.E.2d 171 (1977); Watson v. Gradzik, 34 Conn.
Super. 7, 373 A.2d 191 (Conn. C.P. 1977); In Re Sorrell, 20 Md. App. 179, 315 A.2d
110 (1974); Corley v. Lewless, 227 Ga. 745, 182 S.E.2d 766 (1971); Mahaney v.
Hunter Enterprises, Inc., 426 P.2d 442 (Wyo. 1967); General Insurance Company v.
1984]
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judicated as such. In Corley v. Lewless,1"1 the Georgia Supreme Court
held the Georgia parental liability statute void because the statute vio-
lated both state and Federal due process requirements. 32 However, the
Georgia statute was distinguishable from other state statutes because
Georgia's contained no limits on recovery.' 33 It sought to provide full
redress for both personal injury and property damage. Since the 1971
Corley ruling, the Georgia General Assembly has adopted a new stat-
ute,13 1 omitting the defects which plagued its predecessor.1' 5 This new
legislation expressly states an intention to control delinquency as it
places a limit on parental liability. 36 In 1982 this new statute with-
stood a constitutional challenge in Hayward v. Ramick."7 The Georgia
Supreme Court declared:
We hold that this statute, intended to aid iii reducing juvenile de-
linquency by imposing liability upon parents who control minors is
neither unreasonable, arbitrary nor capricious. We further hold
that the state has a legitimate interest in the subject (controlling
juvenile delinquency), and that there is a rational relationship be-
tween the means used (imposing liability upon parents of children
who wilfully or maliciously damage property) and this object. 38
This language was quoted with approval in Stang v. Waller, 39 the
Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida ruling "that the better view
[of Florida's Parental Liability Statute] supports
constitutionality ... .
Other challenges to statutory constitutionality have been unsuc-
cessful. In General Insurance Company of America v. Faulkner,41 for
example, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that these statutes
Faulkner, 259 N.C. 317, 130 S.E.2d 645 (1963); Kelly v. Williams, 346 S.W.2d 434
(Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
131. 227 Ga. 745, 182 S.E.2d 766 (1971).
132. Id. at 751, 182 S.E.2d at 770.
133. Id. at 749-750, 182 S.E.2d at 769-770.
134. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-2-3 (1976 & Supp. 1982).
135. Id.; Hayward v. Ramick, 248 Ga. 841, 285 S.E.2d 697 (1982).
136. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-2-3(c) (1976 & Supp. 1982).
137. 248 Ga. at 841, 285 S.E.2d at 697.
138. Id. at 843, 285 S.E.2d at 699.
139. 415 So. 2d 123, 124 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
140. Id.
141. 259 N.C. at 317, 130 S.E.2d at 645.
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fall within the state's police power. 4 ' A unique assertion of unconstitu-
tionality was made in the case of Watson v. Gradzik'43 in 1977 when
the defendant parents of a child tortfeasor claimed that Connecticut's
parental liability statute "interfere[d] with the fundamental right to
bear and raise children." 44 The court found the challenged statute to
be constitutional, stating that:
[We] cannot accept the defendant's premise that the fundamental
right to bear and raise children has been interfered with merely
because a parent is held responsible for his child's torts. With the
right to bear and raise children comes the responsibility to see that
one's children are properly raised so that the rights of other people
are protected. 45
While beyond the scope of this note, it bears mentioning that the
Civil law jurisdictions of Louisiana and Hawaii have statutory laws
which are unhampered by common law principals. These statutes hold
parents strictly liable, with certain exceptions, for their child's wrongs.
In these states, such liability is based solely on the familial
relationship. 46
VI. Proposed Direction for Parental Liability in Florida
Snow v. Nelson14 7 provides Florida's Supreme Court with the op-
portunity to take another look at the issue of parental liability for the
acts of minor children, specifically in the area of negligent parental
supervision. The 1955 decision in Gissen v. Goodwill 48 created confu-
sion in this area of Florida tort law. As the Third District Court of
Appeal said of Gissen in Snow, "the Supreme Court's holding in
Gissen, purporting to adopt the similar acts rule, . . . instead creat[ed]
a 'particular acts' rule."'149 The Snows, in their Petitioner's brief to
142. Id. at 323-24, 130 S.E.2d at 650.
143. 34 Conn. Super. 7, 373 A.2d 191 (1977).
144. Id. at 8, 373 A.2d at 192.
145. Id.
146. See HAWAI REV. STAT. § 577-3 (1976); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2318
(West 1979). See also Bryan v. Kitamura, 529 Fed. Supp. 394 (D. Hawaii 1982);
Turner v. Bucher, 308 So. 2d 270 (La. 1975); Marvin, Discerning the Parent's Liabil-
ity for the Harm Inflicted by a Nondiscerning Child, 44 LA. L. REv. 1213 (1984).
147. 450 So. 2d at 269.
148. 80 So. 2d at 701.
149. Snow, 450 So. 2d at 274.
1984]
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Florida's Supreme Court have emphatically asserted that "[t]here ex-
ists in this state no 'particular acts' rule!"150 The Nelsons, on the other
hand, stated in their brief to the District Court of Appeal that
"[a]bsent the specific type of notice that is set out in Gissen, no liabil-
ity can be found as a matter of law."151
The Third District Court of Appeal examined the various alterna-
tives and stated that the "broader rule, . . . a requirement of reasona-
ble care in the circumstances, short of some form of vicarious liability,
is the better rule. '152 This is similar to the position advocated by the
Snow petitioner.
It is submitted that the particular acts rule, if it indeed exists,
should be modified. Currently, under this type of law the parents of a
chronic but creative delinquent can dodge serious liability with a total
disregard for their parental duties. 53 It is inconsistent with the tort
principle of accountability that the parental duty to exercise restraint
and control arises only upon notice of a child's habitual performance of
a single wrongful act. For that matter, a requirement that the child's
actions constitute a course of conduct containing 'similar acts' is not
without its problems either. How many acts make up a course of con-
duct? Three? Ten?
Arguably, the better rule would allow the jury to consider the seri-
ousness of the child's previous act or acts to determine the need, in
each situation, for parental action. As previously submitted, the under-
lying question is: When does this parental duty to exercise control
arise? It appears that the Florida Supreme Court has already answered
this question in the general negligence case Stevens v. Jefferson,5 4 by
stating, "[t]he extent of the defendant's duty is circumscribed by the
scope of the anticipated risks to which the defendant exposes
others."' 55
150. Brief for Petitioner at 21, Snow v. Nelson, No. 65,391 (Fla. filed June 4,
1984) (emphasis in original).
151. Brief for Appellee at 10, Snow v. Nelson, 450 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1984).
152. Snow, 450 So. 2d at 272-73.
153. See generally Murray, Domestic Relations, Second Survey of Florida Law,
12 U. MIAMI L.Q. 317, 352 (1956).
154. 436 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1983).
155. Id. at 35, (quoting with approval Crislip v. Holland, 401 So. 2d 1115, 1117
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981)). The full summary of state negligence law was stated
as follows:
An action for negligence is predicated upon the existence of a legal duty
226 [Vol. 9
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Thus, the parents of a child who maliciously beats another child
on one occasion might have a greater duty to reprimand him than the
parents of a child who has played roughly on a few occasions. This
general negligence approach would allow each case to be examined on
its merits, with the ultimate determination of negligence being made by
the jury. Logically, the requirements for parental negligence should be
commensurate with the requirements of any other negligence action.
Upon receiving notice of their child's scurrilous disposition, parents are
to protect the world at large by deterring continuance of this activity.
The extent of this duty will depend on the severity of the child's mis-
deeds and the probability that others will be harmed if such actions
continue. With this duty the parent should at least make an effort to
exercise restraint over the child. It is the parents' failure to act which is
the basis for liability. Parents who try but fail to control their child's
conduct should not be accountable for this failure. However, those par-
ents who merely acquiesce to the actions of their mischievous offspring
effectively sanction the resulting consequences.
Considering the unique procedural posture in Snow, 156 the first is-
sue in resolving this case under a general negligence approach should
be whether the notice received by Mark Nelson's parents was of such a
nature that it imposed on them the duty to reprimand their son. If in
fact they were told only that "Mark plays too rough,"' 57 the sufficiency
of this notice is questionable. The threshold question is whether Mark's
prior conduct, as conveyed to his parents, was severe enough to war-
rant his reprimand. To determine this severity, the necessary inquiry is
whether his 'rough play' would expose others to an unreasonable risk of
harm. If so, was the type of harm suffered by Randall Snow "within
owed by the defendant to protect the plaintiff from an unreasonable risk of
harm. The extent of the defendant's duty is circumscribed by the scope of
the anticipated risks to which the defendant exposes others. In order to
prevail in a lawsuit, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he is within the
zone of risks that are reasonably foreseeable by the defendant. The liabil-
ity of the tortfeasor does not depend upon whether his negligent acts were
the direct cause of the plaintiffs injuries, as long as the injuries incurred
were the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the tortfeasor's conduct.
If the harm is within the scope of danger created by the defendant's con-
duct, then such harm is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the negli-
gence. The question of foreseeability and whether an intervening cause is
foreseeable is for the trier of fact.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
156. See supra note 35.
157. See supra text accompanying note 34.
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the zone of risks . . . reasonably foreseeable by [Mr. and Mrs. Nel-
son] ?"158 Arguably, this foreseeability requirement has not been met in
this case. It appears that the Snows have attempted to show that
Mark's previous actions constituted a pattern such that a subsequent
incident and injury was a foreseeable consequence of his prior conduct.
A close examination of this pattern reveals that all prior alleged con-
duct was intentional. 159 It is submitted that Mark Nelson's behavior
which resulted in Randall's injury, amounted to negligence. The Snows
have not contended that Mark willfully, maliciously or intentionally
struck Randall with the croquet mallet.
A distinction should be made between injuries which a minor in-
flicts intentionally versus those inflicted negligently. While plausible, it
does not seem likely that a child's negligent conduct becomes reasona-
bly foreseeable upon notice that he has committed prior wrongful acts
which were intentional. Of course, these are considerations which go
towards proximate cause and foreseeability, and as such they are ques-
tions for the trier of fact. The Snow trial judge granted a directed ver-
dict in favor of the Nelsons, but still allowed the jury to reach a verdict
for judicial economy. 60 In that jury's determination, Mark Nelson's
parents were negligent in the supervision of their son.' 6 '
VII. Conclusion
While minors inflict large amounts of damage, they rarely compensate
their victims. The common law rules which disallowed vicarious liabil-
ity from being imputed on parents have been relaxed to allow such lia-
bility on more occasions. In fact, every American state has passed a
parental liability statute, holding parents vicariously liable, to a limited
extent, for their children's torts.6 2 With a single exception, these stat-
utes have withstood constitutional challenges. 6 3 Some courts have held
that these statutes promote valid public interests and are thus within
the state's police power.16 Their provisions for limited recovery indi-
cate that redress of the victim is not always the 'interest' being pro-
moted. In fact some courts have acknowledged that these statutes are
158. See note 155 for full summary of state negligence law.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 29-31.
160. See supra note 35.
161. See supra note 35.
162. See table of statutes in note 115.
163. See supra notes 130-45 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
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more punitive in nature than they are compensatory.'65
Florida's statute, providing limited vicarious liability for property
damage, has been held constitutional. 168 However, its common law
based counterpart, providing unlimited liability for negligent parental
supervision, has been characterized by an intermediate state appellate
court as "harsh doctrine from a distant and dissimilar era.11 7 Thus,
the Supreme Court of Florida has an opportunity to give new consider-
ation to this sensitive issue. While faced with various alternatives, the
state should treat this type of negligence action as it does all negligence
actions. It is a parental duty to protect the world at large from unrea-
sonable risks of harm which become foreseeable upon notice of their
child's wrongful conduct. The extent of this duty shall rise as the mag-
nitude of the threatened harm becomes more severe.
Robert Charles Levine
165. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
167. See supra note 41.
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The Shrinking of the Fourth Amendment Umbrella:
Oliver v. United States
I. Introduction
Recently the United States Supreme Court was called upon to de-
termine the size of the fourth amendment umbrella. In Oliver v. United
States,' the Court was asked whether a search warrant was required,
"for the search of a highly secluded field from which the public is ex-
cluded when a reasonable expectation of privacy can be shown to exist
in that field."' By granting the writ of certiorari, the Court agreed to
settle a question which has plagued lower courts for over fifteen years.
In order to understand the Supreme Court's decision in Oliver, this
comment will begin with a cursory glance at the origin of the fourth
amendment. 3 The evolution of the "open fields" doctrine4 as developed
in five landmark decisions: Hester v. United States,5 Olnstead v.
United States,6 Katz v. United States,' Air Pollution Variance Board
v. Western Alfalfa Corporation,8 and Marshall v. Barlow's Inc. will be
1. -U.S.-, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984).
2. Brief for Petitioner Ray E. Oliver, Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1735
(1984).
3.
The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924), is generally recognized as the
case responsible for the creation of the "open fields" doctrine. The Court held "the
special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their 'persons,
houses, papers, and effects,' is not extended to the open fields. Therefore, if a search is
conducted in an open field, the courts will not apply fourth amendment protection from
unreasonable search and seizure and any evidence obtained as a result of this warrant-
less search will be admissible at trial.
5. id.
6. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
7. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
8. 416 U.S. 861 (1974).
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reviewed. 9 This comment will focus on the analysis employed, as well
as that not employed, by the Court in Oliver. In conclusion, this com-
ment will examine the Court's decision in light of the constant tension
which exists between effective law enforcement and an individual's
right to be free from governmental intrusion.
II. Origin of the Fourth Amendment
Just as American attention is currently focused on volatile issues
such as protecting the environment, preventing the occurrence of a nu-
clear disaster, and reducing the national debt, so were there issues in
the latter half of the eighteenth century which were of equal impor-
tance to the people of this country. 10 One issue more compelling and
immediate than any other in the eighteenth century was America's de-
termination to be free from the dictates of the British Government."
One particularly loathsome practice of the British was the use of writs
of assistance, a device considered to be a major cause of the American
Revolution, and also credited with inspiring the Framers to include the
fourth amendment in the Bill of Rights.'" The British, by utilizing a
procedure known as a writ of assistance, were able to subject the colo-
nists to search and seizures without first showing probable cause.' 3 The
Framers, keenly aware of the abuses a government could subject its
people to, constructed the fourth amendment with an aim to prevent
the new American government from continuing the British practice of
warrantless searches.' 4 As Justice Field explained in his discussion of
the fourth amendment, it is essential to the peace of mind of every
American citizen that he have confidence in his government to protect
his right to keep his private affairs beyond the scrutiny of others.' 5 In
9. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
10. See generally, N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT To THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 103 (1937).
11. Id. at 58-9.
12. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625-26 (1886). For an analysis of this
historic decision, see Note, The Life and Times of Boyd v. United States (1866-1976),
76 MICH. L. REV. 184 (1977).
13. In Boyd, the Court explained that writs of assistance "authorized the exami-
nation of ships and vessels, and persons found therein, for the purpose of finding goods
prohibited to be imported or exported, or on which the duties were not paid; and to
enter into and search any suspected vaults, cellars, or warehouses for such goods."
Boyd, 116 U.S. at 623.
14. Id. at 623-30.
15. In Re Pacific R.R. Comm', 32 F. 241, 250 (1887).
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the decades which followed, the courts struggled to determine the
bounds of fourth amendment protection from unreasonable search and
seizures.'" Although that struggle began over 200 years ago, courts
continue to wrestle with issues that require them to balance the de-
mands of effective law enforcement against the preservation of personal
liberties.
III. The Evolution of the "Open Fields" Doctrine
The open fields doctrine evolved as a result of one of the Supreme
Court's endeavors to determine the extent of fourth amendment protec-
tion. Hester v. United States 7 is the case generally recognized as the
source of this doctrine. The open fields doctrine asserts that the fourth
amendment does not protect activities which take place in the open
fields, i.e. grasslands, ranges, cow pastures or woods.',
In Hester, revenue agents hiding on Hester's father's land, saw
Hester hand a bottle to a man named Henderson.'" When a warning
was given Hester took a gallon jug from a nearby car and he and Hen-
derson ran.20 The officers followed and a pistol was fired.2' The jug
carried by Hester was dropped and the one by Henderson discarded.2
The officers retrieved the discarded bottle and jug which had contained
Of all the rights of the citizen, few are of greater importance or more
essential to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security,
and that involves, not merely protection of his person from assault, but
exemption of his private affairs, books, papers, from the inspection and
scrutiny of others. Without the enjoyment of this right, all other rights
would lose half their value.
16. The continuous development in this area of the law is evidenced by the long
evolution of the "exclusionary rule." E.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914) (origin of the exclusionary rule which held evidence seized in violation of a
person's fourth amendment rights can not be used against that person in federal court);
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (the Court determined the exclusionary rule ap-
plied to the states via the fourteenth amendment); United States v. Leon, -U.S.-,
104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984) (the Court held that the exclusionary rule does not bar the use
of evidence obtained in reasonable reliance on a defective search warrant).
17. Hester, 265 U.S. at 57.
18. An open field is defined as "any unoccupied or undeveloped area outside of
the curtilage. An open field need be neither 'open' nor a 'field' as those terms are used
in common speech." Oliver, - U.S. at ._ 104 S. Ct. at 1742, n.1 1.
19. Hester, 265 U.S. at 58.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
1984]
233
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1984
Nova Law Journal
illicitly distilled moonshine whisky.23 Since a warrant for search or ar-
rest had not been obtained by the revenue officers, Hester claimed that
the police violated his constitutional rights under the fourth amend-
ment.24 Justice Holmes, in delivering the opinion of the Court, stated
that "the special protection accorded by the fourth amendment to the
people in their 'persons, houses, papers and effects,' is not extended to
the open fields. The distinction between the latter and the house is as
old as the common law."'2 5 The Court noted that even though the reve-
nue officers had committed a technical trespass, the fourth amendment
protection did not extend to the area referred to as the open field since
Hester's own acts had disclosed the evidence." In essence, Hester
stands for the proposition that government agents can trespass on prop-
erty from which the public was not excluded during a warrantless
search, and without violating the fourth amendment, could view that
which was exposed to the public.2
Three years later in Olmstead v. United States,2 the Supreme
Court addressed the issue of whether the tapping of telephone wires by
federal officers constituted an illegal search and seizure. 9 The govern-
ment submitted recorded conversations as evidence to prove the defen-
dants had engaged in activities prohibited by the National Prohibition
Act. A closely divided Court determined that there could not be a vio-
lation of a defendant's fourth amendment rights, "unless there has been
an official search and seizure of his person or such a seizure of his
papers or his tangible material effects or an actual physical invasion of
his house 'or curtilage' 0 for the purpose of making a seizure." 3' 1 The
significant point of the Court's analysis is that certain areas are to be
considered "constitutionally protected" and unless a search and seizure
23. Id.
24. Id. at 57-8.
25. Id. at 59.
26. Id. at 58.
27. United States v. Oliver, 686 F.2d 356, 363 (6th Cir. 1982) (Keith, J.,
dissenting).
28. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 438.
29. The wire taps were not done on the property belonging to the defendants. Id.
at 457.
30. Curtilage is a common-law term which describes buildings subject to bur-
glary. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, CRIMINAL LAW 712-13 (1972). Curtilage is de-
fined as "the inclosed space of ground and buildings immediately surrounding a dwel-
linghouse." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 346 (5th ed. 1979).
31. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466.
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took place within those specified areas, the fourth amendment could not
be invoked. 32 This decision made actual physical intrusion into the de-
fendant's house or within the curtilage a prerequisite to a fourth
amendment defense.3 3 For many decades, Olmstead's per se rule al-
lowed law enforcement personnel to conduct arbitrary warrantless
searches of the area beyond the curtilage. This locational approach to
defining the reach of the fourth amendment became the subject of criti-
cism 34 and was eventually overruled in Katz v. United States.3 5
Katz is credited with dramatically altering fourth amendment
analysis employed in determining whether an illegal search and seizure
took place. In Katz, the defendant was convicted for transmitting ille-
gal gambling information from a public phone booth. 6 The government
introduced evidence of these conversations, overheard by F.B.I. agents
who had placed electronic listening and recording devices on the
outside of a telephone booth.37 The Supreme Court held that Katz's
fourth amendment rights had indeed been violated because the govern-
ment had invaded an area in which Katz had a reasonable expectation
of privacy. 38 The Court rejected the locational approach to fourth
amendment protection employed in Olmstead.39 Instead, the Court de-
termined that the focus of the application of fourth amendment protec-
tion centers on one's right of privacy. 40 The Court held, that the
"fourth amendment protects people, not places. What a person know-
ingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office is not a
subject of fourth amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve
as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitution-
ally protected.'
The Court concluded that the common-law property concepts of
32. Id. at 466.
33. Id.
34. E.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (the Court held that
conversations can be the subject of fourth amendment violations even without a techni-
cal trespass); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (the Court refused to restrict
the concept of unlawful search and seizures to the limitations of common-law property
rights and held the spirit of the fourth amendment was to protect the privacy rights of
individuals).
35. Katz, 389 U.S. at 350.
36. Id. at 348.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 353.
39. Id. at 352-53.
40. Id. at 353.
41. Id. at 351.
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trespass and curtilage were to be considered only as factors in deter-
mining if a fourth amendment violation had taken place.42 Writing for
the majority, Justice Stewart stated that the activities of the F.B.I. had
indeed "violated the privacy upon which . . .[Katz] had justifiably re-
lied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a 'search and
seizure' within the meaning of the fourth amendment. '43 The Court
then had to determine whether the governmental activities met with
constitutional standards.44 Failure of the officers in Katz to obtain the
approval of a neutral magistrate, prompted the Court to clarify its pol-
icy on the warrant requirement. The Court viewed the warrant require-
ment as a necessary safeguard to assure that independent judicial re-
view determines whether there is probable cause to issue a search
warrant.45 Acknowledging that the officers believed that their activities
would produce evidence of a particular crime and that they carried out
their investigation by utilizing the least intrusive means, the Court,
nevertheless, held the warrantless search to be unlawful.46 The Court
concluded, "that searches conducted outside the judicial process, with-
out prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable
under the fourth amendment-subject only to a few specifically estab-
lished and well delineated exceptions. 47
Another major contribution of Katz to fourth amendment analysis
was the two-pronged test set forth in Justice Harlan's concurring opin-
ion. Designed to further define the standard of review applicable in de-
termining when the fourth amendment's protections should be ex-
tended, the test requires: "first that a person have exhibited an actual
42. Id. at 353.
43. id.
44. Id. at 354.
45. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1963); United
States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975).
See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) which contains Justice Jackson's
classic explanation of the rationale behind the fourth amendment warrant requirement:
Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer en-
gaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. ...
When the right to privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is,
as a rule, to be decided by judicial officer, not by a policeman or govern-
ment enforcement agent.
Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14.
46. Warrantless searches have been considered unlawful regardless of probable
cause. See, e.g., Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925).
47. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
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(subjective) expectation of privacy, and second, that the expectation be
one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "48 That this
test was readily adopted by courts throughout the country and, is in
fact frequently quoted in other Supreme Court majority opinions, per-
haps accounts for the particularly powerful impact of Justice Harlan's
concurrence.
The next major case to amplify the Court's application and inter-
pretation of the "open fields" doctrine was Air Pollution Variance
Board v. Western Alfalfa Corporations.49 A State Board of Health In-
spector entered the outdoor premises of the defendant's business, from
which the public was not excluded, and conducted visual pollution
tests.5" The evidence obtained from this daylight test proved that the
emissions from the business' chimneys violated state statutes.5' The
business claimed that the inspector's failure to obtain either a search
warrant or the consent of the owners violated its fourth amendment
right to be free from unreasonable searches. 52 The Court observed that
the inspector did not enter the plant or offices, and in fact had "sighted
what anyone in the city who was near the plant would see in the
sky-plumes of smoke." 53 Justice Douglas then noted the Hester deci-
sion and Justice Holmes' refusal to "extend the fourth amendment to
sights seen 'in the open field.' "-5 In essence, the Court held that it did
not constitute an illegal search and seizure, within the meaning of the
fourth amendment, for a government agent to trespass upon land from
which the public is not excluded and to submit as evidence anything
exposed to the public view. 55
Justice Douglas did not clarify whether the decision would have
been different, had the inspector entered land in which the owners had
exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy. Yet the Court's emphasis
on the fact that the inspector was on premises open to the public, ar-
guably implies that this fact affected the Court's conclusion.56 Also
noteworthy is the language chosen by Justice Douglas in quoting the
Hester decision. Douglas speaks of Holmes' refusal to extend constitu-
48. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
49. Air Pollution Variance Board, 416 U.S. at 861.
50. Id. at 862-63.
51. Id. at 863-64.
52. Id. at 864.
53. Id. at 865.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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tional protection to "sights seen 'in the open field.' -5 This language
will be significant in the later examination of Oliver since in that case
the police had to trespass on highly secluded, fenced and posted land
before they were in a position to view the sights seen in that so called
"open field." 58
The Supreme Court refined the definition of a permissible war-
rantless search in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.59 In Marshall, a business-
man refused to allow a warrantless search by an Occupational Safety
and Health Administration inspector who was looking for safety
hazards and regulatory violations.60 The Court upheld the district
court's decision, which held that statutory authorization for warrantless
searches were unconstitutional.61The Court determined that a govern-
ment inspector "[w]ithout a warrant stands in no better position than a
member of the public. What is observable by the public is observable,
without a warrant, by the government inspection as well."62 At this
phase of evolution the open fields doctrine appeared to relegate a gov-
ernment agent, minus a search warrant, to exactly the same position as
any other member of the public.
In order to clarify the case law development of the open fields doc-
trine under the fourth amendment, the following is a brief summary of
the previously discussed cases:
1. Hester (1924): Fourth amendment protection does not extend to
the open fields.13
2. Olmstead (1928): Actual physical intrusion into the house or sur-
rounding curtilage is required before one's fourth amendment rights
could be violated.64
3. Katz (1967): a. This is a shift from the locational approach of
Olmstead, to the reasonable expectation of privacy test: "Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places."6 5
b. Harlan's test for determining whether the privacy expectation
is reasonable "first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that
57. Id.
58. Oliver, 686 F.2d at 358.
59. Marshall, 436 U.S. at 307.
60. Id. at 310.
61. Id. at 325.
62. Id. at 315.
63. Hester, 265 U.S. at 59.
64. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466.
65. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
[Vol. 9
238
Nova Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [1984], Art. 10
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol9/iss1/10
Oliver v. United States
society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "6
c. Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the fourth
amendment (subject to a few exceptions).67
4. Air Pollution (1974): Warrantless searches are permitted in areas
from which the public is not excluded.68
5. Marshall (1978): Without a warrant a government official is in no
better position than any other member of the public and conversely
anything exposed to the public is observable by the police.69
The years between 1924, when Justice Holmes first articulated the
"open fields" doctrine in Hester, and 1978 when the Court issued its
ruling in Marshall, produced many changes in the doctrine. A consid-
erable amount of confusion resulted from this evolutionary process and
courts were uncertain whether Hester remained viable in light of Katz.
This is evidenced by the varied interpretations and applications of the
open fields doctrine in courts throughout the country. Many courts al-
lowed warrantless searches only of areas from which the public was not
excluded and where a reasonable expectation of privacy, as measured
by the two-prong test, was absent.7" This method of application of the
open fields doctrine, constituted a rejection of the per se approach of
Hester, and an adoption of the reasonable expectation of privacy test
developed in Katz. Other courts, however, continued to apply the loca-
tional analysis of the Olmstead decision to the holding in Hester.
Under this latter view, the area labeled as the open field was beyond
the zone of fourth amendment protection or outside of the constitution-
66. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 357.
68. Air Pollution Variance Board, 416 U.S. at 865.
69. Marshall, 436 U.S. at 315.
70. See, e.g., United States v. Lace, 669 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 1982), where the
court referred to the "Hester-Katz rationale" as determinative in cases involving the
"open fields" doctrine. This combined rationale considers activities observable by the
general public to be observable by government agents without a warrant, and con-
versely, that which is excluded from public view can not be used as evidence by the
police without a warrant; see also United States v. Varkonyi, 645 F.2d 453 (5th Cir.
1981) (government agents observed illegal aliens working in fenced scrap metal yard);
United States v. Mullinex, 508 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Ky. 1980) (court rejected a
per se approach to the "open fields" doctrine and held a reasonable expectation of
privacy, Justice Harlan's two-pronged test, to be controlling); United States v. Swart,
679 F.2d 698, 702 (7th Cir. 1982) (The analysis used in Katz, prohibits a rule deter-
mining an activity which takes place a particular distance from the house or curtilage
to be, as a matter of law, denied fourth amendment protection).
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ally protected areas.71 Due to the uncertainty concerning the scope of
the open fields doctrine in the wake of Katz, the Supreme Court
granted the writ of certioari in Oliver.72
IV. Statement of the Case
Without the aid of a clear ruling from the Supreme Court, lower
courts have been required to determine on their own if and when the
open fields doctrine applies as a viable exception to the fourth amend-
ment warrant requirement. The divergent lower court holdings of
United States v. Oliver73 and State v. Thornton7 4 are representative of
the problem which has existed in courts across the country. The prob-
lem is dramatically underscored by the contrary decisions reached in
these two cases which possess almost identical facts.75 The question
presented in each of these cases was whether the open fields doctrine
allows government agents to trespass upon and search for marijuana
fields without a warrant, where the fields are secluded, surrounded by
no trespassing signs and clearly exhibit the landowner's subjective ex-
71. See, e.g., United States v. Oliver, 686 F.2d 356 (6th Cir. 1982) (en banc)
(the Court held that Hester applied to a field that was fenced and posted); United
States v. Williams, 581 F.2d 451 (5th Cir. 1978) cert. denied, 440 U.S. 972 (1979)
(Hester still considered viable in light of Katz analysis); Ford v. State, 264 Ark. 141,
569 S.W.2d 105 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 947 (1979) (applied "open fields" doc-
trine to posted land which was fenced and had a locked gate).
72. The inconsistency which resulted from different interpretations and applica-
tions of the "open fields" doctrine prompted the Supreme Court to first grant certioari
in State v. Brady, 406 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 1981), cert. granted, 456 U.S. 988 (1982),
cert. dismissed in part, vacated in part - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 2380 (1984). In Brady,
the Florida Supreme Court determined that the fourth amendment prohibited applica-
tion of the "open fields" doctrine when contraband was seized in a warrantless search
of land posted, surrounded by barbed wire, and secured by locked gates. However, due
to procedural difficulties, the viability of the case became questionable. This comment
assumes the Court granted the writ of certiorari in Oliver as a result of these proce-
dural developments in Brady.
73. Oliver, 686 F.2d at 356. For an analysis of this 5 to 4 decision see, Glickman,
Katz In Open Fields, 20 AMER. CRIM. L. REV. 485, 497 (1983), and Gibson, How
Open Are Open Fields? United States v. Oliver, 14 U. TOL. L. REV. 133, 157 (1982).
74. 453 A.2d 489 (Me. 1982).
75. In Oliver, tried before the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit, the court found the warrantless search of Petitioner's fenced and posted property
was not a violation of the fourth amendment rights. Yet in Thornton, heard before the
Maine Supreme Judicial Court, the court held that entry by government agents onto
defendant's fenced and posted land was a violation of his fourth amendment rights.
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pectation of privacy.
In United States v. Oliver,76 the defendant, Ray Oliver, was a re-
tired farmer living with his wife and daughter in the Commonwealth of
Kentucky on a two hundred acre farm which he owned.77 Oliver used a
portion of his farm to raise hogs, and the rest he leased to third par-
ties.78 In the summer of 1980, the Kentucky State Police received an
anonymous tip that marijuana was being grown on Oliver's farm.7 9
Without attempting to secure a search warrant or to obtain Oliver's
consent, the police proceeded to the farm to investigate.80 They drove
down Oliver's private road past several "No Trespassing" signs, until a
locked gate blocked their path.8 At this point the agents abandoned
their car and slipped through a gap in the gate on a path clearly
marked with a "No Trespassing" sign."' The narcotics agents pro-
ceeded to walk three-quarters of a mile down the road and past a barn
and truck camper. After the police had walked approximately one
quarter of a mile beyond the barn and camper, a man appeared near
the camper and requested the agents to turn around and come back.
The officers stated that they were Kentucky State Police and did in fact
begin to walk back toward the camper. However, the person who had
requested they leave the property was no longer present.83 The officers
continued with the investigation proceeding through a wooded area un-
til they came upon two fields of marijuana. The fields were located at
the rear of the farm84 in a secluded area surrounded by a natural bar-
rier of trees, banks and fences. 85 The facts clearly indicate that one
could not view these marijuana fields unless he were standing on Oli-
ver's land and had gone to the same trouble to view the fields as the
agents had.86
The government charged Oliver with manufacturing marijuana. 7
76. Oliver, 686 F.2d at 356.
77. Id. at 358.
78. Id. at 361 (Keith, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 358.
80. Id. at 362 (Keith, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 358.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 362 (Keith, J., dissenting).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 358. Oliver was charged under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1981) and 18
U.S.C. § 2 (1969).
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The Kentucky District Court found that the state police had violated
Oliver's fourth amendment rights and granted the defendant's motion
to suppress the marijuana evidence. The Sixth Circuit applied Justice
Harlan's two-prong test to determine first, if Oliver exhibited an actual
expectation of privacy, and second, if the expectation was one that soci-
ety is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Under this standard the
Sixth Circuit court found that Oliver possessed a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy sufficient to require a search warrant. 88 However, on
rehearing the Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed and found that
any expectation of privacy in an open field is, as a matter of law,
unreasonable.8 9
In State v. Thornton,90 the companion case of Oliver, the Maine
police received an anonymous tip that marijuana was being grown on
property located off of the Davis Corner Road.9 The officers proceeded
to the Davis Corner Road and following the directions given by the
informant entered the Thornton property by walking between a mobile
home and an adjacent house until they came upon an "overgrown tote
road."92 The officers continued on this path and discovered two clear-
ings fenced in with chicken wire which contained marijuana. Due to
the density of the woods, it was not possible to see the patches of mari-
Under title 21:
(a) Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any
person knowingly or intentionally-
(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to man-
ufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance; or
(2) to create, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to distribute,
or dispense, a counterfeit substance.
21 U.S.C. § 841 (1981); Under title 18:
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets,
counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a
principal.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly per-
formed by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is
punishable as a principal.
18 U.S.C. § 2 (1969).
88. United States v. Oliver, 657 F.2d 85, 88 (6th Cir. 1981). Circuit Judges
Keith and Lively, and District Judge Rice, sitting in designation, made up the panel in
the original decision.
89. Oliver, 686 F.2d at 360.
90. Thornton, 453 A.2d at 489.
91. Id. at 490.
92. Id.
242
Nova Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [1984], Art. 10
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol9/iss1/10
Oliver v. United States
juana from any significant distance whatsoever.93 The Thornton prop-
erty was surrounded by an old barbed wire fence, an old stone wall,
and numerous "No Trespassing" signs. The officers left the area once
they determined that the plants were marijuana.94
Three days later the state trooper involved in the initial search of
the Thornton property, filed an affidavit and obtained a warrant to
search the defendant's land.95 The trooper relied on three factors to
substantiate his claim of probable cause: 1) he had seen marijuana
growing on the defendant's land in 1980; 2) his observations from the
warrantless search three days earlier; and 3) the information given by
the anonymous informant.9" A warrant was granted based on the affi-
davit and the trooper returned to the Thornton property and confis-
cated the marijuana. Thornton was subsequently charged with unlaw-
fully furnishing scheduled drugs in violation of state law.97
Thornton moved to suppress both the evidence seized and the ob-
servations of the government agents. The Superior Court of Somerset
County granted the order to suppress upon finding: 1) that the District
Attorney had abandoned any attempt to prove the informant's tip justi-
fied the issuance of the warrant; 2) that the information gathered in the
state trooper's 1980 search was stale and possibly obtained during an
unlawful search; and 3) that the sole remaining ground for substantiat-
ing the validity of the warrant rested entirely on the observations of the
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 491.
97. Id. at 490. Thornton was charged with unlawfully furnishing scheduled drugs
which is a violation of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1106. That section provides:
1. A person is guilty of unlawfully furnishing scheduled drugs if he inten-
tionally or knowingly furnishes what he knows or believes to be a sched-
uled drug, and which is, in fact, a scheduled drug, unless the conduct
which constitutes such furnishing is either:
A. Expressly authorized by Title 22;
B. Expressly made a civil violation by Title 22.
2. Violation of this section is:
A. A Class C crime if the drug is scheduled W drug; or
B. A Class D crime if the drug is scheduled X, Y, or Z drug.
3. A person shall be presumed to be unlawfully furnishing a scheduled
drug if he intentionally or knowingly possesses more than 1 ounces of
marijuana.
17 A M.R.S. A. § 1106 (1983).
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state trooper.98 According to the trial judge, the central issue was
whether the initial warrantless search of the police qualified as an ex-
ception to the warrant requirement. Taking into consideration the na-
ture of the land searched, that it was secluded, had been fenced in and
that signs were posted, the court concluded that Thornton had a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy and that the initial search was unlaw-
ful.99 The Maine Supreme Court affirmed, upholding the trial court's
determination that the initial search violated Thornton's reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy and that the open fields doctrine did not apply.100
Consequently, the evidence obtained in Thornton constituted the
fruit of an unlawful search and seizure and, therefore, was inadmissi-
ble. However, in Oliver a contrary decision was reached, allowing the
evidence to be introduced at trial even though it was obtained under
almost identical circumstances. As stated, both cases used different but
presumptively valid Supreme Court cases to arrive at different results.
It, therefore, became necessary for the Supreme Court to clarify the
fourth amendment standard for search and seizures in the open fields.
V. Analysis of Case
Because the Court consolidated the cases of Oliver v. United
States'' and State v. Thornton0 2 this comment will also focus on the
issues raised by these cases as though they were one. The Court in
Oliver concluded that fourth amendment protection does not extend to
posted and fenced fields which clearly manifest the property owner's
expectation of privacy. 0 3 In reaching this decision, the Court first de-
clared that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend an intrusion
by government agents onto land located beyond the curtilage to be pro-
scribed by the laws against unreasonable search and seizure. 04 Second,
the Court stated that in light of Hester, "an individual may not legiti-
mately demand privacy for activities conducted out of doors in fields,
except in the area immediately surrounding the home."'1
In determining whether the defendants had a justifiable expecta-
98. Id. at 491-92.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 495-96.
101. Docket No. 82-15.
102. Docket No. 82-1273.
103. Oliver, -U.S. at-, 104 S. Ct. at 1743.
104. Id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1740.
105. Id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1741.
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tion of fourth amendment protection, the Supreme Court specifically
stated that no single factor was to be determinative. 106 Rather, a num-
ber of components were to be considered: 1) the intentions of the Fram-
ers of the Constitution; 2) the use made of the area by the defendants;
and 3) the understanding of society that certain locations requie fas-
tidious protection from government intrusions.'07
The Court reasoned that the Framers' substitution of the word
"effects" in place of "property," which James Madison had in his pro-
posed draft of the fourth amendment, is evidence of their intent to limit
the protection of the fourth amendment to personal rather than real
property. 0 8 Therefore, the Court concluded, "the government's intru-
sion upon the open fields is not one of those 'unreasonable searches'
proscribed by the text of the fourth amendment." 09 This narrow inter-
pretation of the fourth amendment is sharply divergent from the path
taken in past Supreme Court decisions. For example, this new interpre-
tation of the Framers' intent is inconsistent in light of the Court's hold-
ing in Katz" 0 that a conversation in a public phone booth is worthy of
fourth amendment protection; as well as with the Court's holding in
Marshall"' that an office or commercial establishment, that excluded
the public, is protected from warrantless searches. It is also at odds
with the Court's prior attitude toward constitutional interpretation as
demonstrated in the cases of Boyd v. United States"2 and Weems v.
United States."13
Cases such as Boyd represent the method of constitutional inter-
pretation utilized to guard values traditionally deemed worthy of the
Supreme Court's protection. In Boyd, Justice Bradley warned that a
strict construction of the fourth amendment will result in a gradual loss
of the personal rights the amendment was created to protect."14 Clauses
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at -, at 1740.
109. Id.
110. 389 U.S. 347.
111. 436 U.S. at 310.
112. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 616.
113. 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
114. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 635.
This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provi-
sions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed.
A close and literal construction of them deprives them of half their efficacy
and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in
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designed to protect the individual from governmental abuses of power,
were also the focus of the Court's attention in Weems v. United States.
Justice McKenna emphasized that it is better to read the Constitution
liberally, for although a particular wrong might have inspired the crea-
tion of an amendment, in order for the underlying principle to remain
vital it "must be capable of wider application than the mischief which
gave it birth.""" In the dissent in Oliver, Justice Marshall's style of
Constitutional interpretation is in harmony with that employed by Jus-
tice Bradley in Boyd and Justice McKenna in Weems. In Oliver Justice
Marshall stated that "[t]he fourth amendment, like the other central
provisions of the Bill of Rights that loom large in our modern jurispru-
dence, was designed, not to prescribe with 'precision' permissible and
impermissible activities, but to identify a fundamental human liberty
that should be shielded forever from governmental intrusion." '116 Only
if the Constitution is liberally construed to allow the courts to effectu-
ate the purposes of the Framers, will our individual liberties be
protected.
Although the Supreme Court purported to use the reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy test, in effect the Oliver Court injected a threshold
question into the second prong of Justice Harlan's test: "whether the
government's intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal values
protected by the fourth amendment?" By determining that the Fram-
ers never intended that fourth amendment protection should extend to
the area beyond the curtilage, the Court did not need to proceed any
further with an examination of Justice Harlan's test. For once the
Court decided that the Framers would not accept the defendants' ex-
pectation of privacy in an open field as reasonable, it followed that soci-
ety, too, was not prepared to recognize an expectation of privacy as
reasonable, which was not based on a right protected by the Constitu-
tion. Although it appears that the Oliver Court is using a fresh ap-
sound than in substance. It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the
constitutional rights of the citizen, and guard against any stealthy en-
croachments thereon.
115. Weems, 217 U.S. at 373.
Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is true, from
an experience of evils, but its general language should not, therefore, be
necessarily confined to the form that evil had theretofore taken. Time
works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. There-
fore a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the
mischief which gave it birth. This is peculiarly true of constitutions.
116. Oliver, -U.S.-, 104 S. Ct. at 1745 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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proach it was actually in Olmstead that the Supreme Court first de-
clared that certain areas were to be considered "constitutionally
protected." Both Courts based their .decisions upon a literal construc-
tion of the fourth amendment and determined that unless a search and
seizure took place within those specified areas, the fourth amendment
did not apply.
Arguably, the decision by the Court in Oliver, is a retreat back to
the period of constitutional interpretation which existed prior to Katz.
Although Katz overruled the Olmstead "constitutionally protected ar-
eas" method for application of fourth amendment protection, the Oliver
decision appears to draw once again upon that antiquated locational
approach. By ruling that constitutional prohibitions forbidding war-
rantless searches and seizures do not apply to specific areas, i.e. open
fields, no matter what the individuals subjective expectation of privacy
might be, the Court appears to be utilizing pre-Katz analysis. Regard-
less of the approach taken, a direct result of the Court's decision in
Oliver is that police officers will no longer be required to prove proba-
ble cause to an impartial magistrate before conducting a "search" of
that portion of a citizen's property which lies beyond the curtilage. Far
from carrying out the intentions of the Framers, the Court's narrow
interpretation of the fourth amendment actually impedes protection of
the fundamental values which it was designed to safeguard.
Additional factors examined by the Court include: the use made of
the areas by Oliver and Thornton, and whether society requires fastidi-
ous protection from government intrusion of clearly marked privately
owned property.117 As an example of a use which has historically re-
ceived fastidious fourth amendment protection, the Court discussed the
"sanctity of the home.""' 8 Writing for the majority in Oliver Justice
Powell contrasted activities which take place in the home with those
that occur in open fields, and concluded that the level of intimacy for
activities in open fields was insufficent to warrant "an expectation [of
privacy] that 'society recognizes as reasonable.' "1119 Three reasons were
given by the Court for reaching this conclusion: 1) "open fields are
accessible to the public and the police in ways that a home, office, or
commercial structure would not be,"'120 2) posting and fencing "do not
117. Oliver, -U.S., 104 S. Ct. at 1741.
118. Id.
119. Id. The cultivation of crops was an example, given by Justice Powell, of
activities that take place in open fields.
120. Id.
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effectively bar the public from viewing open fields,"' 21 and 3) "the pub-
lic and police lawfully may survey land from the air."' 22
Arguably, in making the determination that any expectation of
privacy a landowner might have in an open field is per se unreasonable,
the Oliver Court did not fully utilize the test as outlined in Katz. Ac-
cording to Justice Harlan's test as outlined in Katz, the inquiry should
have been whether the defendants had a reasonable (subjective) expec-
tation of privacy which society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable. 2 '
Although the premise that only property interests limit the power
of the government to conduct warrantless searches has been rejected by
the Court,2 4 common-law property concepts are still relied on to help
determine whether the expectation of privacy in the area in question is
reasonable.' 25 As Justice Powell observed in his concurrence in Rakas
v. Illinois, "property rights reflect society's explicit recognition of a
person's authority to act as he wishes in certain areas, and therefore
should be considered in determining whether an individual's expecta-
tions of privacy are reasonable."'1 2 6 Accordingly, the common law has
long recognized the right to exclude others as an incident of property
ownership.12 7 It is this right to exclude which creates a legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy.' 28
The steps taken by both Thornton and Oliver to exclude the public
from their land clearly manifest a subjective expectation of privacy. It
was not possible to see either field from any direction of public access.
Nor was it the government's contention that the police had probable
cause for the warrantless search, or that exigent circumstances existed
which would have done away with the warrant requirement. 129 The
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
124. Id. at 353.
125. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 at 143, 144 n.12 (1978) (Powell,
J., concurring): ("the Court has not altogether abandoned the use of property concepts
in determining the presence or absence of the privacy interest protected by [the
Fourth] Amendment"); and Marshall, 436 U.S. at 312 (1978) ("if the government
intrudes [upon] a person's property, the privacy interest suffers .....
126. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 153.
127. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATC Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435
(1982) ("The power to exclude has traditionally been considered one of the most trea-
sured strands in the owner's bundle of property rights").
128. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 153.
129. Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1738 n.1.
[Vol. 9
248
Nova Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [1984], Art. 10
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol9/iss1/10
Oliver v. United States
Court in Katz found the warrant requirement a necessary safeguard to
assure that an impartial tribunal determines whether there is probable
cause to issue a search warrant.130 A warrantless search is justified only
under the strict guidelines established as exceptions to the warrant re-
quirement. The five basic exceptions' include: incident to a lawful ar-
rest;132 probable cause and exigent circumstances; 133 suspect consents
to the search; 34 hot pursuit; 35 and stop and frisk.' 36 These exceptions
apply where the general welfare of society, balanced against the indi-
vidual's privacy interest, warrant government action. It was clearly es-
tablished in Katz, that searches which are conducted without the prior
approval of a magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the fourth
amendment.'37
In the lower courts, resolution of the inquiry as to whether a war-
rantless search was justified according to the open fields doctrine in-
volved an objective appraisal of surrounding circumstances, in particu-
lar the existence of gates, signs, fences, and locks.' 8 The fact that both
Oliver and Thornton owned the land lends additional credence to their
assertion of a justifiable expectation of privacy. It is also important to
note that in both Kentucky and Maine, violation of the property rights
130. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. The purpose of the fourth amendment's warrant
requirement is to protect citizens from arbitrary intrusion by the government into their
private domain.
131. The "plain view" doctrine allows the police to seize evidence, in plain view,
and inadvertently seen in the course of a lawful search in regard to another crime. See,
e.g., Collidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1970); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730
(1982).
132. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 35 (1979).
133. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1979).
134. Schnickloth v. Bustomonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973).
135. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967).
136. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968).
137. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
138. Compare, e.g., United States v. Lace, 669 F.2d 46 (2nd Cir. 1982) (held a
warrantless search was justified because the property was not posted and the public
could enter at will), United States v. Balsamo, 468 F. Supp. 1363, 1379 (D. Me. 1979)
(search justified because the land was not posted or fenced), and United States v.
Miller, 589 F.2d 1117, (1st Cir. 1978) (warrantless search allowed since outsiders
could enter at will); with United States v. Dunn, 674 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1982)
(fenced property is protected), vacated -_U.S.-., 104 S. Ct. 2380 (1984) and State
v. Brady, 406 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 1981) (property protected where posted and fenced),
cert. granted, 456 U.S. 988 (1982), cert. dismissed in part, vacated in part -U.S.-,
104 S. Ct. 2380 (1984).
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of others is considered a criminal offense.' 3 9 In determining whether a
defendant's asserted privacy expectations were justifiable, the Supreme
Court, prior to the Oliver decision, inquired as to whether the defen-
dant "took normal precautions to maintain his privacy. ' 140 If such pre-
cautions were taken by the defendant, the Court usually determined
that without a warrant a government official was in no better position
than any other member of the public.' 4 ' In Oliver, had a private citizen
entered the property concerned, he would clearly have been trespassing
and therefore committing a criminal offense.
The Court in Oliver makes it clear that violations of a citizen's
property interest by a government agent will not, in and of itself, create
a fourth amendment problem. Although the majority does not specifi-
cally address the issue of criminal trespass, that the Court is unwilling
to suppress the evidence means, in essence, that the only remaining
remedy for the defendants is to sue the officers for trespass. Needless to
say this remedy falls short of being of any real assistance to either
Oliver or Thornton. Ultimately the only remedy that truly counts is
application of the exclusionary rule.
Apparently the approach, developed in Marshall,'42 has now been
rejected by the Court. In Oliver, the Court supported its decision that a
trespass by a government agent upon an open field is not necessarily a
violation of the fourth amendment, stating that Katz determined that
property interests do not control the right of the government to search
and seizure.'4 3 It is important to note, that the purpose behind Katz in
discarding the Olmstead "constitutionally protected areas" approach,
was to shift the focus away from the place being intruded upon by
government officials and to place it on the person being subjected to the
warrantless search. Presumably, the objective of the Court in Katz, was
to increase the size of the fourth amendment umbrella and thereby
broaden constitutional protection.
The third rationale offered by the Oliver Court to show that the
defendants' expectation of privacy was unreasonable, was that aerial
surveillance could have been used to gather sufficient evidence to obtain
139. Ky. REv. STAT. § 511.070(1), .080, (1975 & 1984); and ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. TIT. 17A, § 402(1)(c) (1983).
140. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105 (1980).
141. Marshall, 436 U.S. at 315.
142. Id.
143. Oliver, -U.S.-., 104 S. Ct. at 1743.
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a search warrant or to justify a warrantless search.'" The utilization of
sophisticated technology which makes this type of wide-ranging, arbi-
trary search for crime possible, threatens the basic constitutional right
to be free from unreasonable search and seizures.' 4" As one writer
stated, "U]udicial implementations of the fourth amendment need con-
stant accomodation to the ever-intensifying technology of surveil-
lance."'14 6 The cases of Olmstead and Katz demonstrate that there are
times when fourth amendment interpretation has lagged behind rapidly
developing technologies of surveillance, and thus newer techniques
which invade privacy may go temporarily unrecognized as "searches"
and "seizures."'4 7 In this era of ever-increasing surveillance capabili-
ties, care must be taken to ensure that tomorrow's sophisticated surveil-
lance devices, do not go so far as to deprive Americans of the right to
privacy recognized by the Supreme Court as existing within the "sanc-
tity of the home."' 48
VI. Justice Marshall's Dissent
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan and Justice Stevens
dissented in Oliver. These Justices listed three factors traditionally used
to determine whether a person's expectation of privacy in a physical
space is reasonable: 1) whether the defendants' expectation of privacy
was recognized by positive law; 2) the potential uses of the open fields
on defendants' property; and 3) whether the defendants had clearly
manifested to the public, in a manner likely to be understood, their
intent that the land in question was private. 4"
To determine whether the defendants' privacy expectations were
grounded in positive law, the dissent reflected upon the Court's state-
ment in Rakas,150 that one who lawfully possesses property, coupled
144. Id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1741.
145. Granberg, Is Warrantless Aerial Surveillance Constitutional? 55 CAL. ST.
B.J. 451, 454 (1980).
146. Brief for Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Northern Cali-
fornia (ACLU-NC), Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund
(MALDEF), and California Rural Legal Assistance (CRLA) in Support of Petitioner,
Oliver, - U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1735. But see, Justice Rehnquist's statement in
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1982) for a contrary argument.
147. Id.
148. Oliver, -U.S.-., 104 S. Ct. at 1741.
149. Id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1747 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
150. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 153.
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with the right to exclude, will probably have a justifiable expectation of
privacy. The dissent noted that the defendants could subject an in-
truder to criminal liability, under local law, for violation of their prop-
erty rights.15' Taking into consideration that Oliver and Thornton both
owned the property concerned, the dissenters concluded that the defen-
dants' expectations of privacy were of the type that society has tradi-
tionally accepted as reasonable.'52
The Oliver dissenters speculated upon the numerous ways the de-
fendants could have enjoyed their secluded property which society
would recognize as deserving of privacy. Solitary walks, lovers tryst,
and religious services were but a few of the potential uses to which the
defendants' could have put their property. 153 "Our respect for the free-
dom of the landowners to use their posted 'open fields' in ways such as
these" accounts for the gravity with which the positive law considers
intentional trespass. 5 4
Finally, the dissent explained that it is essential to a strong claim
of privacy to clearly manifest an intent to exclude. Justice Marshall
stated that although a property owner need not execute his right to
exclude the public, if and when he does exercise this entitlement, he
bears the burden of clearly communicating his intention to pass-
ersby. 55 Both positive law and social convention consider undeveloped
land to be open to the public unless the landowner has clearly indicated
a contrary intent.' 56 Justice Marshall concluded that if the property
had been properly fenced and posted, and the intentional intrusion of a
private citizen would expose him to criminal liability, then "[I] see no
reason why a government official should not be obliged to respect such
unequivocal and universally understood manifestations of a landowner's
desire for privacy."' 57
The dissent expressed concern that not only will the Oliver ruling
pave the way for a variety of distasteful investigative activities, but also
that society will gradually become accustomed to law enforcement
agencies routinely engaging in this type of invasive "search."'1 58 The
dissent warns, that even the most repugnant of activities can become
151. Oliver, - U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1748.
152. Id.
153. Id. at __, 104 S. Ct. at 1748-49.
154. Id. at -' 104 S. Ct. at 1749.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at __, 104 S. Ct. at 1750.
158. Id. at _, 104 S. Ct. at 1751.
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common place and thereby lose their power to offend. 159
VII. Effect of the Oliver Decision
Arguably the Oliver decision demonstrates that the Court is shift-
ing away from the protection of civil liberties. Perhaps the govern-
ment's interest in combating crime is replacing its fundamental concern
for personal liberty. Judicial attention appears to reflect society's con-
cern with the rising crime rate. The Court, it appears, is prepared to
sacrifice rights protected by the Constitution in an effort to aid law
enforcement personnel in apprehending and prosecuting criminal sus-
pects. No longer does the Court place a higher value on guarding per-
sonal rights than on detecting criminals. Justice Holmes, once faced
with a decision similar to the Court in Oliver, said "[w]e have to
choose, and for my part I think it is a less evil that soie criminals
should escape than that the government should play an ignoble
part."160
If the pendulum continues to swing in this direction, and the
courts grow increasingly preoccupied with "fighting" crime, there is yet
another danger threatening the preservation of our fourth amendment
rights. Professor Amsterdam warns that the danger of requiring an ac-
tual expectation of privacy is that the government could conceivably
manipulate the public's expectations so that no legitimate subjective
expectation could exist."" In effect the Oliver Court determined, using
the objective standard as defined in the second prong of Justice
Harlan's test, that society would not recognize the defendant's expecta-
tion of privacy in an open field as reasonable. Although the Court
grounded the Oliver decision on the objective prong of Justice Harlan's
test, Professor Amsterdam points out that the subjective prong can also
be used as a device to limit fourth amendment protection. 2 In his ex-
amination of Justice Harlan's two-pronged test Professor Amsterdam
focuses upon the potential for governmental abuse.'6 3 To reiterate, Jus-
tice Harlan required the Court to determine whether the defendant
possessed an expectation of privacy and whether this expectation was
159. Id. at __, 104 S. Ct. at 1751, n.21.
160. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 470.
161. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349, 384 (1974).
162. United States v. Jacobstein, -U.S.-, 104 S. Ct. 1652 (1984).
163. Id.
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one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable."" As noted by
another commentator, "each element of Justice Harlan's test, if taken
to its logical extreme, might eliminate the right to have expectations of
freedom from governmental intrusions, thereby nullifying the safe-
guards of the fourth amendment."' 16 5 In Oliver, for example, the Court
determined that an individual can not possess a justifiable expectation
that open fields will be free from warrantless intrusion by agents of the
government. 166 If the government of the United States "can condition
citizens to expect that certain intrusive searches and seizures will oc-
cur, then those searches and seizures, by definition, would not be un-
reasonable.' 1 67 Therefore, regardless of the measures taken by an indi-
vidual, i.e. electric fencing, posting, ten foot high brick walls etc., no
action will be deemed sufficient to create a reasonable subjective expec-
tation of privacy in property which lies outside the curtilage.
Arguably, by defining the open fields doctrine in this manner, the
Oliver Court has reduced the protection of personal privacy tradition-
ally guarded by the fourth amendment. Indeed, there is little doubt
that by concluding that any expectation of privacy an individual might
have in an open field is per se unreasonable, the Court has removed
numerous barriers from the path of law enforcement personnel. By
eliminating the necessity of obtaining a warrant, the police are no
longer required to convince an impartial magistrate of sufficient proba-
ble cause before beginning a search of that portion of a citizen's prop-
erty, considered by the police to be an open field. Therefore, the police
are free to conduct arbitrary, persistent, and indiscriminate searches on
private property in an effort to discover criminal activity. In essence,
the Oliver decision marks a return to a pre-Katz approach to fourth
amendment analysis. By determining that constitutional protection
from warrantless searches and seizures does not apply, as a matter of
law, to open fields, regardless of the individual's subjective expectation
of privacy, the Court has apparently returned to the once disfavored
locational approach of Olmstead.
The Court justified its decision in Oliver by claiming that an ad
hoc case-by-case determination of whether or not a defendant possessed
a reasonable expectation of privacy was not a workable solution to an-
164. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
165. Note, A Reconsideration of the Katz Expectation of Privacy Test, 76
MICH. L. REv. 154, 157-58 (1977).
166. Oliver, - U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1742.
167. Note, supra note 168, at 157-58.
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swer the needs of law enforcement. 16 8 Yet the dissent offered a solution
which is not only workable and can easily be applied, but which contin-
ues to offer protection against unreasonable search and seizure. The
dissent suggested that "[p]rivate land marked in a fashion sufficient to
render entry thereon a criminal trespass under the law of the state in
which the land lies is protected by the Fourth Amendment's proscrip-
tion of unreasonable searches and seizures."' 69
The Court in Oliver held that, "[t]he test of legitimacy is not
whether the individual chooses to conceal assertedly 'private' activity.
Rather, the correct inquiry is whether the government's intrusion in-
fringes upon the personal and societal values protected by the Fourth
Amendment.' 170 This is an excellent question posited by the Court but
never satisfactorily answered. Constitutional interpretation is the
method the Supreme Court uses to discover which values the Framers
intended to protect by the creation of the fourth amendment. The Oli-
ver Court chose a close and literal interpretation of the language in the
fourth amendment. Judicial history, however, demonstrates what past
Supreme Courts have considered values protected by the fourth amend-
ment.' 7 ' In Boyd Justice Bradley, in his discussion of the fundamental
principles of constitutional liberty, stated, "[i]t is not the breaking of
his doors and the rummaging of his drawers that constitutes the es-
sence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefensible right of
personal security, personal liberty and private property .... ,172 Jus-
tice Brandeis, in his well known dissent in Olmstead, stated that the
Framers of the Constitution "sought to protect Americans in their be-
liefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They con-
ferred, as against the government, the right to be left alone-the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."' 73
Even in 1984, Orwellian projections of doom' 74 can still be kept at
bay. By remembering Justice Frankfurter's graceful phrase, "[t]he
course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures . . . has not...
168. Oliver, - U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1743.
169. Id. at 1750 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 1743.
171. Id.
172. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630. Justice Brandeis called Boyd, "a case that will be
remembered as long as civil liberty lives in the United States."
173. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
174. Amsterdam, supra note 165, at 384.
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run smooth,"' 75 one can hope that Oliver is but one more bump in the
road.
Vickie Popkin Kligerman
175. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
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